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Re-organization of Chinar Division (theoretical)

Elements of 12th Infantry Division then took part in Kargil war and made numerous advances into IOK and dogged resistance to IA's attacks, until the order for withdrawal arrived and the disaster began. I dont see how the combat effectiveness has been affected in any way due to its large size.
Sir by this do you mean 'Elements' of 12 Division in FCNA area, beyond kel or withing 12 Division Area? because i think the kargil conflict was beyond its domain and there wasnt any advance or set back within 12 division area of responsibility.
 
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12 Div elements were sent in as reinforcements during July, suffered a lot of casualties due to withdrawal phase (duck shoot) and lack of acclimatization.
Sir by this do you mean 'Elements' of 12 Division in FCNA area, beyond kel or withing 12 Division Area? because i think the kargil conflict was beyond its domain and there wasnt any advance or set back within 12 division area of responsibility.
 
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Northern Areas weren't under Chinar Division, the scouts under a DG had responsibility for holding. If 12th Div had been divided into 2, one would have focused primarily on offense and the other could've held the holding sectors. GOC would face lesser trouble in coordination. I think the I Corps example is fair enough to explain my point.
Reinforcement,Supplies, ammo etc are responsibility of QMG Branch. Had 12th Inf Division been supplied consistently in 1971, the momentum of advance shouldn't have broken. This is what i meant by low priority. As for Scouts further North, they even in a weaker position. And keeping them in weaker position has caused India to make roads in Kargil-Leh corridor and make gains in Siachen.

The terrain on Indian side of IOK is suited better logistically for Military deployment than terrain on Pakistan's AJK, opposite 12th Infantry Division. The terrain on Pakistan side becomes worse where mules maybe required fro RVFC unit. If you divide 12th Infantry Division into 2 Divisions, as you have envisioned, you will be deploying another unit of RVFC for the second created Division, where as more mules on same terrain are not required, better mobility is required -> air lift through choppers. Same for other support units, extra unit of Signals, Engineers etc. Artillery units could also be increased if area of operations and objectives are considered different for both Divisions in case of war. Although more firepower is always welcomed, however attention should be towards diverse forms of fire power, such as aircrafts, UCAV's, gunships, MLRS etc.

Coordination between Brigades and battalions from 12th Div HQ is not a hurdle since lines of communication have already been set up. You have to take a look the terrain first. So far no issues for communication of lack or firepower or coordination on LOC have come up, which means the decision to form a multiple-brigade sized force in this terrain is correct. If something is not broken, there is no need to fix it or experiment on it.

All the units under 12 ID operate on the same terrain at majority of the areas, which is mountains. This means the formation, 12th ID, has uniformity to perform any task (defense or offense) set by GOC or X-Corps HQ. The second Division derived from 12th ID, would be performing the same task in the same terrain, unless that second division is not infantry or mountain Division, the purpose does not stand for it to exist. In other Corps HQ's, different infantry Divisions are sent to different areas for Operations or the divisions are meant to operate in different areas on same terrain or different terrain altogether. Mechanised and Armored Divisions are the ones, which are set to operate everywhere, be it plains or forests or desert. So if a new type of Division (say airborne) has to be created from 12th ID, then yes create it. Thats why i gave example of 34th LID since if air borne, it helps 12th ID as well as FCNA by jumping from choppers onto peaks and holding the peaks till relieved by 12th ID and FCNA. 7th Infantry Division is usually sent east for reinforcing AJK.

Even if you create a second division out of 12th ID, it would still operate on the same terrain, on the same lines of comm and most importantly, its objective would be the same. It would hardly happen that 12th ID is asked to attack into IOK and the second division is asked to defend, either they will both be attacking (one as reserve maybe) or both be defending. But even if one is held at reserve, that is already in place through extra brigades of 12th ID. Why create another Div HQ to hold extra Brigades in reserve. If the position of FCNA becomes weak in the north, then a reserve brigade from 12th ID can be sent further north. If 12th ID already had 3 brigades and was on the offensive and the second Division also was engaged with IA with plans of its won, there wont be a reserve Brigade with any of these two Divisions to be sent North for FCNA. If a brigade was sent from either of these two then that respective Division will need to go on defensive or lose momentum during an offensive. With 12 ID's 6-7 Brigades, the operation shouldn't get affected as it would be planned as such from the start.

Another factor in Mountain warfare is strength of battalions. The Regular Infantry battalions are mostly full strength like their Plain/desert deployed counterparts, however some units like Mujahid/Janbaz force are lesser in strength in formation than Regular Infantry Units. You will also have to check if NLI units are full compliment of 780 troops or lesser for a battalion. Due to humongous nature of 12th ID's formations, the regular battalions compliment weaker NG battalions and vice versa.

