The Conflict in Syria as it Relates to Turkey | Updates & Discussions

[Hurshid Celebi]

Ya bi sus, gerizekalı.

You are afaik a real coward

 

[passo_del_bosniako]

Only fool go and fight other's proxies with their army in foreign lands, otherwise fight proxies with proxies.
How Afghan free their country? Russia was using same jet and gunship on them, if syrian dont have will to get rid of iranian and their russian master then Turks cant change anything.

That would be true a few months ago. But Iran and Russia change the game (its npt just a russian airforce, they both deployed troops also; IRGC now has substantial number of its troops on every front) & Turkey must adapt.

 

[T-123456]

Russian Napalm attack on civilians @T-123456 @madmusti

I must cut all horrifying scenes, much work for an old buddy.

I give up

 

[DemirkanTR]

Russian Napalm attack on civilians @T-123456 @madmusti

I must cut all horrifying scenes, much work for an old buddy.

Are you going to file Russian war crimes and massacres? Harder than counting stars in the sky!

They even surpassed ISIS and USA on killed civilian numbers in Syria, only in 4 months!

 

[T-123456]

Serious question brother.
Is there any bloody or rule violation ?
If yes , I would apologize to all. But where ?
It is a screenshot from original war crime video. Showing NAPALM TRACE

The picture doesnt bring any value to the topic,its just a picture,it doesnt prove anything.

 

[Bubblegum Crisis]

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https://twitter.com/x/status/703203694825873408

...

 

[Timur]

Some killed foreign PKK terrorists

https://twitter.com/x/status/702619709200592898

RUSSIAN logistic support for WAR in Syria, dozens of vehicle ( you can only see on deck) passing Turkish Straits.

ELHAMDULILLAH

 

[passo_del_bosniako]

YPG and pro-Assadist attract some wierd mix of white/christian supremacist and commies of all shape and colors. I guess their extreme hate against anything remotly islamic is stronger then their ideological differences.

 

[Yellow-place]

For morning smile. ..

Putin Rus gizli servisi FSB'ye Batmobile aldı

 

[era_shield]

In battle for one corner of Al-Hasakah, 30,000 displaced move south toward Islamic State territory amidst fears of SDF

AMMAN: Tens of thousands of residents in Islamic State territory in the southern Al-Hasakah countryside have fled south towards neighboring Deir e-Zor in the wake of Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) lightning advances towards the former’s last stronghold in Syria’s far northeastern province.

Residents are reportedly heading south, deeper into IS-controlled areas, rather than north, east or west into territory currently controlled by the Kurdish-majority SDF because they say they are afraid of arrests, expulsions and revenge killings, Abdullah al-Ahmad, an activist in Al-Hasakah city, told Syria Direct on Monday.

“The crimes that civilians witnessed the Kurdish militias commit in neighboring villages, such as expelling them [from their homes], along with arrests, killings and pillaging, is driving them toward IS despite people’s hatred of them,” said al-Ahmad.

Last week, the SDF launched the Anger of al-Khabur campaign to take IS’s last stronghold in Al-Hasakah province, a-Shadadi. [Ed.: The campaign is named after the al-Khabur river, the largest tributary inside Syria that feeds into the Euphrates River.]

Located approximately 50km south of Al-Hasakah city, a-Shadadi is a way station on the supply route connecting IS’s de facto Syrian capital, A-Raqqa, to their Iraqi stronghold in Mosul.

Though pro-opposition and Western media reported the SDF had captured a-Shadadi last Friday, IS forces counter-attacked, and have since reportedly retaken most of the town, Ahmad Awwad, an activist from the southern Al-Hasakah countryside told Syria Direct on Monday.

The SDF then sent in “a huge number” of reinforcements to the a-Shadadi front. Both sides are now digging in for a “vicious” battle over the town, Umr a-Shami, an activist from a-Shadadi who is on the ground near the frontline, told Syria Direct Monday.

Syria Direct could not confirm the exact position of SDF forces inside or around the town due to conflicting reports and since fighting is ongoing.

Despite IS’s counter offensive, SDF forces maintain control over most of the hundreds of oil and gas wells surrounding a-Shadadi to the east and west, including the al-Jabiseh gas field, one of the largest in Syria.

Losing these oil and gas wells means IS’s situation in Al-Hasakah is now “dire,” said a-Shami.

“IS will try and maintain control of a-Shadadi by all possible means.”

