The end of the deal, hopes, delusions and treasons

[TheImmortal]

Just two facts:

You cant hide plutonium production due to neutrinos produced, but you can hide uranium production.

You can also enrich HEU with IR-1, IR-2m which is different to the P-2, just enrichs faster and cheaper.

Plutonium pathway is much easier to assemble from a plutonium producing source. That is why Syria selected a North Korean design. Arak would have allowed for 3-4 nuclear bombs worth of by product material per year. It was the West number one concern, they weren’t even concerned about Natanz.

i don’t think IR-1 (P-1) can break the needed fissile material threshold for a nuclear bomb unless your plan is to build a dirty bomb. And IR-2M is pretty similar to P-2.

Pakistan built its bombs on P-2 not on P-1. At best, P-1 can enrich to a high level just before weapons grade and then to feed into a P-2 cascade to make the sprint much faster.

Either way the point is mute, since 2003 Iran’s centrifuge manufacturing capability has been under the watchful eye of intelligence services.

Diverting enough uranium and centrifuges for a SECERT facility is unlikely to have occurred pre-2003.

Now if the international community found out a decade later (2010ish) about Iran’s nuclear program then I would say enough time and progress in centrifuge production had been made to account for secret facility.

 

[PeeD]

Plutonium pathway is much easier to assemble from a plutonium producing source. That is why Syria selected a North Korean design. Arak would have allowed for 3-4 nuclear bombs worth of by product material per year. It was the West number one concern, they weren’t even concerned about Natanz.

Yes it could produce plutonium for bombs. However, the moment the reactor runs up, the U.S will know and track. The U.S fear was primarily Iran mastering centrifuges.

i don’t think IR-1 (P-1) can break the needed fissile material threshold for a nuclear bomb unless your plan is to build a dirty bomb. And IR-2M is pretty similar to P-2.

Any centrifuge that is capable to enrich uranium, can enrich it to bomb level. Its only a question of time.

Pakistan built its bombs on P-2 not on P-1. At best, P-1 can enrich to a high level just before weapons grade and then to feed into a P-2 cascade to make the sprint much faster.

P-1 is a much more complex and difficult design than P-2. It has lower performance but you need to master it if you want super powerful centrifuges like IR-8/9 in the future. One reason Iran went with it, learning curve.

For Pakistans bomb goal, P-2 was the best design, it did the job and they simply ordered critical components from Europe.


What the U.S fears is Irans centrifuge progress. With IR-9 Iran will be only one generation behind the best centrifuges in the world. A IR-10 or so will mean one centrifuge does the job of 100 IR-1 or 30 P-2.

This means: At some point, getting fissle material for a bomb won't be any problem for Iran.

Either way the point is mute, since 2003 Iran’s centrifuge manufacturing capability has been under the watchful eye of intelligence services.

The easiest part of it is to create manufacturing capability for secret centrifuges: Once the technology is mastered, a mature high-power centrifuge developed under safeguards watch, you have no more problems. They would to track raw material (carbon fiber) production to control it, not very practicable.

 

[khansaheeb]

though I should have created this thread months ago, yet as we Persian say, whenever you catch the fish, it's still fresh.

Almost nothing

Almost nothing. this was the answer of Iran's central bank chief about the benefits of the deal (JCPOA) for Iran.
the comment which was boycotted by all reformists and Pro-Rohani medias.

It was just a few weeks earlier that Rohani's team showed bunch of monitors to reporters and claimed that swift system is functioning, and called anybody who speaks the otherwise as ignorant, extremist, etc.
yet yesterday Iran's central bank chief broke the silence and talked about the real world and how Americans ignored their commitments.

read it here:
US Failed to Comply with JCPOA Commitments, CBI Chief Says

to make it simple, after the deal, we have been sanctioned several times through other excuses, our money hasn't been released, our banks can't have transactions with foreign banks and we can't buy or sell anything unless through barter. we can't launch our missiles or space rockets without receiving more sanctions. everything is like before the deal. before destroying our nuclear infrastructure and filling our nuclear reactor with concrete and firing our scientists.

it's not a surprise though, Americans did it in the previous deal too, when Rohani himself was the negotiator. when he accepted to shut down all of our nuclear activities in return of The first nothing.

