Behind the CeaseFireLine (CFL) ......

[Armchair]

If one reads the book Bear Trap, the ISI officer ruefully noted that Afghan Mujahideen with minimal training became better shots than PA army regulars. He noted that motivation was a key factor.

I don't think conscription will necessarily yield low quality troops. Such troops will be on average more tech savy. Also, by taking out the lowest quartile and giving them civil defence and civil works duties, the quality can be improved.

@PanzerKiel ever read this book?

 

[PanzerKiel]

If one reads the book Bear Trap, the ISI officer ruefully noted that Afghan Mujahideen with minimal training became better shots than PA army regulars. He noted that motivation was a key factor.

I don't think conscription will necessarily yield low quality troops. Such troops will be on average more tech savy. Also, by taking out the lowest quartile and giving them civil defence and civil works duties, the quality can be improved.

@PanzerKiel ever read this book?

Of course.... But then, there is a big difference between our army of 80s out 90s and the present one which has fought alot.... You become a marksman with practice, nothing else.

 

[Armchair]

Of course.... But then, there is a big difference between our army of 80s out 90s and the present one which has fought alot.... You become a marksman with practice, nothing else.

I agree. PA has one of the most battle hardened forces in the world today. Point I am making is that conscription may not yield low quality forces. Yes, they won't be battle hardened forces like the regulars, but they would give better than they take against Indian units.

After all, they are fighting defensive battles for their homes, just like the Afghan Mujahideen did back then...

 

[Pakistani Fighter]

I want Pakistan to capture Whole Jammu and Kargil atleast. Than we can make our way into valley

 

[Cuirassier]

Interesting point about the pakistani aims to support insurgency.

Btw, i wasn't claiming that today the insurgency is more effective - it's not, they're barely armed. My point was I think if we repeated the actions of the 90's today, we'd probably get "better results" (feels terrible to describe the loss of human life as a result).

To build on aim B - do you think a re-built and well equipped insurgency could also provide a useful asset in IoK during wartime? Attacking supply lines/depots/stores resulting in enemy forces having to protect their backs too.

1. The LC is fenced and has an extensive CI Grid with multiple layers of sensors, cameras and troops to minimize infiltration. Musharraf allowed this process to go unchallenged as after '03 ceasefire he wanted to shift focus to Western Front and dissauded militants who once fought in Kashmir.

2. Due to our own WoT and action against militancy nationwide, the availibility of expendables is much lower than before -so that they can be kept under leash and don't go uncontrollable & do provocative stuff like Mumbai. Currently I believe the mindset in the military is most mature since inception - at ideological level they have learnt from experiences that moderation among rank and file is pertinent to prevent radicals like Haroon Ashiq & Dr Usman to cause self-destruction.

3. Post Pulwama clashes have shown that high-intensity insurgency could trigger Indian retaliation at a conventional but limited level, as their leadership is bolder than before & certainly tired of the long-running conflict. Irrespective of the outcomes of these clashes, it is in Pakistan's benefit that such events aren't repeated so that another pretext is not given to them for triggering a cascade of attacks and retaliations.

Currently ISI has lost most of it's links with the local insurgents in J&K - a true sign that the resistance has gradually become more indigenous, regardless of intensity. This can be worrisome as their actions can trigger an all-out conflict if too daring.

If I was in position of power, I'd let current course continue. Low-tempo insurgency which occasionally causes drastic harm. Focus should be on finding a solution to insurgencies affecting us on Western Front - be aggressive and get HVTs like Mangal Bagh, Hafiz Gul Bahadur & Allah Nazar.

 

[Pakistani Fighter]

3. Post Pulwama clashes have shown that high-intensity insurgency could trigger Indian retaliation at a conventional but limited level, as their leadership is bolder than before & certainly tired of the long-running conflict. Irrespective of the outcomes of these clashes, it is in Pakistan's benefit that such events aren't repeated so that another pretext is not given to them for triggering a

Thats cowardice

 

[Cuirassier]

Thats cowardice

That's called being wise according to circumstances.

 

[PakFactor]

That's called being wise according to circumstances.

I like reading your posts bro, the way you explain is really good.

 

[Nilgiri]

Interesting exchange @PanzerKiel you had with Joe, thanks!

