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Ukraine war will make China more cautious on Taiwan, advisers say

There are always other powers. The issue is how far away they are from US.


But the problem is that China have a limited window for to launch the invasion fleet, and that small window is created by the weather. You do not know how long it will take to get that air dominance. But not only does the weather limit the surface strait crossing, the weather also limit the time for the PLAAF to get that air dominance. Maybe you should go study some of that Cold War military history.




Your PLA was wrong about US in Desert Storm and like it or not, the PLA is wrong about Ukraine as well. Everyone was wrong. You guys on this forum are even worse in that your opinions depends SOLELY on the 'shiny new toys' foundation which is understandable considering none of you ever served and that on this forum you guys consistently displayed a disdain for history. Everyone was wrong about Ukraine, so what make YOU think you are correct about Taiwan?

You're the one that has to cross the Pacific with a few bases in the region, while the island of Taiwan is literally within long range MRLS range for China. News flash, you're not the dominant power in East Asia anymore.

While the time it takes to achieve air supremacy is anyone's guess, the point is China will. Ukraine recorded approximately 60 precision strikes on the first day across its territory. Taiwan can expect a much denser volume of fire with targets concentrated in 1/6 the area. Large movement or deployment is going to be extremely difficult given China's surveillance and strike capacities being significantly better than Russia's. We have the most extensive spy satellite network outside of US, augmented by large number of drones and AEW&C assets. That's not to mention years of HUMINT and ELINT collected. Cold War has been over for over 30 years, and the China has evolved past you.

That is not to say the military operation will go smoothly. These things never do, and I am sure China will have its share of blunders as with any war. Hiccups do not change the final outcome. Taiwan's fate is as sealed as your mind is to the 1980's.
 
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War are always easy when you are sitting in the side-line watching.

When you are the one that are tasked to storm the beachhead, that's a completely different story.

Before this war, I remember some member here say "You just need to use missile" in case you have not noticed, Russia used 1300 tactical missile over 28 days, something not even the US had used that many, they even used a hypersonic missile. So do tell me, when is Ukraine surrendering??

Was gonna think this Russian - Ukrainian war would talk some sense into people's simplification on war, but well. I guess some people just never learn.

1300/28 = 46 precision strikes a day on average

That's the problem. Besides the shock and awe of the opening salvos, you need to sustain the volume of strike in order to ensure the defenders remain suppressed. Russia has failed to do so, which allowed Ukraine to quickly repair its airfields and re-organize its defenses. Perhaps even more importantly, you need good battlefield awareness (satellites, drones, ELINT) to hit targets of opportunity, an area which Russia is sorely behind.
 
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1300/28 = 46 precision strikes a day on average

That's the problem. Besides the shock and awe of the opening salvos, you need to sustain the volume of strike in order to ensure the defenders remain suppressed. Russia has failed to do so, which allowed Ukraine to quickly repair its airfields and re-organize its defenses. Perhaps even more importantly, you need good battlefield awareness (satellites, drones, ELINT) to hit targets of opportunity, an area which Russia is sorely behind.

That was the issue. You cannot sustained that damage over a long period of time.

Bear in mind Russia strike concentrate on 5 different district, and they seldom strike city in the West (Only 2-3 times on record about 20 missile in all) If they have to paralyse the entire Ukrainian with missile, and doing so continuously, you would have used up your missile stock before you can make a new batch.

Missile are tactical strike, which mean you are using it to disable a target in order to compete your tactical objective. It is not supposed to sustain a long suppression of target. For example, you fire missile on an airport to disable their air defence so you can launch an Airborne Ops or Air Assault Ops to capture the airport, you can't keep bombing it with missile and put it out of action continuously.
 
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News flash, you're not the dominant power in East Asia anymore.
News flash, we still are.

While the time it takes to achieve air supremacy is anyone's guess, the point is China will.
What happens if Taiwanese defense put the invasion launch outside of that narrow weather allowance window? Are you going to bombard the island until next yr? Do you have enough munition? Will your economy sustain that war time tempo? Shipping traffic will cease in the SCS, so how would that affect China during that yr of bombardment?

