Indian Army ORBAT Against Pakistan-Visualised

[Tomcats]

True. Then we have to sit and solve the environmental problem that a force attacking across the fine-grained sand of the Thar would face.

That desert kills tanks.

But, of course, you already know the answer to that problem.

The biggest issue comes in the form of logistics, any offensive would be large in nature and requires a lot of logistical support to maintain its momentum of advance. So you would need large supply convoys which would also face an increased strain as Indian troops would be facing an increased amount of attrition due to the environment hence more supplies required, more equipment to ferry that etc. Couple this with the limited infrastructure of the region, one example being the lack of properly paved direct roads that can support some of the soft skin vehicles. You'll possibly be facing a supply situation as bad as the German 6th Army if you don't plan on the Logistics side. If the supply situation can be resolved then it can be a deadly incursion indeed.
Russia-Ukraine conflict should really highlight how vital it is to have a strong and robust logistical plan for any offensive, an environment such as seen in the south requires intricate planning in that regard.

 

[surya kiran]

To be perfectly honest, I had hoped that @surya kiran would answer this. Having spotted an apparent opportunity arising out of the deployment of defensive forces, he needs to apply his mind to what else goes into the mix.

Disclaimer : I am not a military strategist, just using simple common sense. Due to paucity of time, making short points.

a. Threaten the cities, not take them. Objective is not to take population centres. Put pressure on them while we achieve the below objectives.
b. Objective is to make Pakistan lose territory/lose control of territory, below the nuclear threshold with long term economic and strategic implications.
c. Look to the Indus river delta. 'Control' this area, unpopulated/sparsely populated. Marine sanctuary. Stop short of Karachi.
d. In the areas north of the delta, stop on the east of the Indus and south of Hyderabad. Around the Thatta area or 30 kms south of Hyd.
e. Do not push beyond this.

Why
a. What lies beyond Karachi to the NorthWest and North?
b. How will this affect EEZ?
c. It is immature to think, we can take any city by fighting.

Getting back to work now.

 

[VkdIndian]

Attacking and taking over population centres appears to be hot topic in last few posts. Is that a good military tactics?
Battle of Britain was all about attacking civilian centres but it didn’t work inspite of major destruction and loss of lives.
In the scenario painted above, none of the sides have that extra offensive power available that can be diverted from military objectives to focus on taking over civilian centres. Taking over cities can come in play only after military objectives have been achieved.

 

[surya kiran]

They won't go rushing down south, they are likely to do Operation Re-wind Up.

If a road link with Balochistan appears, they would probably rush south. Thereby, freeing the North.

This is wishful thinking.

 

[Joe Shearer]

The biggest issue comes in the form of logistics, any offensive would be large in nature and require a lot of logistical support to maintain its momentum of advance. So you would need large supply convoys which would also face an increased strain as Indian troops would be facing an increased amount of attrition due to the environment hence more supplies required, more equipment to ferry that etc. Couple this with the limited infrastructure of the region, one example being the lack of properly paved direct roads that can support some of the soft skin vehicles. You'll possibly be facing a supply situation as bad as the German 6th Army if you don't plan on the Logistics side. If the supply situation can be resolved then it can be a deadly incursion indeed.
Russia-Ukraine conflict should really highlight how vital it is to have a strong and robust logistical plan for any offensive, an environment such as seen in the south requires intricate planning in that regard.

I do not think the logistics difficulty can be overcome at all.

 

[Sayfullah]

Disclaimer : I am not a military strategist, just using simple common sense. Due to paucity of time, making short points.

a. Threaten the cities, not take them. Objective is not to take population centres. Put pressure on them while we achieve the below objectives.
b. Objective is to make Pakistan lose territory/lose control of territory, below the nuclear threshold with long term economic and strategic implications.
c. Look to the Indus river delta. 'Control' this area, unpopulated/sparsely populated. Marine sanctuary. Stop short of Karachi.
d. In the areas north of the delta, stop on the east of the Indus and south of Hyderabad. Around the Thatta area or 30 kms south of Hyd.
e. Do not push beyond this.

Why
a. What lies beyond Karachi to the NorthWest and North?
b. How will this affect EEZ?
c. It is immature to think, we can take any city by fighting.

Getting back to work now.