One may ask why he was fooled again? and how? if we got nothing, why Rohani doesn't announce the failure then? was he really fooled? if this deal is a failure then why some people want to make another deal, this time about our missiles? the People which our supreme leader called traitor! (it's thread was deleted, not by me though!)
I will post about the deal and these issues in this thread hereafter.

Iranians sound like the Native Americans and may well end up like them.

 

[Blue In Green]

Yes it could produce plutonium for bombs. However, the moment the reactor runs up, the U.S will know and track. The U.S fear was primarily Iran mastering centrifuges.



Any centrifuge that is capable to enrich uranium, can enrich it to bomb level. Its only a question of time.



P-1 is a much more complex and difficult design than P-2. It has lower performance but you need to master it if you want super powerful centrifuges like IR-8/9 in the future. One reason Iran went with it, learning curve.

For Pakistans bomb goal, P-2 was the best design, it did the job and they simply ordered critical components from Europe.


What the U.S fears is Irans centrifuge progress. With IR-9 Iran will be only one generation behind the best centrifuges in the world. A IR-10 or so will mean one centrifuge does the job of 100 IR-1 or 30 P-2.

This means: At some point, getting fissle material for a bomb won't be any problem for Iran.



The easiest part of it is to create manufacturing capability for secret centrifuges: Once the technology is mastered, a mature high-power centrifuge developed under safeguards watch, you have no more problems. They would to track raw material (carbon fiber) production to control it, not very practicable.

As it currently stands (in your opinion) where is Iran? how does the future look for the country (nuclear related)? is the spectre of open-conflict still looming? And will Iran ever shed its religious stigma of nuclear weapons and fully acknowledge the bomb for what it's worth?

 

[Shawnee]

1. You do not need plutonium even for thermonuclear bombs. It is replaceable with other agents. Uranium reactor also makes neutrino and antineutrino which is only 20% less in energy level.

2. Salami could have never said this without upper level approval:

3. Many peaceful experiments allowed by IAEA also produce neutrino. Detection means need for further verification. Signature of neutrino and antineutrino can be close as well. Localization is very difficult when it is beyond 1000 miles. Most Known neutrino detection studies were done from a close distance like 20 miles. Max that I know was several hundred km and not 1000 km.

Medical generators/reactors/reactions also make positron and neutrino. Bushehr makes neutrino. Multiple small reactors are tough to detect. Energy spectra of neutrino and anti neutrino (in case of French model of detection) can be very similar. Seismic activity an help but to an extent and only in a warm test.

4. Iran has unlimited research space. It includes marine engines that can make neutrino and it can be open and spread out in the country with similar range of neutrino and antineutrino energy spectrum.
This is just one example.

 

[TheImmortal]

Yes it could produce plutonium for bombs. However, the moment the reactor runs up, the U.S will know and track. The U.S fear was primarily Iran mastering centrifuges.



Any centrifuge that is capable to enrich uranium, can enrich it to bomb level. Its only a question of time.



P-1 is a much more complex and difficult design than P-2. It has lower performance but you need to master it if you want super powerful centrifuges like IR-8/9 in the future. One reason Iran went with it, learning curve.

For Pakistans bomb goal, P-2 was the best design, it did the job and they simply ordered critical components from Europe.


What the U.S fears is Irans centrifuge progress. With IR-9 Iran will be only one generation behind the best centrifuges in the world. A IR-10 or so will mean one centrifuge does the job of 100 IR-1 or 30 P-2.

This means: At some point, getting fissle material for a bomb won't be any problem for Iran.



The easiest part of it is to create manufacturing capability for secret centrifuges: Once the technology is mastered, a mature high-power centrifuge developed under safeguards watch, you have no more problems. They would to track raw material (carbon fiber) production to control it, not very practicable.

Plutonium reactor detection via nutrino is impractical. It is not a suprise that several powers that sprinted to nuclear bomb chose this pathway.

Again I’m telling you what US officials privately said off the record that Arak was their primary concern and they fooled Iran. Khans P-1 and P-2 designs were not a concern they had been spread across the Middle East. In case of Arak, Nearly a decade after the nuclear deal Arak reactor has not been re designed and has not come online. Quite frankly a joke. Meanwhile that idiot Salehi continues to breath on this planet. He got played for a fool by Moniz.

I have my doubts that IR-1 can achieve weapons grade fissile material without breaking down. Again hiding 10,000+ IR-1s is not very practical.

