More than 300 PAF Mirages & F-7s will be retired in future. A huge market indeed.

[Aamir Hussain]

Sheffield was a destroyer sunk by Exocet fired by a Dagger a/c . Two frigates were sunk; Ardent and Antelope. Both were type 21's and sunk by bombs during attacks by A-4 Skyhawks.

A lot of bomb hits were achieved by AAF but due to poor quality of bombs, some of them did not explode. Otherwise casualty list HM N would have been higher.

 

[Bilal Khan 777]

It was the destroyer HMS Sheffield

The ships that were sunk in falklands, most of them, were from air to ground bombs.

 

[silent hawk]

Let's just ignore the carrier will a) not be alone, instead it will be escorted by a large amount of very advanced surface vessels all with advanced SAMs and some of the best radars in service anywhere in the world (BARAK-8/RAN-40L/MFSTAR combo is absolutely cutting edge) and b) even the carriers have their own AD systems (BARAK-8 and CIWS).

1 SQN of PAF jets (no matter what they are) are a) not going to fare well against the CBG's BARCAP (supported by the carrier's own AEW assets) b) any ordinance that slips through will be dealt with by the CBG's own AD network.

I fail to see how the PAF could ever get anywhere near an IN CBG, it's not like the IN is going to park it 300km of the Pak coast, it will be a mobile target operating 500km+ away from your shores and there would be little you could do to touch it.

AoA
We would be engaging the target using standoff weapons. Raad has a range of 350 Km. Without aircover those large protecting vessels would go down first. You would have to keep the carrier much further away.
Regards

 

[Bilal Khan 777]

AoA
We would be engaging the target using standoff weapons. Raad has a range of 350 Km. Without aircover those large protecting vessels would go down first. You would have to keep the carrier much further away.
Regards

Indian carriers will stay inside harbours, as all previous wars. The threat to them is not from the air, but from underwater.

 

[untitled]

Sheffield was a destroyer sunk by Exocet fired by a Dagger a/

The Daggers were not modified to carry the excoet only the Naval Super Etendards were

The ships that were sunk in falklands, most of them, were from air to ground bombs.

All but the HMS Sheffield and the Atlantic Conveyor

The Argentian tug Alferaz Sobral was also hit by Sea Skua missiles from Lynx helicopters

 

[silent hawk]

Indian carriers will stay inside harbours, as all previous wars. The threat to them is not from the air, but from underwater.

AoA
Could you please elaborate?
Regards

 

[Ghazwa e Hind]

Indian aircraft carriers are no more than show pieces. They can steer them 400-500 nautical miles inside the sea and then launch few sorties but they will never get the needle in haystack by scanning Arabian Sea or Indian Ocean. Carriers are not meant for these duties what Indians have assigned to them.

 

[Abingdonboy]

Sheffield was a destroyer sunk by Exocet fired by a Dagger a/c . Two frigates were sunk; Ardent and Antelope. Both were type 21's and sunk by bombs during attacks by A-4 Skyhawks.

A lot of bomb hits were achieved by AAF but due to poor quality of bombs, some of them did not explode. Otherwise casualty list HM N would have been higher.

A war fought in 1982 does little to reflect a conflict occurring in 2015 and into the future. The difference in technology and capabilities is VAST.

AoA
We would be engaging the target using standoff weapons. Raad has a range of 350 Km. Without aircover those large protecting vessels would go down first. You would have to keep the carrier much further away.
Regards

I had taken this into account in my above analysis.

Anyway, I'll dissect a little further, to launch the Ra'ad (or any other standoff ordinance) the first step is knowing the (rough) location of the target (carrier). How does Pakistan do this with know dedicated military satellites? Anyway, let's assume this has been taken care of- let's say the Indian CNS accidentally tweets the exact GPS coordinates of the IN CBG and take it from there. So the PAF fighters launch with their CMs to the IN CBG

1) When within 500km of the carrier (still 150km outside of maximum launch range of said weapons) such fighters will be detected by the CBG's integrated (overlapping) sensors or the BARCAP (Barrier Combat Air Patrol- flight of MiG-29K/KuB) or the CBG's AEW assets (perhaps even IAF AWACS depending on their deployment/utilisation).

