PA TANKS comparison with contempory tanks

[Kasrkin]

The US was trying hard to sell M1/A1 Abrams tanks to Pakistan. Production tanks were provided for trials and evaluation, which did not go well. It’s not just the weight problem that discouraged us (though the sands of Rajistan desert are probably some of the thinnest in the world), this deal would have tied Pakistan to the US spare parts pipeline for years to come (which given the US’s singular lack of loyalty as an ally, would have been problematic to say the least).

Also the tank trial itself was a shambles. The 55-ton behemoth, designed for cleaner climes and hard surfaces of Europe and North America, did not fare too well in the desert of Tamewali. A film of the trials shows the tank trying to fire on the move and from a stationary position, surrounded by clouds of dust. But the movement of the tanks was seriously constrained by the fact that its engines sucked up the fine dust of Tamewali and clogged its filters, jamming the Chrysler turbine engines. The most pathetic sight was of the tank trying to climb up a dirt ramp built at the site, getting stuck, and then sliding sideways off the ramp like a drunken sailor. Clearly, this was not the tank for the Pakistan Army...

In other accounts I’ve read about how the tank failed to hit even half of its targets…All observers concur that rejecting the offer was the right decision for Pakistan (as subsequent US imposed sanctions would prove beyond doubt).

 

[Hellfire]

My thanks to you are due the fact that Arjun verses Khalid is probably a better discussion point as T-90 is purely Russian. Arjun on the other hand is totally indigenous and Khalid also incorporates a lot of indigenous effort.

IMO, on paper Arjun, if the engine and heating problems can be resolved, with better protection and 10 tons heavier, appears to be superior to Al Khalid.

You might remember that M-1 Abrams was tested by PA during Zia time (Zia lost his life on the way back from the tests in Bhawalpur desert) and was rejected. Understand M-1 was found to be too heavy for our road bridges and for fighting on the mud flats of Punjab.

I am pretty sure that DRD must have taken all of this into consideration when designing Arjun. Nevertheless, I believe that whereas on the dry sands of Rajasthan desert; Arjun may prove more effective, on the irrigated soft mud plains of Punjab (Gurdaspur/Shakargarh are where Chowinda battle was fought) 55 tons weight of Arjun will be an impediment to its mobility. Al Khalid on the other hand is only 46 tons, therefore should score over Arjun in mobility if not in anything else.

you can open a new thread about the same ...... thetank arjun was junk till 2002-03 thence has tremendously improved...even the logistical profile ...... questions of mobility in plains of southasia as also transport and bridging etchave been adressed , the engine issue is resolved and the tank as a whole is quite good post 2006 ....... i shall look forward to a new post on same or may start one if its of interest

 

[S-2]

I'm sure you've made the correct choice for a variety of reasons.

 

[saiko]

You've got to be able to bridge in the east to attack. Couldn't you today bridge a 70T capacity?

Sure, that's possible. But I think it's rather impractical. The Abrams is actually even too heavy for most European bridges and during the Cold War key bridges were reinforced specifically to handle the load of the heavier Abrams versions. If you can't use any of the existing bridges but have to build your own bridge that can handle 70t of capacity on the go you are seriously hurting your offensive capabilities. And if Pakistan needs heavy pillboxes it would be far cheaper to buy cement from China .

70 ton tanks are for nations that are hyper-sensitive to casualties. It is really much more practical to use an autoloader to reduce the number of potential casualties in a tank and make sure you have a powerful gun + quality munitions. Keep some good armor on there with a keen eye on the law of diminishing returns.

For a nation like Pakistan, the name of the game is cost effectiveness - the 20/80 rule. 20% of the cost, 80% of the effectiveness and that's precisely the direction Pakistan seems to be going with the Al-Khalid and JF-17, while building up embargo proof access to these weapons. If India wants to spend 80% more to get that last 20%, let them do so. It will be of marginal effectiveness in any war and they will blow their size advantage.

However, in some key areas, you can't follow the 20/80 rule. The software necessary to data link tanks (and other platforms) together... you want to spend the extra 80% of cost on, because that is a serious force multiplier.

 

[S-2]

"If you can't use any of the existing bridges but have to build your own bridge that can handle 70t of capacity on the go you are seriously hurting your offensive capabilities. And if Pakistan needs heavy pillboxes it would be far cheaper to buy cement from China"

So there we were in the spring of 2003, stuck between two of the world's great rivers and a vast agricultural, canal-laced network to traverse the many hundreds of kilometers to Baghdad on the roads and bridges of a underdeveloped nation employing the comparatively lighter armor of a Soviet client...

