At Bai Beche on November 5, for example, a mostly al-Qaida defensive force occupied an old, formerly Soviet system of deliberate entrenchments. With proper cover and concealment, the defenders were able to prevent U.S. commandos
from locating individual ªghting positions for precision attack. Instead, the SOF commander ordered more than two days of carpet bombing across the extent of the defenses. Dostum’s Northern Alliance cavalry was then ordered to assault the defenses. Yet enough defenders survived the bombing to drive back this initial attempt. Observing the setback, U.S. SOF began calling renewed air strikes in anticipation of a second assault. In the process, a SOF warning order to the cavalry to prepare for another push was mistaken as a command to launch the assault, with the result that the cavalry
began its attack much sooner than intended. The surprised commandos watched the Afghan cavalry begin their advance just as a series of 500-pound bombs had been released from U.S. aircraft in response to the SOF calls for air
support. The SOF commander reported that he was convinced they had just caused a friendly ªre incident: the bomb release and the cavalry advance were much too close together for ofªcial doctrinal limits, and the air strike would
never have been ordered if the SOF had known that the cavalry was then jumping off for the second assault. As it happened, the bombs landed just seconds before the cavalry arrived. In fact, the cavalry galloped through the enormous cloud of smoke and dust that was still hanging in the air after the explosions, emerging behind the enemy defenses before their garrison knew what was happening. The defenders, seeing Northern Alliance cavalry to their
rear, abandoned their positions in an attempt to avoid encirclement. The victory at Bai Beche turned the tide in the north and led directly to the fall of Mazar-e-Sharif. But the battle involved serious close combat (attackers overrunning prepared, actively resisting defenses), and the outcome was a close call. The assault proªted from an extremely tight integration of movement with suppressive fire—far tighter than the cavalry’s skills could normally provide (indeed, far tighter than even U.S. troops would normally attempt).
...
The Afghan campaign thus shows evidence of several important combinations of ground force skill. When the United States’ indigenous allies faced unskilled opponents, as they did at Bishqab, Cobaki, Zard Kammar, and
Ac’capruk, the Afghan model annihilated the defenses at standoff range and obviated the need for meaningful close combat. Without the need to advance against ªre, the skills of the allied ground forces were irrelevant and outcomes
were one sided. But when U.S. allies faced better-skilled, less-exposed al-Qaida opponents, as at Bai Beche, Konduz, Highway 4, Sayed Slim Kalay, and Anaconda, precision strikes were insuffcient to destroy the enemy at standoff
range, and close combat was needed. Where friendly ground forces were better skilled than their opponents, asWestern infantry were in Anaconda, this close combat was one sided. Where friendly ground forces were not superior but nevertheless proved able to reduce their exposure and combine movement with suppressive ªre, as at Bai Beche and Highway 4, the results were closer calls but ultimately went the United States’ way, even when U.S. allies were outnumbered. But where friendly ground forces lacked their enemies’ skills, as at Arghestan Bridge and Zia’s assault at Anaconda, the result was failure— despite U.S. precision firepower.
