Then, why indeed, are you so keen in engaging me? Move along....!
Says a man who posted a statement with out the reference being posted........
Yes, the Egyptian military achieved it's objectives of crossing over to the East Bank and then they lost their plot. They lost the initiative, I have said it earlier. But the subsequent actions when Egyptian forces post re-org and consolidation moved East in order to relieve the pressure on Syrians, was still a continuation of war.
What is war?
For arm chair 'experts'/ignorant 'professionals' like you (who may have served but slept in their Junior Commander's courses and totally lost the plot in Military History & Tactics):
"We shall not enter into any of the abstruse definitions of war used by publicists. We shall keep to the element of the thing itself, to a duel. War is nothing but a duel on an extensive scale. If we would conceive as a unit the countless number of duels which make up a war, we shall do so best by supposing to ourselves two wrestlers. Each strives by physical force to compel the other to submit to his will: his first object is to throw his adversary, and thus to render him incapable of further resistance.
War therefore is an act of violence to compel our opponent to fulfil our will.
Violence arms itself with the inventions of Art and Science in order to contend against violence. Self-imposed restrictions, almost imperceptible and hardly worth mentioning, termed usages of International Law, accompany it without essentially impairing its power. Violence, that is to say physical force (for there is no moral force without the conception of states and law), is therefore the means; the compulsory submission of the enemy to our will is the ultimate object. In order to attain this object fully, the enemy must be disarmed; and this is, correctly speaking, the real aim of hostilities in theory. It takes the place of the final object, and puts it aside in a manner as something not properly belonging to war"
A revision for you!
While the Egyptians militarily lost the war as their aim was to wrest back control of the Sinai (as the breakthrough at the Great Bitter Lake was successfully exploited by Israel), in my first statement of this thread itself I had conceded that Sadat achieved his objective but paid dearly for it (in terms of his assassination). That is why when I said read everything and then speak, I meant for you to read it and see my response ALWAYS as an overall context.
Further revision for you:
"The result in war is never absolute"
'even the final decision of a whole war is not always to be regarded as absolute. The conquered/defeated state often sees in it only a passing or transitory stage, a situation which may be repaired in after times by means of political combinations and new alliances/allegiances. How much this also must modify the degree of tension and the vigour of the efforts made is evident in itself'
Hence, the state (the defeated/conquered state) may use this modified tension or invigorated efforts to either proceed on a path of alternate actions e.g. of improvement in bilateral relations and accumulation of diplomatic currency; or it may proceed along a route of renewed hostility/antagonism.
My first post in reply to GiannKall #50 for your reference
Now coming back to my statement here regarding 1973:
"The law of the extreme, the view to disarm the adversary, to overthrow him, has hitherto to a certain extent usurped the place of this end or object (the political objective) Just as this law loses its force, the political object must again come forward. If the whole consideration is a calculation of probability based on definite persons and relations, then the political object, being the original motive, must be an essential factor in the product. The smaller the sacrifice we demand from our opponent, the smaller it may be expected will be the means of resistance which he will employ; but the smaller his are, the smaller will ours require to be. Further, the smaller our political object, the less value shall we set upon it, and the more easily shall we be induced to give it up altogether."
Was the Egyptian effort a small political objective? (The recapture of Sinai to force Israel to negotiations?) One may argue on both sides of the point. However, the objective by itself is not small and was indeed, the principal aim of the whole exercise of war in 1973, the aim to ensure repossession of territories lost to Israel in 1967 war and also to achieve a political negotiation in order to bring about an end to hostilities between the two nations.
"Thus, therefore, the political object, as the original motive of the war, will be the standard for determining both the aim of the military force, and also the amount of effort to be made. This it cannot be in itself; but it is so in relation to both the belligerent states, because we are concerned with realities, not with mere abstractions. One and the same political object may produce totally different effects upon different people, or even upon the same people at different times; we can, therefore, only admit the political object as the measure, by considering it in its effects upon those masses which it is to move, and consequently the nature of those masses also comes into consideration. It is easy to see that thus the result may be very different according as these masses are animated with a spirit which will infuse vigour into the action or otherwise. It is quite possible for such a state of feeling to exist between two states that a very trifling political motive for war may produce an effect quite disproportionate, in fact, a perfect explosion."