2) The CBG's BARCAP will move to intercept the PAF fighters (still outside of the range of the launch range of their weapons). The MiG-29Ks are amongst some of the world's most potent A2A fighters and nothing the PAF has in service is significantly more capable than them- the Blk.52s are about on par, if not inferior in a many ways), an opposing flight (PAF) will encounter a fearsome welcome.



Anyway, let's say a few fighters somehow (miraculously) manage to make it through and launch their CMs- at 350km-the CBG's integrated automated AD will kick in, tracking the subsonic (Ra'ad is) CMs and when within the launch envelop of the BARAK-8 (90km) the relevant escort vessel's weapons will automatically be launched to intercept. The BARAK-8 being guided by the EL/M-2248 MF-STAR, and in the final stages of flight by its own seeker, that has been specifically designed to counter supersonic, highly manoeuvrable, low flying cruise missiles will, I'm afraid to say, (for you) make mincemeat of the Ra'ad.


Progressing on, BARAK-8 SAMs have somehow failed to prevent a few missiles from getting within 500m of the carrier (the minimal targeting distance of the BARAK-8 and thus outside of its ability to intercept)- the last hopes are on the automated radar-guided bullet-firing CIWS of the carrier firing many 1000s of rounds a minute.


Between the multiple levels of (very capable) cover that would exist with a CBG it is hard to imagine a scenario where the PAF is able to get anywhere near an IN CBG- let alone "touch" it.


It is said that saturation attacks (dozens of AShM targeting a CBG) are one of the greatest threats to a CBG but the PAF would not be able to deliver that kind of ordinance against an IN CBG at once nor would their stated standoff weaponry be much of an issue for some of the world's most sophisticated sensors and weaponry to handle.


Also note, for the above I have not included the IAF's Pune/Mumbai Su-30MKI SQNs who could easily supplement the IN's assets if so required thanks to massive internal fuel and buddy-buddy refuelling.

In 2017 the above scenario will need to be revised to factor in 2 IN CBGs (with the induction of IAC-1). This will complicate the job of the PAF significantly (more targets to locate/track, more opposing fighters to face, more fights to fight on etc).


The above scenario will be relevant until around 2025, when the IN's 65,000 ton (likely) EMALS equipped IAC-2 comes into service with its air wing consisting of advanced fighters (Rafale-M/F-35C) and the world's most formidable carrier-based AWACS (E-2D) the picture changes significantly- and not in Pakistan's favour.


@Dillinger @Capt.Popeye @Penguin @MilSpec @PARIKRAMA please correct me as you see fit.

Indian carriers will stay inside harbours, as all previous wars. The threat to them is not from the air, but from underwater.

Was that the case in the last full-scale/conventional war India and Pakistan fought (1971)? Nope- the INS Vikrant targeted your military in East Pakistan. Even during 1999 (Kargil) INS Viraat was out of harbour "exercising" ( )with the rest of the Western fleet. Not so sure what nonsense reading of history you have done.


+ as for the sub-surface threat it is no doubt considerable but with some of the world's most sophisticated ASW systems (S-70B, P-8I, Karmorta class ASW, ACTAS, HUMSA-NG etc) the threat will be minimised.

Indian aircraft carriers are no more than show pieces. They can steer them 400-500 nautical miles inside the sea and then launch few sorties but they will never get the needle in haystack by scanning Arabian Sea or Indian Ocean. Carriers are not meant for these duties what Indians have assigned to them.

Care to explain what duties the Indians have assigned to their carriers and why their carriers are no more than show pieces? India has employed its carriers in combat with Pakistan in the past.