A better suggestion would have been to increase FCNA's size and also focus on GB scouts to bring them in par with FC standards. There are 3 brigades under FCNA and GB scouts is also a brigade strength. That is just 4 Brigades up in the North. SSD/34th LID is deployed sparsely so can't be sure which formations under it are deployed behind FCNA.

The foremost task at hand is clearing Siachen, which has become a stalemate and costing both sides dearly everyday. The second task is to clear the enemy from disputed posts near Kargil. The third is modernization of Logistics by putting FWO back in action and creating roads that can handle tons of equipment everyday. This also requires transport aviation brigades attached to mountain formations. Fourth is training of scouts and increasing strength of Mujahid/Janbaz Battalions.
 
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Reinforcement,Supplies, ammo etc are responsibility of QMG Branch. Had 12th Inf Division been supplied consistently in 1971, the momentum of advance shouldn't have broken. This is what i meant by low priority. As for Scouts further North, they even in a weaker position. And keeping them in weaker position has caused India to make roads in Kargil-Leh corridor and make gains in Siachen.

The terrain on Indian side of IOK is suited better logistically for Military deployment than terrain on Pakistan's AJK, opposite 12th Infantry Division. The terrain on Pakistan side becomes worse where mules maybe required fro RVFC unit. If you divide 12th Infantry Division into 2 Divisions, as you have envisioned, you will be deploying another unit of RVFC for the second created Division, where as more mules on same terrain are not required, better mobility is required -> air lift through choppers. Same for other support units, extra unit of Signals, Engineers etc. Artillery units could also be increased if area of operations and objectives are considered different for both Divisions in case of war. Although more firepower is always welcomed, however attention should be towards diverse forms of fire power, such as aircrafts, UCAV's, gunships, MLRS etc.

Coordination between Brigades and battalions from 12th Div HQ is not a hurdle since lines of communication have already been set up. You have to take a look the terrain first. So far no issues for communication of lack or firepower or coordination on LOC have come up, which means the decision to form a multiple-brigade sized force in this terrain is correct. If something is not broken, there is no need to fix it or experiment on it.

All the units under 12 ID operate on the same terrain at majority of the areas, which is mountains. This means the formation, 12th ID, has uniformity to perform any task (defense or offense) set by GOC or X-Corps HQ. The second Division derived from 12th ID, would be performing the same task in the same terrain, unless that second division is not infantry or mountain Division, the purpose does not stand for it to exist. In other Corps HQ's, different infantry Divisions are sent to different areas for Operations or the divisions are meant to operate in different areas on same terrain or different terrain altogether. Mechanised and Armored Divisions are the ones, which are set to operate everywhere, be it plains or forests or desert. So if a new type of Division (say airborne) has to be created from 12th ID, then yes create it. Thats why i gave example of 34th LID since if air borne, it helps 12th ID as well as FCNA by jumping from choppers onto peaks and holding the peaks till relieved by 12th ID and FCNA. 7th Infantry Division is usually sent east for reinforcing AJK.

Even if you create a second division out of 12th ID, it would still operate on the same terrain, on the same lines of comm and most importantly, its objective would be the same. It would hardly happen that 12th ID is asked to attack into IOK and the second division is asked to defend, either they will both be attacking (one as reserve maybe) or both be defending. But even if one is held at reserve, that is already in place through extra brigades of 12th ID. Why create another Div HQ to hold extra Brigades in reserve. If the position of FCNA becomes weak in the north, then a reserve brigade from 12th ID can be sent further north. If 12th ID already had 3 brigades and was on the offensive and the second Division also was engaged with IA with plans of its won, there wont be a reserve Brigade with any of these two Divisions to be sent North for FCNA. If a brigade was sent from either of these two then that respective Division will need to go on defensive or lose momentum during an offensive. With 12 ID's 6-7 Brigades, the operation shouldn't get affected as it would be planned as such from the start.

Another factor in Mountain warfare is strength of battalions. The Regular Infantry battalions are mostly full strength like their Plain/desert deployed counterparts, however some units like Mujahid/Janbaz force are lesser in strength in formation than Regular Infantry Units. You will also have to check if NLI units are full compliment of 780 troops or lesser for a battalion. Due to humongous nature of 12th ID's formations, the regular battalions compliment weaker NG battalions and vice versa.

