PAF Exercise Saffron Bandit 2012-13

[Liquidmetal]

Aircraft That Fly, But Don't Move
by James Dunnigan
January 26, 2011

Last month, India completed tests of the first of two aerostat systems it is developing. The one that completed its tests employs a tethered (to a 1,000 meter/3,100 foot cable) unpowered blimp (aerostat) containing sensors and transmitters. India has been using imported aerostat radars for several years, and was satisfied enough to develop their own. It's not high tech, but requires effort to integrate all the existing technologies.

Over the last few years, India bought four Israeli EL/M-2083 Aerostat radars. Both India and Pakistan have been using radar aerostats (blimps) to fill in the many gaps in the radar coverage of their mutual border. The United States is providing aerostats to Pakistan. India bought its first EL/M-2083s three years ago, and is planning to deploy a total of six. India needs a total of 13 to cover all its borders. Pakistan is getting six L-88 Aerostat Systems.

Aerostat systems use a 32-85 meter (100-250 foot) long, helium filled, unmanned blimp equipped with radar and other sensors. The larger of these blimps are more than twice the size of the more familiar advertising blimps. An aerostat is designed to always turn into the wind and stay in the same place. An aerostat is unpowered, and secured by a cable that can keep the aerostat in position at its maximum altitude of 5,000 meters. India is now developing a larger aerostat that can operate that high. The cable also supplies power, which means the blimp can stay up for about 30 days at a time before it has to be brought down for maintenance on its radars and other sensors. Often, two radars are carried. One is a surveillance radar, the other is a precision track and illumination radar (PTIR). The surveillance radar provides long-range coverage (about 500 kilometers for the EL/M-2083), while the PTIR, which is a steerable system capable of tracking multiple targets, can focus in on items of interest.

Aerostat systems cost varies from $5 million, to over $100 million each, depending on the size of the aerostat and the capabilities of the radar and other sensors. Aerostats work. Kuwait had one in 1990, and the ground radar spotted the Iraqis as soon as they crossed the border. The U.S. uses dozens of aerostat systems in Iraq and Afghanistan, to guard bases. The EL/M-2083 costs about $20 million each. Israel itself is using six of them.

While aerostats stay in one place, they are up there, and in the way of aircraft that move. Some of the onboard sensors are used to alert moving aircraft that the aerostat is there, and to maneuver accordingly.


Year old article but may be of interest in this thread. I believe PK has 6 of these systems which were ordered in 2002 and provide an interesting mix of airborne surveillance capability.

 

[gambit]

Even a AEW&C cant 'drive' a BVR fired from the fighter to its target. You need a radar lock for this and a AEW&C won't come such closer to the enemy fighter to get the same. Too dangerous for it. |It is several times described here by professionals but their machines can do anything.

In radar detection, these are basic vital target resolutions:

- Altitude
- Speed
- Heading
- Aspect angle

However, if you have two viewers in different positions looking at the same target, each viewer will have different target resolutions, from one to all four. If the target's heading and aspect angle are towards/approaching one viewer, then the target is probably receding from the other viewer. So now we have two Doppler resolutions from the same target: increasing Doppler freq to one viewer, and decreasing Doppler freq to the other viewer.

The analogy is if two men in different positions are looking at a girl, each man will see a different view of the same girl. Bust or butt.

The problem here is that one viewer (AWACS) cannot communicate to the other viewer (fighter) on what he sees. The AWACS cannot tell the fighter that the target have increasing Doppler (approach) when the target is actually producing a decreasing Doppler shift from the fighter. Who is telling the truth? Both of them are. Each have a different set of target resolutions that are unique to his position.

What this mean is that if there is communication between viewers, we must have rules on what kind of information about the target that is most advantageous to the situation at hand.

If the target is approaching the AWACS, then he is more of a threat to the AWACS than he is to the fighter. The missile's intercept solution will have to factor in the fact that the target will be increasing its distance from the parent launch aircraft. Longer distance mean higher fuel needed for straight flight and less for maneuvers in case the target take defensive measures such as decoys and radical maneuvers.

If the target is approaching the fighter, then he is more of a threat to the fighter than to the AWACS. In this situation, the target to fighter distance will be decreasing and the missile will have to calculate a very different intercept solution. Shorter and decreasing distance is good but also if there is a miss, the missile may not have enough time to reorient and reacquire.

In either case, while the ability to communicate between viewers is important, if the CONTENTS of that communication is unusable, the ability is just as useless as if it has never existed in the first place.

So if the AWACS can communicate with the fighter, and we are not talking about voice, then we must take in the disparity of computing power between the two viewers. The AWACS is obviously more powerful.

A) He can see if the target is the greater threat to whom and he can even calculate the missile's intercept solution for it, assuming his hardware and software is sophisticated enough.

Z) He can provide the least of data: Heading and Position, and let the fighter/missile figure the intercept solution for themselves.