 

[Pan-Islamic-Pakistan]

Expansion of irregulars, lashkars, and voluntary fighters is key for Pakistan to defeat India in such a war. We have to use the same strategy which we used against Soviets in Afghanistan. Short of involuntary service, this is the answer.

Mujahideen corps usually have high motivation and show bravado in war, taking high risks and pushing areas of weakness, something Indians will not expect.

FATF can be seen as a way world powers are trying to disrupt any advantage Pakistan may have by putting us on defensive about Mujahideen groups and other potential proxies.

I heard Jamat e Islami is recruiting youth, and I know tribes of FATA have pledged lashkars, while population of Azad Kashmir are being trained (just like Lahoris were in '65 and '71)

 

[PanzerKiel]

There is one place where an attack can be successful, but I'll keep that to myself.l

Bhai bata dain, would be food for thought for learning members like me who can then think about multiple ways of developing that approach.

@Armchair for all these decades, we have been unable to liberate Kashmir just because we always attacked at the wrong locations... Why ... Because the one location which could benefit us, you kept it to yourself....

Bhai bata dain, would be food for thought for learning members like me who can then think about multiple ways of developing that approach.

@Armchair for all these decades, we have been unable to liberate Kashmir just because we always attacked at the wrong locations... Why ... Because the one location which could benefit us, you kept it to yourself....

@Armchair ... Don't mind dear, on a lighter note...

 

[PanzerKiel]

On a serious note, keeping in view India's recent claims about GB, a replay of a heavily customized Op Trident plan may be on the tables.....since the essence of Op Trident was the capture of GB areas.

Superiority of force is very difficult to achieve here in case long warning times are available. The terrain is so difficult that the absolute number of troops that can be inducted by either side is very limited. So, if Pakistan has sufficient warning time, we can neutralize the Indian buildup, like we did in 87/88.

On a serious note, keeping in view India's recent claims about GB, a replay of a heavily customized Op Trident plan may be on the tables.....since the essence of Op Trident was the capture of GB areas.

Superiority of force is very difficult to achieve here in case long warning times are available. The terrain is so difficult that the absolute number of troops that can be inducted by either side is very limited. So, if Pakistan has sufficient warning time, we can neutralize the Indian buildup, like we did in 87/88.

Lets take a glance at Op Trident....

It was to be an attack by Indian 15 Corps on Skardu and then Gilgit with the aim of capturing GB area.
It involved elements of 3, 19 and 28 Division, all of 15 Corps.....reinforced by the externally inducted 6 Mountain Division (which was the biggest indicator and as we have already seen, gave the game away).

Main attack direction was from Kargil towards Skardu using 121 Brigade + additional brigade, both of 28 Division

Supporting attack was to be from Thoise via Khapplu to Skardu using 102 Brigade, and 70+114 Brigades from 3 Division

A diversionary effort from Gurais to Gilgit using 268 Brigade of 19 Division

6 Mountain Division was to have taken over 3 Division's locations opposite Chinese. Reserves were to be provided by a brigade each of 6, 19 and 28 Division

On a serious note, keeping in view India's recent claims about GB, a replay of a heavily customized Op Trident plan may be on the tables.....since the essence of Op Trident was the capture of GB areas.

Superiority of force is very difficult to achieve here in case long warning times are available. The terrain is so difficult that the absolute number of troops that can be inducted by either side is very limited. So, if Pakistan has sufficient warning time, we can neutralize the Indian buildup, like we did in 87/88.



Lets take a glance at Op Trident....

It was to be an attack by Indian 15 Corps on Skardu and then Gilgit with the aim of capturing GB area.
It involved elements of 3, 19 and 28 Division, all of 15 Corps.....reinforced by the externally inducted 6 Mountain Division (which was the biggest indicator and as we have already seen, gave the game away).

Main attack direction was from Kargil towards Skardu using 121 Brigade + additional brigade, both of 28 Division

Supporting attack was to be from Thoise via Khapplu to Skardu using 102 Brigade, and 70+114 Brigades from 3 Division

A diversionary effort from Gurais to Gilgit using 268 Brigade of 19 Division

6 Mountain Division was to have taken over 3 Division's locations opposite Chinese. Reserves were to be provided by a brigade each of 6, 19 and 28 Division

A word about 6 Mountain Division airlift

Op Trident had, as its key, the rapid shifting of 6 Mountain Division to Leh, which was done in remarkable effort withing 6 days. On one day alone, the peak, 70 landing were made at Leh. Keeping in view that by late morning the weather at Leh closes on, so these 70 sorties, consisting of Il-76s, An-12s and An-32s would have landed within a window of perhaps 5 hours at best.

