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Iran's second military satellite launched to "LEO" orbit (500km)

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the problem . all the inside from the engine to the seeker to the even explosive is , MIM-23 not AIM-54 and only the shell resemble Aim-54 even the diameter is more in line of MIM-23
by the way wonder since when air defense force had access to the Aim-54
AD reverse engineered MIM23, lazy air force borrowed it's engine, and used AIM54 body so that they can have a fake AIM54 without doing an actual R&D!

protecting the sky not playing CAS role for border guards , that was falling in the line of duty of Army and IRGC Aviation or HavaNiruz
220px-IRGC_Pilot_Wing.svg.png
220px-Havaniruz.svg.png

now let not go to the place that IRGC airforce literally have zero air to air capability and is only suited for CAS
starting from the last part, yes, cause from the beginning, air to air combat was the duty of army airforce. you can't count on Havanirooz for supporting the border guards, our borders are too much stretched for that.
for that role, army should have developed it's armed drones, even quick reaction armed propeller planes, yet, we didn't saw such a thing till IRGC developed it's Mohajer-6 drones.


you mean operated by IRGC as the building of short range missiles were started in defense ministry and then become a joint project of IRGC and defense ministry
No, I meant development, our ballistic missile advancement was started by IRGC forces and Tehrani Moghaddam particularly, from the very first moment of reverse engineering scuds, to pin point accurate missiles.
yes, they may have used defense ministry support cause there was no IRGC aerospace force at the beginning, but it has always been IRGC troops. when leader wanted the accurate missiles, he called on Hajizadeh, not defense minister, that tells a lot.
 
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you can compensate for that by putting several Sat at leo .
the problem remain Communication . for effectively using our drones we need that GSO sat .

The issue is what type of imaging quality can you get out of 50KG cube sat as well as adding other technologies like SAR/ISR to be able to see in all weather and day/night.
 
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Salman TVC upper-stage

(Comparable to American Star 48 , Castor 30)

Diameter: 1 m (3 ft 3 in)
Gross mass: 1,900 kg (C fiber casing to reduce weight)
Burn time: 60 seconds
Thurst: 56 KN
Isp: 2599 Ns/kg
Propellant: Solid

Equipped with Gimballed Thrust Vector Control (TVC) for steering in endo and exoatmospheric flight.

salman-exhib.jpg



irgc-logo.jpg


Salman_3.JPG
 
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All of these facts will be judged by the output of this administration.

The output is not always visible to outsiders, because it is not simply measurable in terms of number of launches, weight of SLV's / satellites, or type of orbit reached. It also and mostly takes the shape of far less publicized R&D work which is going on silently in the background and whose fruits sometimes take years to come to bear.

Increasing the budget by 12 times is nothing but a waste of resources and embezzlement if the output doesn't get multiplied by at least 10.

Waste of resources and embezzlement are serious charges which call for proof. As for the output, explained above.

After all, we all blamed the Rouhani administration for his sabotage of the Iranian space program. Now that he's gone, and the budget has increased by 12 times, we should be able to launch heavier satellites into farther orbits.

Not in 7 months. What can be done over such a relatively brief period of time is the following:

1) Increase the activity of Iran's space agencies, conduct more launches than before. Which is precisely what the current administration has been doing.
2) Unfreeze the funds needed to work towards more lofty aims, which again is what seyyed Raisi's cabinet has proceeded with.

As a strong opponent of the Rouhani administration, after 7 months, I cannot see much difference between the new administration and his.
And as far as our space program is concerned, one failed launch and one launch which has achieved nothing new are not going to cut it for people who expect Iran to reach a geostationary orbit by 2025.

1) The SLV launching rate has increased two to three fold. If this or a similar figure is maintained over the entire duration of Raisi's presidential term, then all records in Iranian history will be broken, surpassing even the frequency of space launches under Ahmadinejad. This onto itself constitutes a factual increase in output.

2) The budget was augmented by a factor of no less than twelve. Which implies that there's a vast difference in how these two administrations view and treat the space program.

The JCPOA is being restored and the new version is not any better than what Zarif signed.

Zarif did not sign any document, the JCPOA not being a proper treaty but a political understanding.

It is neither known whether any deal will be reached, nor what the exact terms will be. Lots of misinformation spread in the media including western mainstream sources was proven to be baseless so far. Furthermore any form of guarantees or additional concessions made by the opposite side would mean a better deal for Iran.