Nah...You do not know what you are talking about.

 
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That was the issue. You cannot sustained that damage over a long period of time.

Bear in mind Russia strike concentrate on 5 different district, and they seldom strike city in the West (Only 2-3 times on record about 20 missile in all) If they have to paralyse the entire Ukrainian with missile, and doing so continuously, you would have used up your missile stock before you can make a new batch.

Missile are tactical strike, which mean you are using it to disable a target in order to compete your tactical objective. It is not supposed to sustain a long suppression of target. For example, you fire missile on an airport to disable their air defence so you can launch an Airborne Ops or Air Assault Ops to capture the airport, you can't keep bombing it with missile and put it out of action continuously.
Except you have to. Against any competent military, airbases can be repair in a matter of hours. Russian paratroopers got a nasty shock when Ukrainian Su-24 and Su-25 started hitting them as they attempted to take Hostomel Airport. You cannot conduct air assault or paradrops without significantly weakening the enemy, and keeping it weakened. Failing to do so will mean your soldiers will have to be thrown into the meat grinder. China has a large arsenal of precision guided rockets and drones for this purpose as follow-on to the opening hours.

Let's put it this way. Russian economy is smaller than that of Guangdong, trying to support a military operation to take over an area 6 to 8 times that of Taiwan. It has little relevance in the Taiwan context.
 
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News flash, we still are.


What happens if Taiwanese defense put the invasion launch outside of that narrow weather allowance window? Are you going to bombard the island until next yr? Do you have enough munition? Will your economy sustain that war time tempo? Shipping traffic will cease in the SCS, so how would that affect China during that yr of bombardment?

Nah...You do not know what you are talking about.
I gotta say you have a very optimistic view of your relative position in East Asia.

The island is a bit bigger than the state of Massachusetts, with little room to maneuvered and hide military assets. A dozen CH-5 drone can cover the entirety of the island uninterrupted. How long do you think an isolated island can last without food and supplies being shipped in?

Did I say it was going to be a cakewalk? No, but its fate is already sealed.
 
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Except you have to. Against any competent military, airbases can be repair in a matter of hours. Russian paratroopers got a nasty shock when Ukrainian Su-24 and Su-25 started hitting them as they attempted to take Hostomel Airport. You cannot conduct air assault or paradrops without significantly weakening the enemy, and keeping it weakened. Failing to do so will mean your soldiers will have to be thrown into the meat grinder. China has a large arsenal of precision guided rockets and drones for this purpose as follow-on to the opening hours.

Let's put it this way. Russian economy is smaller than that of Guangdong, trying to support a military operation to take over an area 6 to 8 times that of Taiwan. It has little relevance in the Taiwan context.
Well, if you have unlimited amount of missile, yeah, you can. It is not the matter of you "have to", it's the matter of "can you"?

Fighting in Urban environment is putting your soldier in meat grinder, you can only bomb it to a certain level, then you will have to insert ground troop, you cannot just keep bomb and bomb and bomb and hope the defender is gone and your invading troop do not suffer casualty. You don't need to look that far, Russian have destroyed 90% of Mariupol, does that mean anything? They are still heavy fighting in Mariupol as I type...

Finally, it never about the size of a country, it's about how many target you have to strike. For a single strike, you need 3 or 4 missile, so 100 target you would need up to 400 missile. And if you bomb it twice, you will need 800 missile. That increase is exponential, and you would definitely runs out of missile in probably 4 or 5 fold. Which wouldn't give you too much time to capture the entire country.
 
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Well, if you have unlimited amount of missile, yeah, you can. It is not the matter of you "have to", it's the matter of "can you"?

Fighting in Urban environment is putting your soldier in meat grinder, you can only bomb it to a certain level, then you will have to insert ground troop, you cannot just keep bomb and bomb and bomb and hope the defender is gone and your invading troop do not suffer casualty. You don't need to look that far, Russian have destroyed 90% of Mariupol, does that mean anything? They are still heavy fighting in Mariupol as I type...