 

[silent hawk]

Anyway, I'll dissect a little further, to launch the Ra'ad (or any other standoff ordinance) the first step is knowing the (rough) location of the target (carrier). How does Pakistan do this with know dedicated military satellites? Anyway, let's assume this has been taken care of- let's say the Indian CNS accidentally tweets the exact GPS coordinates of the IN CBG and take it from there. So the PAF fighters launch with their CMs to the IN CBG

1) When within 500km of the carrier (still 150km outside of maximum launch range of said weapons) such fighters will be detected by the CBG's integrated (overlapping) sensors or the BARCAP (Barrier Combat Air Patrol- flight of MiG-29K/KuB) or the CBG's AEW assets (perhaps even IAF AWACS depending on their deployment/utilisation).

2) The CBG's BARCAP will move to intercept the PAF fighters (still outside of the range of the launch range of their weapons). The MiG-29Ks are amongst some of the world's most potent A2A fighters and nothing the PAF has in service is significantly more capable than them- the Blk.52s are about on par, if not inferior in a many ways), an opposing flight (PAF) will encounter a fearsome welcome.

Anyway, let's say a few fighters somehow (miraculously) manage to make it through and launch their CMs- at 350km-the CBG's integrated automated AD will kick in, tracking the subsonic (Ra'ad is) CMs and when within the launch envelop of the BARAK-8 (90km) the relevant escort vessel's weapons will automatically be launched to intercept. The BARAK-8 being guided by the EL/M-2248 MF-STAR, and in the final stages of flight by its own seeker, that has been specifically designed to counter supersonic, highly manoeuvrable, low flying cruise missiles will, I'm afraid to say, (for you) make mincemeat of the Ra'ad.

Progressing on, BARAK-8 SAMs have somehow failed to prevent a few missiles from getting within 500m of the carrier (the minimal targeting distance of the BARAK-8 and thus outside of its ability to intercept)- the last hopes are on the automated radar-guided bullet-firing CIWS of the carrier firing many 1000s of rounds a minute.

Between the multiple levels of (very capable) cover that would exist with a CBG it is hard to imagine a scenario where the PAF is able to get anywhere near an IN CBG- let alone "touch" it.

It is said that saturation attacks (dozens of AShM targeting a CBG) are one of the greatest threats to a CBG but the PAF would not be able to deliver that kind of ordinance against an IN CBG at once nor would their stated standoff weaponry be much of an issue for some of the world's most sophisticated sensors and weaponry to handle.

Also note, for the above I have not included the IAF's Pune/Mumbai Su-30MKI SQNs who could easily supplement the IN's assets if so required thanks to massive internal fuel and buddy-buddy refuelling.

In 2017 the above scenario will need to be revised to factor in 2 IN CBGs (with the induction of IAC-1). This will complicate the job of the PAF significantly (more targets to locate/track, more opposing fighters to face, more fights to fight on etc).

The above scenario will be relevant until around 2025, when the IN's 65,000 ton (likely) EMALS equipped IAC-2 comes into service with its air wing consisting of advanced fighters (Rafale-M/F-35C) and the world's most formidable carrier-based AWACS (E-2D) the picture changes significantly- and not in Pakistan's favour.

@Dillinger @Capt.Popeye @Penguin @MilSpec @PARIKRAMA please correct me as you see fit.

AoA
Thanks for the detailed response. I have detected many technical flaws in it.

Let us start with detection of the carrier group. We would not be dependent on a tweet by CNS. The initial information would come from intelligence sources which are abound on both sides. CAPS being flown to protect the carrier would be detected by radars to indicate the carrier position. Enough ELINT data would be available to locate the carrier. Finally PAF AEW aircraft have the capability to detect a submarine periscope. To even assume that IN would be able to conceal the location of its Carrier is Naive.

Next is the assumption that you would be able to detect low flying targets over the sea 500 Km away. Curvature of earth would prevent any surface based asset to detect anything more than 100 Km out. Low RCS os PAF aircraft would be an advantage for PAF plus initiative is always with attacker. Sneaking in to 350 Km range is hence a possibility which cannot be ruled out.