But, what is factually known is that the approach adopted respectively by the Raisi and Rohani administrations towards the negotiation process and the JCPOA is nothing alike.

First, the Rohani cabinet was considering it essential to reach a deal no matter what and it made public statements to that effect. More over it had no plan B whatsoever. It was giving the impression that it is desperate to reach a deal, which is a catastrophic way of conducting a negotiation. The Raisi team's method is diametrically opposed: they've made it clear from the beginning that while willing to revive the JCPOA, imbalances it contained to Iran's detriment would have to be corrected, or else Iran won't insist at all and will do without the nuclear deal altogether, having prepared alternative paths to pursue. Right now it appears that the west is more dependent on a restoration of the JCPOA than Iran, a reversal from the Rohani period.

Second, as mentioned Iran is working on correcting JCPOA provisions so as to turn this into an actually useful and no longer one-sided agreement.

Third and most importantly, as long as revolutionary forces are in charge, they unlike liberals will not try and use the JCPOA as a springboard towards additional deals restricting Iran's vital missile arsenal and other armaments, as well as its regional role. If the JCPOA hadn't blatantly failed, reformists and moderates would have reaped sufficient popular legitimacy and political clout to keep pressuring the system, especially the Leadership, on these essential dossiers.

So when considering the facts in depth, there's definitely a significant difference between the policies of the Rohani and Raisi administrations, whether on the JCPOA, the space program or other aspects. Much to their chagrin, Iran's enemies are witnessing and acknowledging it.
 
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The output is not always visible to outsiders, because it is not simply measurable in terms of number of launches, weight of SLV's / satellites, or type of orbit reached. It also and mostly takes the shape of far less publicized R&D work which is going on silently in the background and whose fruits sometimes take years to come to bear.



Waste of resources and embezzlement are serious charges which call for proof. As for the output, explained above.



Not in 7 months. What can be done over such a relatively brief period of time is the following:

1) Increase the activity of Iran's space agencies, conduct more launches than before. Which is precisely what the current administration has been doing.
2) Unfreeze the funds needed to work towards more lofty aims, which again is what seyyed Raisi's cabinet has proceeded with.




1) The SLV launching rate has increased two to three fold. If this or a similar figure is maintained over the entire duration of Raisi's presidential term, then all records in Iranian history will be broken, surpassing even the frequency of space launches under Ahmadinejad. This onto itself constitutes a factual increase in output.

2) The budget was augmented by a factor of no less than twelve. Which implies that there's a vast difference in how these two administrations view and treat the space program.



Zarif did not sign any document, the JCPOA not being a proper treaty but a political understanding.

It is neither known whether any deal will be reached, nor what the exact terms will be. Lots of misinformation spread in the media including western mainstream sources was proven to be baseless so far. Furthermore any form of guarantees or additional concessions made by the opposite side would mean a better deal for Iran.

But, what is factually known is that the approach adopted respectively by the Raisi and Rohani administrations towards the negotiation process and the JCPOA is nothing alike.

First, the Rohani cabinet was considering it essential to reach a deal no matter what and it made public statements to that effect. More over it had no plan B whatsoever. It was giving the impression that it is desperate to reach a deal, which is a catastrophic way of conducting a negotiation. The Raisi team's method is diametrically opposed: they've made it clear from the beginning that while willing to revive the JCPOA, imbalances it contained to Iran's detriment would have to be corrected, or else Iran won't insist at all and will do without the nuclear deal altogether, having prepared alternative paths to pursue. Right now it appears that the west is more dependent on a restoration of the JCPOA than Iran, a reversal from the Rohani period.

Second, as mentioned Iran is working on correcting JCPOA provisions so as to turn this into an actually useful and no longer one-sided agreement.

Third and most importantly, as long as revolutionary forces are in charge, they unlike liberals will not try and use the JCPOA as a springboard towards additional deals restricting Iran's vital missile arsenal and other armaments, as well as its regional role. If the JCPOA hadn't blatantly failed, reformists and moderates would have reaped sufficient popular legitimacy and political clout to keep pressuring the system, especially the Leadership, on these essential dossiers.

So when considering the facts in depth, there's definitely a significant difference between the policies of the Rohani and Raisi administrations, whether on the JCPOA, the space program or other aspects. Much to their chagrin, Iran's enemies are witnessing and acknowledging it.
Blah blah blah, blah blah blah.