Things which suddenly went wrong were, insufficient food for these extra 10,00 troops, their heavy equipment delivery was delayed. Date of attack of changed from February 6 to 8, which allowed to 2 more days to the Division to acclimatize as well.

The attack was scheduled for 0430 hours on Feb 8, but 0300 hours, it was cancelled.

Rest , we have already seen what Pakistan Army did, by bringing in two brigades on C130s within 3-4 days to alter force ratios.


Now

Coming to problems which IA faces in this sector

First is the timing, the time required to capture Skardu and Gilgit...
its about 80 air kilometers from Kargil to Skardu which means a minimum of 150 Kms along the valley, from Skardu to Gilgit will somewhat 300-350 kms....this operation can take maybe months....

Just to narrate an example
Indians, in 1971, sent two companies of Ladakh Scouts from Turtok to a location to attack ,objective was 30 kms away. They were opposed by few platoons of FC (not regulars, like it is now). Within two weeks, once the operation ended, the Indians were still short of their objective.

There is nothing wrong with a six or even a twelve week war. Both sides have the capability to wage a six or even a twelve month war (of course not without external assistance)
The problem lies in the mindset of strategic decision makers who may never conceive of a longer war, or may be never agree to it.


Next problem is terrain and weather factors...
Overall , terrain favors India since they will be attacking downhill.
But then, dis-advantage is that, in mountain terrain, Indians have to advance along very predictable routes....Shyok, Indus, and Astor river valleys...
These river valleys are narrow and easily defended by a small force, Indians will have to launch a major effort as well to secure the mountain tops along both sides of the valleys before advancing...

In essence, in mountains, the geography favors the defender heavily.



Then comes the vehicular movement

An Indian infantry division in mountains, in offensive mode, may require 300 to 400 tons of supplies of all types a day...some 2000 vehicles of all sizes will be plying around...
But then the narrow roads in the mountains, full of culverts and small bridges.....interdiction, vehicle breakdowns on a single road
...and then this problem intensifies the more Indians come into GB, with that division having the potential to get cut off

On a serious note, keeping in view India's recent claims about GB, a replay of a heavily customized Op Trident plan may be on the tables.....since the essence of Op Trident was the capture of GB areas.

Superiority of force is very difficult to achieve here in case long warning times are available. The terrain is so difficult that the absolute number of troops that can be inducted by either side is very limited. So, if Pakistan has sufficient warning time, we can neutralize the Indian buildup, like we did in 87/88.



Lets take a glance at Op Trident....

It was to be an attack by Indian 15 Corps on Skardu and then Gilgit with the aim of capturing GB area.
It involved elements of 3, 19 and 28 Division, all of 15 Corps.....reinforced by the externally inducted 6 Mountain Division (which was the biggest indicator and as we have already seen, gave the game away).

Main attack direction was from Kargil towards Skardu using 121 Brigade + additional brigade, both of 28 Division

Supporting attack was to be from Thoise via Khapplu to Skardu using 102 Brigade, and 70+114 Brigades from 3 Division

A diversionary effort from Gurais to Gilgit using 268 Brigade of 19 Division

6 Mountain Division was to have taken over 3 Division's locations opposite Chinese. Reserves were to be provided by a brigade each of 6, 19 and 28 Division



A word about 6 Mountain Division airlift

Op Trident had, as its key, the rapid shifting of 6 Mountain Division to Leh, which was done in remarkable effort withing 6 days. On one day alone, the peak, 70 landing were made at Leh. Keeping in view that by late morning the weather at Leh closes on, so these 70 sorties, consisting of Il-76s, An-12s and An-32s would have landed within a window of perhaps 5 hours at best.

Things which suddenly went wrong were, insufficient food for these extra 10,00 troops, their heavy equipment delivery was delayed. Date of attack of changed from February 6 to 8, which allowed to 2 more days to the Division to acclimatize as well.

The attack was scheduled for 0430 hours on Feb 8, but 0300 hours, it was cancelled.

