fatman17
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RedBaron
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This is definitely THE space to watch for new developments. Acquiring situational awareness enabling all IAF and IA assets within a battlegroup to "see" the same battlefield in real-time is a critical success factor for any Cold Start strategy.
Page 6 of the below report on NCW fundamentals has some cool US mil schematics. Rest of the paper also has some useful info specific to Indian context.
http://www.aerospaceindia.org/Journ...twork-Centric Warfare - Some Fundamentals.pdf
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Contrarian
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fatman mate, if you do have access to information, then post about the NCW capacities of IA.
You would really and i mean -really be surprised with what IA is busy with nowadays and has been for the last 2 years! The big budgets are actually manifesting themselves into intangible stuff. Thats why you'd wonder that inspite of the ever increasing defence budget with the largest pie going to the IA, there was literally next to nil capital acquisitions compared to the budget they are getting.
You would really and i mean -really be surprised with what IA is busy with nowadays and has been for the last 2 years! The big budgets are actually manifesting themselves into intangible stuff. Thats why you'd wonder that inspite of the ever increasing defence budget with the largest pie going to the IA, there was literally next to nil capital acquisitions compared to the budget they are getting.
Bull
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Come on dont do this, i have a weak heart. I would like to know about it NOW.
fatman17
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Wilco, however IA is generally not divulging that information in detail.
fatman17
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Excercises
In May 2005, Ex Vajra Shakti (Lightening Power) on the northern Punjab plains tested the doctrine of Network Centric Warfare (NCW) and jointness in a NBC environment. 25,000 troops were involved. During this excercise, the army's growing ability to provide real-time battlefield scenarios to field commanders and planners was displayed. The excercises also implemented the "cold start" doctrine.
In August 2005, US and Indian SF forces took part in the 3-week Excercise Vajra Prahar in Rajasthan, an annual combined counter insurgency training period. This was followed in September by the 2-week Ex Yudh Abhyas-05 at the Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School (CIJWS) at Vairengte. This excercise for conventional units at platoon level has been running annually since 2003.
In October 2005, Russian and Indian airborne troops (both at company strength) took part in the land phase of the combined Ex - Infra 2005 in the Mahajan field firing range in Rajashthan. The excercise had a counter terrorist theme.
It was announce in 2007 that China and India are to boost military co-operation through joint army excercises and reciprocal military visits. It is assessed these will be largely cosmetic.
In May 2005, Ex Vajra Shakti (Lightening Power) on the northern Punjab plains tested the doctrine of Network Centric Warfare (NCW) and jointness in a NBC environment. 25,000 troops were involved. During this excercise, the army's growing ability to provide real-time battlefield scenarios to field commanders and planners was displayed. The excercises also implemented the "cold start" doctrine.
In August 2005, US and Indian SF forces took part in the 3-week Excercise Vajra Prahar in Rajasthan, an annual combined counter insurgency training period. This was followed in September by the 2-week Ex Yudh Abhyas-05 at the Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School (CIJWS) at Vairengte. This excercise for conventional units at platoon level has been running annually since 2003.
In October 2005, Russian and Indian airborne troops (both at company strength) took part in the land phase of the combined Ex - Infra 2005 in the Mahajan field firing range in Rajashthan. The excercise had a counter terrorist theme.
It was announce in 2007 that China and India are to boost military co-operation through joint army excercises and reciprocal military visits. It is assessed these will be largely cosmetic.
fatman17
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Army Procurement
Main Battle Tanks (MBTs)
Arjun
The long running Arjun project is a failure but is likely to continue until production of a token, but highly expensive 124 units has been completed. There will be a continiuing requirement for Russian T-90 and its derivatives as there are no other competitors for the supply of MBTs, and Russia is in a position to negotiate most favourable terms for extended licenced production and provision of ancilaries.
The indian designed Arjun was originally seen as a cost-effective indigenously replacement for obsolete Vijayantas (all now retired) and T-55s (not now in front line use). The concept was first laid down in 1974 with the development program has been sunject to a series of delays and problems. When the Arjun first reached the trials stage it was still found wanting in several spheres, particularly in engine power. It is also significantly heavier (5 tonnes) than comparable MBTs, which has raised doubts concerning battlefield mobility, ease of rail movement, use of bridges and replacement of existing road transporters.
In December 2003, the indian parliament's public accounts committee (PAC) criticised the defence ministry for what is described as an "inordinate delay" on the tank's development. As the committee pointed out, the original schedule was for the first Arjun tank regiment (45 units) to be operational by 2002, with two further regiments by 2007. It also criticised the rise in the number of foreign components in the tank prototypes, comprising around 60 percent of the final product. The committee concluded that continued delays would have an adverse impact on wider planning regarding equipping the armed forces.
The Indian Combat Vehicles Research and Development Establishment, which is the overall contractor of the tank project has built 32 Arjun tanks so far. Of these 12 were prototypes, 15 pre-series production units, two are torsion bar tanks, one test vehicle, one recovery vehicle and one MKII model. Five tanks were handed over to the army on 7 August 2004, and the total order is for 124. Although official reports in July 2007 indicate that aim is to have delivery completed by the end of 2009, conflicting official reports state that the production rate is to be 30 a year.
Reports on the trials on the first five tanks in July 2005, suggests that these have not been successful, with problems reported with the fire-control system, suspension and main gun sight. The tank's engine reportedly "seized" during excercises in temperatures averaging 55-60*C.