The statement you have quoted of the Israeli 'commanders' is the result of this ambiguity of the situation. For the Israelis, the shock of loosing Bar-Lev line and the significant losses they incurred in the subsequent failed counter attack to stabilise their position, was an immense shock to the military and national psyche, who had believed in their own invincibility in the aftermath of 1967. The precision with which the Egyptian armies crossed the Suez and the ingenuity of the Engineering efforts in facilitating the same, was an eye opener for the complacent and confident Israeli commander.
"This applies to the efforts which the political object will call forth in the two states, and to the aim which the military action shall prescribe for itself. At times it may itself be that aim, as for example the conquest of a province. At other times, the political object itself is not suitable for the aim of military action; then such a one must be chosen as will be an equivalent for it, and stand in its place as regards the conclusion of peace. But, also, in this, due attention to the peculiar character of the states concerned is always supposed. There are circumstances in which the equivalent must be much greater than the political object in order to secure the latter. The political object will be so much the more the standard of aim and effort, and have more influence in itself, the more the masses are indifferent, the less that any mutual feeling of hostility prevails in the two states from other causes, and, therefore, there are cases where the political object almost alone will be decisive"
Here, the political objective was repossessing the lost territories. The military objective was formulated with the same being he principal objective. Hence, the immense pressure on Sadat to continue offensive operations against his better judgement. That the precarious situation on Syrian front demanded the action need not be underscored. However, the political action of only capturing the Suez was made redundant with the Israeli counter-attack and thence the military objectives converged as one with the overall political objective of repossessing the Sinai.
One can argue that the political aim of Sadat was limited to capture of Suez, but that in itself is a travesty as the political aim was always to repossess the Sinai.
"If the aim of the military action is an equivalent for the political object, that action will in general diminish as the political object diminishes, and that in a greater degree the more the political object dominates; and so is explained how, without any contradiction in itself, there may be wars of all degrees of importance and energy, from a war of extermination, down to the mere use of an army of observation."
There is your final explanation. I hope you can now co-relate.
Now coming to your specifics about the third army:
"AS THINGS FELL APART TO THE NORTH, SADAT felt compelled to order an offensive and press deeper into the Sinai. Shazly, his chief of staff, and other top generals fiercely opposed this move. They remembered how Israeli planes had devastated Arab ground forces in the 1967 war, and they did not want to move the army from under its missile shield. Yet on October 14, as many as 1,000 Egyptian tanks and several mechanized brigades rumbled forward. The targets were two gateways into Israel: the mountain passes at Mitla and Giddi, both at least 30 miles east of the Suez.
This thrust was met by air strikes as well as some 800 tanks led by heroes of Israel’s previous wars—General Avraham Adan and Major General Sharon. The two armored divisions outflanked the Egyptian units and ripped into them, destroying 265 tanks and at least 200 other vehicles. In contrast, only 40 Israeli tanks suffered damage, most of it minor. Worse for the Egyptians, the Israeli assault opened a chink in their lines along the Great Bitter Lake, which lay north of the Gulf of Suez. Adan and Sharon pounced and launched a counteroffensive to bridge the Suez Canal and divide the Egyptian Second and Third Armies on the west bank. Sharon was to boldly move his forces across the canal and push the Second Army north, establishing a corridor for Adan’s men to cross and wheel south, where they would destroy SAM missile launch sites and hit the Egyptian Third Army from the rear.
On October 15 and 16, Sharon’s 143rd Reserve Armored Division crossed the canal on pontoon bridges and established a bridgehead. The Israelis also raced southeast on the Sinai, slamming into the Egyptians concentrated in an area known as the Chinese Farm.
The fighting here was fierce. For four days the Egyptians fought the Israelis off from behind well-prepared defenses but Adan crushed their counterattacks. The Egyptian 25th Armored Brigade, for instance, lost its entire force of armored personnel carriers and 85 of its 96 T-62s while destroying only three IDF tanks.