Finally, it never about the size of a country, it's about how many target you have to strike. For a single strike, you need 3 or 4 missile, so 100 target you would need up to 400 missile. And if you bomb it twice, you will need 800 missile. That increase is exponential, and you would definitely runs out of missile in probably 4 or 5 fold. Which wouldn't give you too much time to capture the entire area.
See that's where you're mistaken.

Taiwan is close enough for PLA to hit with long range rockets without having to utilize cruise missiles that are much more expensive and difficult to produce. If Penghu gets taken, even extended range 155mm rounds can be used to hit targets in its east coast. That's not to mention the dirt cheap drones circling overhead. If you thought Turkey was effective with its TB-2 fleet, then you haven't seen anything remotely close to what China could do yet. If the Armenia-Azerbaijan war was any indication, Armenia was rendered defenseless in 3 weeks despite years of prepration.
 
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See that's where you're mistaken.

Taiwan is close enough for PLA to hit with long range rockets without having to utilize cruise missiles that are much more expensive and difficult to produce. If Penghu gets taken, even extended range 155mm rounds can be used to hit targets in its east coast. That's not to mention the dirt cheap drones circling overhead. If you thought Turkey was effective with its TB-2 fleet, then you haven't seen anything remotely close to what China could do yet. If the Armenia-Azerbaijan war was any indication, Armenia was rendered defenseless in 3 weeks despite years of prepration.
Again, you are setting too many assumption to support your point, as I said, that's what Russia get wrong in this case.

Of course if you can take Penghu, then you can bomb Taiwan with ease, but then as I said before, even if you are able to destroy 90% of Taiwanese metro city, that does not mean the fight is over, as in Mariupol case, fights goes on and the only reason why Russia is winning is because they encircled Mariupol from the very early onset. Not because of the bombardment.

I mean, I can't comment on "what if everything goes your way" well, maybe you can even say Tsai have no stomach for war and turn tail like Ghani, I mean, I am not going to comment on that.....
 
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Everyone but the Chinese seems to be writing these articles. Everyday we find some moron and idiots mouthing off about what China thinks. Let the Chinese say what they are thinking, maybe they're just more busy about containing covid and improving economy rather than any such stupid plans.
 
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NATO is supplying real time intelligence, weapons, training, and men (maybe PMC, not official military) to Ukraine, but both Russia and NATO are playing this surreal game of pretending NATO isn't helping Ukraine because they want to avoid direct conflict.

This surreal denial won't be possible in Taiwan. To break through a PLAN blockade, US would have to directly engage with PLAN.

Will US officially declare war on China?
Guaranteed US/British SF are operating with Ukrainians. This will come to fore a decade down the road.
 
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Did I say it was going to be a cakewalk? No, but its fate is already sealed.
When I was active duty, we trained on the usual 4-ship attack approach. Lead then wingman, then next lead then wingman. Assuming using PGM, if a target is assessed to require a 4-ship attack to decommission its capabilities, it does not mean ordnance from 3 ships will suffice. It mean ordnance from all 4 ships must land on target, and even then, not all ordnance may land accurately. So to ensure that the target receives ordnance from 4-ship, we would assign the target two 4-ship allotment, or a total of 8 attackers. This overkill is intended to compensate for any unexpected events.

What this mean is that Taiwanese air defense can degrade the effectiveness of each 4-ship attack by taking out just one, but given the sophistication of Taiwanese air defense, WITHOUT learning from the current Russia-Ukraine war, the PLAAF would be looking at a 2-ship degradation. And current Taiwanese air defense is better than Iraq's back in Desert Storm. Not a cakewalk is already a gross understatement. Now add in the lessons of the Russia-Ukraine war, from tactics to technology, and that the US and Asian allies will arm Taiwan, how about the potentiality that the PLAAF will suffer a 3-ship degradation?
 