Regarding IR-9, Iran is far away from deploying that. Iran’s centrifuge tech is still 1970’s based. Thus my point remains valid unlikely Iran can go nuclear this year or next. Iran’s best bet is to wait for a period of upheaval in the world when they are distracted to go nuclear. That could take 10-20 years for such an event to transpire.

 

[PeeD]

Plutonium reactor detection via nutrino is impractical. It is not a suprise that several powers that sprinted to nuclear bomb chose this pathway.

By public information it might seem impractical. U.S "back world" capabilities are not to be underestimated,

Plutonium reactor is good if you want to break out fast and officially become a nuclear power (poor mans nuclear path). Advanced centrifuges however offer you elegant latent capability.

Khans P-1 and P-2 designs were not a concern they had been spread across the Middle East.

Yet they could not be produced without european components, hence sanctions prone. Iran however mastered it under sanctions.
And while IR-1 was 6 generations behind leading european centrifuges, 35 years, an operational IR-9 is only one generation behind.

Nearly a decade after the nuclear deal Arak reactor has not been re designed and has not come online. Quite frankly a joke. Meanwhile that idiot Salehi continues to breath on this planet. He got played for a fool by Moniz.

Salehi is not an idiot, he just favors centrifuges and latent capability: I do too.

I have my doubts that IR-1 can achieve weapons grade fissile material without breaking down. Again hiding 10,000+ IR-1s is not very practical.

It can achieve it but yes, due to its low capability on material side, it is just a learning project for Iran to allow machines like IR-9.

Regarding IR-9, Iran is far away from deploying that. Iran’s centrifuge tech is still 1970’s based.

No. IR-9 is to be the Urenco generation that was developed in the mid-90's and is still running as the 2nd machine in Urenco production plants.
The air is thin at the top; that's why Urenco only managed to create one generation after that by the late 2000's. They are still far away from the next generation because there are almost no notably superior materials anymore.

Iran is very far in this field, the most important field in the nuclear escalation game and the most difficult and sophisticated.

 

[Arian]

Plutonium pathway is much easier to assemble from a plutonium producing source. That is why Syria selected a North Korean design. Arak would have allowed for 3-4 nuclear bombs worth of by product material per year. It was the West number one concern, they weren’t even concerned about Natanz.

The IR-40 heavy water reactor would've produced about 8 - 10 kilograms of plutonium as a bi-product of nuclear fission. Could Iran use it for nuclear bombs? Well, as I am going to answer later, in case of a political willingness and a strong army that could deter a possible military conflict, yes. Otherwise, no. There was no chance that IR-40 would be used for plutonium production without huge international escalation. Every milligram of that plutonium had to be reported to the IAEA and had to be sent abroad.

i don’t think IR-1 (P-1) can break the needed fissile material threshold for a nuclear bomb unless your plan is to build a dirty bomb. And IR-2M is pretty similar to P-2.

The problem with the IR-1 centrifuge was that it didn't perform well. Many of our IR-1 centrifuges (about one-fourth of them) crashed on their own while spinning near their maximum capacity. Other than that, IR-1 like any other working centrifuge is capable of enriching uranium to HEU at any amount. You will just need more centrifuges or more time. IR-2 is the Iranian equivalent of P-2. IR-2m is slightly more advanced than P-2.

Pakistan built its bombs on P-2 not on P-1. At best, P-1 can enrich to a high level just before weapons grade and then to feed into a P-2 cascade to make the sprint much faster.

You just need highly enriched uranium for the core of your bomb. Once the nuclear chain reaction starts and enough neutrons have been produced, even lower numbers like 60% might be acceptable. Although obviously you will get a lower yield overall.

Either way the point is mute, since 2003 Iran’s centrifuge manufacturing capability has been under the watchful eye of intelligence services.

Diverting enough uranium and centrifuges for a SECERT facility is unlikely to have occurred pre-2003.

Now if the international community found out a decade later (2010ish) about Iran’s nuclear program then I would say enough time and progress in centrifuge production had been made to account for secret facility.

Iran has started the production of metal uranium. If it's achieved in large scale successfully, Iran can go for a covert program that employs laser isotope separation. I personally find Iran's production of uranium metal much more dangerous for the West than the IR-40 heavy water reactor, provided that it is backed by a good infrastructure for laser enrichment.