In between A and Z are the many technological sophistication levels of AWACS on the market. What you have depends on the size of your national wallet. Ultimately, the missile will resort to its own sensor guidance when it is close enough to the target but the more data update it receives from an external source, the greater the odds of success of a hit via the element of surprise when it illuminate the target at the shortest possible distance. It reduces the target's response time for such as decoys and/or radical maneuvers.

 

[Liquidmetal]

In radar detection, these are basic vital target resolutions:

- Altitude
- Speed
- Heading
- Aspect angle

However, if you have two viewers in different positions looking at the same target, each viewer will have different target resolutions, from one to all four. If the target's heading and aspect angle are towards/approaching one viewer, then the target is probably receding from the other viewer. So now we have two Doppler resolutions from the same target: increasing Doppler freq to one viewer, and decreasing Doppler freq to the other viewer.

The analogy is if two men in different positions are looking at a girl, each man will see a different view of the same girl. Bust or butt.

The problem here is that one viewer (AWACS) cannot communicate to the other viewer (fighter) on what he sees. The AWACS cannot tell the fighter that the target have increasing Doppler (approach) when the target is actually producing a decreasing Doppler shift from the fighter. Who is telling the truth? Both of them are. Each have a different set of target resolutions that are unique to his position.

What this mean is that if there is communication between viewers, we must have rules on what kind of information about the target that is most advantageous to the situation at hand.

If the target is approaching the AWACS, then he is more of a threat to the AWACS than he is to the fighter. The missile's intercept solution will have to factor in the fact that the target will be increasing its distance from the parent launch aircraft. Longer distance mean higher fuel needed for straight flight and less for maneuvers in case the target take defensive measures such as decoys and radical maneuvers.

If the target is approaching the fighter, then he is more of a threat to the fighter than to the AWACS. In this situation, the target to fighter distance will be decreasing and the missile will have to calculate a very different intercept solution. Shorter and decreasing distance is good but also if there is a miss, the missile may not have enough time to reorient and reacquire.

In either case, while the ability to communicate between viewers is important, if the CONTENTS of that communication is unusable, the ability is just as useless as if it has never existed in the first place.

So if the AWACS can communicate with the fighter, and we are not talking about voice, then we must take in the disparity of computing power between the two viewers. The AWACS is obviously more powerful.

A) He can see if the target is the greater threat to whom and he can even calculate the missile's intercept solution for it, assuming his hardware and software is sophisticated enough.

Z) He can provide the least of data: Heading and Position, and let the fighter/missile figure the intercept solution for themselves.

In between A and Z are the many technological sophistication levels of AWACS on the market. What you have depends on the size of your national wallet. Ultimately, the missile will resort to its own sensor guidance when it is close enough to the target but the more data update it receives from an external source, the greater the odds of success of a hit via the element of surprise when it illuminate the target at the shortest possible distance. It reduces the target's response time for such as decoys and/or radical maneuvers.

I must thank you for explaining some complex concepts in an involving and simple way, whereby even I, a simpleton in these matters can understand. I apologise to the mods for any perceived wastage of a post.

 

[gambit]

I must thank you for explaining some complex concepts in an involving and simple way, whereby even I, a simpleton in these matters can understand. I apologise to the mods for any perceived wastage of a post.

Yer welcome. I used to teach this sh1t.

 

[Alphacharlie]

In radar detection, these are basic vital target resolutions:

- Altitude
- Speed
- Heading
- Aspect angle

However, if you have two viewers in different positions looking at the same target, each viewer will have different target resolutions, from one to all four. If the target's heading and aspect angle are towards/approaching one viewer, then the target is probably receding from the other viewer. So now we have two Doppler resolutions from the same target: increasing Doppler freq to one viewer, and decreasing Doppler freq to the other viewer.

The analogy is if two men in different positions are looking at a girl, each man will see a different view of the same girl. Bust or butt.

The problem here is that one viewer (AWACS) cannot communicate to the other viewer (fighter) on what he sees. The AWACS cannot tell the fighter that the target have increasing Doppler (approach) when the target is actually producing a decreasing Doppler shift from the fighter. Who is telling the truth? Both of them are. Each have a different set of target resolutions that are unique to his position.

What this mean is that if there is communication between viewers, we must have rules on what kind of information about the target that is most advantageous to the situation at hand.

If the target is approaching the AWACS, then he is more of a threat to the AWACS than he is to the fighter. The missile's intercept solution will have to factor in the fact that the target will be increasing its distance from the parent launch aircraft. Longer distance mean higher fuel needed for straight flight and less for maneuvers in case the target take defensive measures such as decoys and radical maneuvers.

If the target is approaching the fighter, then he is more of a threat to the fighter than to the AWACS. In this situation, the target to fighter distance will be decreasing and the missile will have to calculate a very different intercept solution. Shorter and decreasing distance is good but also if there is a miss, the missile may not have enough time to reorient and reacquire.

In either case, while the ability to communicate between viewers is important, if the CONTENTS of that communication is unusable, the ability is just as useless as if it has never existed in the first place.

So if the AWACS can communicate with the fighter, and we are not talking about voice, then we must take in the disparity of computing power between the two viewers. The AWACS is obviously more powerful.