Rest , we have already seen what Pakistan Army did, by bringing in two brigades on C130s within 3-4 days to alter force ratios.

On a serious note, keeping in view India's recent claims about GB, a replay of a heavily customized Op Trident plan may be on the tables.....since the essence of Op Trident was the capture of GB areas.

Superiority of force is very difficult to achieve here in case long warning times are available. The terrain is so difficult that the absolute number of troops that can be inducted by either side is very limited. So, if Pakistan has sufficient warning time, we can neutralize the Indian buildup, like we did in 87/88.



Lets take a glance at Op Trident....

It was to be an attack by Indian 15 Corps on Skardu and then Gilgit with the aim of capturing GB area.
It involved elements of 3, 19 and 28 Division, all of 15 Corps.....reinforced by the externally inducted 6 Mountain Division (which was the biggest indicator and as we have already seen, gave the game away).

Main attack direction was from Kargil towards Skardu using 121 Brigade + additional brigade, both of 28 Division

Supporting attack was to be from Thoise via Khapplu to Skardu using 102 Brigade, and 70+114 Brigades from 3 Division

A diversionary effort from Gurais to Gilgit using 268 Brigade of 19 Division

6 Mountain Division was to have taken over 3 Division's locations opposite Chinese. Reserves were to be provided by a brigade each of 6, 19 and 28 Division



A word about 6 Mountain Division airlift

Op Trident had, as its key, the rapid shifting of 6 Mountain Division to Leh, which was done in remarkable effort withing 6 days. On one day alone, the peak, 70 landing were made at Leh. Keeping in view that by late morning the weather at Leh closes on, so these 70 sorties, consisting of Il-76s, An-12s and An-32s would have landed within a window of perhaps 5 hours at best.

Things which suddenly went wrong were, insufficient food for these extra 10,00 troops, their heavy equipment delivery was delayed. Date of attack of changed from February 6 to 8, which allowed to 2 more days to the Division to acclimatize as well.

The attack was scheduled for 0430 hours on Feb 8, but 0300 hours, it was cancelled.

Rest , we have already seen what Pakistan Army did, by bringing in two brigades on C130s within 3-4 days to alter force ratios.


Now

Coming to problems which IA faces in this sector

First is the timing, the time required to capture Skardu and Gilgit...
its about 80 air kilometers from Kargil to Skardu which means a minimum of 150 Kms along the valley, from Skardu to Gilgit will somewhat 300-350 kms....this operation can take maybe months....

Just to narrate an example
Indians, in 1971, sent two companies of Ladakh Scouts from Turtok to a location to attack ,objective was 30 kms away. They were opposed by few platoons of FC (not regulars, like it is now). Within two weeks, once the operation ended, the Indians were still short of their objective.

There is nothing wrong with a six or even a twelve week war. Both sides have the capability to wage a six or even a twelve month war (of course not without external assistance)
The problem lies in the mindset of strategic decision makers who may never conceive of a longer war, or may be never agree to it.


Next problem is terrain and weather factors...
Overall , terrain favors India since they will be attacking downhill.
But then, dis-advantage is that, in mountain terrain, Indians have to advance along very predictable routes....Shyok, Indus, and Astor river valleys...
These river valleys are narrow and easily defended by a small force, Indians will have to launch a major effort as well to secure the mountain tops along both sides of the valleys before advancing...

In essence, in mountains, the geography favors the defender heavily.



Then comes the vehicular movement

An Indian infantry division in mountains, in offensive mode, may require 300 to 400 tons of supplies of all types a day...some 2000 vehicles of all sizes will be plying around...
But then the narrow roads in the mountains, full of culverts and small bridges.....interdiction, vehicle breakdowns on a single road
...and then this problem intensifies the more Indians come into GB, with that division having the potential to get cut off

and then ofcourse, the last major problem....

The Pakistan's reinforcements....

In response to Op Trident, the final ratios were....due to PA reinforcements....

On Shyok axis- 3 IA brigades against 2 PA brigades
On Indus axis- same as above
On Astor axis- One against One

No one could or can pretend any quick victory with the problems discussed above.

Op Trident, therefore, had to be called off at the last moment.

On a serious note, keeping in view India's recent claims about GB, a replay of a heavily customized Op Trident plan may be on the tables.....since the essence of Op Trident was the capture of GB areas.