Now back to my initial point, the problem of Iran becoming a nuclear power is more than anything about political willingness and military calculations. As I have calculated it before on PDF, Iran's breakout time can be as short as 6 weeks to 8 weeks, assuming that it could reach 19,000 SWU UF6 Kg/year, produce and install more IR-6 centrifuges after that daily, and taking into account the latest IAEA reports that estimate Iran's current stockpile of enriched uranium at about 3 tonnes of 4.5% LEU and 17 kilograms of 20% HALEU.

However, as soon as a major diversion is seen in Iran's nuclear program, I strong believe that the United States will form an international coalition to bomb Iranian nuclear and missile infrastructures. China and Russia will just sit idle and watch it as usual. The problem is that Iran's civilian nuclear program is so strictly under monitoring and 24/7 surveillance that Iran does not have any room for weaponizing it without being noticed. And we all know that there are spies everywhere in Iran's defense and nuclear industries.

The Bushehr nuclear reactor, if modified to a breeder reactor with safety considerations, will give Iran more than 100 kilograms of plutonium per year. It will definitely give Iran enough neutron flux to convert tens of kilograms of uranium to plutonium each year. But can Iran do that without getting bombed to the stone age? I highly doubt it.

 

[Shawnee]

I will add this one too. I had a hard time convincing other members about the limitations of satellites. Maybe Mr Reyhani is a better source.

Beta/gamma emission, x Ray and of course alpha can be very well shielded. You can try to smell it in the air but limitations are accuracy and localization.

https://twitter.com/x/status/1209074768554668032

 

[Khibiny]

Birth and death of ‘a-step-for-a-step’ proposal

Over the past days and weeks, some instances of multilateral diplomatic activism have been witnessed towards eliminating the deadlock that has been formed around the issue of the United States’ potential return to the Iran Nuclear Deal. Vienna, Geneva, Brussels, Paris, Berlin, Washington, New York, and Tehran have been playing host to this activism.

Iran Press/ Commentary: Over the past week, the International Atomic Energy Agency hosted a battle of brawn that had Iran on one side and the United States together with its threesome European allies in the JCPOA on the other.

Although, Iran and the IAEA came to a controversial three-month agreement, which was followed by the opposition of members of Majlis (the Iranian Parliament), towards retaining the IAEA’s physical observations of Iran’s nuclear sites, the European powers proposed an anti-Iran resolution at the UN nuclear agency’s Board of Governors that intensely increased the Iranians’ suspicion regarding their good will and fitness to mediate between Tehran and Washington.

Iran’s concern about the role played by the European sides was so serious that prompted Tehran to relay indirect messages to them indicating that if Iran and the US were supposed to exchange any messages at all, the official channel through the Swiss Embassy that represents the US interests in the Islamic Republic would serve as a better conduit than the European vehicles.

This means that not only does not Tehran consider the Europeans to be any better than US President Joe Biden himself, but also it suspects that they could be providing wrongful and misleading consultation and assessments to the new American administration. Therefore, it would be better for any potential messages to be relayed through Switzerland.

Europeans saw no choice before themselves other than to take back their resolution thanks to Iran’s insistence on its position that potential adoption of the resolution would prompt Tehran to end its agreement with the IAEA.

Of course, based on Press TV’s information, they had received messages from the Iranian side earlier showing that the “a-step-for-a-step” proposal could warrant examination. Based on the proposal, some steps on the part of the US could be followed by some steps on the part of Iran, the American steps featuring unfreezing of part of Iran’s overseas assets.

Still according to Press TV’s information, the US has principally had no objection to this proposal. It, however, did not want the unfreezing process to take place before any unofficial or even closed-door meeting with Iran, instead preferring the unblocking process to be announced as the outcome of one such meeting. Another sticking point has revolved around the amount of the frozen assets that has to be released. This volume has oscillated between $1 and $15 billion. Press TV’s information indicates, though, that those who have been proposing the idea on the part of Tehran have not been certain whether the proposal was in accordance with the policies of the country’s establishment.

Nevertheless, presentation of the issue on the part of some people in Iran and appearance of some relevant hazy remarks in the media heartened the Europeans to play a role in the area. It was then that they tried to portray their withdrawal of the anti-Iranian resolution, which had actually resulted after Tehran’s official threat, as an instance of their good will towards promotion of the “a-step-for-a-step” proposal.

