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HawkEye27

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So a renowned defense journalist of India has come up with this @@@@

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And here is the long article.

https://theprint.in/defence/8-piece...abhinandan-shot-down-a-pakistani-f-16/278752/

Extremely desparate to claim F-16
 
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Interesting situation in coming days.

-Indian may try a misadventure around 26-27 Aug (Revenge on 27th)

-PAF is planning to go full bore with all official version on 6 September. Expect a full show with actual heroes, their interviews and actual story of the day.

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No 14 Sqn JF-17 based at Minhas AB (closest to Kashmir) spotted with REK Glide Bombs.
 
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It's long but with full of reasoning. Good read for mystery of 27Th Feb and #doosara banda.
 
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Evidence 6: The ‘Tadpole’
The ‘Tadpole’ is a nickname given to a tadpole-shaped ‘large smokey cloud like object’, which was observed from two locations — Charhoi and Thanamandi (ref videos). In both videos, the ‘Tadpole’ stands out against a clear sky, which is devoid of any clouds and any other natural phenomenon.

So, what was it?

Before analysing the videos, let’s take a look at the position of the Sun in southern Azad Kashmir area on 27 February 2019 at approximately 1020 — 1030 hours. The position is as shown below, obtained through a Sun position calculator and will be used for calculating the directions as required.

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Position of the Sun with respect to Azad Kashmir at 1030 hours on 27 February 2019 | Image: By special arrangement
1. Analysing the Thanamandi video
This video was shot by a Kashmiri named Wasim from the Thanamandi town of Rajouri district in J&K, looking towards Azad Kashmir from his location. It was uploaded on YouTube on 28 February 2019. From the shadow of the objects and the known position of the Sun at approx 1030 hours in J&K, it can be inferred that the observer is looking towards a westerly course of 230–250 degrees.

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A tadpole-shaped, cloud-like object is seen falling towards the earth in Azad Kashmir in the video (Screenshot)
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The enlarged view clearly shows a burning object falling, being shielded by a smoke cover.
An image analysis of the enlarged view of the Tadpole indicates presence of a hot spot — with a fire burning within, shielded by the emanating smoke.

This clearly indicates that the Tadpole is a man-made object on fire.

With feedback from Wasim that he had taken the video from his mobile phone from Thanamandi area in J&K, it was easy to locate and geotag the location using Google Earth. The coordinates of the observer are 33°31’30.90″N, 74°20’37.20″E at an AMSL (above mean sea level) altitude of 4,800 feet. His geotagged position with Google Earth (Courtesy @bishwa55900127) is as shown below:

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Geotagged position of Thanamandi observer | Courtesy : @bishwa55900127
The ‘Tadpole’ is mathematically calculated to be at a distance of between 37–40 km from, and 8,000 feet higher than the observer, which makes it 4,800+8,000 feet=12,800 feet or 13,000 feet AMSL. On the basis of this the (bottom to top) height of the Tadpole is calculated as approx 800–1,000 feet. Thanamandi to Tadpole line is from 33°31’30.90″N, 74°20’37.20″E to 33°22’14.54″N, 73°46’4.47″E, that means that the Tadpole is located anywhere on this line between 37–40 km.

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Thanamandi to Tadpole line | By special arrangement
2. Analysing the Charhoi video
The Charhoi video which was shot by an unknown Azad Kashmir resident using a mobile camera, captures some very crucial events on 27 February. These raw clips from the same mobile within the period 1020–1045 hours were stitched together and uploaded on YouTube.

It shows the same Tadpole as seen in the Thanamandi video from a different direction, which assessing the position of the Sun, is on a course between 020–030 from the observer.

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The Tadpole seen from the Charhoi observer’s position
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A close up of the same Tadpole
When we superimpose the Tadpole seen from Charhoi with the one seen from Thanamandi, we get the SAME image. Both locations are seeing the same smokey cloud.