Fourteen test vehicles were handed over to the army in early 2007 for trials, but were returned to the manufacturer with a list of deficiencies ranging from poor fire-control to low speed. The vehicles were also unable to operate in high temperatures. On 12 July 2007, the indian defence minister, Pranab Mukherjee stated, "production hiccups have been overcome and (the) first lot of production is in progress". However, when the tanks were subjected to 5 months of trials the outlook for the Arjun became even more bleak. The standing committee on defence reported to parliament in April 2008, that the Arjun had "performed poorly" and experienced "four engine failures" during the trials. The Arjun now must undergo more rigorous testing in the western rajasthan desert region, where temperatures can top 50 degrees celsius. Production of the first 85 tanks was due to commence at the end of 2008, however, in July 2008 the indian army has confirmed that it will not place additional orders for the locally designed Arjun main battle tank (MBT), beyond the 124 units already under construction.
Main Battle Tanks (MBTs)
Arjun
The long running Arjun project is a failure but is likely to continue until production of a token, but highly expensive 124 units has been completed. There will be a continiuing requirement for Russian T-90 and its derivatives as there are no other competitors for the supply of MBTs, and Russia is in a position to negotiate most favourable terms for extended licenced production and provision of ancilaries.
The indian designed Arjun was originally seen as a cost-effective indigenously replacement for obsolete Vijayantas (all now retired) and T-55s (not now in front line use). The concept was first laid down in 1974 with the development program has been sunject to a series of delays and problems. When the Arjun first reached the trials stage it was still found wanting in several spheres, particularly in engine power. It is also significantly heavier (5 tonnes) than comparable MBTs, which has raised doubts concerning battlefield mobility, ease of rail movement, use of bridges and replacement of existing road transporters.
In December 2003, the indian parliament's public accounts committee (PAC) criticised the defence ministry for what is described as an "inordinate delay" on the tank's development. As the committee pointed out, the original schedule was for the first Arjun tank regiment (45 units) to be operational by 2002, with two further regiments by 2007. It also criticised the rise in the number of foreign components in the tank prototypes, comprising around 60 percent of the final product. The committee concluded that continued delays would have an adverse impact on wider planning regarding equipping the armed forces.
The Indian Combat Vehicles Research and Development Establishment, which is the overall contractor of the tank project has built 32 Arjun tanks so far. Of these 12 were prototypes, 15 pre-series production units, two are torsion bar tanks, one test vehicle, one recovery vehicle and one MKII model. Five tanks were handed over to the army on 7 August 2004, and the total order is for 124. Although official reports in July 2007 indicate that aim is to have delivery completed by the end of 2009, conflicting official reports state that the production rate is to be 30 a year.
Reports on the trials on the first five tanks in July 2005, suggests that these have not been successful, with problems reported with the fire-control system, suspension and main gun sight. The tank's engine reportedly "seized" during excercises in temperatures averaging 55-60*C.
Fourteen test vehicles were handed over to the army in early 2007 for trials, but were returned to the manufacturer with a list of deficiencies ranging from poor fire-control to low speed. The vehicles were also unable to operate in high temperatures. On 12 July 2007, the indian defence minister, Pranab Mukherjee stated, "production hiccups have been overcome and (the) first lot of production is in progress". However, when the tanks were subjected to 5 months of trials the outlook for the Arjun became even more bleak. The standing committee on defence reported to parliament in April 2008, that the Arjun had "performed poorly" and experienced "four engine failures" during the trials. The Arjun now must undergo more rigorous testing in the western rajasthan desert region, where temperatures can top 50 degrees celsius. Production of the first 85 tanks was due to commence at the end of 2008, however, in July 2008 the indian army has confirmed that it will not place additional orders for the locally designed Arjun main battle tank (MBT), beyond the 124 units already under construction.
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fatman17
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Army Procurement
Main Battle Tanks (MBTs)
T-90S
The army of the Indian Republic recently procured 310 Russian T-90S MBTs, 124 of which were delivered complete (deliveries starting 2001) with the remaining 186 to be assembled locally from kit by Heavy Vehicles Factory. The first kit-built unit was delivered to the army in January 2004. The army requires further MBTs and it would appear that the disasterous Arjun program has finally been relegated to that of a technology demonstrator. Negotiations are reportedly in progress for another 1300 T-90S built in Russia and under licence. Particularly galling for indian esteem to the comparitive success of the Pakistani Al-Khalid MBT program, examples of which are now equipping armoured divisions. While the T-90 is relatively elderly (as indeed are most tanks on offer around the world), it remaind an effective platform. Remote weapons stations, a modern fire-control system and active defence systems will keep it a useful asset over the next couple of decades. Though, unlike many current tank operators, India faces the possibility of large scale conventional war with its neighbour, it seems more likely that T-90 units will face insurgents of various kinds in the disputed Kashmir region. Recent western and israeli experience has shown that if properly used and equipped, the traditional MBT still has utility even against such light forces.
It was announced in November 2007, that India has signed a USD 1.237 billion contract with Russia to procure 247 T-90 MBTs. Reports from Russia suggest that parts of the tanks will be assembled at the Heavy Vehicles Factory at Avadi in Tamil Nadu, in southern India from the kits to be supplied by the Russian Uralvagonzavod tank plant.
T-72M1 Modernisation
Initially as a interim measure a modernisation program for T-72M1 MBTs has been underway since 2002. (Project Rhino). An announcement in February 2004 stated that 31 had been fitted with advanced reactive armour, a global positioning system (GPS) and an integrated fire detection and suppression system. In 2002 Poland's FCO received a USD 73 million contract to supply 250 SKO-11 Drawa-T computerised day/night fire-control systems for the project. A contract for 300 Thermal Imaging Stand Alone Systems (TISAS) for T-72 upgrading may also have been awarded to Israel's Elbit in 2002, but it is not clear whether this was ever completed. Although the govt. has stated that the T-72 upgrade program is proceeding well, it is apparent that the throughput is slow, amounting at best to some 40 tanks annually. It is doubtful that the project will succeed in producing a battleworthy fleet of T-72s unless there is a award of a substantial foreign contract or contracts for upgrading all systems.