Capturing land in the desert could be easy for Indians especially since many villages are Hindu majority there. However, I think Pakistan can afford to lose those areas because they have 0 strategic value and are barren land with horrible infrastructure. India to capture land in the desert would put a huge amount of resources into it and will gain nothing useful out of it.
Further south the Indus delta would be very hard to capture and control because you’ll have to take every island there and you’ll need boats to do amphibious landing on every island there. When war starts, Pakistan can easily send troops to these islands to set up defensive positions and india will be stuck trying to capture dozens of islands and, to make matters worse india has very poor infrastructure leading up to Indus delta and there’s islands on Indian side as well. So supplies and even sending in military to capture Pakistan’s Indus delta would require multiple amphibious landings and Indian navy supplying them by ship. India could blockade the defending troops in indus delta but the defenders would likely have enough supplies for the whole war since any war will be a short war. Only way to avoid this but capture indus delta is going around it from the north but you’ll be entering the green built and theres many strategic canals built there that’ll be used against Indians and would make it very hard for Indians to make any gains. Also this green belt of sindh is where majority of Sindhs population live so you’ll have to suppress the locals and those areas are majority Muslim so they won’t accept Indians.
In sindh, all Pakistan’s valuable land and infrastructure is in the green belt which has well prepared defences against an invader.
Karachi is pretty well protected by Indus delta and green belt so Indians would have to do an amphibious assault on it.
IMO it would be more easier for Indians to do a landing west of Karachi like Gaddani and from there push towards Karachi while another force pushes Badin, Golarchi and Thatta because those are small cities on the way to Karachi and right north of Indus delta. They have good enough infrastructure to make Indian logistics easier and Indians wouldn’t have to deal with the massive populations of Mirpur Khas and Hyderabad going against them. From Badin Indians can push on Hyderabad and Karachi at the same time while going down towards Keti Bandar from there. This will force Pakistan to defend 2 major cities while also defending Indus delta which would put Pakistan in a very tough position. Indians can also attempt a amphibious landing at keti bandar in the beginning to push from there towards Gharo, Thatta and Badin.
But if that happens I think Pakistan will use tactical nukes because it’ll put the whole indus delta, Karachi, Hyderabad and basically all of southern sindh in danger.

Also disclaimer: I’m not a military strategist but a mere teen who’s very interested in these topics and learning daily. A lot of stuff I say might be totally wrong but I’m trying to understand war

 

[surya kiran]

irst, the PA must receive the same courtesy that the IA expected to be extended: there ought to be a 3:1 superiority in force to allow for an attack even a chance of success.

Second, between Hyderabad, Karachi (Malir) and Pano Aqil, there is sufficient force to defend, to require perhaps the equivalent of nine divisions - around 135,000 jawans, with their train of vehicles, of armour, of artillery, and of reconnaissance and scouting units, not to mention close air support, to be mustered. The question is not about the ratio; it is about the assembling of such a force swiftly enough, secretly enough to be able to mount an attack.

Where will they assemble? Where will they form up before commencing the assault? How will they fare, traversing extremely difficult and hostile desert terrain, to face an enemy safely parked on armour-friendly terrain?

Third, if the Pakistani forces are not dumb and deaf, and blind as well, they should be able to make out that things are going on in Jaisalmer and Barmer that need close examination.

a. The reason, I say hold or make Pakistan lose/lose control over territory which is uninhabited is admitting that it will be difficult to achieve control over terrain which has been defended strongly by the PA. Which is why, I say threaten the cities to bog down the main defensive force while controlling uninhabited terrain.

b. Why do I say, concentrate on the coast and marshy area? As a country, we keep thinking of Kashmir, Punjab. Why? Because the are beautiful and we believe them to be truly ours? Arable? My belief is we need to concentrate on longer term. Kashmir and Punjab are well defended and both sides have set pieces. If we are to threaten Pakistan for the long term what could it be? Take out their access to the coast. Above Karachi, you have Balochistan. Let us forget about wanting to control the populated centres of Pakistan. If we are able to threaten Karachi even during peace, it becomes precarious.

c. Access to the coast gives access to the continental shelf and thereby the EEZ. Control over the EEZ south of Karachi is bigger than Kashmir. It is low visibility, high value terrain.

d. Loss of control or threat of loss of control of terrain between Hyd and Karachi and we threaten CPEC. This means, Pak will be forced to move troops from the North to the South. This they will be forced to do in the long term also. Which is what I hinted at earlier. Simultaneously talk about similar projects on equal basis with China from our East to our west. On our terms. This can involve security guarantees which we can provide. China for this needs to ensure peace across our border. China needs to support our route to the South East via Burma.

e. Our long term goal, if we decide to go on the offensive should be to degrade the lines of trade of Pakistan to the outside world, by ensuring gradual loss of control of territory for the PA.

f. The route between Marwar and Bhuj is now getting converted to standard guage. The dedicated freight corridor can help us move troops quickly.

From where the staging areas will be? My guess will be Bhuj and Jaisalmer, with thrust towards Baiden.

 

[M.AsfandYar]

reduction in personnel head-count, leading to dramatic reduction in budget provisions for pensions and retirement benefits in the middle future

Isnt this already ongoing?

 

[Joe Shearer]

Isnt this already ongoing?