Ten days to close on Baghdad- about 450 kms, in a sandstorm, unknown terrain w/unreinforced bridges EVERYWHERE, against an opponent sometimes actually giving battle...for awhile...

Get my drift?

There's a slight chance that you and others are working off comfortable narratives that may not reflect realities proven under conditions where people are shooting back.

We also have a modest jaunt of some considerable distance involving multiple corps around the flank of another large army some years before with essentially the same vehicle-in the thousands.

Nobody missed the fight.

Of course, Saudi, Kuwaiti, and Iraqi deserts just don't produce the incredibly fine, talcum-like powdered dust and sand unique to Pakistan... or Gowan Field, Idaho, 29 Palms, Ca...Bright Star in eastern Egypt...

I'm glad you like and have faith in your armor. Saiko, I think much of what kasrkin and you have suggested-in combination, makes sense.

 

[saiko]

Here's a fun fact:

The US defence budget is 150 times larger than Pakistan's defence budget.

So it's nice that the most lavishly equipped army in the world with the largest logistical trains can afford to build extremely heavy tanks and afford to have them collapse bridges (like in Al Faysaliyph) because they can pay the ridiculous premium of bringing anything they need anywhere.

The other 95% of the armies of the world have to be much more practical than that.

And of course, nevermind the fact that the buildup of the examples you are talking about took months and months and months. There's certainly something to that which led to the creation of the Stryker brigades.

 

[S-2]

Your arguments are understood and appreciated even if the tone, perhaps, isn't.

I agree that it's an advantage to my army to be able to show up as the visiting team on a distant battlefield in our accumulated weight and then be able to sustain combat assaults of hundreds of kilometers sustained from over 6,000 miles away that can render armies on their own terrain utterly null.

Yes, STRYKER is a reflection of our continuing pursuit of strategic and operational mobility. We value these assets as combat-multipliers in our view of conflict.

Until the U.S. Army is posed with the dilemma of forced entry onto a high-intensity battlefield of a trained and prepared enemy, we won't know the absolute values of our investments here.

In the interim, that unknown is backfilled with the certainty of our strategic and operational overmatch that allows systems like the M1A2 to collapse bridges in "Al Faysaliyph [sic]"-and it will continue for the foreseeable future.

Meanwhile, I marvel at the calm of a commander like LTC Terry Farrell, Cdr 3-7 Cav who recovered that vehicle and one more while re-orienting his squadron's column of 500 vehicles in a nighttime urban battle...

...and found another crossing for all of his other M-1A1 tanks. Tactical mobility now restored by his command presence and ingenuity, Lieutenant Colonel Farrell continued his attack north.

Gotta love it.

Yup.

 

[Hellfire]

You might remember that M-1 Abrams was tested by PA during Zia time (Zia lost his life on the way back from the tests in Bhawalpur desert) and was rejected. Understand M-1 was found to be too heavy for our road bridges and for fighting on the mud flats of Punjab.

Well, I guess under more functional stresses of battle from the Saudi, Kuwaiti, and Iraqi deserts to agricultural reaches of the Tigris and Euphrates valleys we've been able to employ the M1A2 (an even heavier version than you'd have likely tested under Zia which was, my guess, the base M-1 w/M-68 105mm cannon still).

As a defensive weapon falling back upon it's own log train in a Pakistani Punjab defense scenario, it may have been unbeatable. In the offense, as far as your log train and combat engineers will permit at speeds that truly shock.

You've got to be able to bridge in the east to attack. Couldn't you today bridge a 70T capacity?

At the time the M1 was still in evoluton phases post-induction and as such was found to be failing in the conditions prevalent in south asia. no doubt lessons were learnt from the inaccuracies of firepower in these conditions and necessary changes made to suit the tank for operations in hot desert conditions vastly different from the cool climate of the european theater which was its once designated field of operations during the closing decade of cold war .......

also quoting the gulf war 1 as a proven philosophy is a judgemental error from my point of view ( no offence intended ) as the fact remains that by 1987 tanks were getting the DU mesh into the armor to strengthen the already strong armor on M1s which rendered the HEATs and HESHs held by Iraq useless and they hardly had any KE penentrator to fire ..... so overwhelming superiority against an ill prepared and ill equipped force. In Indo-Pak equations, the situations are quite different as neither country is a roll over or push over as various conflicts have demonstrated, a fact recognised by US also. The development of war philosophy in south asia is completely different from that for US.