This is while, the Europeans, who still confidently consider themselves to be the JCPOA’s defenders, even construe potential removal of Iran’s oil sanctions that former US President Donald Trump issued after leaving the JCPOA as a “difficult measure” the resolution of which definitely requires Iran and the US to hold a meeting. On the other hand, they regard Iran’s potential cessation of 20-percent enrichment as only a small step.

In line with this supposed intermediary function, Paris and Berlin resorted to some intense efforts by funneling some direct and indirect messages to persuade Iran to attend an unofficial meeting with the US.
As a result of these contacts and relaying of these messages, in which Brussels would sometimes intervene as Europe’s foreign policy headquarters, a proposal emerged in Iran, which advised implementation of a phased-out and months-long procedure involving reciprocal measures by Iran and the US.

Some lobbying efforts inside the new US new administration were also effective in the formation of the proposal. These lobbying efforts came on the part of people of Iranian origin, who tried to establish some contact between Iran’s representative mission to the United Nations and the person in charge of Iran’s dossier in Biden’s administration. These people eventually realized, however, that the main proposal was in the making in Tehran amid contact with Europeans.

As part of the proposal that bore some defects completely similar to those of the JCPOA’s, the US was supposed to make some unverified commitments in exchange for completely verifiable and palpable commitments on the part of Iran. Nor did the volume of the Iranian assets that was supposed to be unfrozen as part of the proposal bore the smallest resemblance to the $1,000-billion that Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif recently specified in an interview with Press TV as the damages that the Islamic Republic has incurred due to the US departure from the JCPOA. The proposal, however, came to use for deployment on such symbolic junctures such as the final days of the solar calendar year and the National Nuclear Technology Day. Its emergence also well suited the nearing period of campaigning for Iranian presidential elections.

Still, not only did it not enable verifiable sanction relief, but also it would lead to subsequent negotiations that would, in turn, impose harsher, lengthier, and more dangerous commitments on Iran.
The proposal went down the official path of assessment of its commensurability with the establishment’s policies, but was deemed irreconcilable with the policies and the establishment’s strategies. Accordingly, Press TV aired an exclusive report, announcing that the “a-step-for-a-step” proposal had been ruled out as it did not suit the establishment’s policies on the issue of the JCPOA.

Press TV’s information indicates that the US has even changed its mind regarding potential unfreezing of $1 billion in Iranian assets that has been blocked in South Korea. Washington had sought to announce the prospect of unfreezing the money as a result of a potential meeting with Tehran, but began frowning on even such a limited unblocking process after realizing that the Islamic Republic insisted on complete sanction relief.

Based on verified information, Press TV has made certain that no proposal that does not match the Iranian Islamic establishment’s declared policy would be used as the basis of the country’s interaction in the area. The United States can, therefore, only rely on a proposal that is in accord with the conditions announced by Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, especially the ones that the Leader laid emphasis upon through the speech dated January 8, 2021.
Press TV is in possession of more details about the issue at hand, which it holds out on releasing since it is yet to verify them.

By PressTV Editorial Board

 

[Shawnee]

By public information it might seem impractical. U.S "back world" capabilities are not to be underestimated,

Plutonium reactor is good if you want to break out fast and officially become a nuclear power (poor mans nuclear path). Advanced centrifuges however offer you elegant latent capability.



Yet they could not be produced without european components, hence sanctions prone. Iran however mastered it under sanctions.
And while IR-1 was 6 generations behind leading european centrifuges, 35 years, an operational IR-9 is only one generation behind.



Salehi is not an idiot, he just favors centrifuges and latent capability: I do too.



It can achieve it but yes, due to its low capability on material side, it is just a learning project for Iran to allow machines like IR-9.



No. IR-9 is to be the Urenco generation that was developed in the mid-90's and is still running as the 2nd machine in Urenco production plants.
The air is thin at the top; that's why Urenco only managed to create one generation after that by the late 2000's. They are still far away from the next generation because there are almost no notably superior materials anymore.

Iran is very far in this field, the most important field in the nuclear escalation game and the most difficult and sophisticated.

@PeeD jaan
I believe that there is secret US weapons but a practical remote neutrino detector may not be one of them.

Considering any fission material makes neutrino/antineutrino, then why Russia and US are not decommissioning their nuclear submarine.

A nuclear submarine is no more stealth if there is antineutrino/neutrino detectors that can work remotely and effectively.
Russians have to start decommissioning their nuclear subs that have 40 or more MW power equal to Arak reactor 40 MW power.