Yeah. The output is quite measurable. Just like any decent private company even in Iran, let alone rest of the world. If the entity you are working for is allocating sizeable resources and capital to a project, you need to have output proportional to the size of the allocated resources. It's like management 101 or whatever you want to call it. Otherwise, you're either wasting the allocated resources by overpaying your employees or they're embezzling somewhere somehow. Even by Islamic standards, people who receive money from the Beyt-ul Maal of the Muslims are responsible to spend them well and in good faith with hard work and determination. And hard work and determination always lead to output. Always.

In this case, there are very clear guidelines and goals set for the country in our development plans and we're behind every single one of them from one way or another. For example, Ahmadinejad set our vision to send an astronaut into space by 2017. Five years later, we haven't progressed much and the project seems cancelled without an iota of progress. The main purpose of a civilian space program is to improve communication which is possible with either too many communication satellites in LEO and MEO or few satellites in geosynchronous orbits. The higher you go, the rotational period obviously gets closer to the Earth's (meaning that you'll need fewer satellites in orbit to have high coverage time of your area) and also, due to lower friction caused by the Earth's atmosphere and lower density of floating space debris, the life expectancy of your satellites (equally your constellation) increases. By launching one micro-satellite once a year in LEO, Iran is not going to have anything useful in the next decade. GPS has about 30 satellites in MEO right now and it can work with a minimum of 24 operational satellites in the constellation. If the IRGC wants to do the same in LEO, it will probably need more like 30 satellites and it will end up more expensive for Iran because the satellites will need to be replaced and retired faster.

If Iran is looking for a local positioning system to observe the Greater Middle East and our neighborhood only, then Iran should reach farther orbits. But then again Iran needs more advanced optics and sensors to do that as well. At any right, launching a toaster once a year is not going to cut it for our communication needs or even military needs. Assuming that Iran has reached impressive missile accuracy without satellite guidance using ring laser gyroscopes, we still need to know where we want to hit and we cannot rely on the photos of commercial satellites or the cooperation of the Chinese or the Russians for matters of national security and defense. Hence, we need spy satellites to take close to real-time photos for us with high resolution. An ability that we clearly lack now and at this rate, we won't acquire in the next 10 years.

As for the restoration of the JCPOA, first of all, Zarif did sign the agreement. Just like John Kerry signed it and Zarif always boasted that Kerry's signature was the guarantee of the US commitment to the deal. Secondly, the deal that is revived has already angered too many conservatives in the parliament. It's not just me that feels extremely disappointed by the news from the JCPOA talks. Basically anyone who understands what is happening is enraged. Some of the most conservative and best-informed people on Twitter like EternalPhysics are also quite disappointed like me. The restoration of the deal will be more of the same just like the time of the Rouhani administration, at a time when Iran has too many cards to play because of the Ukraine war and the impending energy crisis.
And again, there is no guarantee that the US won't leave the deal after Iran reverts its compensatory measures. In fact, Biden's chance of winning the second term in office is gloomy and Trump may win the next presidential election. And I'm sure this time he won't make the stupid mistake of just leaving the JCPOA. He will activate the trigger mechanism just before 2025 comes and the deal ends, basically restoring all UNSC sanctions against us right before the deal finishes. And anyone who wants to restore the JCPOA knowing the current dynamics of the world and the uncertainty of the future US politics is doing nothing short of treason to the country.
 
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Just like any decent private company even in Iran, let alone rest of the world. If the entity you are working for is allocating sizeable resources and capital to a project, you need to have output proportional to the size of the allocated resources. It's like management 101 or whatever you want to call it. Otherwise, you're either wasting the allocated resources by overpaying your employees or they're embezzling somewhere somehow. Even by Islamic standards, people who receive money from the Beyt-ul Maal of the Muslims are responsible to spend them well and in good faith with hard work and determination. And hard work and determination always lead to output. Always.

Addressed above.

In this case, there are very clear guidelines and goals set for the country in our development plans and we're behind every single one of them from one way or another. For example, Ahmadinejad set our vision to send an astronaut into space by 2017. Five years later, we haven't progressed much and the project seems cancelled without an iota of progress. The main purpose of a civilian space program is to improve communication which is possible with either too many communication satellites in LEO and MEO or few satellites in geosynchronous orbits. The higher you go, the rotational period obviously gets closer to the Earth's (meaning that you'll need fewer satellites in orbit to have high coverage time of your area) and also, due to lower friction caused by the Earth's atmosphere and lower density of floating space debris, the life expectancy of your satellites (equally your constellation) increases. By launching one micro-satellite once a year in LEO, Iran is not going to have anything useful in the next decade. GPS has about 30 satellites in MEO right now and it can work with a minimum of 24 operational satellites in the constellation. If the IRGC wants to do the same in LEO, it will probably need more like 30 satellites and it will end up more expensive for Iran because the satellites will need to be replaced and retired faster.