 

[Hellfire]

The basic constraint on PA's side maybe financial reasons as also constraint in the industrial base and willingness of sharing of sensitive technology at times due to political reasons by foreign partners. Also the concept of DCB defences and high density population together with the extensive urbanisation of the south asian region on either side of border has led to reluctance of either countries to introduce bigger and heavier tanks as there is no space to employ staggering armor moves on large scale as also lack of mobility in taking over towns ...... one can always argue with development of urban survival kit for abrahms but the fact is no survival kit can last long once the tank is not able to maneuver in constricted spaces of narrow alleys and streets of south asian towns/cities.

arjun was a decades old product which was ultimately done in in 2002 but due to the shock of loosing valuable r&d funding from GoI, DRDO woke with a start and by 2006 95% of the problems were rectified. Only the FCS from Thales was problematic in operations over sustained temperatures of 50'C which too has been rectified ....... as for mobility BFAT carriages have been introduced as also bridging in form of Sarvatra class which is in 70 ton class ...... now the only hesitancy is in change of logistic plans for the arjun regiments which will eat into lot of money which IA wants to use to buy new gadgets ..... anyways am waiting if someone opens a specific arjun - alkhalid forum for discussion .......

 

[S-2]

"also quoting the gulf war 1 as a proven philosophy is a judgemental error from my point of view ( no offence intended ) as the fact remains that by 1987 tanks were getting the DU mesh into the armor to strengthen the already strong armor on M1s which rendered the HEATs and HESHs held by Iraq useless and they hardly had any KE penentrator to fire..."

That may be so. I'll take your word that Iraq went to battle without an adequate series of 100mm, 115mm, or 125mm kinetic penetrators. What it wouldn't answer is performance of sensors under varied conditions and accuracies (target hits vs. expenditure) for either side. Also relative detection and engagement ranges.

As to European climes, we remain an expeditionary army and were also in the mid to late 70s during the M-1s development. We request, test, and acquire equipment to meet the full contingent range of terrain and weather possibilities. The M-1 series needed to achieve combat overmatch wherever it might be deployed.

Thanks.

 

[Hellfire]

"also quoting the gulf war 1 as a proven philosophy is a judgemental error from my point of view ( no offence intended ) as the fact remains that by 1987 tanks were getting the DU mesh into the armor to strengthen the already strong armor on M1s which rendered the HEATs and HESHs held by Iraq useless and they hardly had any KE penentrator to fire..."

That may be so. I'll take your word that Iraq went to battle without an adequate series of 100mm, 115mm, or 125mm kinetic penetrators. What it wouldn't answer is performance of sensors under varied conditions and accuracies (target hits vs. expenditure) for either side. Also relative detection and engagement ranges.

As to European climes, we remain an expeditionary army and were also in the mid to late 70s during the M-1s development. We request, test, and acquire equipment to meet the full contingent range of terrain and weather possibilities. The M-1 series needed to achieve combat overmatch wherever it might be deployed.

Thanks.

the whole doctrine of US war fighting is on employment of overwhelming forces and especially in Gulf War I on revamping and re-employing the airland battle concept to widen the scope of their air cavalry operations which were developed back in 1963-64 during vietnam era .

The edge US had was in terms of DU enhanced armour + DU enhanced APFSDs with a strike range of assured kill at 3000m. In addition, the high kill ratio achieved was more due to poor training of the Iraqi army (a debatable point), lack of night fighting capability and thermal imagers and computerised FCS (which gives a better parameter in operations) in addition to lack of the required ammunition. also the bulk of Iraqi army had the inferior T-69s and only the republican guard had T-72s which were better were deficient for above reasons. It was like a grown up fighting a toddler.

One more point was - "highway of death". As most of the iraqi columns were on retreat just at the onset of air war, the allied air force had field day in mauling the best regiments on the highway to basra and establishing an armor superiority in terms of numbers also .......

no doubt the tank is formidable in reality though only has not had chance to be tested against a worthy adversary. anyways I guess we can stick back to topic

 

[S-2]

"One more point was - "highway of death". As most of the iraqi columns were on retreat just at the onset of air war, the allied air force had field day in mauling the best regiments on the highway to basra and establishing an armor superiority in terms of numbers also ......."