A better suggestion would have been to increase FCNA's size and also focus on GB scouts to bring them in par with FC standards. There are 3 brigades under FCNA and GB scouts is also a brigade strength. That is just 4 Brigades up in the North. SSD/34th LID is deployed sparsely so can't be sure which formations under it are deployed behind FCNA.

The foremost task at hand is clearing Siachen, which has become a stalemate and costing both sides dearly everyday. The second task is to clear the enemy from disputed posts near Kargil. The third is modernization of Logistics by putting FWO back in action and creating roads that can handle tons of equipment everyday. This also requires transport aviation brigades attached to mountain formations. Fourth is training of scouts and increasing strength of Mujahid/Janbaz Battalions.
Hi @Signalian
Love reading your posts. Always get some knowledge. Thanks a lot

Please shed some light on following, please
1. In case of action, what should PA priority be?
Akhnoor or Madhupur?
What kind of terrain is up there and what IA defenses in these sectors are?

2. Could we dislodge enemy from Siachen and then hold it on further? Is it possible militarily and logistics wise?
3. In case of war, could PA gain in Kargil/Drass/Batalik?

Thanks in advance
 
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Reinforcement,Supplies, ammo etc are responsibility of QMG Branch. Had 12th Inf Division been supplied consistently in 1971, the momentum of advance shouldn't have broken. This is what i meant by low priority. As for Scouts further North, they even in a weaker position. And keeping them in weaker position has caused India to make roads in Kargil-Leh corridor and make gains in Siachen.

The terrain on Indian side of IOK is suited better logistically for Military deployment than terrain on Pakistan's AJK, opposite 12th Infantry Division. The terrain on Pakistan side becomes worse where mules maybe required fro RVFC unit. If you divide 12th Infantry Division into 2 Divisions, as you have envisioned, you will be deploying another unit of RVFC for the second created Division, where as more mules on same terrain are not required, better mobility is required -> air lift through choppers. Same for other support units, extra unit of Signals, Engineers etc. Artillery units could also be increased if area of operations and objectives are considered different for both Divisions in case of war. Although more firepower is always welcomed, however attention should be towards diverse forms of fire power, such as aircrafts, UCAV's, gunships, MLRS etc.

Coordination between Brigades and battalions from 12th Div HQ is not a hurdle since lines of communication have already been set up. You have to take a look the terrain first. So far no issues for communication of lack or firepower or coordination on LOC have come up, which means the decision to form a multiple-brigade sized force in this terrain is correct. If something is not broken, there is no need to fix it or experiment on it.

All the units under 12 ID operate on the same terrain at majority of the areas, which is mountains. This means the formation, 12th ID, has uniformity to perform any task (defense or offense) set by GOC or X-Corps HQ. The second Division derived from 12th ID, would be performing the same task in the same terrain, unless that second division is not infantry or mountain Division, the purpose does not stand for it to exist. In other Corps HQ's, different infantry Divisions are sent to different areas for Operations or the divisions are meant to operate in different areas on same terrain or different terrain altogether. Mechanised and Armored Divisions are the ones, which are set to operate everywhere, be it plains or forests or desert. So if a new type of Division (say airborne) has to be created from 12th ID, then yes create it. Thats why i gave example of 34th LID since if air borne, it helps 12th ID as well as FCNA by jumping from choppers onto peaks and holding the peaks till relieved by 12th ID and FCNA. 7th Infantry Division is usually sent east for reinforcing AJK.

Even if you create a second division out of 12th ID, it would still operate on the same terrain, on the same lines of comm and most importantly, its objective would be the same. It would hardly happen that 12th ID is asked to attack into IOK and the second division is asked to defend, either they will both be attacking (one as reserve maybe) or both be defending. But even if one is held at reserve, that is already in place through extra brigades of 12th ID. Why create another Div HQ to hold extra Brigades in reserve. If the position of FCNA becomes weak in the north, then a reserve brigade from 12th ID can be sent further north. If 12th ID already had 3 brigades and was on the offensive and the second Division also was engaged with IA with plans of its won, there wont be a reserve Brigade with any of these two Divisions to be sent North for FCNA. If a brigade was sent from either of these two then that respective Division will need to go on defensive or lose momentum during an offensive. With 12 ID's 6-7 Brigades, the operation shouldn't get affected as it would be planned as such from the start.

Another factor in Mountain warfare is strength of battalions. The Regular Infantry battalions are mostly full strength like their Plain/desert deployed counterparts, however some units like Mujahid/Janbaz force are lesser in strength in formation than Regular Infantry Units. You will also have to check if NLI units are full compliment of 780 troops or lesser for a battalion. Due to humongous nature of 12th ID's formations, the regular battalions compliment weaker NG battalions and vice versa.