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Both images show the same Tadpole image
Geotagging and finding the location of the observer took a while since the origin was unknown. However, two images in the video do provide us a clue to the location — a mobile tower and a building with a water tank, both located in the vicinity. The observer is on the building with the water tank. The scene matching with GE was done by @bennedose & @bishwa55900127, who were able to pin point the location well.

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The video scenes matched to Google Earth | @bennedose
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Observer’s location & scene matching in the video | Credits @bennedose
The location of the Charhoi building is at 33°18’29.17″N 73°57’25.38″E. Its elevation is aprox 2,900 feet AMSL. Using maths and related thumb rules, the Tadpole near Charhoi was 3,000–4,000 feet above the observer, or 2,900 + 3,500 (avg)= 6,500 feet AMSL. Means that the Charhoi observer saw the Tadpole at a slightly later stage than as seen from Thanamandi. In fact, towards the end in the Charhoi video, one can see that the Tadpole starts to marginally disintegrate.

Taking the heading of the Tadpole from the Charhoi observer as 025 degree on a north-east extended line, we now bisect it with the extended line from the Thanamandi observer. This gives us a ballpark position of the Tadpole on the map.

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The bisector of two observation lines shows us the approximate position of the Tadpole
3. Tadpole — resolving the mystery
The Thanamandi and Charhoi videos clearly bring out that the burning object falling in the sky was made of combustible material. While the Thanamandi observer captured the Tadpole in a well-formed state around 13,000 feet AMSL— the burning object would have needed at least 8–10,000 feet to attain that shape from an initial null position, hence from altitude around 23–25,000 feet AMSL.

The white smoke and cloudy appearance also indicate — very high temperatures and continuous combustion from a supportive material, as well as condensation due to low temperatures of the burning fuel.

So, what would have the capacity to burn continuously, condense, as well as fall at a low ROD giving an appearance of a tadpole like cloud?

Fuel!

Yes, lots of fuel. Okay, this would have to be a very cold day that warms up dramatically initially and then sustains very gradual warming, leading to condensation of fuel which burns steady and slowly thereafter. But when does this ever happen?

On an average, the temperature drops by 2 degrees Celsius for every 1,000 feet of altitude gained, which would mean a drop of 2 x 22,000 feet (elevation allowance of 3,000 feet) = 44-degree change. With the ground temperature over Azad Kashmir on 27 February around 1020 hours being in the region of 10 degree centigrade, at 25,000 feet AMSL works out to be +10–44 = – 33 degrees centigrade. And what would cause a sudden, very high-rise temperature spike enough to ignite fuel at -33 degree centigrade?

That would be a combustible material — which will burn very fast, producing very high temperatures, as well as adjust to temperature changes quickly. Aluminium, is second only to copper for rapid heat transfer properties, which will burn at a very fast rate, within a confined zone.

And once the combustible material burns out, the large volume of condensation of fuel, would still be good enough to maintain the consistency and cloudy shape of the tadpole, dissipating gradually.

Here’s the $75 million question — What is made of aluminium and carries a lot of fuel in the sky?

A fighter jet!!

For trivia’s sake, 80 per cent of the airframe structure of the F-16 is of conventional aluminium alloy.

The Tadpole was formed after an aircraft’s aluminium airframe caught fire due to volatile kinetic stress — the damage releasing huge quantities of fuel in the rarefied cold air, experiencing condensation and started burning at a slow, but steady rate. A gallon of Jet A-1 type fuel weighs 6.66 pounds, which in its condensed form would have a low rate of decent — the net result — white smoke due to very high temperature (in addition to the aluminium airframe and fuel, all the armament would have exploded) intermixed with condensed fuel falling towards earth very slowly, forming a near definitive cloud like shape till dissipation at lower (warmer) levels.

On that day, temperatures till about 4–5,000 feet AGL would have been below freezing point, hence seen for a large duration of time from two different locations. Would probably have started to dissipate below 5,000 feet AGL, especially with the airframe having burnt out much earlier, encountering warmer temperatures below the freezing point during descent.