You just lost a lot of credibility with me sir. I was a U.S. Army artillery officer at this time. Neither our intel debriefs at the time nor open source info since has given any indication that iraqi columns "were on retreat just at the onset of air war..."

That simply wasn't the case until allied forces crossed the berms into Kuwait. As the allies fought north, the Iraqis departed Kuwait City. THEN we created the bottleneck that became known as the "highway of death". As to best regiments? The BEST regiments were in the west as part of Talwakana and Medina fighting and getting their azzes kicked by VII Corps, XVIII Airborne Corps, the French and the Brits. Those were T-72s that died in large numbers-quickly and violently, and their crews were manned by the best that Iraq had to offer.

Pretty basic and easily-research moment in history. Sufficient on the ol' T.V. screen to lead Colin Powell and G.H. Bush to conclude we would be accused of "slaughter".

Most of your "best regiments" were civilian cars as it turned out and REMFs in soft-skinned vehicles like trucks-loaded down with half of Kuwait. They'd already taken the other half.

I've studied and trained to conduct artillery operations on an air-land battlefield. I instructed others to do the same. Your air-land battle musings are as poorly misrepresented as "the highway of death".

Let's save that one for some other time, though, shall we?

Thanks.

 

[Hellfire]

"One more point was - "highway of death". As most of the iraqi columns were on retreat just at the onset of air war, the allied air force had field day in mauling the best regiments on the highway to basra and establishing an armor superiority in terms of numbers also ......."

You just lost a lot of credibility with me sir. I was a U.S. Army artillery officer at this time. Neither our intel debriefs at the time nor open source info since has given any indication that iraqi columns "were on retreat just at the onset of air war..."

That simply wasn't the case until allied forces crossed the berms into Kuwait. As the allies fought north, the Iraqis departed Kuwait City. THEN we created the bottleneck that became known as the "highway of death". As to best regiments? The BEST regiments were in the west as part of Talwakana and Medina fighting and getting their azzes kicked by VII Corps, XVIII Airborne Corps, the French and the Brits. Those were T-72s that died in large numbers-quickly and violently, and their crews were manned by the best that Iraq had to offer.

Pretty basic and easily-research moment in history. Sufficient on the ol' T.V. screen to lead Colin Powell and G.H. Bush to conclude we would be accused of "slaughter".

Most of your "best regiments" were civilian cars as it turned out and REMFs in soft-skinned vehicles like trucks-loaded down with half of Kuwait. They'd already taken the other half.

I've studied and trained to conduct artillery operations on an air-land battlefield. I instructed others to do the same. Your air-land battle musings are as poorly misrepresented as "the highway of death".

Let's save that one for some other time, though, shall we?

Thanks.

no problem sir ..... i am sure your intel debriefs were as good as the ones which justified the invasion of Iraq again on March 20 2003 on the indisputable facts of WMDs

and now your "intel" is faulty as per your own services admissions. when have you heard of the concept of telling the truth before war which is antithetical to justification of warin the first place?

do you know that Gen Norman Schwarzkopf, the allied commander, paid a visit to a place called National Defence Academy, Pune in India in the days leading upto the war? And do you know why the USAF ACs (C-130s) were stationed at Lohegaon airbase at the time? Because the plan was being broadly discussed with Gen K Sunderji, once Indian Army COAS as also one person on whose confidential report, the Senior Directing Staff at Command & General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth US had endorsed "this officer is fit to command NATO troops in any theater" in the days when India was considered pro-Soviet in good old days of Cold War. My father, who is IA and also an honor graduate from US Army Chemical School, Ft. McClellan (near Aniston) and given similar report by Col. John D Spence CM, Asst Commandant of the school before it was renamed and shifted to Ft. Leonard Wood, Mn. US, was also at the time present on these briefings.