But what happens if by some miracle you do detect the low flying raid. It simply turns back to come again later. You as defender have to succeed everytime. PAF has no such limitation. The mere nuisance value of such attacks would keep the carrier away.

Then again there is no need to sneak in. The carrier has 02 Sqns of MIG 29K (an aircraft not regarded very highly in PAF- same is not true about MKI). Fragility being an airpower characteristic aircrafts are susceptible to scheduled and unscheduled inspections due to which expecting a serviceability rate beyond 80% would be unrealistic. Calculate the effort with remaining aircraft and at most it would be possible to maintain two CAP station plus one pair on ADA. Hence PAF at any given point would be facing not two squadrons but just 6 Mig 29Ks. It would take 18 F-16s to tilt the TSR matrix in our favor (3:1 ratio) and clear the skies. So why sneak in when PAF can use brute force?

Then it comes down to your BARAK-8 which has never been used in an operational scenario. The Bekka valley conflict has proven that reliance on SAMs is futile. Yet Indians continue to invest heavily on these systems. They do cause attrition but are best a nuisance which might be able to delay the inevitable. In the actual scenario after neutralizing the air cover and achieving local air superiority the jammers and SEAD aircrafts would come into play. As far the goal keeper type weapons are concerned they are instruments of luck. The Carrier would soon be kissing the sea floor.

The technical details aside it is basic military knowledge that no defence is impregnable. Starting from Dimale in 219 BC through operation Badr in 1973 there are countless examples of strong defenses that were breached. For India to think that its carrier would be an exception is a folly for which they would pay dearly. That too against an innovative and determined adversary like PAF. Have you forgotten Kalaikunda already?

Regards

@Dillinger @Capt.Popeye @Penguin @MilSpec @PARIKRAMA please correct me as you see fit.

 

[A.P. Richelieu]

It appears to me, that if you want to sink a carrier,
a saturation attack by submerged drones would be a good idea.

A flying stealth reconnaissance drone like the Neuron would keep track of the location,
and transmit it to the submerged drones which could home into the target, moving
to other targetting technologies when close.

 

[zeetr]

 

[Abingdonboy]

Let us start with detection of the carrier group. We would not be dependent on a tweet by CNS. The initial information would come from intelligence sources which are abound on both sides. CAPS being flown to protect the carrier would be detected by radars to indicate the carrier position. Enough ELINT data would be available to locate the carrier. Finally PAF AEW aircraft have the capability to detect a submarine periscope. To even assume that IN would be able to conceal the location of its Carrier is Naive.

If yo

Next is the assumption that you would be able to detect low flying targets over the sea 500 Km away. Curvature of earth would prevent any surface based asset to detect anything more than 100 Km out. Low RCS os PAF aircraft would be an advantage for PAF plus initiative is always with attacker. Sneaking in to 350 Km range is hence a possibility which cannot be ruled out.

A combination of the carrier's own AEW, escort vessels equipped with the EL/M-2248 MF-STAR, radars of the BARCAP will ensure a massive net is thrown around the carrier itself- far beyond 100km.

This could be supplemented by IAF AWACS that could be tasked with expanding the IN's awareness.

Then again there is no need to sneak in. The carrier has 02 Sqns of MIG 29K (an aircraft not regarded very highly in PAF- same is not true about MKI).

Well more fool the PAF if true. Looking at the specs of the MiG-29K should not give the PAF any delusions of superiority- the orginal MiG-29 was explicitly meant to counter the USAF's air supremacy fighter-the F-15. The MiG-29K is an entirely enhanced beast that is 1.5 times bigger, fully digitised, truly multi role and as modern (if not more so) than anything the PAF has flying- don't get lost in the MiG-29 designation.

It would take 18 F-16s to tilt the TSR matrix in our favor (3:1 ratio) and clear the skies. So why sneak in when PAF can use brute force?

You are clearly more informed of the PAF's abilities than I am but i am doubtful of the assertion that the PAF would be in a position to field an entire SQN of their top end fighter to attack an Indian CBG when they are also coming under pressure from on their Eastern front from a more numerous and able foe (IAF). Even if they could my point remains- an IN CBG could deal with it.