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Ukrainians are very different from Taiwanese. 1,Ukrainians have martial spirit. Which you can never see from Taiwanese. I heard Ukrainian soldiers always performed best in NATO millitary drills. 2,Ukrainians hates Russians. Which is something in their DNA. Taiwanese and mainland Chinese may have some issues. But they don't hate mainland Chinese.

I also said today's Taiwanese are reluctant to join in army.
You can't assume that. It is best to view them as a combination of modernized Imperial Japan and Nazi Germans.

Remember that Taiwanese soldiers shot and killed unarmed Vietnamese refugees including babies.

 
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There are always other powers. The issue is how far away they are from US.


But the problem is that China have a limited window for to launch the invasion fleet, and that small window is created by the weather. You do not know how long it will take to get that air dominance. But not only does the weather limit the surface strait crossing, the weather also limit the time for the PLAAF to get that air dominance. Maybe you should go study some of that Cold War military history.


Here is an op-ed from The Atlantic mag that is relevant to everyone...

About the author: Phillips Payson O’Brien is a professor of strategic studies at the University of St. Andrews in Scotland. He is the author of How the War Was Won: Air-Sea Power and Allied Victory in World War II.
Let me tell you a story about a military that was supposedly one of the best in the world. This military had some of the best equipment: the heaviest and most modern tanks, next-generation aircraft, and advanced naval vessels. It had invested in modernization, and made what were considered some of Europe’s most sophisticated plans for conflict. Moreover, it had planned and trained specifically for a war it was about to fight, a war it seemed extremely well prepared for and that many, perhaps most, people believed it would win.​
All of these descriptions could apply to the Russian army that invaded Ukraine last month. But I’m talking about the French army of the 1930s. That French force was considered one of the finest on the planet. Winston Churchill believed that it represented the world’s best hope for keeping Adolf Hitler’s Nazi Germany at bay. As he said famously in 1933, and repeated a number of times afterward, “Thank God for the French army.”​
Of course, when this French army was actually tested in battle, it was found wanting. Germany conquered France in less than two months in 1940. All of the French military’s supposed excellence in equipment and doctrine was useless. A range of problems, including poor logistics, terrible communications, and low morale, beset an army in which soldiers and junior officers complained of inflexible, top-down leadership. In 1940, the French had the “best” tank, the Char B-1. With its 75-mm gun, the Char B-1 was better armed than any German tank, and it outclassed the Germans in terms of armor protection as well. But when the Battle of France started, the Char B-1 exhibited a number of major handicaps, such as a gas-guzzling engine and mechanical unreliability.​
Having good equipment and good doctrine reveals little about how an army will perform in a war. To predict that, you must analyze not only its equipment and doctrine but also its ability to undertake complex operations, its unglamorous but crucial logistical needs and structure, and the commitment of its soldiers to fight and die in the specific war being waged. Most important, you have to think about how it will perform when a competent enemy fires back. As Mike Tyson so eloquently put it, “Everyone has a plan until they are punched in the mouth.”​
What we are seeing today in Ukraine is the result of a purportedly great military being punched in the mouth. The resilience of Ukrainian resistance is embarrassing for a Western think-tank and military community that had confidently predicted that the Russians would conquer Ukraine in a matter of days. For years, Western “experts” prattled on about the Russian military’s expensive, high-tech “modernization.” The Russians, we were told, had the better tanks and aircraft, including cutting-edge SU-34 fighter bombers and T-90 tanks, with some of the finest technical specifications in the world. The Russians had also ostensibly reorganized their army into a more professional, mostly voluntary force. They had rethought their offensive doctrine and created battalion tactical groups, flexible, heavily armored formations that were meant to be key to overwhelming the Ukrainians. Basically, many people had relied on the glamour of war, a sort of war pornography, to predict the outcome of Russia’s invasion of its neighbor.​