It is a thought, and there has been an unofficial stop to recruitment. How they will make it effective, without significantly changing the force composition to put in heavy infusions of integral artillery, integral air support and a huge change in doctrine, is not clear yet.

 

[JX-1]

a. The reason, I say hold or make Pakistan lose/lose control over territory which is uninhabited is admitting that it will be difficult to achieve control over terrain which has been defended strongly by the PA. Which is why, I say threaten the cities to bog down the main defensive force while controlling uninhabited terrain.

b. Why do I say, concentrate on the coast and marshy area? As a country, we keep thinking of Kashmir, Punjab. Why? Because the are beautiful and we believe them to be truly ours? Arable? My belief is we need to concentrate on longer term. Kashmir and Punjab are well defended and both sides have set pieces. If we are to threaten Pakistan for the long term what could it be? Take out their access to the coast. Above Karachi, you have Balochistan. Let us forget about wanting to control the populated centres of Pakistan. If we are able to threaten Karachi even during peace, it becomes precarious.

c. Access to the coast gives access to the continental shelf and thereby the EEZ. Control over the EEZ south of Karachi is bigger than Kashmir. It is low visibility, high value terrain.

d. Loss of control or threat of loss of control of terrain between Hyd and Karachi and we threaten CPEC. This means, Pak will be forced to move troops from the North to the South. This they will be forced to do in the long term also. Which is what I hinted at earlier. Simultaneously talk about similar projects on equal basis with China from our East to our west. On our terms. This can involve security guarantees which we can provide. China for this needs to ensure peace across our border. China needs to support our route to the South East via Burma.

e. Our long term goal, if we decide to go on the offensive should be to degrade the lines of trade of Pakistan to the outside world, by ensuring gradual loss of control of territory for the PA.

f. The route between Marwar and Bhuj is now getting converted to standard guage. The dedicated freight corridor can help us move troops quickly.

From where the staging areas will be? My guess will be Bhuj and Jaisalmer, with thrust towards Baiden.

Capturing the Delta is an impressive feat. However, doing so poses a threat to Karachi, and you have technically crossed the Indus River aka the red line of all red lines. This may result in TNWs being launched at Indian formations in the Thar desert to ease pressure on Pakistani forces.

 

[Raja Porus]

(In purple are the major drains while in blue are the canals, while the area area marked in brown is the Nara Desert)

As can be seen, Sindh has one of the most complex canal systems in the world. Not included in the above network plan are the numerous link canals and nullahs. This canal network is very dense and laterally extending. Hence they create a very large defensible tract with the desert creating a buffer. It'd be difficult for Indian forces to reach the irrigated area, not only because of PAF but also because of the terrain. Unlike North African deserts, the sand here is too fine to allow traffic to pass, moreover it is very soft and vehs sink into it. These deserts make it equally difficult for both tracked and wheeled traffic.

Also the Pakistani formations are well positioned. With two infantry Divisions which are mechanised and have Armd bdes, one complete Mech div having four integral IABGs (larger than other mech divs) and several IMBGs/IABGs throughout the region and an Artillery division. Add to this the two plus inf divs that might arrive from the 12 corps, Balochistan. None of these formations feature old tanks and are mostly equipped with AK and AK1.

Overall, even if we believe that IA has assembled Large forces and has moved in without detection the Indian attack due to the deserts would be funneled into few axis which the PA would be defending with solid defences based around the canals.
PA has the option to trade space for time but I doubt IA would be able to manage the space. First all IA mech forces will have to pass through the inhospitable terrain that opposes tracked vehs as well under pressure from PAF and Arty. Even if they somehow manage to reach the irrigated area in face of PAF and IABGs,
they'll be in no condition to launch an attack against the canal based defenses. Their wheeled logistics will find it impossible to make it through and the whole attack would be foiled, without PA playing a significant role. This will provide the 25 mech div with an opportunity for counter attacks.
Thus overall the defence of Sindh is pretty much solid with PA brilliantly basing its defence around the terrain and canals.

I believe that the only meaningful outcome for India can be in Southern Punjab region and that should be our main focus here.

 

[JX-1]

Loss of control or threat of loss of control of terrain between Hyd and Karachi and we threaten CPEC. This means, Pak will be forced to move troops from the North to the South. This they will be forced to do in the long term also. Which is what I hinted at earlier. Simultaneously talk about similar projects on equal basis with China from our East to our west. On our terms. This can involve security guarantees which we can provide. China for this needs to ensure peace across our border. China needs to support our route to the South East via Burma.

If India commits more forces towards the south, what's stopping Pakistan from launching a major offensive in the north? Will India trade land in Punjab or Kashmir for the barren Thar desert?

View attachment 831004
(In purple are the major drains while in blue are the canals, while the area area marked in brown is the Nara Desert)

As can be seen, Sindh has one of the most complex canal systems in the world. Not included in the above network plan are the numerous link canals and nullahs. This canal network is very dense and laterally extending. Hence they create a very large defensible tract with the desert creating a buffer. It'd be difficult for Indian forces to reach the irrigated area, not only because of PAF but also because of the terrain. Unlike North African deserts, the sand here is too fine to allow traffic to pass, moreover it is very soft and vehs sink into it. These deserts make it equally difficult for both tracked and wheeled traffic.

Also the Pakistani formations are well positioned. With two infantry Divisions which are mechanised and have Armd bdes, one complete Mech div having four integral IABGs (larger than other mech divs) and several IMBGs/IABGs throughout the region and an Artillery division. Add to this the two plus inf divs that might arrive from the 12 corps, Balochistan. None of these formations feature old tanks and are mostly equipped with AK and AK1.

Overall, even if we believe that IA has assembled Large forces and has moved in without detection the Indian attack due to the deserts would be funneled into few axis which the PA would be defending with solid defences based around the canals.
PA has the option to trade space for time but I doubt IA would be able to manage the space. First all IA mech forces will have to pass through the inhospitable terrain that opposes tracked vehs as well under pressure from PAF and Arty. Even if they somehow manage to reach the irrigated area in face of PAF and IABGs,
they'll be in no condition to launch an attack against the canal based defenses. Their wheeled logistics will find it impossible to make it through and the whole attack would be foiled, without PA playing a significant role. This will provide the 25 mech div with an opportunity for counter attacks.
Thus overall the defence of Sindh is pretty much solid with PA brilliantly basing its defence around the terrain and canals.

I believe that the only meaningful outcome for India can be in Southern Punjab region and that should be our main focus here.

What do the blue boxes around Islamkot depict?

 

[Raja Porus]

do the blue boxes around Islamkot depict

Coal reserves

 

[S.Y.A]

View attachment 831004
(In purple are the major drains while in blue are the canals, while the area area marked in brown is the Nara Desert)

As can be seen, Sindh has one of the most complex canal systems in the world. Not included in the above network plan are the numerous link canals and nullahs. This canal network is very dense and laterally extending. Hence they create a very large defensible tract with the desert creating a buffer. It'd be difficult for Indian forces to reach the irrigated area, not only because of PAF but also because of the terrain. Unlike North African deserts, the sand here is too fine to allow traffic to pass, moreover it is very soft and vehs sink into it. These deserts make it equally difficult for both tracked and wheeled traffic.

Also the Pakistani formations are well positioned. With two infantry Divisions which are mechanised and have Armd bdes, one complete Mech div having four integral IABGs (larger than other mech divs) and several IMBGs/IABGs throughout the region and an Artillery division. Add to this the two plus inf divs that might arrive from the 12 corps, Balochistan. None of these formations feature old tanks and are mostly equipped with AK and AK1.

Overall, even if we believe that IA has assembled Large forces and has moved in without detection the Indian attack due to the deserts would be funneled into few axis which the PA would be defending with solid defences based around the canals.
PA has the option to trade space for time but I doubt IA would be able to manage the space. First all IA mech forces will have to pass through the inhospitable terrain that opposes tracked vehs as well under pressure from PAF and Arty. Even if they somehow manage to reach the irrigated area in face of PAF and IABGs,
they'll be in no condition to launch an attack against the canal based defenses. Their wheeled logistics will find it impossible to make it through and the whole attack would be foiled, without PA playing a significant role. This will provide the 25 mech div with an opportunity for counter attacks.
Thus overall the defence of Sindh is pretty much solid with PA brilliantly basing its defence around the terrain and canals.

I believe that the only meaningful outcome for India can be in Southern Punjab region and that should be our main focus here.

Is the PAF equal to, outnumbers or is outnumbered by the IAF in this region? if it is outnumbered, i dont think it will have time to provide support to the army.

the region from sukkur to hyderabad is empty and undefended though.

If India commits more forces towards the south, what's stopping Pakistan from launching a major offensive in the north?

obstacles like rivers, canals etc will stop pakistan, and indian army already outnumbers us, what makes you think that committing more force in the south will lead to weakening of indian forces in the north? and even if they are weakened, will they be in such a state that they will not be able to offer any resistance?

 

[PanzerKiel]

the region from sukkur to hyderabad is empty and undefended though.

This region has a minimum of two armored and two mechanized brigades, all independent. They are separate from the three mechanized divisions integral to V Corps

Is the PAF equal to, outnumbers or is outnumbered by the IAF in this region? if it is outnumbered, i dont think it will have time to provide support to the army.

PAF has credible numbers here, almost half a dozen squadrons within range here. Outnumbering doesn't matter in real life. No force will let itself be degraded to zero in pursuit of something. FORCE IN BEING concept prevails in subcontinent.