 

[PeeD]

Fair point.

From the information that is rumored in credible circles, this is a rather recent capability the U.S has gained.
Possibly satellite based and hence a whole constellation would be needed to reliably track mobile submarines, while a single one could scan static reactors over months.

I'm on thin ice here, on this black world stuff.

However, Soviets and Russians use a nuclear detection device on their submarines to track western nuclear subs and the open world still is not sure how it works. Neutrino detection or if it picks up radionuclides of the reactor. At least its clear that water is a good shielding method.

Some people still think the U.S relies on airborne SIGINT assets for a electronic order of battle, to safely operate their stealth airpower. Just because their "spysats" are black projects and secret, but it is known that they have switched to such systems.

I also think one reason Chinese abandoned the 816 nuclear plant project was their realization that long term plutonium production can't be done undetected, even by a underground reactor.

I can distantly remember that someone anonymous told the NY times or WP at the IAEA that neutrino detectors are reality and can easily track when Arak goes critical.

 

[Surenas]

Iran has not yet recovered from Natanz explosion hit - exclusive

Iran has yet to recover from a devastating explosion at its Natanz nuclear facility last July, sources have told The Jerusalem Post, undercutting IAEA reports this week that the Islamic Republic has made progress with advanced centrifuges for enriching uranium.

On Tuesday, Reuters disclosed an IAEA report which claimed that Iran has started enriching uranium at its new underground Natanz facility using advanced IR-4 centrifuges.

This could be highly significant because until now, most of Tehran’s centrifuges were the slower IR-1 model, with a smaller number of IR-2ms.

The more advanced IR-4 centrifuges could shorten the timeline for breaking out to a nuclear weapon, and having the machines underground could severely complicate or even prevent the IDF’s ability to attack them in the future.

Despite the report and these implications, sources have revealed to the Post that Iran is still far from a full recovery following the July 2 explosionat an above-ground structure at the Natanz facility. The structure was the main site for assembling advanced centrifuges like the IR-4 and the IR-6.

The explosion was attributed to the Mossad. Sources emphasized that Israel’s activities to prevent Tehran from obtaining a nuclear weapon never end and that there is no site, old or new, which is safe.

At the time, Israeli defense officials and nuclear experts collectively said that the explosion would push the Islamic Republic’s advanced centrifuge program back by one to two years.

But now more than eight months later, the IAEA report this week saying that Iran has begun feeding a cascade of 174 IR-4 centrifuges at Natanz with natural UF6 – the form of uranium that is fed into centrifuges for enrichment – seemed to suggest a recovery.

The IAEA report also suggested that a second cascade of IR-4 centrifuges would soon be installed at Natanz.

However, these numbers not only pale in comparison to where Iran would have been at this point had the explosion not taken place, but they are also much less advanced than the country was even back in July 2020, defense officials have indicated.

Given additional time, Iran may recover to the point where it was in July 2020.

Weeks after the Natanz facility was destroyed, Intelligence Minister Eli Cohen told the Post that Israel knows “everything that is happening in Iran.”

In addition, intelligence officials have indicated that the destruction of the old Natanz facility damaged the ayatollahs psychologically – and could help deter them from crossing certain lines toward acquiring a nuclear capability that might cause them to fear triggering Israeli action.

Regarding the psychological impact, the Post reported in September that the purpose of the attack was to send an unambiguous and public deterrent message that progress toward a nuclear weapon beyond certain redlines would not be tolerated.

Though Tehran initially played down the Natanz and other explosions, within days satellite footage revealed that the impact was far more serious than the regime was claiming.

On top of all of that, an underground facility creates logistical problems and slows down virtually all elements of nuclear progress, sources explained.

Institute for Science and International Security president David Albright said that even if Iran had made a very partial recovery since July, it was significant that they still lacked the capacity to mass produce advanced centrifuges.

Albright said that the 164 IR-4 centrifuges reflected existing or possibly very limited additional production, but no real new production, which has not yet been restored.

He added that the destroyed above ground facility had taken six years to build from 2012-2018.

Without mass production capacity, it was unclear whether Iran could meet its apparent self-declared deadline of operating 1,000 IR-6 advanced centrifuges by December 2021, though some reports indicated that the deadline was in fact in March and passed last weekend. Albright, however, said that his team of Farsi translators had determined the deadline was still some nine months off.