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The Tadpole’s journey from 15,000 feet to 5,000 feet
Refer to the Thanamandi image on the left — the hot spot nearly encompasses an area of 150 feet (height) x 75 feet (width), which indicates a super-HOT core. In the Charhoi image (right) there is no hot spot, which indicates the combustion material may have completely burnt out. There would however be very small pieces of unburnt debris and molten metal, which would have fallen below the Tadpole over a large area.

A very critical output here is that — MOST of the airframe would have burnt out at a very fast rate, hence no large sized debris in that zone.

The Tadpole— is the VISUAL PROOF of the crash of a second aircraft in Azad Kashmir on 27 February 2019!

IF IAF only lost one aircraft — who lost a second aircraft that day?

Why the Tadpole cannot be the IAF MiG-21 is addressed in subsequent paragraphs. Also, the claimed Su-30MKI kill by the PAF was supposed to have fallen over J&K, not Azad Kashmir.

I can close the argument right here — because we now have the VISUAL proof of a ‘PAF asset’ going down during Op Swift Retort!

Yes, there is no image of the debris on ground (neither will there be anything meaningful)— but since time immortal, kills have been granted basis gun camera footage — in the absence of which, the crashing image of the ‘Tadpole’ is a very serious piece of evidence — debunking consistent lies of the PAF and ISPR on the subject.

However, let’s continue the reconstruction of events to get to the bottom of what happened that day! So, what caused a PAF fighter jet to convert into a Tadpole?

It all started with a puff!

Evidence 7: The puff
The ‘puff’ was the point of impact of a R-73 missile with the PAF aircraft. It can be seen in two videos in different capacities, setting in motion a series of events, which culminated in the formation of the tadpole.

Analysing the Charhoi video
The Charhoi video interestingly starts with a missile streak and appearance of a small ‘puff’ of smoke after some seconds, followed by sound of twin thuds at an estimated distance of 4–5 km from the observer.

Based on the Sun’s position that day, the observer is looking at this on a heading between 290–320 degrees. The visible missile streak is indicative of an air-to-air missile, with the puff being its point of impact.

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A missile streak and a subsequent puff is visible in the beginning of Charhoi video
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The red circle shows the approximate position of the puff from the observer
Could it have been a contrail? Possible at higher levels as seen that day — but unlikely around 25,000 feet for a small missile.

The puff appears 4–5 seconds after the spotting of the streak in the video, followed by two sharp thuds. Is this the MiG-21 shootdown video?

No, NOT the MiG-21 being hit by an AMRAAM (the MiG-21 crash videos is available here and here as reference). The MiG after being hit, fell down fast, with a well-formed smoke trail and one loud sharp bang — While in the Charhoi video, no other event is noticeable around the ‘puff’ for a considerable period thereafter.

The major difference being that — the ‘puff’ indicates an explosion of a warhead which has NOT caused any upfront incendiary damage — On the other hand, a large smoke trail in the MiG video is indicative of a post-impact explosion and trauma.

Also, the twin thuds heard in the Charhoi video, indicate the explosion of the missile warhead and probable deceleration below Mach 1 barrier by the stricken aircraft (wherein as per IACCS radar info, most PAF BARCAP F-16’s were flying supersonic over Mach 1+)

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Comparison of MiG-21 shootdown vs events as seen by Charhoi observer
In terms of direction, for the observer at Charhoi — the MiG-21 crash site is on a southerly course of 170 degrees or so, while the ‘puff’ is on approx. direction of 300 degrees. Hence the missile streak and the ‘puff’ in the Charhoi video are not related to the MiG-21 crash at all.

The ‘puff’ as seen in the video is the point where the proximity fuse of the R-73 has activated its warhead close to a PAF aircraft (not visible).

Sceptics will question why can’t this be an AMRAAM fired from a PAF jet? To the best my knowledge, no PAF missile was fired in this direction. On the other hand, the R-73 launch and distance covered by the missile matches perfectly with Abhi’s initial position as per the IACCS radar picture provided in Evidence No3. More on this later.