A better suggestion would have been to increase FCNA's size and also focus on GB scouts to bring them in par with FC standards. There are 3 brigades under FCNA and GB scouts is also a brigade strength. That is just 4 Brigades up in the North. SSD/34th LID is deployed sparsely so can't be sure which formations under it are deployed behind FCNA.

The foremost task at hand is clearing Siachen, which has become a stalemate and costing both sides dearly everyday. The second task is to clear the enemy from disputed posts near Kargil. The third is modernization of Logistics by putting FWO back in action and creating roads that can handle tons of equipment everyday. This also requires transport aviation brigades attached to mountain formations. Fourth is training of scouts and increasing strength of Mujahid/Janbaz Battalions.
1. In 1971, the 12th Div assaulted Poonch with 2 brigades, the regular one managed to successfully reach till Chandak Ridge/Mandi, but the AK Brigade failed to even break the outer crust of IA defences at Shahpur/Gutrian. In hilly terrain you need a greater advantage in forces for success, whereas we had 1:1 ratio as IA had 2 brigades in the area. Hence an attack bound to fail. Thank God for our tenacious troops that most of the IA assaults in vaccums created due to this botched offensive stalled as they fought extremely well to avert extensive strategic defeat.

2. Terrain wise at many areas Indians are at top, and I'm sure both sides use Remount units.

3. Do you think that the combat support group for an oversized division would be normal-sized? Heck, even the staff would be oversized!

4. Emphasis on air assault formations is very risky considering both sides don't allow choppers minimum 5km from the LoC, and I'm sure the army wouldn't go for an erratic/asset attrition way, considering solid low-level AD on both sides.

5. I've specifically mentioned that the new Div's AoR should/can be along the areas where we have an inherent tactical disadvantage i.e. Leepa-Athmuqam-Kel.
Naturally, the burden of enemy assaults in these sectors would be better dealt when you have a more streamlined chain of command.

6. Isn't it unnatural that a 2-star is appointed GOC of a division like this? Ideally the army should be creating full-fledged commands with executive authority like IA ones have, instead our 2 commands are somewhat ad-hoc and just wartime stuff with a Corps Commander acting supreme to others despite same formations under them?

7. Mujahids are usually posted in VP/VA, act as border police there and free up the regular battalions of the brigade for offensive action if needed, hence the poor Mujahids take maximum casualties in crossfire.

Anyways thank you for your detailed responses, you're my personal favourite on PDF.
 
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PA I Corps should exploit the Shakargarh Bulge (which is hasn't in past), threatens IA more than Akhnoor (especially after new road links and increased emphasis on air travel). Presence of XXX Corps would help in such action (flank protection/luring Ambala Corps).

Siachen is a gone case, unfortunately we don't have the resources to overcome enemy at Saltoro. Perhaps the Iron Brother may help, if the time comes. Mush tried and faltered due to overambitious planning with no rationality in perception of enemy capacity. Also requires mental grit to risk all-out war for that piece of ice.



Hi @Signalian
Love reading your posts. Always get some knowledge. Thanks a lot

Please shed some light on following, please
1. In case of action, what should PA priority be?
Akhnoor or Madhupur?
What kind of terrain is up there and what IA defenses in these sectors are?

2. Could we dislodge enemy from Siachen and then hold it on further? Is it possible militarily and logistics wise?
3. In case of war, could PA gain in Kargil/Drass/Batalik?

Thanks in advance
 
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Hi @Signalian
Love reading your posts. Always get some knowledge. Thanks a lot

Please shed some light on following, please
1. In case of action, what should PA priority be?
Akhnoor or Madhupur?
What kind of terrain is up there and what IA defenses in these sectors are?

2. Could we dislodge enemy from Siachen and then hold it on further? Is it possible militarily and logistics wise?
3. In case of war, could PA gain in Kargil/Drass/Batalik?

Thanks in advance
Thank you for your kind words.

Akhnur hold strategic value. Major roads and a river passes through Akhnur. Advance can then be made towards south east capturing Jammu or towards north west around Naushera sector. It basically is a cut off point also.

There are IA MBT's deployed around Aknoor. This is not really a vast land for Tank warfare but Tanks should be able to move along with infantry and give significant firepower for defense as well as offense. Regular infantry and Artillery formations are present.

Dislodging IA from Siachen will be very costly militarily however, strangling supply routes could be an option. That would again require infiltration.