On October 17 or 18, Soviet officials showed Sadat and General Ahmad Ismail Ali, his war minister, satellite pictures of the expanding bridgehead that Sharon had established on the west bank of the Suez. General Shazly recommended pulling back four armored units from the Sinai to counter the threat. But Sadat, calculating the political need to hang on to Egyptian gains, ruled against a withdrawal.
Three days later, with the Israeli threat deepening, Sadat finally pushed for an end to the war. “I knew my capabilities,” he said later, noting the American aid to Israel. “I did not intend to fight the entire United States of America.” Kissinger flew to Moscow, where he and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev drafted a U.N. Security Council resolution calling for a cease-fire.
Although Egyptian and Israeli officials accepted the truce, fighting continued. The IDF sensed a crushing victory and marched on. Having crossed the Suez through the corridor that Sharon had established, General Adan and his 200 or so tanks raced south, destroying SAM sites and enveloping the 45,000-man Egyptian Third Army.
Some Israelis wanted to destroy the force, which was cut off from food and water supplies. Sadat requested U.S. and Soviet troops to enforce the cease-fire, shrewdly drawing the two superpowers into the fray. When the Americans hesitated, Brezhnev signaled that the Soviet Union was willing to act unilaterally—a message that the United States interpreted as major threat. Kissinger and a special crisis-management team within the White House held an emergency meeting and raised U.S. military forces from Defense Readiness Condition 4 to 3 for the first time since the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Ultimately, diplomacy defused the situation, but it was one of the Cold War’s most dangerous moments.
On October 28, Israel, under pressure from the United States, agreed to allow the Egyptians to deliver food and medical supplies to the trapped Third Army. The next day, Syria stopped fighting. A couple of weeks later, on November 11, Egypt and Israel agreed to a cease-fire drafted by Sadat and Kissinger."
Some resources:
http://www.liquisearch.com/yom_kippur_war/combat_operations/in_the_sinai/egypts_trapped_third_army
Then you can have another view point like this; makes sense too:
http://www.counterpunch.org/2012/02/22/what-really-happened-in-the-yom-kippur-war/
I am sure you can find all sorts of views floating and indeed may be having the minimal faculties to make informed judgement.
But on PDF, I think that as a military professional/history buff, one has to analyse war for the facts as stated factually and and as available.
For example, despite the official line of India (which is parroted by 99% of Indian members here that 1962 war was thrust upon India by China, I love to take them to task over the incorrect information and indeed dissemination of falsehood. The conflict began with Indian troops moving across Macmahon line in Arunachal or NEFA of the time; something which our official narrative buries in a footnote).
So as a whole:
Aim of Sadat: To reclaim Sinai. Achieved
Aim of Sadat in 1973: To militarily force Israel to negotiate after wresting Sinai - not achieved. A military defeat as even the minimal aim of capture of Suez (not merely capture but you have to hold the territory too to qualify as a success in your war objectives) - not achieved. So Yom Kippur was a failure for them.
Aim of Israel: To legitimise itself as a state. Achieved. 1978 Camp David accord afforded this. So Israelis achieved their target to.
End result if only political objectives are looked at? A stalemate.
But if you look at the political objectives from the specific viewpoint of initiation of hostilities in 1973, failed; militarily lost the war.
No, it means you are sufficiently challenged to appreciate the information as
a. You are merely an enthusiast (or a fanboy; depending on how you look at it) having no clue about the art of war or indeed war fighting.
b. In case you are indeed a veteran, you have poor understanding of subjects as relevant to basic military instructorial course and may have fared poorly on them (am not presuming you are)
c. Or you may just be out to have some fun ....!
I am surprised that such a low level of comment is coming from you now .....
I am left with no words except that sometimes it is better to lick A$s than have someone shaft you for their benevolence (and get into the habit of getting shafted and enjoying it), which your original country seems to have developed!!!
You take care and note that not all people appreciate a crude sense of humour.
Thanks.
@Joe Shearer This is the gentleman who has started the thread about the Indian army conventional superiority over Pakistani army being exaggerated and has given outdated and lopsided view in them.
is what he believe and nothing will change him from deviate from that.