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Interpretation of the streak and the subsequent puff in the Charhoi video
 
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Evidence 8: The puff, a parachute & a piece of debris
The journey of the PAF aircraft after being hit by the R-73 is captured in video No. 4 called Khuiratta, available here.

Captured by an amateur who would have reacted at least 10 seconds after hearing the twin thuds post the ‘puff’ event and spotting the scene unfolding — this is taken near the town of Khuiratta in Azad Kashmir. The observer is capturing the aerial component of the video and looking on course 220–250 degrees, which confirms with the angle of the Sun at that time.

This video provides the chain of events between the ‘puff’ and the ‘Tadpole’ — capturing the impact point ‘puff’ (which appears momentarily at 1:14 in the video) and after that, details the fall of a debris from the PAF aircraft and a parachute coming down.

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The Khuiratta video, though mostly shows the debris piece and the parachute, also momentarily shows a glimpse of the puff
If we take a close-up look and compare the puff seen in the Khuiratta video, we see that it’s the same event seen in the Charhoi video.

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The ‘puff’ recorded in the Khuiratta and Charhoi videos are nearly identical
The geotagging and Google Earth scene matching of the observer’s position was done by @bishwa55900127, which is shown as below.

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Scene build-up from the Khuiratta video | @bishwa55900127


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Credit | @bishwa55900127
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Credit | @bishwa55900127
The location of the Khuiratta observer is at 33°14’13.82″N, 73° 54’25.29″E

Next we calculate the distance to the various objects seen and their direction lines. Here @bishwa55900127 has done the math well.

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The montage of linked images shows the complete scene in the video | @bishwa55900127
The montage of linked images shows the complete scene in the video. The highest entity seen in the video is the ‘puff’, which may be around 25,000 feet AMSL. Mostly we see a parachute and a partial debris falling towards the earth. What is interesting to note is that these (puff-parachute-debris) appear to be on a near line.

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Puff line: 33°22’9.96″N, 74° 0’23.89″E to 33°17’27.90″N, 73°52’47.01″E
Debris line: 33°22’9.96″N, 74° 0’23.89″E to 33°20’32.56″N, 73°51’4.00″E
Parachute line: 33°22’9.96″N, 74° 0’23.89″E to 33°20’15.53″N, 73°51’10.37″E

The distance of the puff from the observer is around 11 km (with the aircraft at 25,000 feet AMSL). The debris falling is a piece of the aircraft and NOT the complete aircraft.
The various inferences are:

  1. The ‘puff’ or a missile impact is clearly seen from two different locations. In the Khuiratta video we have assumed that the observer starts to record 10 seconds after hearing the twin thuds from the R-73 explosion.
  2. In the video — we see a low rate of descent object falling — which can only be a parachute.
  3. There is a displaced gap between the ‘puff’ and the parachute and the debris. The approx distance between them is calculated as 6 km. It also indicates that the pilot ejected after a ‘delay’ post the initial impact at the ‘puff’.
  4. The debris falling with a high rate of descent in this video is a ‘partial’ debris piece from the aircraft, having detached from the aircraft. This debris, will be the largest part of the aircraft still intact, especially in light of the fact that most of the airframe would have burnt during the Tadpole formation in the next phase— being seen to fall from the sky without any major fire.
  5. We still cannot see the aircraft in the video.
Why can’t this be the MiG-21 crashing?
It is not — because both aircraft crashes, are TWO distinct and DIFFERENT shoot-downs — each exhibiting a characteristic conveying the manner in which they were shot down.

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Abhinandan’s crashing MiG (left) vs the PAF jet crash (right)
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The Khuiratta video shows the parachute of a PAF fighter pilot, as well as a part of the debris falling after the ‘puff’ event — cementing the fact that there indeed is a ‘Doosra Banda’ in this very intriguing episode.