Those predictions, based on alluring but fundamentally flawed criteria, have now proved false. Western analysts took basic metrics (such as numbers and types of tanks and aircraft), imagined those measured forces executing Russian military doctrine, then concluded that the Ukrainians had no chance. But counting tanks and planes and rhapsodizing over their technical specifications is not a useful way to analyze modern militaries. As The Atlantic’s Eliot Cohen has argued, the systems that the West used to evaluate the Russian military have failed nearly as comprehensively as that military has.​
Though analysts and historians will spend years arguing about exactly why prewar assessments of the Russian military proved so flawed, two reasons are immediately apparent. First, Western analysts misunderstood the Russian military’s ability to undertake the most complex operations and the robustness of its logistical capabilities. And second, prognosticators paid too little attention to the basic motivations and morale of the soldiers who would be asked to use the Russian military’s allegedly excellent doctrine and equipment.​
Russia’s problems executing complex operations became obvious almost immediately after its army crossed the border into Ukraine. For instance, many observers believed that the large, advanced Russian air force would quickly gain air dominance over Ukraine, providing the Russian land forces with support while severely limiting the Ukrainians’ movement. Instead, the Ukrainians have put in place a far more sophisticated than expected air-defense system that stymied Russian air efforts from the start. By challenging the Russians in the air, the Ukrainians have shown that Russia’s army cannot efficiently conduct the complex air operations needed to seize air supremacy from a much smaller enemy. Russia’s logistical system has been, if anything, even worse. Russian trucks are poorly maintained, poorly led, and too few in number. Once the Russian forces advanced, they found that bringing up the supplies needed to keep them moving forward became more and more difficult. Many advances, most famously the 40-mile column of vehicles stretching down to Kyiv from Belarus, simply stopped.​
At the same time, the supposedly professional volunteer Russian soldiers were confused as to what they were doing, totally unprepared to meet stiff Ukrainian resistance, and, from photo evidence, surprisingly willing to abandon even the most advanced Russian equipment almost untouched. As the war has gone on, and Russian casualties have mounted, Russian soldiers have fallen victim to frostbite, refused to follow orders, and, in at least one episode, tried to kill their superior officers.​
More of the Western experts who study Russia’s armed forces could and should have anticipated these problems. The Russian military has not been asked to undertake complex technological or logistical operations for at least three decades. Its more recent military actions, such as the bombing of Syria, were quite straightforward operations, in which aircraft could be used to terrorize an enemy that could not efficiently fire back.​
To truly understand a military’s effectiveness, analysts must investigate not only how it looks on a spreadsheet but also how it may function in the chaos and pressure of a battlefield. War is an extremely difficult and complex business. Western strategists cannot go back in time and alter their earlier assessments. Any system with a widespread consensus that an excellent and modernized Russian military would conquer Ukraine in a matter of days is a system in crisis. We can, and must, try to do better next time. If world leaders have a better understanding of the potential difficulties of any war in East Asia, for example, perhaps they will realize how hard the outcome of such a confrontation is to predict. If the Chinese tried an amphibious landing on Taiwan, for instance, they would be undertaking maybe the most complex wartime operation, and one that their military has never attempted before. I can’t tell you what would happen, but I know it would not go according to plan. War never does.​

Your PLA was wrong about US in Desert Storm and like it or not, the PLA is wrong about Ukraine as well. Everyone was wrong. You guys on this forum are even worse in that your opinions depends SOLELY on the 'shiny new toys' foundation which is understandable considering none of you ever served and that on this forum you guys consistently displayed a disdain for history. Everyone was wrong about Ukraine, so what make YOU think you are correct about Taiwan?
But history says US predicted ROC forces would steamroll PLA during the Chinese civil war then they ended up on Hainan and Taiwan. Then they lost Hainan and it's down to just Taiwan.

PRC has already proved itself against ROC once. Meanwhile is the ROC learning? Not really. In the Hankuang exercises ROC has time and time again demonstrated an obsolete doctrine. What about the air force? They barely fly more than North Korea while PLAAF and PLAN pilots fly as much as the US. Do you believe that training hours matter?

So while nobody can say for sure what will happen, the relevant factors point towards Taiwanese air and naval defeat.
 
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