As for Dras/Kargil/Batalik, have a look at terrain, you will see mountain/hill peaks on the map. The PA forces deployed there are not enough to launch successful offensive and capture these areas. For defense, PA forces are adequate. When you see mountain peaks, bear in mind that in Indian area, Indian forces will sit at the peaks to direct fire everywhere around the peaks. They will monitor all movement. Advancing up hill to take the peak is difficult in the face of opposing gun fire. PA needs better mobility options, better deployment and more firepower. Kargil war has shown the effectiveness of AF supporting ground troops.
 
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As for Dras/Kargil/Batalik, have a look at terrain, you will see mountain/hill peaks on the map. The PA forces deployed there are not enough to launch successful offensive and capture these areas. For defense, PA forces are adequate. When you see mountain peaks, bear in mind that in Indian area, Indian forces will sit at the peaks to direct fire everywhere around the peaks. They will monitor all movement. Advancing up hill to take the peak is difficult in the face of opposing gun fire. PA needs better mobility options, better deployment and more firepower. Kargil war has shown the effectiveness of AF supporting ground troops.
It's only area which i think usually gives sleepless nights to IA brass.
PA still holds point 5353,about which Former Lt. Col. Kuldip Singh Ludra states,it dominates, by observation and fire, the complete area on both side of the Line of Control.According to IA itself point 5353 offers a view of the National Highway.
Capturing NH1 at same 1999 point would cut IOK into two halves.

Dislodging IA from Siachen will be very costly militarily however, strangling supply routes could be an option. That would again require infiltration.
A thread would be a welcome addition coupled with maps.
 
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1. In 1971, the 12th Div assaulted Poonch with 2 brigades, the regular one managed to successfully reach till Chandak Ridge/Mandi, but the AK Brigade failed to even break the outer crust of IA defences at Shahpur/Gutrian. In hilly terrain you need a greater advantage in forces for success, whereas we had 1:1 ratio as IA had 2 brigades in the area. Hence an attack bound to fail. Thank God for our tenacious troops that most of the IA assaults in vaccums created due to this botched offensive stalled as they fought extremely well to avert extensive strategic defeat.

2. Terrain wise at many areas Indians are at top, and I'm sure both sides use Remount units.

3. Do you think that the combat support group for an oversized division would be normal-sized? Heck, even the staff would be oversized!

4. Emphasis on air assault formations is very risky considering both sides don't allow choppers minimum 5km from the LoC, and I'm sure the army wouldn't go for an erratic/asset attrition way, considering solid low-level AD on both sides.

5. I've specifically mentioned that the new Div's AoR should/can be along the areas where we have an inherent tactical disadvantage i.e. Leepa-Athmuqam-Kel.
Naturally, the burden of enemy assaults in these sectors would be better dealt when you have a more streamlined chain of command.

6. Isn't it unnatural that a 2-star is appointed GOC of a division like this? Ideally the army should be creating full-fledged commands with executive authority like IA ones have, instead our 2 commands are somewhat ad-hoc and just wartime stuff with a Corps Commander acting supreme to others despite same formations under them?

7. Mujahids are usually posted in VP/VA, act as border police there and free up the regular battalions of the brigade for offensive action if needed, hence the poor Mujahids take maximum casualties in crossfire.

Anyways thank you for your detailed responses, you're my personal favourite on PDF.

Thank you for your encouraging words.

Have a look at road infrastructure and Indian deployments behind LOC. Then have a look at PA deployments of 12th Infantry Division and the roads near LOC .
Staff in HQ should be doubled, but usually staff remains the same. 12th Infantry isn't the only Division with more than three brigades, there is one Infantry Division in Okara having 4 Brigades and probably there is one in Sialkot also. I also talked about terrain and nature of Ops, that defines the supporting units. If two brigades are deployed next to each other, their axis of attack is the same, then even 18 artillery guns can be allotted to them instead of 36 ( 18 guns per brigade).
Leepa sector and surrounding areas probably lie under 12th ID AOR. This area and areas north of it make mobility worse, these regions are good for defense but for offense they would again require a plethora of supplies and reinforcements. Again, its best to cater for mobility which is the core essence of any offense. No one can conduct offense staying static. Vehicle mobility is an issue, traversing on foot is stealthier but very slow. Even if you place a new division here, unless it solves the mobility issue, everything remains more or less the same.

An Infantry Division is composed of 3+ brigades usually. 3 Infantry Brigades, 1 Artillery Brigade, AD Battalion , Armour regiment, S&T battalion etc. Therefore, a 2-Star General is responsible for multiple Brigades.

Mujahid/Janbaz force are deploy-able infantry units. They are very strong in defense of the area but have relatively average offensive training. Same for Scouts who more or less are trained on the same pattern. Secondary AD capability of Mujahid/Janbaz force also helps. They are hand-on heavy MG's used in AA role also.