A) He can see if the target is the greater threat to whom and he can even calculate the missile's intercept solution for it, assuming his hardware and software is sophisticated enough.

Z) He can provide the least of data: Heading and Position, and let the fighter/missile figure the intercept solution for themselves.

In between A and Z are the many technological sophistication levels of AWACS on the market. What you have depends on the size of your national wallet. Ultimately, the missile will resort to its own sensor guidance when it is close enough to the target but the more data update it receives from an external source, the greater the odds of success of a hit via the element of surprise when it illuminate the target at the shortest possible distance. It reduces the target's response time for such as decoys and/or radical maneuvers.

Sir - how will the data connectivity integrated with out "MIDS-LVT(1) - Link 16 Tactical Airborne Terminal" & Satellite Uplink ?

 

[Viper0011.]

Does that mean all PAF assets are now interconnected?

Yes, if you read my post above yours, this is the intermediate layer I was referring to. The Link 16 communication is interconnected with the GC communications system. The data is transferred from the Link 16 enabled device to the Ground Control, where it can be relayed to any other device running whatever other protocol. The information usually takes a few seconds to update but than that's how the traditional radars work too. So a 4-6 seconds worth of delay in the data or location doesn't make a whole lot of difference. These scenarios are usually used for long range bvr bogey that are out of the range of a jet's own radar. Once the bogey gets into a defensive fighter's radar range, than the fighter takes the homing over and points its missiles onto the vector.
I was going to post some material but I think Gambit just posted some very cool and self explanatory diagrams that can tell you about a radar's detection to interception phases (4 step target illumination / detection till elimination / neutralization and solution prioritization).

Yer welcome. I used to teach this sh1t.

Where at? Nellis, Georgia, Colorado, Florida... (I am kind of naming all major areas to not point to specifics )

 

[SQ8]

Thank you for your Views, I served in Heptr Unit for 7 years and have fair idea of the subject. Will Stop here . Disagree with your understanding on the Subject.

I have actively participated in the initial design phase for a Link-16 compatible protocol(among other things).. So I disagree with yours.
However, agreeing to disagreeing amicably is still better than arguments with no end. Cheers.

Does that mean all PAF assets are now interconnected?

Not all, but almost all of them will be.
The F-7's ,Mirage,JF-17 and F-16 fleet are now all secure comms compatible with each other and the Erieyes.
The F-16's are all MIDS compatible with the Erieyes...and in about a year or so. ..with the JF-17 and ZDK-03.

 

[Bratva]

I have actively participated in the initial design phase for a Link-16 compatible protocol(among other things).. So I disagree with yours.
However, agreeing to disagreeing amicably is still better than arguments with no end. Cheers.



Not all, but almost all of them will be.
The F-7's ,Mirage,JF-17 and F-16 fleet are now all secure comms compatible with each other and the Erieyes.
The F-16's are all MIDS compatible with the Erieyes...and in about a year or so. ..with the JF-17 and ZDK-03.

You post is giving impression US and NON US assets can directly communicate with each due to German radios. Is it so or still there is a intermediate ground station where chinese origin aircraft will send updates which will than be routed to Erieye?

 

[Safriz]

You post is giving impression US and NON US assets can directly communicate with each due to German radios. Is it so or still there is a intermediate ground station where chinese origin aircraft will send updates which will than be routed to Erieye?

ITU has assigned certain range of frequencies for link 16,and its not about US/Non US....its just a set of perimeters..whoever complies can have the communication.
About securing the coms,again many systems can be devised .
Its same as mobile phone...the radio wave can be received by anybody but can only be decoded by the mobile phone for which it is meant for US-NON US-CHINESE doesnt matter as long as they are following GSM standards?

 

[ice_man]

is the PN any part of this saffron babu??????? or is it AS USUAL SITTING THIS ONE OUT!

 

[Windjammer]

is the PN any part of this saffron babu??????? or is it AS USUAL SITTING THIS ONE OUT!

PN, recently carried out their own exercises, namely Seaspark and Naseem-e-Sahar.

 

[airomerix]

Saffron bandit is carried out more in air force style. Involving air-to-air, air to groud, Recon missions and electronic warfare. Anti ship missions are rarely carried out in this exercise.

 

[ice_man]

this is sad why don't we have a integrated system for PN,PA & PAF! i mean we pay too much attention to our Army then airforce and totally neglect our navy!


we should have a navy and airforce integrated exercise. after all that is where the battle will be decided given that the border region will be a stalemate.

 

[airomerix]

this is sad why don't we have a integrated system for PN,PA & PAF! i mean we pay too much attention to our Army then airforce and totally neglect our navy!


we should have a navy and airforce integrated exercise. after all that is where the battle will be decided given that the border region will be a stalemate.

An exercise of such sort did take place last year or in 2011 in which the Army, Airforce and Navy participated together. The COAS, CAS and CNS were there to witness it along with Wazeer-e-Azam Gillani. I cant recall the name of that exercise..

 

[Safriz]

Armed forces prepared to defend country: General Wynne - thenews.com.pk

@ice_man read the whole news and your querries will be answered.