Superiority of force is very difficult to achieve here in case long warning times are available. The terrain is so difficult that the absolute number of troops that can be inducted by either side is very limited. So, if Pakistan has sufficient warning time, we can neutralize the Indian buildup, like we did in 87/88.



Lets take a glance at Op Trident....

It was to be an attack by Indian 15 Corps on Skardu and then Gilgit with the aim of capturing GB area.
It involved elements of 3, 19 and 28 Division, all of 15 Corps.....reinforced by the externally inducted 6 Mountain Division (which was the biggest indicator and as we have already seen, gave the game away).

Main attack direction was from Kargil towards Skardu using 121 Brigade + additional brigade, both of 28 Division

Supporting attack was to be from Thoise via Khapplu to Skardu using 102 Brigade, and 70+114 Brigades from 3 Division

A diversionary effort from Gurais to Gilgit using 268 Brigade of 19 Division

6 Mountain Division was to have taken over 3 Division's locations opposite Chinese. Reserves were to be provided by a brigade each of 6, 19 and 28 Division



A word about 6 Mountain Division airlift

Op Trident had, as its key, the rapid shifting of 6 Mountain Division to Leh, which was done in remarkable effort withing 6 days. On one day alone, the peak, 70 landing were made at Leh. Keeping in view that by late morning the weather at Leh closes on, so these 70 sorties, consisting of Il-76s, An-12s and An-32s would have landed within a window of perhaps 5 hours at best.

Things which suddenly went wrong were, insufficient food for these extra 10,00 troops, their heavy equipment delivery was delayed. Date of attack of changed from February 6 to 8, which allowed to 2 more days to the Division to acclimatize as well.

The attack was scheduled for 0430 hours on Feb 8, but 0300 hours, it was cancelled.

Rest , we have already seen what Pakistan Army did, by bringing in two brigades on C130s within 3-4 days to alter force ratios.


Now

Coming to problems which IA faces in this sector

First is the timing, the time required to capture Skardu and Gilgit...
its about 80 air kilometers from Kargil to Skardu which means a minimum of 150 Kms along the valley, from Skardu to Gilgit will somewhat 300-350 kms....this operation can take maybe months....

Just to narrate an example
Indians, in 1971, sent two companies of Ladakh Scouts from Turtok to a location to attack ,objective was 30 kms away. They were opposed by few platoons of FC (not regulars, like it is now). Within two weeks, once the operation ended, the Indians were still short of their objective.

There is nothing wrong with a six or even a twelve week war. Both sides have the capability to wage a six or even a twelve month war (of course not without external assistance)
The problem lies in the mindset of strategic decision makers who may never conceive of a longer war, or may be never agree to it.


Next problem is terrain and weather factors...
Overall , terrain favors India since they will be attacking downhill.
But then, dis-advantage is that, in mountain terrain, Indians have to advance along very predictable routes....Shyok, Indus, and Astor river valleys...
These river valleys are narrow and easily defended by a small force, Indians will have to launch a major effort as well to secure the mountain tops along both sides of the valleys before advancing...

In essence, in mountains, the geography favors the defender heavily.



Then comes the vehicular movement

An Indian infantry division in mountains, in offensive mode, may require 300 to 400 tons of supplies of all types a day...some 2000 vehicles of all sizes will be plying around...
But then the narrow roads in the mountains, full of culverts and small bridges.....interdiction, vehicle breakdowns on a single road
...and then this problem intensifies the more Indians come into GB, with that division having the potential to get cut off




and then ofcourse, the last major problem....

The Pakistan's reinforcements....

In response to Op Trident, the final ratios were....due to PA reinforcements....

On Shyok axis- 3 IA brigades against 2 PA brigades
On Indus axis- same as above
On Astor axis- One against One

No one could or can pretend any quick victory with the problems discussed above.

Op Trident, therefore, had to be called off at the last moment.

@Nilgiri @Joe Shearer
Now the post is complete.

 

[Joe Shearer]

@jbgt90
Ref our conversation. They knew everything!

On a serious note, keeping in view India's recent claims about GB, a replay of a heavily customized Op Trident plan may be on the tables.....since the essence of Op Trident was the capture of GB areas.

Superiority of force is very difficult to achieve here in case long warning times are available. The terrain is so difficult that the absolute number of troops that can be inducted by either side is very limited. So, if Pakistan has sufficient warning time, we can neutralize the Indian buildup, like we did in 87/88.