It's only area which i think usually gives sleepless nights to IA brass.
PA still holds point 5353,about which Former Lt. Col. Kuldip Singh Ludra states,it dominates, by observation and fire, the complete area on both side of the Line of Control.According to IA itself point 5353 offers a view of the National Highway.
Capturing NH1 at same 1999 point would cut IOK into two halves.


A thread would be a welcome addition coupled with maps.
That area is with in range of the PA Artillery guns, but this wont help win the skirmish neither the war. PA ground troops could move in maybe 5-6 miles, but then again defender holds advantage in Mountain warfare where as attacker relies on speed of mobility, which PA does not have.

As for siachen, in case of war, cornering, traversing Siachen Glacier and showing up at the rear of Siachen and then capturing Siachen is possible, than just launching skirmishes head-on.

PA needs lots of support from PAF in case of bombing runs and air superiority, if by some miracle if PA decides to use helis to insert troops on peaks inside IOK. Just like without IAF, there was hardly any way that IA could have dislodged PA troops without double or triple causalities. Its because of IAF that IA causality number did not rise. IAF struck those places again and again where artillery and small weapons couldn't even lay a dent.

@Khafee
A crash course on Mountain Warfare is required - courtesy of a Professional.
 
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That area is with in range of the PA Artillery guns, but this wont help win the skirmish neither the war. PA ground troops could move in maybe 5-6 miles, but then again defender holds advantage in Mountain warfare where as attacker relies on speed of mobility, which PA does not have.
Having highway under control would be a hige blow to enemy moral.
As for siachen, in case of war, cornering, traversing Siachen Glacier and showing up at the rear of Siachen and then capturing Siachen is possible, than just launching skirmishes head-on.
I though same,if troops are inserted via helos,even a brig sized forced under protection from Jets and Gunships would wrech havoc on enemy.
PA needs lots of support from PAF in case of bombing runs and air superiority, if by some miracle if PA decides to use helis to insert troops on peaks inside IOK. Just like without IAF, there was hardly any way that IA could have dislodged PA troops without double or triple causalities. Its because of IAF that IA causality number did not rise. IAF struck those places again and again where artillery and small weapons couldn't even lay a dent.
Air Force along with guided Arty munition would pay a monumental in any skirmish in Kashmir.
Air superiority is the key.Any party who would rule the skies would rule the land.
 
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Back in 1965, During Operation GrandSlam, the Division advanced a good margin into IOK against Indian Army, the 'fault' remained with its Commander's religion in eyes of GHQ, how can an Ahmadi General be hailed as a hero for leading a successful campaign into Kashmir, it had to be a pure Muslim, absurd, the pure Muslim General was found as Yahya Khan, who ruined the whole Operation
What you have claimed is rhetoric. Ayub was a secular dictator, and Qadianis were not officially non-Muslims.

The Presidential directive to General Mohammad Musa, C-in-C Pakistan Army, read:
1- To take such action as will de-freeze Kashmir problem (sic), weaken India’s resolve and bring her to a conference table without
provoking a general war (sic). However, the element of escalation is always present in such struggles. So, while confining our action
to Kashmir area we must not be unmindful that India may in desperation involve us in a general war or violate Pakistan territory
where we are weak. We must therefore be prepared for such contingency.
2. To expect quick results in this struggle, when India has much larger resources than us, would be unrealistic. Therefore, our
action should be such that can be sustained over a long period.” [Suggesting a war of attrition]

3. As a general rule, Hindu morale would not stand more than a couple of hard blows delivered at the right time and place. Such
opportunities should therefore be sought and exploited.
(Annexure G to GHQ Letter No 4050/5/MO-1 dated 29th August 1965)



[ More on this ](and I quote)
............................................. During the handing over ceremony near Gujrat, Akhtar Malik had virtually begged Maj Gen Yahya to allow him to lead the attack as his subordinate commander and let him capture Akhnur and the glory would be for Yahya. Maj Gen Yahya had emphatically rejected his pleading and walked out. Incontestably, Yahya had been brought in to replace Maj Gen Akhtar Malik with orders not to take Akhnur!

................................Yahya knew fully well that the C-in-C, Gen Musa, during his first and possibly only visit to the Corps HQ, had opined within the hearing of several shocked officers “What is the point in capturing Akhnur?” His words had echoed his master’s voice – the supreme commander, President Ayub Khan. The President and the Army Chief were obviously in mortal fear of an all out war (an inevitable reality) if Akhnur was captured. Both must have been terrified later when the enemy struck with two Corps in a three pronged attack on Lahore– Sialkot with a feint in the north-east at Jassar and a holding manoeuvre around Kasur in the south.