The concept was clear. Mobilisation had taken place, Iraq had dared to thumb its nose at world, Soviet Union was weak and no more able to support its "ally" and message had to be sent who the new boss of the day was......

hard intel about Iraqi units withdrawing as the deadline came to pass was there both with US and India, IA had close contact with Iraqi Army and PLO at the time with the officers being trained in India regularly, so info is not false. how else do you explain large number of troops caught in open when coalition forces had the clearest air superiority of modern history? even the biggest dimwit of the generals (and you will agree there have been whole loads of them for you also since Gen Joe Hooker let Gen Robert E Lee gather sufficient troops to give a thrashing by indecision to attack across potomac) would know not to move his troops in open in clear view en-masse to give target practice to USAF!!! The war began and whole "debriefings" are a white wash as always .......

as for air land battle concept ... yes we can discuss other time and forum ...... and i did say we have differing perception of the same here now from its original concept which was first given out by Mikhail Tukhachevsky in late 1920s and early 30s broadly speaking and implemented operationally in 1930s by a german officer ( i dont recall his name off hand) forgotten till US Army coined the term with introduction of FM 100-5 in 1982....I dont know of your military past, and this forum I generally am not getting into the technicals as am in a different line now ..... and I prefer keeping things simple .... so my "musings" may at times seem unprofessional and layman .... i prefer being simple.....

regards

 

[S-2]

"i am sure your intel debriefs were as good as the ones which justified the invasion of Iraq again on March 20 2003 on the indisputable facts of WMDs"

Actually, you idiot, they were far better. Our sensors had ZERO problems identifying units moving into or out of theatre. Zilch.

"...and now your "intel" is faulty as per your own services admissions. when have you heard of the concept of telling the truth before war which is antithetical to justification of warin the first place?"

Gee whiz, hellfire, you're talking to the absolutely wrong guy here. I don't care what was there. I know these unassailable facts which you are permitted to digest IAW your abilities to absorb-

1.) An Iraqi fascist regime is utterly dismantled.

2.) Iraqi irridentist ambitions for conquest, twice demonstrated with Iran and Kuwait, is a non-issue for the forseeable future.

3.) The b'aath leadership is CRUSHED and it's leader and sons ground temperature.

4.) Kurdish and shia aspirations are unleashed and neither race lives under the suffrage of Sunni minority domination.

5.) All vestiges of WMD-past, present, and future-have been dismantled and effectively neutered for the foreseeable future. No more gas attacks upon Kurds, Iranians or anybody else. Fini.

6.) A democratic muslim/arab nation now possesses the opportunity to determine it's own future.

How #6 goes remains to be seen but I'm UTTERLY pleased with our efforts and bear no poor opinion of our strategic intelligence services. Hope that helps...

However, your red herrings aside, we're discussing TACTICAL and OPERATIONAL intelligence. My army, air force, and marines control those sensors and we had (and have) an unparalleled view of the modern battlefield, thank you very much.

"do you know that Gen Norman Schwarzkopf, the allied commander, paid a visit to a place called National Defence Academy... Soviet Union was weak and no more able to support its "ally" and message had to be sent who the new boss of the day was......"

Do you know that I could care less. So Schwartzkopf gave you a single briefing BEFORE the battle opened, eh? Big deal. Meanwhile, I didn't see any I.A. agency on any distribution list of intel I received.

Those usually come classified NOFORN (Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals/Governments/Non-US Citizens: US government classification control).

That means you and your I.A. buddies.

"hard intel about Iraqi units withdrawing as the deadline came to pass was there both with US and India, IA had close contact with Iraqi Army and PLO at the time with the officers being trained in India regularly, so info is not false."

JSTARS said otherwise and I trust them one hell of a lot more than you.

"even the biggest dimwit of the generals (and you will agree there have been whole loads of them for you also since Gen Joe Hooper let Gen Robert E Lee gather sufficient troops to give a thrashing by indecision to attack across potomac)"

You really know your American military history. Not that I'm asking you to but, please understand, I'd prefer that you not butcher it as you administer your "lessons".

That "dimwit" general to whom you refer is named HOOKER. Joseph Hooker. You refer to the Battle of Chancellorsville. It had NOTHING to do with the Potomac River.

"...so my "musings" may at times seem unprofessional and layman .... i prefer being simple....."

Indeed they are and there'd be little purpose to addressing those gaps in your education at this late date. I'm convinced you've no competency to address air-land battle. In point of fact, you seem to really want some type of discussion on the history of mechanized manuever theory. Far more broad an application and lacking specificity.

When and where that thread appears, please allow a professional to direct the discussion, if you wouldn't mind?

Thanks.

 

[Zarbe Momin]

Al-Khalid tank had 48 tonnes Weight with 600 mm armour and Speed of 72 km/h, if we can compromise a little with speed and use Ceramic materials (composite matrix of laminated ceramic-steel-nickel alloy) like used in Merkava & more explosive reactive armor in front and on sides. A minor reduction in speed & minor increase in weight will provide more safety to crew and Al-Khalid tank would be the invincible tank of world.