1) Already, Iran is part of a select and very restricted club of countries to send their own satellites into space.

2) The question was about the difference between the previous and current administrations in this regard. Two to threefold increase in launch frequency, twelve fold increase in budget qualify as a massive difference from any rational viewpoint.

3) Any qualitative leap in the Iranian space program will precisely have these two above cited measures as its starting point. Credit thus goes to Raisi and his cabinet for initiating the process.

If Iran is looking for a local positioning system to observe the Greater Middle East and our neighborhood only, then Iran should reach farther orbits. But then again Iran needs more advanced optics and sensors to do that as well. At any right, launching a toaster once a year is not going to cut it for our communication needs or even military needs. Assuming that Iran has reached impressive missile accuracy without satellite guidance using ring laser gyroscopes, we still need to know where we want to hit and we cannot rely on the photos of commercial satellites or the cooperation of the Chinese or the Russians for matters of national security and defense. Hence, we need spy satellites to take close to real-time photos for us with high resolution. An ability that we clearly lack now and at this rate, we won't acquire in the next 10 years.

1) We can only judge if we're privy to what is currently being worked on at the IRGC Aerospace department and at the ISA, to how the drastically increased budget is affecting the pace of progress, and to how much work was done behind closed doors over the past seven months since Raisi was sworn in.

2) The ability will be acquired, whether in 5 years, in 10 or in 15. Which is not going to be too late for anything. And it will be mostly thanks to administrations like Raisi's, which are facilitating it, as opposed to the previous one. Again, the distinction between these two cannot be obfuscated.

As for the restoration of the JCPOA, first of all, Zarif did sign the agreement. Just like John Kerry signed it and Zarif always boasted that Kerry's signature was the guarantee of the US commitment to the deal.

No. Here's the fact: neither Zarif nor Kerry signed anything in the framework of the JCPOA, because the JCPOA is not an international treaty as per the 1969 Vienna Convention, but merely an informal political agreement. Kerry in person is on the record for stating so. Only the subsequent UNSC resolution endorsing the provisions of the deal indirectly achieved to lend its content some sort of a binding value.

There is no properly signed JCPOA document by any of the parties. Zarif used incorrect terms when making that statement. As mentioned before, the idea that the JCPOA is a signed document constitutes one of the most common mistakes on the topic, even among people who have been following the issue at a journalistic level.

Secondly, the deal that is revived has already angered too many conservatives in the parliament. It's not just me that feels extremely disappointed by the news from the JCPOA talks. Basically anyone who understands what is happening is enraged. Some of the most conservative and best-informed people on Twitter like EternalPhysics are also quite disappointed like me. The restoration of the deal will be more of the same just like the time of the Rouhani administration, at a time when Iran has too many cards to play because of the Ukraine war and the impending energy crisis.

Nothing has been revived yet, no definitive terms are known to the public. And from what is actually known, the Raisi administration's negotiating team is not going to settle for the same i.e. there will be no agreement without additional guarantees from the west and in particular the US as to their committments.

And again, there is no guarantee that the US won't leave the deal after Iran reverts its compensatory measures. In fact, Biden's chance of winning the second term in office is gloomy and Trump may win the next presidential election. And I'm sure this time he won't make the stupid mistake of just leaving the JCPOA. He will activate the trigger mechanism just before 2025 comes and the deal ends, basically restoring all UNSC sanctions against us right before the deal finishes. And anyone who wants to restore the JCPOA knowing the current dynamics of the world and the uncertainty of the future US politics is doing nothing short of treason to the country.

Iran is not going to restore the JCPOA without the addition of mechanisms aiming to prevent a repeat of the Trump turnabout.

More over, it's just as much about having a plan B and not getting caught off guard. And the Raisi administration does have a plan B and it will not get caught off guard. Under these circumstances and will full awareness, extracting even temporary benefits from an improved JCPOA until the US rips it up again would be admissible.
 
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Manifest projection.



Already addressed. No need to go in circles.



1) Already, Iran is part of select and very restricted club of countries to send their own satellites into space.