............................The day after Jaurian was taken (4 September), a message was received from GHQ that the C-in-C was coming to meet Maj Gen Yahya in my HQ. The C-in-C arrived in a helicopter at about midday and hurriedly conducted a conference with Maj Gen Yahya. After reviewing the progress of the operation he apparently told the Div Commander to abandon the plan to capture Akhnur and take up positions on the high ground astride the road between Jaurian and Akhnur.

Yahya might have refused to take Akhnur after Indian attack on Lahore however prior to September the 6th, he was ordered not to attack Akhnur for the fear of an all out war between India and Pakistan. But let's blame it on "Maulana Ayub".

@MUSTAKSHAF

 
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What you have claimed is rhetoric. Ayub was a secular dictator, and Qadianis were not officially non-Muslims.

The Presidential directive to General Mohammad Musa, C-in-C Pakistan Army, read:
1- To take such action as will de-freeze Kashmir problem (sic), weaken India’s resolve and bring her to a conference table without
provoking a general war (sic). However, the element of escalation is always present in such struggles. So, while confining our action
to Kashmir area we must not be unmindful that India may in desperation involve us in a general war or violate Pakistan territory
where we are weak. We must therefore be prepared for such contingency.
2. To expect quick results in this struggle, when India has much larger resources than us, would be unrealistic. Therefore, our
action should be such that can be sustained over a long period.” [Suggesting a war of attrition]

3. As a general rule, Hindu morale would not stand more than a couple of hard blows delivered at the right time and place. Such
opportunities should therefore be sought and exploited.
(Annexure G to GHQ Letter No 4050/5/MO-1 dated 29th August 1965)



[ More on this ](and I quote)
............................................. During the handing over ceremony near Gujrat, Akhtar Malik had virtually begged Maj Gen Yahya to allow him to lead the attack as his subordinate commander and let him capture Akhnur and the glory would be for Yahya. Maj Gen Yahya had emphatically rejected his pleading and walked out. Incontestably, Yahya had been brought in to replace Maj Gen Akhtar Malik with orders not to take Akhnur!

................................Yahya knew fully well that the C-in-C, Gen Musa, during his first and possibly only visit to the Corps HQ, had opined within the hearing of several shocked officers “What is the point in capturing Akhnur?” His words had echoed his master’s voice – the supreme commander, President Ayub Khan. The President and the Army Chief were obviously in mortal fear of an all out war (an inevitable reality) if Akhnur was captured. Both must have been terrified later when the enemy struck with two Corps in a three pronged attack on Lahore– Sialkot with a feint in the north-east at Jassar and a holding manoeuvre around Kasur in the south.

............................The day after Jaurian was taken (4 September), a message was received from GHQ that the C-in-C was coming to meet Maj Gen Yahya in my HQ. The C-in-C arrived in a helicopter at about midday and hurriedly conducted a conference with Maj Gen Yahya. After reviewing the progress of the operation he apparently told the Div Commander to abandon the plan to capture Akhnur and take up positions on the high ground astride the road between Jaurian and Akhnur.

Yahya might have refused to take Akhnur after Indian attack on Lahore however prior to September the 6th, he was ordered not to attack Akhnur for the fear of an all out war between India and Pakistan. But let's blame it on "Maulana Ayub".

@MUSTAKSHAF
you are free to believe what you wish to believe :tup:

Having highway under control would be a hige blow to enemy moral.

I though same,if troops are inserted via helos,even a brig sized forced under protection from Jets and Gunships would wrech havoc on enemy.

Air Force along with guided Arty munition would pay a monumental in any skirmish in Kashmir.
Air superiority is the key.Any party who would rule the skies would rule the land.
Now that PA has a UCAV in its hands, and along with recon/surveillance capabilities of a standard UAV, most of the operations can be carried out even if PAF doesn't show up. During the past decade, coordination between PA and PAF has increased in the mountains of FATA. Experience from those missions should be carried over to AJK and IOK in case of war, if advances have to be made inside IOK. PAF would of course be stretched out, since its Operations would be ranging from supporting PN south of coastline up to the mountains of Kashmir in North. PAF would also be conducting air strikes inside Indian territory apart from defending own skies. This means that PAF has to be expanded, another air strip made in AJK for use by PAF, new squadrons inducted (preferably JF-17) and over all weapon acquisition/delivery modernized.