It also gives us a clue that in all probability, the PAF aircraft which crashed was a single-seater, unless for some reason in a twin-seater — the other pilot was not able to eject out.

Combining the observation lines from all 3 videos
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Combined chart of the various observation lines from various locations
The combination of the observation lines from all three videos from the puff to Tadpole formation stage, will help us zero down on the approximate landing zones of the PAF parachute, the falling piece of debris, as well as the Tadpole formation zone.

What we don’t have is the altitude of the PAF jet when it was hit? Also, what was its speed and related parameters? A combination of these inputs, will give us near accurate points on the observation lines as shown above. This would help resolve the investigation into the subject in the most logical manner.

For this, we will need to go back to the time — when Abhinandan crossed over into Azad Kashmir around 1020 hours.

‘MiG-21 vs F-16’
Reconstructing the AIR COMBAT ENGAGEMENT over Azad Kashmir between 1020 to 1045 hours

Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman crossed over to Azad Kashmir sometime after 1020 hours, flying at 0.9 Mach at an altitude of 15,000 feet. He spotted targets on his Kopyo radar in search mode at 30–35 km, higher at 30–35,000 feet. He switched to close combat (CC) mode on course 290 (deg) and sweeped (cover a specified Field of View from the nose) the area ahead to pick anything closer. He was climbing. His approximate position is as shown in the radar picture shared by the Indian Air Force.

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IAF Radar Situation Map | Image : by special arrangement
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IAF Image superimposed on a map | Image: By special arrangement
Abhinandan was callsign ‘Alpha-1’. At this stage his No. 2 (Alpha-2) had turned back and was back in Indian territory.

Coincidentally, the PAF Barrier Combat Air Patrol (BARCAP) at that time, may also have had the call sign ‘Alpha’.

Tens of minutes before that 2 x 4 aircraft F-16 formations (total 8 aircraft) of 9 Sqn (Griffins) and 29 Sqn- CCS (Aggressors), both from Sargodha AFB had performed Offensive Counter Air (OCA) Missions at the LoC, where they had fired 4–5 AIM-120C-5 missiles against IAF Su-30MKIs, claiming a Su-30MKI kill. Two formations (C/S Bravo & Charlie) had fallen back around 1017 hours and the third (Alpha) now formed the BARCAP in depth. These were controlled by a Saab ERIEYE AEW&C aircraft, Callsign — ‘Vigil’. Alpha 1–4 (all probably from 29 Sqn-CCS) were the 4 x F-16s which the IAF radar picture showed.

According to sources in the IAF, the call sign of the aircraft which went down in Azad Kashmir that day was ‘Alpha-3’. This is according to PAF’s R/T intercept, wherein after this sharp engagement, Callsign Alpha-3, never responded back on any communication channel.


Initial Situation Map based the shared IAF data
As Abhinandan was looking for targets in CC mode, he got a missile seeker head lock. Important to note, it was not a radar assisted Lock, but a missile head Lock — which picked up a heat emitting target out to 30 km within its 30 deg field of view.

Abhinandan fired his missile while on course 280 at 20,000 feet, turning northwards and finally settling down on an eastern heading towards Jhangar in J&K for a getaway.
 
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So what really happened that day?
The subsequent sequence of events gives a ‘blow by blow’ account of the final aerial engagement till the last fall of a PAF jet in Azad Kashmir.

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The Consolidated Air Situation Map based on OSINT & Shared data (Not to Scale)
Refer the above consolidated air situation map for events taking place, sequentially marked from 1 to 10 from 1020 to 1040 hours in the following paragraphs.