I'll reiterate that we are looking purely at an arbitrary IN CBG vs PAF scenario but this narrow frame can be expanded.intelligence works both ways, if there is a clear indication that one of India's strategic assets (which all nations consider their carriers to be) is at significant risk then the IAF would have no issues in deploying MKIs and AWACS to supplement the CBG's own air wing over the Arabian Sea. Half a SQN of MKIs deployed for such a task would categorically even the playing field (in the fighter domain).

Then it comes down to your BARAK-8 which has never been used in an operational scenario.

Well this is a rather silly comment to make. Most truly cutting edge military systems have not been in live operational duties. Does this mean they are inherently unproven? Of course not. Do you not think all such systems have faced extensive elopement and subsequent user trials before being inducted into service? Are the Israeli or Indian militaries known for being so unprofessional and callous? You know the answer.

The Bekka valley conflict has proven that reliance on SAMs is futile. Yet Indians continue to invest heavily on these systems.

As do the majority of the world's military powers.

They do cause attrition but are best a nuisance which might be able to delay the inevitable.

The BARAK-8 is nothing but a "nuisance"? I would consider your sources. The BARAK-8 is easily one of the finest such weapons in service today- the missile's own seeker coupled with the AESA EL/M-2248 MF-STAR offers a very high interception rate. As I have said this system has been explicitly designed to counter low flying supersonic, highly manoeuvrable, AhSMs so incoming fighters and subsonic CMs like the Ra'ad would be highly vulnerable to it.

The Carrier would soon be kissing the sea floor.

This kind of bravado is not going to win wars. Pakistan has underestimated India's capabilities in every war and as a result lost all of them.

The technical details aside it is basic military knowledge that no defence is impregnable. Starting from Dimale in 219 BC through operation Badr in 1973 there are countless examples of strong defenses that were breached. For India to think that its carrier would be an exception is a folly for which they would pay dearly. That too against an innovative and determined adversary like PAF. Have you forgotten Kalaikunda already?

Hardly relevant in 2015 and looking ahead, is it?

 

[MastanKhan]

AoA
Thanks for the detailed response. I have detected many technical flaws in it.

Let us start with detection of the carrier group. We would not be dependent on a tweet by CNS. The initial information would come from intelligence sources which are abound on both sides. CAPS being flown to protect the carrier would be detected by radars to indicate the carrier position. Enough ELINT data would be available to locate the carrier. Finally PAF AEW aircraft have the capability to detect a submarine periscope. To even assume that IN would be able to conceal the location of its Carrier is Naive.

Next is the assumption that you would be able to detect low flying targets over the sea 500 Km away. Curvature of earth would prevent any surface based asset to detect anything more than 100 Km out. Low RCS os PAF aircraft would be an advantage for PAF plus initiative is always with attacker. Sneaking in to 350 Km range is hence a possibility which cannot be ruled out.

But what happens if by some miracle you do detect the low flying raid. It simply turns back to come again later. You as defender have to succeed everytime. PAF has no such limitation. The mere nuisance value of such attacks would keep the carrier away.

Then again there is no need to sneak in. The carrier has 02 Sqns of MIG 29K (an aircraft not regarded very highly in PAF- same is not true about MKI). Fragility being an airpower characteristic aircrafts are susceptible to scheduled and unscheduled inspections due to which expecting a serviceability rate beyond 80% would be unrealistic. Calculate the effort with remaining aircraft and at most it would be possible to maintain two CAP station plus one pair on ADA. Hence PAF at any given point would be facing not two squadrons but just 6 Mig 29Ks. It would take 18 F-16s to tilt the TSR matrix in our favor (3:1 ratio) and clear the skies. So why sneak in when PAF can use brute force?