2) The question was about the difference between the previous and current administrations in this regard. Two to threefold increase in launch frequency, twelve fold increase in budget qualify as a massive difference to any rationally thinking person.

3) Any qualitative leap in the Iranian space program will precisely have these two above cited measures as its starting point. Credit thus goes to Raisi and his cabinet for initiating the process.



1) You don't know what is currently being worked on at the IRGC and ISA, nor how the drastically increased budget will affect the pace of progress, nor how much work was done internally over the past seven months since Raisi was sworn in.

2) The ability will be acquired, whether in 5 years, in 10 or in 15. And it will be mostly thanks to administrations like Raisi's, which are facilitating it, as opposed to the previous one. Again, the distinction between these two cannot be obfuscated.



No, wrong.

Here's the fact: neither Zarif nor Kerry signed anything in the framework of the JCPOA, because the JCPOA is not an international contract, but merely an informal political agreement. Kerry in person is on the record for stating so. Only the subsequent UNSC resolution endorsing it indirectly lent the deal sort of a binding quality.

There is no signed JCPOA document by any of the parties. Zarif used incorrect terms when making that statement, plain and simple. As mentioned before, the false idea that the JCPOA is a signed document constitutes one of the most common mistakes on topics like these, even among people who have been studying it at a scholarly or journalistic level.



Nothing is revived yet. And no definitive terms are known to the public. And from what is actually known, the Raisi administration's negotiating team is not going to settle for the same i.e. there will be no agreement without additional guarantees from the west and in particular the US as to their engagements.



Iran is not going to restore the JCPOA without the addition of mechanisms aiming to prevent a repeat of the Trump turnabout.

More over, it's just as much about having a plan B and not getting caught off guard. And the Raisi administration does have a plan B and it will not get caught off guard. Under these circumstances and will full awareness, extracting even temporary benefits from an improved JCPOA until the US rips it up again would be admissible.
I think I have spent too much time responding to your low-quality nonsense. No offense Salar, but not interested in your nonsense anymore. The fact that you think the JCPOA, an international agreement backed by a UN Security Council resolution (which is in many ways unprecedented in world history), is an "informal agreement" is more than enough for me to see that you're just a troll, and possibly on a payroll. Either way, not really worth my time to read your boring blah blah blah posts. Sorry.
 
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I think I have spent too much time responding to your low-quality nonsense. No offense Salar, but not interested in your nonsense anymore. The fact that you think the JCPOA, an international agreement backed by a UN Security Council resolution (which is in many ways unprecedented in world history), is an "informal agreement" is more than enough for me to see that you're just a troll, and possibly on a payroll. Either way, not really worth my time to read your boring blah blah blah posts. Sorry.

Since it's a hugely widespread inaccuracy indeed, one cannot be faulted much for repeating it. But lack of interest in independent verification, paired with the assumption that I'm simply making this up, would be less commendable.

The UNSC endorsing the deal doesn't mean that it's a fully fledged and signed international treaty. In this case, it simply isn't.

Now here's some "low-quality boring nonsensical".... evidence:

j2.jpg


j.jpg


j3.jpg


All taken from the Wikipedia entry on the JCPOA. Follow the footnotes for the primary source to each quote.

Here's more, again from the horse's mouth:

Secretary of State John Kerry clarified to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that a possible nuclear agreement with Iran would not be legally binding.

"We've been clear from the beginning we're not negotiating a legally binding plan," Kerry told the committee, according to ABC News. "We're negotiating a plan that will have a capacity for enforcement."



Please pay attention to the fact that this statement was made prior to the conclusion of the deal. So everyone in Rohani's negotiating team was informed that the US does not intend to sign a proper international agreement with Iran.

In short, the JCPOA is not an international treaty conforming to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and it is not a signed document. There's no doubt about this.
 
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That you wouldn't actually know the fact is one thing, after all this is an extremely common mistake, but that you'd be uninterested in verifying or that you'd assume this is simply an "opinion" of mine and not that I must have read it somewhere, seems less justifiable.

The UNSC endorsing the deal doesn't mean that it's a fully fledged and signed international treaty. And in this case it simply isn't.

Now here's some "low-quality boring blah blah blah nonsense" for you...:

View attachment 823390

View attachment 823384

View attachment 823391

All taken from the Wikipedia entry on the JCPOA, follow the footnotes for the primary source to each quote.

Here's more, again from the horse's mouth:

Secretary of State John Kerry clarified to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that a possible nuclear agreement with Iran would not be legally binding.

