Na bro read this :
Egypt’s procurement of the F-16 (starting in the 1980s under the Peace Vector programmes) appeared to close a qualitative military gap between itself and Israel, but the Egyptian military’s incompetence ensured Israel’s continued dominance. The Egyptian military did not (and does not) prioritise logistics, spending
‘only 30 percent’ as opposed to the
minimum recommended 50% of US foreign aid on sustaining its military equipment. What’s more,
‘based on time elapsed between depot maintenance visits,’ Egyptian F-16s fly only half as much as their US counterparts. This indicates limited pilot training, in comparison to extensive Israeli pilot training which ensured victory in every major aerial engagement with Arab air forces.
This chasm compounds the existing issues Egypt has with training. The Egyptian military command has been described by Western officials as
‘a tower with a pyramid on top,’ indicating that
‘the amount of responsibility and authority retained at any given level in the Egyptian military is noticeably lower than for a U.S. counterpart.’ The mid and low-level commanders therefore cannot exercise the freedom and decision-making necessary for training success. Further, per Brooks’ research, the desire for control among senior officers also hinders effectiveness. Egyptian training
‘often lacks free play in favor of rigid, pre-planned scenarios where the outcome is obvious, and no surprises are permitted.’ According to Pollack, the culture of ‘fear of shame’ and ‘passivity within…patriarchal hierarchies’ in the Egyptian military likely prevents change and perpetuates ineffective training. These issues are all a continuation of the systemic problems that were sharply apparent in the 1973 October War. Here, ‘without a detailed script’ set by senior officers, Egyptian forces ‘floundered’ when left to rely on their limited and inadequate training. Finally, the procurement of the F-16 itself also validates Talmadge’s observations about unstable regimes and unconventional military organisation. President Hosni Mubarak sought to ‘appease…the officer corps by showering it with…[advanced] U.S. weaponry…not ‘accompanied…by the organisation, training, and sustainment necessary to render it truly effective.’