Then it comes down to your BARAK-8 which has never been used in an operational scenario. The Bekka valley conflict has proven that reliance on SAMs is futile. Yet Indians continue to invest heavily on these systems. They do cause attrition but are best a nuisance which might be able to delay the inevitable. In the actual scenario after neutralizing the air cover and achieving local air superiority the jammers and SEAD aircrafts would come into play. As far the goal keeper type weapons are concerned they are instruments of luck. The Carrier would soon be kissing the sea floor.

The technical details aside it is basic military knowledge that no defence is impregnable. Starting from Dimale in 219 BC through operation Badr in 1973 there are countless examples of strong defenses that were breached. For India to think that its carrier would be an exception is a folly for which they would pay dearly. That too against an innovative and determined adversary like PAF. Have you forgotten Kalaikunda already?

Regards

@Dillinger @Capt.Popeye @Penguin @MilSpec @PARIKRAMA please correct me as you see fit.

Hi,

Sir---I am pretty sure that you know of it---the Indians are mighty upset that why these Pakistanis are not running scared sh-itless when they tell us what kind of weapons they have.

You just had a conversation with one of their biggest idiots---and there is no lack of those that can follow.

I missed that " sea floor " thing.

 

[Saifullah]

AoA
Thanks for the detailed response. I have detected many technical flaws in it.

Let us start with detection of the carrier group. We would not be dependent on a tweet by CNS. The initial information would come from intelligence sources which are abound on both sides. CAPS being flown to protect the carrier would be detected by radars to indicate the carrier position. Enough ELINT data would be available to locate the carrier. Finally PAF AEW aircraft have the capability to detect a submarine periscope. To even assume that IN would be able to conceal the location of its Carrier is Naive.

Next is the assumption that you would be able to detect low flying targets over the sea 500 Km away. Curvature of earth would prevent any surface based asset to detect anything more than 100 Km out. Low RCS os PAF aircraft would be an advantage for PAF plus initiative is always with attacker. Sneaking in to 350 Km range is hence a possibility which cannot be ruled out.

But what happens if by some miracle you do detect the low flying raid. It simply turns back to come again later. You as defender have to succeed everytime. PAF has no such limitation. The mere nuisance value of such attacks would keep the carrier away.

Then again there is no need to sneak in. The carrier has 02 Sqns of MIG 29K (an aircraft not regarded very highly in PAF- same is not true about MKI). Fragility being an airpower characteristic aircrafts are susceptible to scheduled and unscheduled inspections due to which expecting a serviceability rate beyond 80% would be unrealistic. Calculate the effort with remaining aircraft and at most it would be possible to maintain two CAP station plus one pair on ADA. Hence PAF at any given point would be facing not two squadrons but just 6 Mig 29Ks. It would take 18 F-16s to tilt the TSR matrix in our favor (3:1 ratio) and clear the skies. So why sneak in when PAF can use brute force?

Then it comes down to your BARAK-8 which has never been used in an operational scenario. The Bekka valley conflict has proven that reliance on SAMs is futile. Yet Indians continue to invest heavily on these systems. They do cause attrition but are best a nuisance which might be able to delay the inevitable. In the actual scenario after neutralizing the air cover and achieving local air superiority the jammers and SEAD aircrafts would come into play. As far the goal keeper type weapons are concerned they are instruments of luck. The Carrier would soon be kissing the sea floor.

The technical details aside it is basic military knowledge that no defence is impregnable. Starting from Dimale in 219 BC through operation Badr in 1973 there are countless examples of strong defenses that were breached. For India to think that its carrier would be an exception is a folly for which they would pay dearly. That too against an innovative and determined adversary like PAF. Have you forgotten Kalaikunda already?

Regards

@Dillinger @Capt.Popeye @Penguin @MilSpec @PARIKRAMA please correct me as you see fit.

Sir
I hope you don't mind if i ask you keep the conversation related to acquiring the Aircraft.
Regards

 

[untitled]

Many people think that the aim of the PN air arm should be too sink an enemy carrier battle group. Even if the air arm manges to badly damage or sink 2 or even 3 frigates/destroyers early since the commencement of hostilities. That would be enough to send shock waves in the attacking fleet.