No not accepted at all The following comments are by a former Indian Ambassador to Russia and diplomat:
Francis Fukuyama wrote a sequel to his celebrated book The End of History and the Last Man (1992) no sooner than he realised that he was hopelessly wrong in his prediction that the global triumph of political and economic liberalism was at hand. He wrote: “What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the crossing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such… That is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western democracy as the final form of human government.” But in no time he realised his rush to judgment and he retracted with another book.
However, unlike the celebrated American neocon thinker, Indian foreign policy thinkers who were heavily influenced by his 1992 thesis are yet to retract. The Indian discourses through the 1990s drew heavily from Fukuyama to throw overboard the scope for reinventing or reinterpreting ‘non-alignment’ in the post-Cold War setting and came to a rapid judgment that Russia belonged to the dustbin of history. Our discourses never really got updated despite Fukumaya’s own retraction.
Indeed, western commentators also fuelled the consequent sense of insecurity in Delhi through the 1990s by endorsing that India would never have a ‘Russia option’ again and Boris Yeltsin’s Russia itself was inexorably becoming an ‘ally’ of the west — and, therefore, what alternative is there for India but to take to the New American Century project? Remember the drama of the Bill Clinton administration arm-twisting Yeltsin not to give to India the cryogentic engines?
In sum, India got entrapped in a ‘unipolar predicament’. The best elucidation of this self-invited predicament has been the masterly work titled Crossing the Rubicon by Raja Mohan, which was of course widely acclaimed in the US. While releasing the book at a function in Delhi, the then National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra even admitted that India’s main foreign policy challenge was somehow to engage the US’s “attention”.
Russia, of course, went on to prove our pundits completely wrong. Russia remerged as a global player and the evidence of it is today spread (and is poised to expand) all across global theatres — Libya, Syria, Iran, Central Asia, Afghanistan, etc.
Why I am underscoring all this is that I am strongly reminded of that sad chapter in the recent history of India’s foreign policy when I see the huge ‘psywar’ being let loose on Pakistan currently when that country too is at a crossroads with regard to its future policy directions in a highly volatile external enviornment.
In Pakistan’s case, the ‘psywar’ substitutes Russia with China. The US’s ‘Track II’ thesis is that China is hopelessly marooned in its own malaise so much so that it has no time, interest or resources to come to Pakistan’s aid, the two countries’ ‘all-weather friendship’ notwithstanding. Let me cull out two fine pieces of this ongoing ‘psywar’.
One is the lengthy article featured by America’s prestigious flag-carrier Foreign Affairs magazine in early December titled “China’s Pakistan conundrum”. Its argument is: ‘China will not simply bail out Pakistan with loans, investment, and aid, as those watching the deterioration of US-Pakistani relations seem to expect. China will pursue politics, security, and geopolitical advantage regardless of Islamabad’s preferences’. It puts forth the invidious argument that China’s real use for Pakistan is only to “box out New Delhi in Afghanistan and the broader region.”
Alongside the argument is the highly-tendentious vector that is beyond easy verification, namely, that US and China are increasingly ‘coordinating’ their policies toward Pakistan. Diplomacy is part dissimulation and we simply don’t know whether the US and China are even anywhere near beginning to ‘coordinate’ about ‘coordinating’ their regional policies in South Asia, especially with regard to Pakistan (and Afghanistan). The odds are that while the US and China may have some limited convergent interests, conceivably, their strategic interests are most certainly in sharp conflict.
A milder version of this frontal attack by US pundits on Pakistan’s existential dilemma appears in Michael Krepon’s article last week titled ‘Pakistan’s Patrons’, which, curiously, counsels Islamabad to follow India’s foreign-policy footsteps and make up with the US. Krepon literally suggests that the Pakistanis are living in a fool’s paradise.
The obvious thrust of this ‘psywar’ — strikingly similar to what India was subjected to in the 1990s — is that Pakistan has no option but to fall in line with the US regional strategies, as it has no real ‘China option’. The main difference between India and Pakistan is that the foreign policy elites in Islamabad — unlike their Indian counterparts — are not inclined to buy into the US argument with a willing suspension of disbelief. In a way, the Sino-Pakistan relationship is proving once again to be resilient. Pakistan is in no mood to get into a ‘unipolar predicament’, as the Indian elites willingly did in the 1990s.