Event No. 1: 1022 hours — launch of an IAF R-73 AAM against a PAF F-16
  1. Abhinandan launched a R-73 missile on a heading of 280–290 degrees at 20,000 feet after the missile head locked onto a target in frontal quarters. Since the radar was in close combat (CC) search mode at that time, the aircraft being tracked by the R-73 would not have got any Lock ON chirp on its radar warning receiver (RWR). Neither does the R-73 missile give any approach warning while using passive guidance. The PAF aircraft, targeted by the IAF MiG-21, was NOT aware that a R-73 missile had been fired against it.
  2. The R-73 seeker could have locked on to two PAF jets, one at north edge and the other at the bottom edge of the Mangla reservoir. The blip at the north edge, which subsequently vanished from the scope was flying at Mach 1+ at 32,000 feet.
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    Image: By special arrangement
    The IAF’s ELINT data suggests that an F-16 was on the bearing where PAF’s Alpha-3 was noticed — hence in all probability, the blip which vanished was an F-16.

  3. This F-16 was identified to have a the callsign — ‘Alpha-3’ (IAF radio intercept).
Event No. 2: 1022 hours — PAF targeting Abhi’s No. 2
  1. The PAF’s F-16, north over the Mangla reservoir, Call sign Alpha -3 was vectored eastwards to intercept Abhinandan’s No. 2, who by now was back across the LoC in J&K, heading north east in the Rajouri sector.
  2. According to reconstruction of the situation, the F-16 (Alpha-3) was at 32,000 feet and assisted by ‘Vigil’ (AEW&C) picked up the MiG-21 (Abhi’s No. 2) on his airborne interception (AI) radar at 60–70 km at 18,000 feet. The F-16 did a fast descending turn to a lower altitude to build up speed and achieve his firing solution sooner, as well as carrying out a rapid change of height to break any fire control lock with all aware that MiGs had crossed the LoC. For info, at Mach 1.5 the AIM-120C-5 AMRAAM receives a bump up of 10–15% in max range (standard USAF AMRAAM firing tactics).
  3. He would have fired his AMRAAM at IAF’s Alpha-2 between Dmax 1-2. This missile is seen in the Thanamandi video. We can also hear the sound of the Indian MiG-21, indicating it was close.
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We know for sure now that the PAF fired an AMRAAM on Abhi’s No. 2. The AMRAAM missed Abhinandan’s No. 2, who had gone COLD by then.

Event No. 3: 1023 hours — The ‘puff’
  1. This describes the ‘puff’ point, when the R-73 missile fired by the MiG-21 reached the vicinity of the F-16 and activated its proximity fuse. The ‘puff’ happened at the cross-section of the observer to the ‘puff’ lines from Khuiratta and Charhoi.
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  2. From Abhi’s last plotted position to the calculated position of the ‘puff’ is a distance of 20 km. The R-73 would have covered this distance + distance required during the proportional navigation ‘lead pursuit’ trajectory. Assuming max 2–3 km deviation for this trajectory from point to point navigation with a non-manoeuvring, supersonic speed F-16 in the R-73’s frontal quarters, passing left to right and descending. So, the R-73 covered approx 22 km to the ‘puff’ location. The F-16’s trajectory actually benefits the R-73 in adjusting a steady (greater) lead ahead and bleeds lesser energy. Reverse calculating, we get time of flight of R-73 to ‘puff’ location at an average speed of 612 m/s at 35 seconds.
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    Advantage of ‘Lead pursuit’ over ‘pure pursuit’ guidance
  3. Flying at Mach 1 (conservative estimate), descending from 32,000 to 25,000 feet, the F-16 would have covered a ground distance of around 375 meters every second (subsonic to supersonic at an average altitude of 28,000 feet at -39 to 40 deg centigrade for that day). Assuming it turned for 3-5 seconds before it proceeded for the intercept (IAF radar picture showed this F-16 in a slight descending turn to left and assuming 20 deg/ sec rate of turn), in 35–5 = 30 seconds — it would cover 11,250 m or 11.25 km — which is close to the estimated distance of 12 km from the F-16s initial position north of Mangla reservoir to the ‘puff’.
  4. An R-73 missile can intercept a 12G manoeuvring target at 0.3–30 km. The F-16 was placed around 22 km (trajectory inclusive) from the missile. The F-16 was well within the kinematic performance range available to the R-73 missile to shoot down the F-16.
  5. How are we sure that it was this aircraft which fired the AMRAAM at Abhi’s No. 2 across the LoC? We are sure because we observe only two missiles fired by the PAF inside Azad Kashmir that day. This was the first event, the second was fired to shoot down Abhinandan seconds later from south of the Mangla reservoir and Mirpur town.
  6. So why no explosion at the ‘puff’? For this we need to understand that the R-73 would have exploded at a near beam (3 o’ Clock) aspect to the F-16 based on our investigation. In my earlier assessment of April 19, I had assumed that the missile hit the F-16 in its frontal quarters. However, I did not have the IAF radar picture and the newer video evidence. The R-73’s proximity fuse activating the 7.4 kg continuous rod warhead in that aspect.
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    The R-73 missile engineering drawing
    Let’s understand how the R-73 warhead would have exploded — The R-73 has a continuous rod warhead weighing 7.4 kg — which is activated by a proximity fuse when it senses an aircraft in close quarters. When detonated, the high explosive imparts momentum to the rods, thrusting them outward in an expanding circle. The pressure wave from the explosive acts evenly on the rods over their length. The rods are sufficiently soft to allow the expansion without breaking the rods or the welded joints, and the detonation velocity is limited to approx. 1000 m/s, allowing the rods to bend at these locations instead.

