True, but who is talking about half good? I was talking about half the truth, which is something else. When you look at the modernisations that I showed, IAF and IN area clearly improving at a good pace and that is often not shown by generalisations. So when 2 of our 3 forces are doing good in terms of defence modernisations, that's more than half good right?
I'll appreciate your effort at starting this thread, in order to clarify some "truth v/s hype". The fact is that: just as there are
"many truths", there is also a
"humongous hype" that exist; and most of all, even overlap each other. But they are not even fully known or talked about, even here for that matter.
To simplify matters somewhat: there has been and there is continuing to be a growth and development in the Armed Forces both
quantitatively and qualitatively. But whether that is satisfactory or not elicits different answers (views) depending on
who that question is addressed to!
Leaving that aside for the time being; it is crystal clear that (in my view) most of the responsibility lies within the precincts of MoD. And that is less to do with
"policy paralysis" and various other things being 'bandied about' so freely here and elsewhere. MoD (in the Indian Scheme of things) is the primary decision maker with MoF having an accessorial role as
facilitator or
spoiler, since it holds the "purse-strings".
Hence again (in the Indian Scheme of things) the Bureaucrats of MoD have the powers and the abilities to either "push" or "block" decision making. Very poor use of those powers and abilities have been on constant display during the term of the last Govt. How and why did it happen? Because of a RM who had poor leadership and managerial skills. There is no escaping that fact; however much A.K. Antony may be a consummate Politician or an Individual of great personal integrity. Those qualities were less called for in his role as RM; than a clear and decisive display of Leadership and Managerial abilities.
The moment that AKA was appointed to the post, he was appointed to a very Senior Managerial position and was required to act in a manner befitting that; which he clearly was unable to.
E.G. if Narayanamurthy was unable to function effectively as Head of Infosys, all the responsibility for his acts would devolve on him.
Therefore; as far as the failings of MoD are concerned, the
"buck stops at" Anthony. Period.
The Armed Forces themselves; also need
"to carry the can" wrt to their own failings. The Armed Forces have begun to display traits of both the Bureaucrats and the Politicians in their approach to their issues. But that seems to be a natural corollary to the "Indian Scheme of things" again. Which has led to the Services following the adage of "if you can't beat them, join them" with some exception, one being the last CNS.
Most of all; the Services need to recognise that as 'end-users'; they are in fact the biggest stake-holders in what is being developed/built within the country or what is being acquired from outside.
But they are still in the role of "kids" who keeps a "wish list" for Santa Claus to fulfill at Yule-Tide!
Hence the outcome is similar.
Only the IN has played a reasonable role in working to not only define but also create some of the hardware that they need. With commensurate results. While the other services have had less than edifying results to show.
I find it amusing that news reports are highlighting something being described as "lack of war-readiness" only because it grabs eyeballs and it also helps to 'pitch' some (hidden) agendas. The fact is that a (any) "War Reserve" is quantified in terms of
X days of ammo, eqpt. etc etc. etc. What has been happening recently, is something known as
"padding" in Civvy Street Mgmt. Every year ; that
X quantity has been increased by a certain quantity/percentage as a revised requirement. How that revised reqd. quantity is reflected in reality is hard to determine, since some of those revisions are strictly arbitrary in nature. That then leads to the "headline mongering" that we get to see, but who knows the reality?
The real requirements then get overlooked, and there are plenty of those extant as it is. Even the last COAS rode that "hobby-horse" since it helped him to push another "personal" agenda. Unfortunately so. And the MoD let it pass......
The lead R&D orgn under MoD is DRDO. A huge Behemoth with mixed results to show at various times in its existence. It is in recent times, that the results are getting noticeably and consistently better.
But MoD has consistently failed to set goals and achieve results from this Orgn in the past. Individuals and (specific) Labs performed outstandingly in the past, but no thanks to MoD. It is fairly recently that MoD has reset/re-booted the Orgn. That has had again something to do with the reluctance of successive RMs to discard the mantle of Politicians and take on "Productivity Issues" in the Labor Union-heavy Ordnance Factories Board and DRDO (much less so in).
The hard reality is that the Services need the Production Agencies (whether PSU or Pvt. Sector) to function effectively wrt their supply chain, this is where MoD again has to function effectively as the
MANAGER and ensure that things get done.
More than anything else, what is now needed; is a serious re-structuring of the Armed Forces and its Higher Command including the setting up of a CDS as well as various Commands based on tasks/capabilities. That will be the real
"growth" rather than just increasing Squadrons and Divisions.