Still, former IAEA official and Stimson Center fellow Olli Heinonen urged caution. “The destruction of the above–ground facility has delayed particularly the IR-6 program, but Iran has likely key equipment for assembling centrifuges. I do not feel that they lay all eggs in one basket when it comes to maintaining crucial manufacturing capabilities. An example of that is after 2004, the construction of Fordow paralleled work in Natanz.”

Moreover, he warned that Iran has achieved “an important technical development at Fordow. The installation of two cascades of IR-6 centrifuges to produce 20% enriched uranium from uranium enriched up to 5% by IR-1 cascades is a major technical achievement – if successful.”

“Such an arrangement removes an intermediate step, where 5%-enriched uranium is collected from one cascade unit to a cylinder and then taken to the next unit and fed to a cascade producing 20%-enriched uranium. It makes the process more efficient,” he said.

Moreover, Heinonen said that “Iranian engineers have collected indispensable experience and knowledge on IR-2 and to some degree on IR-4 centrifuges for further decisions” – which they can use in the future regardless of the general status of the nuclear program.

Iran has not yet recovered from Natanz explosion hit - exclusive

Sources reveal to Post that Iran is still far from a full recovery following the July 2 explosion at an above-ground structure at the Natanz facility.

www.jpost.com

 

[WudangMaster]

I thought this already the case. So were sanctions of oil sales to China from Iran ever being enforced?

US warns China it will enforce sanctions on Iranian oil shipments: Report

Shipments of oil from Tehran to Beijing have soared in recent months, reaching nearly 500,000 barrels a day in February

www.middleeasteye.net

The US has told China it will enforce Trump-era sanctions against Iranian oil sales, as shipments from Tehran to Beijing surge.

A senior Biden administration official told the Financial Times on Tuesday that Iranian oil exports to China had been increasing "for some time now".

"We've told the Chinese that we will continue to enforce our sanctions," the senior administration official told the newspaper. "There will be no tacit green light."

Still, the official noted that such sanctions could be waived during anticipated talks between the two countries over reviving the Iranian nuclear accord.

"Far better than us focusing on sanctions enforcement and China focusing on sanctions evasion would be to get on a more productive course, which is for the US to lift sanctions and Iran to reverse its nuclear steps," the official said.

"We're not going to make a religion out of the format."

The rise in exports had led to questions over whether the new administration was turning a blind eye in order to encourage Iran to return to negotiations over the 2015 nuclear deal, which former US President Donald Trump nixed in 2018.

After leaving the nuclear deal with world powers, Trump reimposed crippling sanctions on the Islamic Republic.

In 2019, the Trump administration stopped providing sanctions waivers to a number of countries, including China, that were importing oil from Iran, and began sanctioning any entities continuing to do so.

China, a signatory to the 2015 deal, imported around 478,000 barrels of oil a day on average in the month of February, the FT reported. In March, that number is expected to reach 856,000 barrels a day, according to the energy research company Kpler.

While Iran's economy has been devastated both by US sanctions and the Covid-19 pandemic, Iranian traders told the British newspaper that signs of new business were emerging.

"Many foreign companies are no longer scared of sanctions since Biden [was] elected," one petrochemicals trader told the FT.

'Goal is not to enforce sanctions'
The unnamed Washington official's comments to the FT come as US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan are scheduled to meet with their Chinese counterparts in Alaska on Thursday.

US President Joe Biden has vowed a return to the nuclear deal, also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), yet both Washington and Tehran are at a standstill as each side expects the other to take the first step.

The Biden administration has signalled that it will not make any concessions to kickstart talks, while Iran has said that sanctions must be lifted before it comes to the negotiating table.


In an interview with Politico published on Wednesday, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif said the US must first issue "an executive order to return [to the JCPOA] and lift all these sanctions" and in return Iran will return to compliance "immediately".

The senior Biden official told the FT that the US could relieve sanctions if Washington reached an understanding with Tehran as a part of a "mutual set of steps or as part of a full return into compliance" with the 2015 agreement:

"Ultimately, our goal is not to enforce the sanctions; it is to get to the point where we lift sanctions and Iran reverses its nuclear steps."

The official noted that such steps could also include the US officially allowing the return of billions of dollars in frozen Iranian funds held in South Korea.

"This [the frozen funds] is precisely the kind of issue we believe we should be discussing in the context of a mutual way back into compliance with the deal," the official said.

 

[Shawnee]

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