    At some intermediate point the ring will have a zig-zag (alternating direction) appearance within a cylindrical envelope — Upon ultimate expansion the ring is circular and contained within a plane.This rapidly expanding ring, when hitting the aircraft, is more effective than an equivalent fragmentation warhead — for the science inclined, the ring’s effectiveness decreasing as 1/R, rather than 1/R2 for fragments.

    Portions of the aircraft intercepted by the expanding ring of the continuous rod warhead — will receive a continuous cut through the skin, light structure, underlying cables, hydraulic lines, and other plumbing if present — This may cause a structural failure, or, if not, can be sufficient for defeating the redundancy of aircraft systems. The effect is only pronounced as long as the ring is unbroken, so multiple layers of rods are employed in practical weapons to increase the effective radius.

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    Expansion of a continuous rod warhead explained
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    Analysing the effect of the R-73 warhead hitting at right beam quarter to the F-16
  7. On the basis of the above, we identify two zones of damage on the F-16. Travelling at a supersonic speed, the nose and the cockpit area of the F-16 would have sustained limited damage due to shrapnel. This may however be enough to critically injure the pilot/s. The brunt of the continuous rod warhead would have been borne by the middle to rear portion. What the ‘puff’ indicates is that the damage was mostly due to the shrapnel’s kinetic effect, not a violent incendiary explosion of any manner. The supersonic state of the aircraft is the most probable reason for the F-16 not catching fire due to the expanding ring of the warhead.Continuous rod warheads generally tend to induce damage, which can slice open an aircraft as can be seen in the case of Abhinandan’s MiG-21, which was hit from the rear. So, while no explosion is visible, there would have been internal damage in the rear portion, as well as a new direction vector — mix of aircraft forward speed and the impact from the right due to the warhead explosion, would have veered the damaged aircraft to the left.
  8. So what was the damage on the aircraft after the hit at the ‘puff’ stage. For this, we get a very brief idea in the Charhoi video. After the puff, the videographer briefly records the state of another ‘puff’ like object, which is however moving towards the right, which is identified by the effort of the person to maintain this smoke blob in the centre of the field of view of the phone. We know that this is not the puff, because the Sun position for this is different. Interestingly in a short glimpse around the 21 second run of the video, we see this object dividing itself in two parts.
This object which divides itself later on into two segments, is the elusive aircraft — which has moved on from the ‘puff’ position when captured by the observer on his phone.

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The R-73 hit the F-16 at supersonic speeds around 25,000 feet at the ‘puff’ location. After which it veers to the left as a result, and a few seconds later broke into two distinct parts due to damage by the R-73 warhead.
 
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