Main Battle Tanks (MBTs)
T-90S
The army of the Indian Republic recently procured 310 Russian T-90S MBTs, 124 of which were delivered complete (deliveries starting 2001) with the remaining 186 to be assembled locally from kit by Heavy Vehicles Factory. The first kit-built unit was delivered to the army in January 2004. The army requires further MBTs and it would appear that the disasterous Arjun program has finally been relegated to that of a technology demonstrator. Negotiations are reportedly in progress for another 1300 T-90S built in Russia and under licence. Particularly galling for indian esteem to the comparitive success of the Pakistani Al-Khalid MBT program, examples of which are now equipping armoured divisions. While the T-90 is relatively elderly (as indeed are most tanks on offer around the world), it remaind an effective platform. Remote weapons stations, a modern fire-control system and active defence systems will keep it a useful asset over the next couple of decades. Though, unlike many current tank operators, India faces the possibility of large scale conventional war with its neighbour, it seems more likely that T-90 units will face insurgents of various kinds in the disputed Kashmir region. Recent western and israeli experience has shown that if properly used and equipped, the traditional MBT still has utility even against such light forces.
It was announced in November 2007, that India has signed a USD 1.237 billion contract with Russia to procure 247 T-90 MBTs. Reports from Russia suggest that parts of the tanks will be assembled at the Heavy Vehicles Factory at Avadi in Tamil Nadu, in southern India from the kits to be supplied by the Russian Uralvagonzavod tank plant.
T-72M1 Modernisation
Initially as a interim measure a modernisation program for T-72M1 MBTs has been underway since 2002. (Project Rhino). An announcement in February 2004 stated that 31 had been fitted with advanced reactive armour, a global positioning system (GPS) and an integrated fire detection and suppression system. In 2002 Poland's FCO received a USD 73 million contract to supply 250 SKO-11 Drawa-T computerised day/night fire-control systems for the project. A contract for 300 Thermal Imaging Stand Alone Systems (TISAS) for T-72 upgrading may also have been awarded to Israel's Elbit in 2002, but it is not clear whether this was ever completed. Although the govt. has stated that the T-72 upgrade program is proceeding well, it is apparent that the throughput is slow, amounting at best to some 40 tanks annually. It is doubtful that the project will succeed in producing a battleworthy fleet of T-72s unless there is a award of a substantial foreign contract or contracts for upgrading all systems.
fatman17
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Army Procurement
Infantry Combat Vehicles & APCs
In May 2005 it as reported that two prototypes of the Abhay Infantry Combat Vehicle (ICV) were undergoing trials with the Indian Army. If ever introduced into service, the Abhay could form the backbone of the Indian Army's ground fleet, supplementing and eventually replacing India's ageing Russian designed BMP-2 ICVs. Development of the Abhay was scheduled for mid-2005, but as with many other ambitious indigenous projects, the target was not achieved. There were no official reports of progress in 2007.
Israel is upgrading the army's BMP-2 APCs, and a request for proposal (RFP) has been issued for purchase of 228 light armoured vehicles. In August 2006, it was announced that a further 123 NMP=2Ks would be built in India under licence from Rosoboronexport.
Small Arms
In late 2002, Israel Military Industries (IMI) was awarded a contract worth USD 15 million for 3,074 - 5.56mm Tavor (TAR-21) assault rifles equipped with 40mm Under Barrel Grenade Launchers (UGBL) for the special forces. Deliveries were to start from September 2005. It was reported that IMI was in talks with the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) to transfer technology to build Tavors locally as part of a potential requirement for some 10,000 units to equip additional SF elements and the Parachute Regiment.
Some TAR-21s without the UGBLs (300-400) have been delivered for use with the Indian Special Frontier Force (SFF). Around 130 Galil 7.62mm sniper rifles with 450,000 rounds of ammunition have also been delivered for use with the SFF and also army special forces.
In addition to this delivery, in March 2008 it was announced that India is to order an additional 1,000 israeli 5.56mm TAR-21 Tavor assault rifles for its special forces (SF) to supplement the 3,070 it bought in 2002 for around USD 20 million.
Artillery
In order to maintain and improve its long range fire support capability, the Indian Army is engaged in a major program known as the Field Artillery Rationalisation Plan, which will acquire howitzers of towed, as well as self-propelled wheeled and tracked types. The 155mm/52 calibre weapons are expected to dominate the procurement, however a number of lightweight 155mm/39 weapons are also being procured so as to enhance rapidly deliverable battlefield firepower. The lightweight towed howitzers sought are to be air transportable. A RFP was released in January 2008 and is expected to have gone to BAE systems (UFH/M777), and Singapore Technologies Kinetics (Pegasus), as well as potential additional bidders.
In April 2008, it was announced that BAE Systems is to partner with indian company, Mahindra Defence Systems. This will provide a local production capacity for BAEs M777 and in May 2008 another indian company, Punj Lloyd announced that it is in advanced discussions with a leading defence manufacturer to provide a joint bid for the program. Then in June 2008, Punj Lloyd partnered with Singapore Tech. Kinetics (STK) to submit a proposal for the program. Under the partnership the two companies will jointly produce STKs Pegasus 155mm howitzer.