‘Between two flames’

While most residents of a-Shadadi have chosen to flee deeper into IS territory rather than take their chances living under SDF rule, an estimated 100 families fled north into areas recently captured by the Kurdish-led coalition, said Ahmad Awwad, the activist from the southern Al-Hasakah countryside.

But displaced Syrians’ fears of abuse at the hands of the Kurdish factions of the SDF grew over the weekend when SDF forces allegedly killed five civilians, including a 12-year-old girl, in one village gained over the past week after accusing them of being Islamic State sympathizers, reported local pro-opposition Al-Hasakah Youth Union on Facebook on Monday. Syria Direct could not independently verify the report.

Tensions between Kurdish YPG forces and their allies in the SDF, which include Sunni Arab rebel brigades in north and northeast Syria, manifested almost immediately after the formation of the US-backed coalition, originally formed last October with a mandate to battle the Islamic State. The SDF has made significant gains in Al-Hasakah since.

Though primarily made up of Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), SDF forces also include Arab tribal militias and FSA rebel factions.

Pre-existing tensions between some Sunni Arab brigades and tribal militias and Kurdish YPG forces in Al-Hasakah increased following the formation of the SDF and subsequent military campaigns, due to what those factions call YPG encroachment on Arab territory. In March 2015, Syria Direct reported on YPG units burning Arab homes in Al-Hasakah.

Though the SDF claims to be a multi-ethnic “national force for a future Syria,” many Arab residents in Al-Hasakah cast doubt on that narrative.

During a joint two-week campaign by YPG and rebel Arab forces in southern Al-Hasakah that began at the end of last October, thousands of residents fled farther south to escape the YPG. One reason is that the Islamic State provides certain “essential goods,” including a monetary stipend to internally displaced Syrians, Abu Jad al-Hasakawi, a citizen journalist form the southern countryside, told Syria Direct at the time.

“This has forced people to live between two flames, that of the Islamic State and the YPG,” said al-Hasakawi. “Most prefer getting burned by IS—it's less hot as far as they're concerned.”

Residents now fleeing this most recent SDF advance are following similar logic, Abdullah al-Ahmad, the activist in Al-Hasakah city, told Syria Direct Monday.

“Civilians are afraid to flee to YPG-held areas or to regime territory because they believe they will be arrested under the pretext that they are IS partisans,” said al-Ahmad, adding that this is what people have experienced “every time” the YPG assumes control of IS territory.

“They have two choices and the best one is still bad.”

 

[Ceri]

“The crimes that civilians witnessed the Kurdish militias commit in neighboring villages, such as expelling them [from their homes], along with arrests, killings and pillaging, is driving them toward IS despite people’s hatred of them,” said al-Ahmad.

This goes to show that even a hated organization that ISIS truly is for some of their actions reported on mass media, however truthfully or untruthfullt depicted they are, people still live under their umbrella and flee to them from Kurdish militia.
One thing all seem to either intentionally or unintentionally ignore is the simple fact that ISIS, and those who joined them, in their own eyes serve what is just and right. 13 years of Sunni persecution by Shia government in Baghdad, Sunnis being disallowed a government representing their interest and security, not only in Iraq, but even more so in Syria. People don't just take guns in their hands and become "terrorists", some do it for sport, but most do it for a cause they believe are rightous. Perhaps, one should look at why they resorted to these measures and why their existence seem to gain ground, rahter than presenting everything in evil/good, simplifying everything by looking at current occurences without realizing the cause reasons that led to these developments. The true grievances by the majority, that to this day fuels their existence.

 

[Timur]

“Civilians are afraid to flee to YPG-held areas or to regime territory because they believe they will be arrested under the pretext that they are IS partisans,” said al-Ahmad, adding that this is what people have experienced “every time” the YPG assumes control of IS territory.

We also wittnessed this kind of ideology in turkey when the yezidi pkk attacked muslims because IS supposedly attacked yezidis, this seems to be typical yezidi pkk behavior

 

[passo_del_bosniako]

YPG offensive in Syria is essentally IC sanctioned ethnic cleansing campaign of northern Syria of non-kurds. Period. SDF is just a smoke screen, few arab militias in their ranks are just useful idiots, nothing more, nothing less. Majority of Hasakah arabs refused to join it, and some who did join left it very soon after realizing that their role in so called SDF is to put mutli-ethnic face to YPGs Rojava project.