PA not only has to come to terms with Regular units of IA but will also find BSF units scattered on major routes, cities and towns, strongholds and working closely with Indian Military. Behind them will be CRPF and Regular Police force. Add up all these forces and PA will be facing a massive number of troops.

PAF will need to play its role significantly to pave way for PA.
 
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What you have claimed is rhetoric. Ayub was a secular dictator, and Qadianis were not officially non-Muslims.

The Presidential directive to General Mohammad Musa, C-in-C Pakistan Army, read:
1- To take such action as will de-freeze Kashmir problem (sic), weaken India’s resolve and bring her to a conference table without
provoking a general war (sic). However, the element of escalation is always present in such struggles. So, while confining our action
to Kashmir area we must not be unmindful that India may in desperation involve us in a general war or violate Pakistan territory
where we are weak. We must therefore be prepared for such contingency.
2. To expect quick results in this struggle, when India has much larger resources than us, would be unrealistic. Therefore, our
action should be such that can be sustained over a long period.” [Suggesting a war of attrition]

3. As a general rule, Hindu morale would not stand more than a couple of hard blows delivered at the right time and place. Such
opportunities should therefore be sought and exploited.
(Annexure G to GHQ Letter No 4050/5/MO-1 dated 29th August 1965)



[ More on this ](and I quote)
............................................. During the handing over ceremony near Gujrat, Akhtar Malik had virtually begged Maj Gen Yahya to allow him to lead the attack as his subordinate commander and let him capture Akhnur and the glory would be for Yahya. Maj Gen Yahya had emphatically rejected his pleading and walked out. Incontestably, Yahya had been brought in to replace Maj Gen Akhtar Malik with orders not to take Akhnur!

................................Yahya knew fully well that the C-in-C, Gen Musa, during his first and possibly only visit to the Corps HQ, had opined within the hearing of several shocked officers “What is the point in capturing Akhnur?” His words had echoed his master’s voice – the supreme commander, President Ayub Khan. The President and the Army Chief were obviously in mortal fear of an all out war (an inevitable reality) if Akhnur was captured. Both must have been terrified later when the enemy struck with two Corps in a three pronged attack on Lahore– Sialkot with a feint in the north-east at Jassar and a holding manoeuvre around Kasur in the south.

............................The day after Jaurian was taken (4 September), a message was received from GHQ that the C-in-C was coming to meet Maj Gen Yahya in my HQ. The C-in-C arrived in a helicopter at about midday and hurriedly conducted a conference with Maj Gen Yahya. After reviewing the progress of the operation he apparently told the Div Commander to abandon the plan to capture Akhnur and take up positions on the high ground astride the road between Jaurian and Akhnur.

Yahya might have refused to take Akhnur after Indian attack on Lahore however prior to September the 6th, he was ordered not to attack Akhnur for the fear of an all out war between India and Pakistan. But let's blame it on "Maulana Ayub".

@MUSTAKSHAF
We havn't changed a bit since:enjoy:

Now that PA has a UCAV in its hands, and along with recon/surveillance capabilities of a standard UAV, most of the operations can be carried out even if PAF doesn't show up. During the past decade, coordination between PA and PAF has increased in the mountains of FATA. Experience from those missions should be carried over to AJK and IOK in case of war, if advances have to be made inside IOK. PAF would of course be stretched out, since its Operations would be ranging from supporting PN south of coastline up to the mountains of Kashmir in North. PAF would also be conducting air strikes inside Indian territory apart from defending own skies. This means that PAF has to be expanded, another air strip made in AJK for use by PAF, new squadrons inducted (preferably JF-17) and over all weapon acquisition/delivery modernized.

PA not only has to come to terms with Regular units of IA but will also find BSF units scattered on major routes, cities and towns, strongholds and working closely with Indian Military. Behind them will be CRPF and Regular Police force. Add up all these forces and PA will be facing a massive number of troops.

PAF will need to play its role significantly to pave way for PA.
Air Superiority is the key to Victory,we have seen that on 27th by showing 24 Jets at their door PAF
literally made IAF walk out of theatre.
If we can pull same maneuver again coupled with determined SEAD/DEAD campign+Scores of UAV's overhead on IOK searching for targets for Air Strikes and on top of that ruling skies for atleast 48 hours,we can easily break there back.
 
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you are free to believe what you wish to believe :tup:
You are free to dunk your head in sand.

We havn't changed a bit since:enjoy:
Neither have we changed nor are we willing to acknowledge the fact that blunders were comitted by our top brass. This thread is a testament to that fact where people are defending the disaster known as operation koh paima. Taking distorted history as truth is the fashion, let alone learning from past blunders.
 
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