Trials for the potential solutions are expected to take place in the western rajasthan desert and mountains. Adecision may follow in late 2008 or 2009. Deliveries are estimated to take place between 2010 and 2013.
Infantry Combat Vehicles & APCs
In May 2005 it as reported that two prototypes of the Abhay Infantry Combat Vehicle (ICV) were undergoing trials with the Indian Army. If ever introduced into service, the Abhay could form the backbone of the Indian Army's ground fleet, supplementing and eventually replacing India's ageing Russian designed BMP-2 ICVs. Development of the Abhay was scheduled for mid-2005, but as with many other ambitious indigenous projects, the target was not achieved. There were no official reports of progress in 2007.
Israel is upgrading the army's BMP-2 APCs, and a request for proposal (RFP) has been issued for purchase of 228 light armoured vehicles. In August 2006, it was announced that a further 123 NMP=2Ks would be built in India under licence from Rosoboronexport.
Small Arms
In late 2002, Israel Military Industries (IMI) was awarded a contract worth USD 15 million for 3,074 - 5.56mm Tavor (TAR-21) assault rifles equipped with 40mm Under Barrel Grenade Launchers (UGBL) for the special forces. Deliveries were to start from September 2005. It was reported that IMI was in talks with the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) to transfer technology to build Tavors locally as part of a potential requirement for some 10,000 units to equip additional SF elements and the Parachute Regiment.
Some TAR-21s without the UGBLs (300-400) have been delivered for use with the Indian Special Frontier Force (SFF). Around 130 Galil 7.62mm sniper rifles with 450,000 rounds of ammunition have also been delivered for use with the SFF and also army special forces.
In addition to this delivery, in March 2008 it was announced that India is to order an additional 1,000 israeli 5.56mm TAR-21 Tavor assault rifles for its special forces (SF) to supplement the 3,070 it bought in 2002 for around USD 20 million.
Artillery
In order to maintain and improve its long range fire support capability, the Indian Army is engaged in a major program known as the Field Artillery Rationalisation Plan, which will acquire howitzers of towed, as well as self-propelled wheeled and tracked types. The 155mm/52 calibre weapons are expected to dominate the procurement, however a number of lightweight 155mm/39 weapons are also being procured so as to enhance rapidly deliverable battlefield firepower. The lightweight towed howitzers sought are to be air transportable. A RFP was released in January 2008 and is expected to have gone to BAE systems (UFH/M777), and Singapore Technologies Kinetics (Pegasus), as well as potential additional bidders.
In April 2008, it was announced that BAE Systems is to partner with indian company, Mahindra Defence Systems. This will provide a local production capacity for BAEs M777 and in May 2008 another indian company, Punj Lloyd announced that it is in advanced discussions with a leading defence manufacturer to provide a joint bid for the program. Then in June 2008, Punj Lloyd partnered with Singapore Tech. Kinetics (STK) to submit a proposal for the program. Under the partnership the two companies will jointly produce STKs Pegasus 155mm howitzer.
Trials for the potential solutions are expected to take place in the western rajasthan desert and mountains. Adecision may follow in late 2008 or 2009. Deliveries are estimated to take place between 2010 and 2013.
Ratus Ratus
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Interesting, espicially the BAE M777 How. Nice and light and Airportable also.
small side coment:
Woudl India be better of with lots of these since that seem to have problems with their own designs at least they will work and fire BB bullets
Ok sorry about the sidetracking..
small side coment:
Woudl India be better of with lots of these since that seem to have problems with their own designs at least they will work and fire BB bullets
Ok sorry about the sidetracking..
Ratus Ratus
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link if you don't have it
BananaHobby - Airsoft Battle Tanks
Go clean up that Canadian district you live in
fatman17
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Army Procurement
155 mm Artillery Systems
A moderm 155mm self-propelled howitzer is considered to be crucial to replace obsolete Abbots and to enable mechanisation of further units and formations in the Strike Corps. The need for new artillery became even more apparent during the Kashmir crisis of March 1999 in which India's Bofors guns were said to have playeda major role but during which over 100 of 410 had to be cannibalised to provide spares in the course of India's extended military stand-off with Pakistan in 2002 it became apparent that strike formations lacked artillery mobility in support of armour.
Trials of South Africa's Denel GS/2000 and Sweden's Bofors FH-77B05L52 were completed in November 2003. Israel's Soltam TIG-2000 had to withdraw but in late 2004 was being considered for a seperate trial. All three vendors were invited for trials in the western-Rajasthan desert for the third time in December 2004 but Denel reportedly withdrew its platform half way through the trials due to technical problems.
Soltam has a contract to upgrade 130mm M-46 field guns to 155mm calibre at a cost of about USD80 million. Some 500 guns are being upgraded, although it is apparent they are unsuitable for deployment in mountain areas, being incapable of elevating beyond 45 degrees.
On 1st October 2004, it was reported that a contract for USD443 million had been signed with Denel, in a joint venture with Bharat Earth Movers Ltd (BELM), to produce the Bhim self-propelled 155mm gun. However the contract has been halted pending the outcome of an investigation into Denel.
The situation remains opaque concerning the govt's long term intentions in regard to 155mm artillery and in July 2007 the defence minister dtated that the army had not been satisfied with the results of trials involving Bofors (now owned by BAE Systems) and Soltam and that fresh tenders for tracked (100) and wheeled (180) 155mm equipment would be issued at the "earliest".