And yes, all is going pritty good for YPG these days, with US and even RU CAS. But... What happens when circumstances change. And they will. They will end up with so many enemies inside Syria alone (not counting Turkey)... And these ppl, will certanly not forget and will seek revange. In short term it all now looks rosie for YPG, Im not so sure abt d long term..

this syrian rebel summs it up well

https://twitter.com/x/status/704026518297640960

 

[passo_del_bosniako]

Shtora, no Shtora - TOW doesnt care

 

[passo_del_bosniako]

America should choose its allies very carefully

A week after ISIL was reportedly expelled from its last stronghold inHasaka, it launched an assault in Tal Abyad in northern Raqqa in the early hours of Saturday.

The militant group clashed with Kurdish militias affiliated to the People’s Protection Units (YPG), who drove ISIL from this border city in June last year. The attack on Saturday was ISIL’s second infiltration of the city since its defeat there.

During the clashes, ISIL fighters reportedly stormed the house of a tribal sheikh from Deir Ezzor living in Tal Abyad and beheaded him. Khaled Dahham Al Bashir – from the Baggara tribal confederation, one of the largest in Syria – was said to have been working with the YPG as part of the tribal component in the Syrian Democratic Forces, and was therefore an obvious target for ISIL. The ISIL assault on several different locations seemed carefully planned with specific targets.

Of particular significance was the fact that the YPG had to immediately call in US air strikes to repel the attack. The episode reveals a fault line in the way that the United States, the main backer of the YPG, fights ISIL in Syria.

The YPG’s victories against ISIL – in Kobani, Tal Abyad and southern Hasaka – were made possible largely because of intensive US firepower. According to military sources, the YPG lacks the capacity to defeat ISIL without close US air support. One source said that American air strikes account for “more than 90 per cent” of the ISIL defeats in those battles.

This is important if one contrasts the YPG with other forces in northern Syria that have defeated ISIL or repulsed its assaults for more than two years without any air support. Those forces would typically be fighting on two fronts at the same time. Rebel forces in Idlib, for instance, have kept the province free from ISIL despite repeated attempts to infiltrate it since 2014 – including at the peak of ISIL’s strength and morale after it defeated the Iraqi army in Mosul.

If the YPG could not alone defend Tal Abyad – which it seized eight months ago from a group that now operates tens of kilometres away from the city – that bodes ill for the current effort to uproot the organisation in Syria.

How long can the US air force serve as the brawn for the supposedly most formidable anti-ISIL force? With growing tensions between the YPG and the rebels on one hand, and the YPG and Turkey on the other, the US should rethink its approach to its overreliance on the YPG to combat ISIL, while continuing to support it in other ways.

The Kurds in Syria have legitimate grievances as I have long highlighted in this space. Both the regime and the opposition have failed to address their fears and aspirations before and after the Syrian conflict started, and the Kurds understandably see no future for themselves as part of either one of these sides. But the YPG has hijacked the Kurdish cause, and the US has no business allowing the fight against ISIL to be a tool to facilitate the YPG’s expansionist agenda – a process that has sometimes included acts of ethnic cleansing that, according to Amnesty International, “amount to war crimes”.

Whether in Syria or Iraq, the US should recognise that there is often a fine line between a force serving as a bulwark against extremism and being a conduit for it. The YPG did well expelling ISIL from Kurdish areas such as Kobani, and it was commendable for the US to provide air support.

But the YPG’s mission has clearly used the unconditional offer of air support to expand its military reach to link its sparse cantons in northern Syria.

Since the anti-ISIL air campaign began in September 2014, the US has worked mainly with the YPG and has ignored many fronts where serious blows could have been dealt to ISIL if the same air support had been provided to other anti-ISIL forces. These include eastern Aleppo, Idlib and Deir Ezzor.

This led many to conclude that the US is at least turning a blind eye to the YPG’s attempts to consolidate its northern enclave and to credible reports from human rights organisations of home demolitions and burnings. The YPG’s behaviour is clearly becoming a cause for concern.

ISIL plays a long game of exploiting social fault lines. Its targeting of the Baggara sheikh in Tal Abyad might be an example of this strategy, which includes assassination of community leaders who work with its enemies. They are its priority targets because they undermine its ability to polarise communities, a familiar tactic since 2005 in Iraq.

In the way it has conducted itself over the past few months, the YPG is helping ISIL achieve this objective one way or the other. And the US should be aware that as a tool to defeat ISIL, the YPG has reached a peak point.

America’s focus now should be to help fortify liberated areas militarily and internally by not allowing the YPG to use the anti-ISIL effort to seek an unsustainable project in northern Syria.


Hassan Hassan is a resident fellow at the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, a think tank in Washington, DC, and co-author of ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror