What's new

Indian Army ORBAT Against Pakistan-Visualised

In fact, while it may be premature to hail the end of the tank, and while what happened in Nagorno-Karabakh may have been an outlier, a very significant outlier, it is time to start wondering about the delicate balance between protection, speed and firepower that has been disturbed once again. From the time of the hoplite on, no, from the time of the charior-mounted Egyptian archers on, this balance of forces has always been disturbed by a creative military commander, thereby winning the field for his duration, and setting the stage for warfare long after his time.

We need to ask ourselves, not if the armoured column is dead - it is not, it is merely going to die a death in the fulness of time - but what will take its place.




Only that person among us who has been an instructor already will understand the difficulty of staying silent when the answer stands up on its hind legs and roars at the unaware group considering a question. The discussion on the specific geographical limitations and consequent inconveniences was so, so tempting. Alas.....

@PanzerKiel
I would be the last person to hail the end of the Tank. The composition of the armored column will evolve like everything else based on the technology and threat assessment specific to the deployment. Stand-off distances for ATGMs are increasing, but that means longer passive and active tracking. The introduction of dirt-cheap slow-moving drones that can conduct air interdiction/ CAS means hardkill and softkill medium-altitude multi-layered defense.
This gives the potential for a better reaction envelope for the protection systems to deploy both softkill and hard kill measures. In addition to the Mobile SAM system to mitigate against Rotary and interdiction platforms, additional CIWS/Vshorad. The biggest change that might change the game is the development of a distributed network for the local battlefield management system. A system where the column moves as one unit and manages all threats and targets through a common network system will be able to keep armor relevant as well as agile. Not to forget, it would serve well for additional systems like short-range battlefield missile systems like specialized TOS-1A.
 
.
Doesn't Active Protection System on a tank make everything else obsolete?
Anything that gives away its position without achieving a direct hit will be then targeted by arty, aviation or by tanks themselves.
 
.
Doesn't Active Protection System on a tank make everything else obsolete?
Anything that gives away its position without achieving a direct hit will be then targeted by arty, aviation or by tanks themselves.
Its not like APS will be able to destroy every incoming projectile. Moreover, APS is very dangerous to own infantry when they are nearby, they also get the APS fragments.....

Moreover, artillery and aviation will be busy on more important tasks instead of neutralizing individual or pair of ATGMs, unless you a have a gunship for each troop of tanks.
 
.
Its not like APS will be able to destroy every incoming projectile. Moreover, APS is very dangerous to own infantry when they are nearby, they also get the APS fragments.....

Moreover, artillery and aviation will be busy on more important tasks instead of neutralizing individual or pair of ATGMs, unless you a have a gunship for each troop of tanks.
Everyone was creating such a sorry image of tanks so I wanted ot return the favour.
 
.
1971 comparison may not be apt for you. At that time there was no radar coverage in Sindh. Moreover, there were no fighters or bases which were there to support any sort of operations in Sindh. These problems have been rectified more than two decades ago.

Regarding Chor (Indians reached this point, almost 50 kms of plain desert, nothing else)......

In 1971 India had its 11 and 12 Divisions, an independent infantry brigade, and a couple of extra tank regiments in the area. It launched 11 Division on the Barmer- Chor axis while 12 Division was to attack from Tanot to Islamgarh and Reti. The 340 (I) Brigade appears to have looked after the Kutch sector.

11 Division’s attack succeeded at first, because the Pakistanis simply fell back on Naya Chor, and then dug in. The Indian attack ground to a halt.

12 Division was thrown off its schedule by a Pakistani attack from the Reti side, consisting of a brigade of 33 Division and a tank regiment. The force was attacked by a Hunter fighter detachment from Jodhpur and withdrew after suffering heavy losses but with its mission accomplished: 12 Division was no more a factor in the war.

India’s several raids into Pakistani Kutch were successful in boosting Indian morale, but could be of no strategic value because of the vast emptiness of the area.

Even when backed up to Naya Chor, Pakistan did not commit any brigade other than the one from 33 Division used in the spoiling attack at Islamgarh. It utilized, instead, mixed ad hoc forces’ consisting of a few companies of regulars, Rangers, and Mujahids. Pakistan has always been especially adept at economically employing such forces to delay India’s advances while conserving i ts regulars. It was thus able to keep in reserve almost its entire forces in Sind.

The operational problem in the Great Indian Desert is, simply, the sand that lies upto 7 meters deep. In the Mideast and North African Deserts the sand cover is shallow. Bulldozers can quickly sweep paths for advancing troops. Wide ranging maneuver is possible, to the extent that the desert actions of World War 2 have been compared to naval battles finding a flank was always troublesome, because both sides would keep going south of each other.

Tracked vehicles have a low footprint - the weight of a 40-ton T-72 tank is distributed along several square meters of tracks, thus reducing pressure on sand to less than that of a two-ton jeep. The jeep will sink into the sand, the tank will float.

Tracked vehicles can move freely in the desert, but not so their wheeled support and the un-mechanized infantry. Some mobility is provided by low-pressure tired vehicle and by aluminum track-ways. The latter is laid at a pace of about 2-3 kilometers an hour by specially equipped vehicles.

There is a difference, however, in laying a few kilometers of matting to help a division across sandy stretches, and laying matting to allow two corps to advance, and two more to operate on their flanks, to distances of hundreds of kilometers.

If the matting stayed laid, there might still be some reasonable prospects of supporting a quarter of a million troops in the desert, provided a very large engineer contingent is available. But because the sand is so deep, it shifts easily under the movement of heavy vehicles, wind and its own internal dynamics. This means the roadways have to be constantly maintained and re-laid.

Once Bikaner-Suratgarh railway line was being re-laid, an Indian newspaper article mentioned a 15-day sandstorm that halted all work. One hates to think what that would do to 40,000 vehicles in the desert.

During the early days of the 1971 War, Mr. K. Subhramanyam suggested that the success in the desert should be reinforced. As advances in other sectors were non-existent or slow, a third division should be committed to the desert. He was told that this was impossible, because our desert terrain required specialized equipment and training: forces from other sectors would not be able to function in this environment at such short notice.


I hope you are not calling that an achievement of any sort....Pakistani 18 Division only was responsible for the WHOLE Sind. With good attack ratios, superiority in men and material, and with total IAF superiority, IA reaching CHor, not even the present green belt is nothing. Large tracts of sand are of no use to anyone.
thank you for the detailed reply, this is what i was looking for, instead of chest thumping by some posters here.
 
.
4 Mechanized Divisions, one artillery division, One Rocket / Missile Division, two independent infantry brigades, four self propelled artillery brigades, II Strike Corps (one armored and one mechanized division, having its own four armored, 3 mechanized and a artillery brigades) available as reserve for this area, two engineer brigades, four (+) air defence brigades, half a dozen PAF squadrons including two F-16 squadrons in range, a whole combat aviation group....to be a bit more specific.
another question: who will be coordinating all of this? wont this create command issues? with too much to handle for one single corps commander (excluding II corps)?
 
.
another question: who will be coordinating all of this? wont this create command issues? with too much to handle for one single corps commander (excluding II corps)?
For that, we have Southern Command which looks after the issues of 5, 31, 2 and 12 Corps.
 
.
For that, we have Southern Command which looks after the issues of 5, 31, 2 and 12 Corps.
but that sounds like a command on top of the corps. i am asking with reference to V corps, since it has a lot of assets, managing them wont be easy for a single commander in a time of war on a vast front....
 
.
i am asking with reference to V corps, since it has a lot of assets, managing them wont be easy for a single commander in a time of war on a vast front....
But then, that should be normal for any Corps Commander. He has to look after so much, modern communications allow him to do so. Wargames and field exercises are also done to make them train for all this.
 
. .
Drones can be jammed or shot down by AAA.
Theoretically yes, but this is yet to be done by any country to set a precedence. Drone warfare is a bit new, so defence against drones havent been solidified yet. Drones dont always use air-bases for their operations, so they can pop up at the enemy from any direction, and then there might not be any GBADs on that approach....this would require a massive re-deployment and re-hashing of AD doctrines everywhere.
 
.
I think in the future the "main" weapon to replace tanks will be highly mobile IFVs with ATGMs and some sort of APS
 
. . . .

Latest posts

Back
Top Bottom