MRLS
Although the Pinaka MRL is in limited service, it appears that user trials continue. Procurement of the Pinaka fills a capability gap existant between BM-21 and BM-9A52 platforms. However, due to various ongoing problems with the platforms it is anticipated that procurement may be delayed pending further testing of the system. It has been announced that the system has completed the first phase of army requirements and that Defence Research Development Organisation (DRDO) conducted further firing trials on 22 December 2004, 27 May 2005 and 14 April 2006. In spite of the declared success of Pinaka, the army wishes to acquire two regiments worth of Russian Smarch MRLS for USD450 million and a contract was signed to that effect in January 2006. It is expected that delivery will take place in 2008.
155 mm Artillery Systems
A moderm 155mm self-propelled howitzer is considered to be crucial to replace obsolete Abbots and to enable mechanisation of further units and formations in the Strike Corps. The need for new artillery became even more apparent during the Kashmir crisis of March 1999 in which India's Bofors guns were said to have playeda major role but during which over 100 of 410 had to be cannibalised to provide spares in the course of India's extended military stand-off with Pakistan in 2002 it became apparent that strike formations lacked artillery mobility in support of armour.
Trials of South Africa's Denel GS/2000 and Sweden's Bofors FH-77B05L52 were completed in November 2003. Israel's Soltam TIG-2000 had to withdraw but in late 2004 was being considered for a seperate trial. All three vendors were invited for trials in the western-Rajasthan desert for the third time in December 2004 but Denel reportedly withdrew its platform half way through the trials due to technical problems.
Soltam has a contract to upgrade 130mm M-46 field guns to 155mm calibre at a cost of about USD80 million. Some 500 guns are being upgraded, although it is apparent they are unsuitable for deployment in mountain areas, being incapable of elevating beyond 45 degrees.
On 1st October 2004, it was reported that a contract for USD443 million had been signed with Denel, in a joint venture with Bharat Earth Movers Ltd (BELM), to produce the Bhim self-propelled 155mm gun. However the contract has been halted pending the outcome of an investigation into Denel.
The situation remains opaque concerning the govt's long term intentions in regard to 155mm artillery and in July 2007 the defence minister dtated that the army had not been satisfied with the results of trials involving Bofors (now owned by BAE Systems) and Soltam and that fresh tenders for tracked (100) and wheeled (180) 155mm equipment would be issued at the "earliest".
MRLS
Although the Pinaka MRL is in limited service, it appears that user trials continue. Procurement of the Pinaka fills a capability gap existant between BM-21 and BM-9A52 platforms. However, due to various ongoing problems with the platforms it is anticipated that procurement may be delayed pending further testing of the system. It has been announced that the system has completed the first phase of army requirements and that Defence Research Development Organisation (DRDO) conducted further firing trials on 22 December 2004, 27 May 2005 and 14 April 2006. In spite of the declared success of Pinaka, the army wishes to acquire two regiments worth of Russian Smarch MRLS for USD450 million and a contract was signed to that effect in January 2006. It is expected that delivery will take place in 2008.
fatman17
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found this 2004 article.....
Country Briefing: India - Divided interests
RAHUL BEDI JDW Correspondent - New Delhi
Failing morale, internecine rivalries, ambiguous policies and financial constraints are just a few of the obstacles blocking India's road to modernising its armed forces
India's armed forces are struggling to overcome a number of obstacles as they strive to rebuild themselves into a nuclear-capable force adept at meeting emerging regional and global security challenges. The services are battling against a traditional mindset, an ambiguous defence policy and a crisis in decision-making. Finally, an unrelenting squeeze on financial resources is hampering urgent equipment modernisation efforts.
This predicament is exacerbated by the continuing rivalry between the divided armed forces and the civilian-dominated Ministry of Defence (MoD). The political leadership, largely ignorant about security and nuclear-related issues, but the final authority on military budgets and equipment allocations, adds to the beleaguered military's woes.
"Neither the political leaders concerned nor the bureaucracy that is tasked with the purpose give two hoots about national security," says former vice chief of army staff, Lt Gen Vijay Oberoi. K Subrahmanyam, former head of the National Security Advisory Board, says the 'lotus eating' attitude of the MoD's 'generalist' civil service has neither been conditioned nor trained to think through long-term international and national security issues. This situation, he adds, became "starker" after India emerged in 1998 as a nuclear weapon state.
The alleged arms corruption scandal involving senior army and MoD officers that led to defence minister George Fernandes' resignation in March 2001 - he rejoined seven months later - has almost permanently scared decision makers into deferring the acquisition of necessary hardware. Fearing future repercussions, few in the armed forces or in the MoD's newly created Defence Procurement Board are willing to finalise contracts, officials admit.
This vacillation in equipment purchases led the government to pressure the MoD into surrendering Rs100 billion ($2.08 billion) of its unspent allocation for Fiscal Year (FY) 2002-03 to meet the country's rising deficit. This includes around Rs64.99 billion of its capital outlay earmarked for new and retrofitted hardware, which the parliamentary standing committee on defence attributed to "slippages, slow progress of work, non-finalisation of deals and contractual commitments".
Apart from the ninth five-year defence plan, which ended in 2002, none of the previous eight plans received government approval. This led to "lop-sided growth" according to many serving and retired officers, and merely addressed the "immediate point of pain" and not collective force levels. "With persistently low expenditure on modernisation, India is not only unable to modernise its defence capability, but [it] actually adds to its obsolescence," says retired Air Cdr Jasjit Singh of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Delhi. The 10th defence plan (2002-07) has not yet been approved.
The impetus to revamp the country's security, defence and intelligence apparatus followed the report of the inquiry committee investigating the army and security agency's failure to detect, for several months, the infiltration of thousands of Pakistani troops and Islamic militants into Indian-administered Kashmir in 1999 (Jane's Defence Weekly 9 June 1999 ).
Attempts thereafter to revise the military's hidebound ethos and procedures by appointing a chief of defence staff (CDS) to streamline the defence machinery, have been stymied by inter-service turf wars and political and bureaucratic machinations. The CDS is envisaged as a crucial interface between the defence, civilian and political establishments and to help re-order archaic procurement and operational procedures.
As a compromise, the government created the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) in October 2001 to create greater synergy between the services and the MoD. The strategic force command (SFC), India's only tri-service command on the Andaman and Nicobar island territory off the east coast was formalised earlier this year and placed under the IDS. The Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) was also made subordinate to the IDS. Both were originally supposed to be under the authority of the CDS.
But in the absence of any precedent or culture of togetherness the IDS is struggling for an identity to play a definitive role in a regrouped force. In turn, it reports to the consensus-driven and largely divided chiefs of the staff committee (CoSC) and its essentially personality-based orientation, headed in rotation by the senior most service chief.
"The IDS cannot perform coherently or effectively without an authoritative and accountable head, much less give advice to the defence minister or the cabinet committee on security," says former chief of army staff Gen Ved Prakash Malik. The CDS is the cornerstone of the armed forces' reforms and its non-implementation is the most serious holdback, particularly as India is now a nuclear weapon state, he adds.
India's nuclear status and the rapidly altering regional and global security scenario, however, have led to a gradual broadening of the military's introverted horizons. "It [the armed forces] is beginning to re-define regional priorities in keeping with its perceived vision and strength, besides strengthening the Indian Navy's (IN's) strategic role and its role overseas as a credible force projector" says an officer associated with Delhi's 'outward thrust' towards creating strategic regional alliances.
ARMY
The flagging morale of the 1.1 million-strong Indian Army following last year's 10-month deployment along the Pakistan frontier in a heightened state of alert, plus the further degradation of its dated equipment, has only added to the problems of an overburdened force (JDW 25 September 2002).
The enormous cost of the mobilisation that ended last November, estimated at more than Rs10 billion ($208 million), has led the government to impose a special state levy and cancel all annual major army manoeuvres. To some extent, it has contributed to the postponement of new, long-awaited equipment. The army's FY03-04 allocation of Rs345.74 billion is barely enough to maintain its existing assets, leaving a meagre amount for capital expenditure to modernise and purchase new equipment.
Despite repeated declarations by successive chiefs of staff of evolving into a "lean and technologically-driven force", the army is actually adding more units in the hope of re-establishing the conventional edge it once enjoyed over Pakistan and to combat the interrelated Kashmiri insurgency.
The 1999 border war with Pakistan along the Line of Control in the Kargil region thwarted the army's five-year-old plans to reduce force levels by 100,000-150,000 personnel by 2015 by using up funds saved for modernisation. According to the Indian Ministry of Defence (MoD), the army instead requires augmented force levels to meet "emerging operational situations along the borders".
"Other than redressing the existing deficiencies in hardware, ammunition and force levels, the declining combat ratio (CR) with Pakistan also needs attention," says a senior officer. Before 1990 the CR was 1.74:1 in favour of India. After 1990, the CR declined to 1.56:1 and 10 years later it is 1.22:1. "This attrition is due mainly to fatigue from extended counter-insurgency (COIN) deployments, inefficient and bureaucratic modernisation procedures, lop-sided promotional policies underpinned by increasing political interference and an acute officer shortage," according to another officer.
In January, the Cabinet Committee on Security sanctioned four additional Special Forces battalions that will be trained by Israel in "irregular warfare". They will be equipped with Israel Military Industries' 5.56mm Tavor 21 assault rifles and 7.62mm Galil sniper rifles and will be stationed in Kashmir. And, after witnessing the success of the US Special Forces in Iraq, India's Chief Of Army Staff, Gen Nirmal C Vij, has asked the Directorate of Military Operations and the Army Training Command to draw up a blueprint for a similar, flexible force to execute specialised missions of a political or strategic nature behind enemy lines.
By 2006-07 the army also plans to establish another 25-30 Rashtriya (or National ) Rifle (RR) battalions dedicated to COIN operations to augment the existing 36 RR units operating across Kashmir. The RR was raised in 1990 as a specialised army-oriented force to exclusively tackle insurgency and rear-area security in order to free regular units from COIN operations and allow them to revert to normal training and thus improve morale.
The army recently announced the formation of its second artillery division achieved by reorganising existing artillery brigades that will be based at Southern Command headquarters at Pune, western India. The 41st Artillery Division will augment armour and mechanised formations in the Rajasthan and neighbouring Gujarat sectors to neutralise strategic Pakistani targets. Besides missiles, it will eventually be equipped with 155mm/52-cal howitzers.
The Strategic Rocket Command, the army's second missile regiment, is also preparing to introduce a variant of Agni, the locally developed intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) that has a range of 2,200km. The Agni has gone into series production and is expected to enter service soon. The short-range Agni variant, tested earlier this year to a range of 700km to strike high value Pakistani targets, and another IRBM capable of hitting targets more than 3,000km inside China, are also likely to be handed over to the Strategic Rocket Command. The 3,000km-range variant, often referred to as Agni III, is being tested later this year.
THREAT ASSESSMENT
India's armed forces are slowly widening their security dragnet to include Afghanistan, the Central Asian Republics and members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). According to some Indian sources, it hopes to strategically surround Pakistan and to contain China, its long-term threat.
India is finalising negotiations to train the Afghan National Army (ANA), open its first foreign military base in Tajikistan and to hold military manoeuvres with the Tajik Army to establish a presence in the oil-rich Caspian region. ANA and Afghan police officers currently attend several of its training academies.
New Delhi is also forging closer military ties with Burma (Myanmar) where China and, to a lesser extent Pakistan, play a dominant security and military role. It has also cemented defence and naval ties with Vietnam and has agreed "in principal" to supply Hanoi with its locally developed Prithvi surface-to-surface missile, with a 150km range, and to train Vietnamese nuclear scientists.
Of growing significance are India's burgeoning military links with Israel over the past five years and, after 11 September 2001, with the US once Washington lifted nuclear sanctions. Since the Hindu nationalists assumed office five years ago, Israel has emerged as a principal supplier of military equipment after Russia, providing an assortment of equipment, upgrades and ordnance to all three services.
The Indian and US navies jointly patrolled, until late 2002, the Malacca Straits over which China exercises considerable control and through which pass more than 80% of Japan's oil supplies from west Asia. A recent US Department of Defence analysis declared that Washington's 'long-term' security alliance with India is also aimed at containing China, which they both view as an emerging economic and military competitor. The 130-page report, "Indo-US military relationship: Expectations and perceptions", states that if Washington's future relationships with traditional allies - Japan, South Korea and Saudi Arabia - become more fragile, India will emerge as a "critical component" of US military strategy in the region.
Besides exercises with the US Navy in the Arabian Sea last October, the Indian Navy held joint manoeuvres with France, Iran, Oman and Russia. India is also to help Iran maintain its three Russian Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines; train Iranian naval personnel; and service its Soviet and Russian BMP armoured personnel carriers. Indian Air Force technicians will also help Tehran support an assorted range of Iranian fighter aircraft like MiG-29 interceptors, Su-22, Su-24 and Su-25 ground-attack aircraft.
INDUSTRY
Technological overreach, mounting inefficiency, poor quality control and an increasing dependency on imports are adversely affecting India's monopolistic state-owned defence industry, which continues to resist urgent calls for privatisation.
The armed forces, supported by the Confederation of Indian Industries (CII), continue to demand a competitive source for equipment and spares. However, politicians and Ministry of Defence (MoD) officials are resisting such attempts in order to protect the employment and economic stakes in the over-staffed and wasteful 39 ordnance factories and eight defence public sector units (PSUs) that operate at less than half their declared capacity.
"They fear social chaos if workers are laid off in any move towards privatisation that is essential to meet India's ambitious target of locally producing 70% of its defence equipment and spares by 2005-07," says an army officer, who declined to be named. Otherwise, India's vast requirements to replace its ageing Soviet and Russian equipment will financially "bleed it dry" he adds.
Despite its enormous military-industrial complex, India's defence exports in 2002-03 totalled $45.22 million, a quarter of the projected target of $208.3 million, and included mostly low-end items like boots, small arms ammunition, explosives, uniforms and belts. "Even when India is able to offer a saleable product, the time and cost overruns associated with its manufacturing units renders the product non-competitive," former chief of naval staff Adm J G Nadkarni said in an article in the newspaper Asian Age. The locally developed, but still inefficient INSAS 5.56mm assault rifle (AR), for instance, was priced at around Rs16,000 ($333.33) per piece, while the relatively better performing Romanian AK-47 ARs, imported in the mid-1990s, cost around $90-$93 each.
Defence Minister George Fernandes recently described India as a "third-rate" weapon-producing nation that is forced to source its military hardware requirements from overseas. Calling for greater privatisation, he said there was a need to instil greater "discipline and integrity" in the defence sector's work force as it took Indian shipyards three times as long to build a warship compared with Russia. He was referring to Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers (GRSE) at Calcutta, which completed INS Brahmaputra, the first of three locally modified Godavari-class frigates that was commissioned in 2000, after 12 years. The two remaining Project 16A boats, INS Beas and INS Betwa, are still under construction and will not be commissioned before the end of 2004, several years behind schedule. All three frigates, however, will have to wait to be fitted with Russian/Israeli missile systems since, like all other Indian Navy (IN) vessels, the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has failed to produce any missile systems locally.
Trishul (Trident), the indigenously developed quick-reaction, low-altitude surface-to-air missile (SAM) was recently withdrawn due to technical problems (JDW 1 May). Trishul was part of the nearly two decade-old integrated guided missile development programme. It will be continued as a technology demonstration programme. Nearly 400 employees at Bharat Dynamics Ltd (BDL), India's principal public sector missile manufacturer in Hyderabad in the south, have been shifted over the past year to the production of 7.62mm self-loading rifles and 9mm pistols for the paramilitary forces. User trials for two other IGDMP products remain incomplete: the multitarget Akash (Sky) SAM and Nag (Snake), the third-generation anti-tank guided weapon.
"Optimal use had to be made of staff employed in the workshop for manufacturing missiles," BDL officials told the parliamentary defence committee recently. BDL's production values too have dropped from Rs3.55 billion in 1997-98 to Rs2.71 billion in 2001-02.
Parliamentary and other defence watchdog committees have repeatedly, over several decades, criticised the government's interminably delayed military equipment development programmes and its resistance to privatisation, but to little avail.
Ambitious and politically sensitive projects like the 20-year old light combat aircraft (LCA) - recently christened Tejas - which was initiated to replace the air force's ageing 300-400 MiG-21s, is not only 10-12 years behind schedule, but highly import dependent. It is powered by the US General Electric F 404-GE-F2J3 engine, while Martin-Marietta has provided the LCA's flight control system. Indian Air Force (IAF) officers privately admit to not taking the LCA into "serious" operational consideration since it will be "technologically obsolete" by the time it enters service around 2006-07. IN officers treat the LCA's proposed naval version with similar scepticism.
Plagued by cost overruns and technological snags, various electronic warfare (EW) systems started in the mid-1980s are nowhere near fruition, while the programme to upgrade 125 MiG- 21bis fighters with improved French and Israeli avionics, weaponry and EW systems is running three-to-five years behind schedule.
Technological and operational shortcomings in the Arjun main battle tank (MBT) after nearly 25 years of development, user trials and limited series production led to the import two years ago of 310 Russian T 90S MBTs for $700 million-$750 million. One hundred and twenty four were completed in Russia and the 186 remainding are to be assembled at the Heavy Vehicles Factory at Avadi, south India, thereafter manufactured locally under licence. Some 124 Arjun MBTs, cleared for manufacture by the Heavy Vehicles Factory in the late 1990s, are awaiting further government approval.
Submarine and frigate building programmes at expensively developed facilities at Mazagaon Dockyard Ltd (MDL), Bombay, have barely been activated, leading to the "lost decade" of the 1990s during which IN force levels dropped appreciably. This, in turn, led to the import of three Russian Krivak III (Project 1135.6 ) Talwar-class frigates that are due to enter service by year-end. Official sources say the IN plans to buy three additional Krivak III-class frigates as indigenous shipyards constantly re-adjust delivery schedules and remain unable to meet the navy's demands.
But under pressure from the CII and the services, the MoD has opened up to private participation through licensing by amending the 47-year-old Industrial Policy Resolution and by permitting a foreign direct investment (FDI) limit of 26% to facilitate technology transfers and meet challenges posed by the revolution in military affairs (RMA).
The newly formed Integrated Defence Staff has also constituted the all-Services Horizon Core Technology Group, headed by a two-star officer, that includes DRDO scientists from the Group for Forecasting and Analysis of Systems. The group will examine technologies and systems that will play a predominant role in developing India's military capability and will recommend measures to implement them.
CII projections indicate that by 2010 around 14,000 private companies will be involved in the defence sector, but many manufacturers are wary about vested MoD interests limiting them to merely making components and sub-systems, instead of completed weapon systems and ordnance. They also remain wary about investing in defence research and development, as insufficient orders from an "untrustworthy buyer" would make their participation commercially untenable.
fatman17
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Army Procurement
UAVs and Mortar / Artillery Locating Radars
The army is seeking expansion of its Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) fleet to provide commanders with real time information about the battlefield in depth. The locally built, low endurance, short range Nishant (restless) was initiated by DRDO in 1990 and first underwent flight trials in 1995 with intended entry into service by 1997. However production delays and technical deficiencies caused the army to look overseas for a reliable UAV with longer range.
In December 2000 a USD300 million contract was negotiated with Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) for Searcher 2 tactical UAVs. Development of Nishant continues with some pre-production models undergoing operational trials. India already operates Israeli Searchers and in early 2008 agreed to develop three UAVs (Rustam, Pawan, Gagan) with Israel inspite of Israel having refused to purchase even token numbers of India manufactured Lakshya target drones.
In April 2002, India ordered eight Raytheon AN/TPQ 37 locating radars for USD146 million, the first major defence deal with the US for some 40 years. The first two radars arrived in India on 10 July 2003. A further order for four radars was approved by Congress and delivery of all 12 systems was completed in Feburary 2007.
In early May 2007, Thales Raytheon Systems completed its delivery of the final two (of 12) AN TPQ 37 /V13 Firefinder artillery acquired under the US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. The systems are mounted on locally built vehicles and equipped with a package supplied by Israel's Tadiran Communications. The Firefinder radars can detect artillery positions at a distance of 28-32 Km and tactical missiles upto 50 km away with an accuracy of 10m. The Indian Army wants 40-50 fire locating radars for deployment in northern Kashmir, the western Rajasthan desert region and in the adjoining Punjab plains, but the deal with Raytheon does not involve any transfer of technology. Officials said the remaining numbers are to be met by a locally developed phased array system.
UAVs and Mortar / Artillery Locating Radars
The army is seeking expansion of its Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) fleet to provide commanders with real time information about the battlefield in depth. The locally built, low endurance, short range Nishant (restless) was initiated by DRDO in 1990 and first underwent flight trials in 1995 with intended entry into service by 1997. However production delays and technical deficiencies caused the army to look overseas for a reliable UAV with longer range.
In December 2000 a USD300 million contract was negotiated with Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) for Searcher 2 tactical UAVs. Development of Nishant continues with some pre-production models undergoing operational trials. India already operates Israeli Searchers and in early 2008 agreed to develop three UAVs (Rustam, Pawan, Gagan) with Israel inspite of Israel having refused to purchase even token numbers of India manufactured Lakshya target drones.
In April 2002, India ordered eight Raytheon AN/TPQ 37 locating radars for USD146 million, the first major defence deal with the US for some 40 years. The first two radars arrived in India on 10 July 2003. A further order for four radars was approved by Congress and delivery of all 12 systems was completed in Feburary 2007.
In early May 2007, Thales Raytheon Systems completed its delivery of the final two (of 12) AN TPQ 37 /V13 Firefinder artillery acquired under the US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. The systems are mounted on locally built vehicles and equipped with a package supplied by Israel's Tadiran Communications. The Firefinder radars can detect artillery positions at a distance of 28-32 Km and tactical missiles upto 50 km away with an accuracy of 10m. The Indian Army wants 40-50 fire locating radars for deployment in northern Kashmir, the western Rajasthan desert region and in the adjoining Punjab plains, but the deal with Raytheon does not involve any transfer of technology. Officials said the remaining numbers are to be met by a locally developed phased array system.
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