Lets take a glance at Op Trident....

It was to be an attack by Indian 15 Corps on Skardu and then Gilgit with the aim of capturing GB area.
It involved elements of 3, 19 and 28 Division, all of 15 Corps.....reinforced by the externally inducted 6 Mountain Division (which was the biggest indicator and as we have already seen, gave the game away).

Main attack direction was from Kargil towards Skardu using 121 Brigade + additional brigade, both of 28 Division

Supporting attack was to be from Thoise via Khapplu to Skardu using 102 Brigade, and 70+114 Brigades from 3 Division

A diversionary effort from Gurais to Gilgit using 268 Brigade of 19 Division

6 Mountain Division was to have taken over 3 Division's locations opposite Chinese. Reserves were to be provided by a brigade each of 6, 19 and 28 Division



A word about 6 Mountain Division airlift

Op Trident had, as its key, the rapid shifting of 6 Mountain Division to Leh, which was done in remarkable effort withing 6 days. On one day alone, the peak, 70 landing were made at Leh. Keeping in view that by late morning the weather at Leh closes on, so these 70 sorties, consisting of Il-76s, An-12s and An-32s would have landed within a window of perhaps 5 hours at best.

Things which suddenly went wrong were, insufficient food for these extra 10,00 troops, their heavy equipment delivery was delayed. Date of attack of changed from February 6 to 8, which allowed to 2 more days to the Division to acclimatize as well.

The attack was scheduled for 0430 hours on Feb 8, but 0300 hours, it was cancelled.

Rest , we have already seen what Pakistan Army did, by bringing in two brigades on C130s within 3-4 days to alter force ratios.


Now

Coming to problems which IA faces in this sector

First is the timing, the time required to capture Skardu and Gilgit...
its about 80 air kilometers from Kargil to Skardu which means a minimum of 150 Kms along the valley, from Skardu to Gilgit will somewhat 300-350 kms....this operation can take maybe months....

Just to narrate an example
Indians, in 1971, sent two companies of Ladakh Scouts from Turtok to a location to attack ,objective was 30 kms away. They were opposed by few platoons of FC (not regulars, like it is now). Within two weeks, once the operation ended, the Indians were still short of their objective.

There is nothing wrong with a six or even a twelve week war. Both sides have the capability to wage a six or even a twelve month war (of course not without external assistance)
The problem lies in the mindset of strategic decision makers who may never conceive of a longer war, or may be never agree to it.


Next problem is terrain and weather factors...
Overall , terrain favors India since they will be attacking downhill.
But then, dis-advantage is that, in mountain terrain, Indians have to advance along very predictable routes....Shyok, Indus, and Astor river valleys...
These river valleys are narrow and easily defended by a small force, Indians will have to launch a major effort as well to secure the mountain tops along both sides of the valleys before advancing...

In essence, in mountains, the geography favors the defender heavily.



Then comes the vehicular movement

An Indian infantry division in mountains, in offensive mode, may require 300 to 400 tons of supplies of all types a day...some 2000 vehicles of all sizes will be plying around...
But then the narrow roads in the mountains, full of culverts and small bridges.....interdiction, vehicle breakdowns on a single road
...and then this problem intensifies the more Indians come into GB, with that division having the potential to get cut off




and then ofcourse, the last major problem....

The Pakistan's reinforcements....

In response to Op Trident, the final ratios were....due to PA reinforcements....

On Shyok axis- 3 IA brigades against 2 PA brigades
On Indus axis- same as above
On Astor axis- One against One

No one could or can pretend any quick victory with the problems discussed above.

Op Trident, therefore, had to be called off at the last moment.



@Nilgiri @Joe Shearer
Now the post is complete.

 

[PanzerKiel]

@jbgt90
Ref our conversation. They knew everything!

Who are "THEY", and what everything "THEY" knew?

 

[Joe Shearer]

Who are "THEY", and what everything "THEY" knew?

The PA, and they knew every last detail, including the disposition of 6th Mtn. Div. (edit.: granted landing it at Leh made things very clear).

Now some in staff positions are saying it should have been a deceptive road movement to Leh, not using the Kargil road, thus not signalling imminent action. Only that would have meant enough lead time, which there wasn't in this case.