"We've been clear from the beginning we're not negotiating a legally binding plan," Kerry told the committee, according to ABC News. "We're negotiating a plan that will have a capacity for enforcement."



In short, the JCPOA is not an international treaty conforming to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and it is not a signed document. End of story.

You apparently don't know the difference between an agreement and a treaty.
Or maybe you know the difference, but you are just trying to pretend that you don't to push your agenda. So, let me clue you in.

The JCPOA is an international agreement backed by the UN Security Council. However, as the other signatories of the JCPOA did not pass the agreement in their parliaments, it is not an international treaty. Meanwhile, Iran did pass it in the parliament in the infamous under 20 minute session held by Larijani as the Head of the Parliament, and therefore it is a binding agreement for Iran. The UN Security Council not only has endorsed this agreement in Resolution 2231, but it has precisely defined the mechanisms of observing it as well. Most importantly, the signatures of all involved parties are there, including Zarif and John Kerry.

Also, the fact that you are now using the US excuse for avoiding to honor its commitments and obligations under the JCPOA to prove that Zarif didn't sign the agreement, not only is illogical because one has nothing to do with the other, but it is the peak of hypocrisy one could achieve.

Anyway, see you later. I am going to put you on ignore for a while. I am tired of your boring nonsense that leads nowhere. I tell you that if Iran wants to have a functional working/military space program, we must ramp up things to way more than now, and you say that "The ability will be acquired, whether in 5 years, in 10 or in 15". Yeah, big f*cking deal! And Somalia will acquire it too, whether in 50 years or 100. lol
 
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You apparently don't know the difference between an agreement and a treaty.
Or maybe you know the difference, but you are just trying to pretend that you don't to push your agenda. So, let me clue you in.

The JCPOA is an international agreement backed by the UN Security Council. However, as the other signatories of the JCPOA did not pass the agreement in their parliaments, it is not an international treaty.

In practice there's no difference between treaty and agreement in the terminology of international law. Both words (and others like accord, convention, contract etc) are used interchangeably.

Treaties can be referred to by a number of different names: international conventions, international agreements, covenants, final acts, charters, memorandums of understandings (MOUs), protocols, pacts, accords, and constitutions for international organizations. Usually these different names have no legal significance in international law (see next section for the difference in U.S. law). Treaties may be bilateral (two parties) or multilateral (between several parties) and a treaty is usually only binding on the parties to the agreement. An agreement "enters into force" when the terms for entry into force as specified in the agreement are met. Bilateral treaties usually enter into force when both parties agree to be bound as of a certain date.


Meanwhile, Iran did pass it in the parliament in the infamous under 20 minute session held by Larijani as the Head of the Parliament, and therefore it is a binding agreement for Iran. The UN Security Council not only has endorsed this agreement in Resolution 2231, but it has precisely defined the mechanisms of observing it as well. Most importantly, the signatures of all involved parties are there, including Zarif and John Kerry.

It's simple, the JCPOA is not a properly signed document. Thence, it does not fulfill the conditions of an international treaty. Onto itself, it is therefore not legally binding in the order of international public law like a regular treaty or agreement would be. It generates no such legally binding power.

The US State Department is not the only source to confirm this. So do scholars of international law at legitimate universities as I showed in my previous post.

Also, the fact that you are now using the US excuse for avoiding to honor its commitments and obligations under the JCPOA to prove that Zarif didn't sign the agreement, not only is illogical because one has nothing to do with the other, but it is the peak of hypocrisy one could achieve.

I am obliged to repeat then: nobody signed the JCPOA in the manner in which a treaty or agreement is supposed to be signed in order to be considered legally binding. None of the seven participants. There's no hypocrisy in mentioning this, since it's simply a cold hard fact. Whether the US invoked that cold hard fact as a justification for its refusal to honor its commitments isn't of import in this regard. For all its treachery and criminality, it's not the American regime's fault if the Rohani team portrayed the JCPOA as something entirely different from it actually is.

By the way, former Foreign Minister Zarif, when asked about a certain provision of the JCPOA, claimed he "did not know" that it was actually part of the deal! So when it comes to a concrete and verifiable technical fact about the document, I'd take Kerry's version over Zarif's any day.

Last but not least, guess what page in the original text is the only one to feature any kind of signature? Answer: its freaking cover page...! That's right, the cover page of the JCPOA document is the sole bearer of signatures - these are thus souvenirs, nothing more. Zarif even added a sentence in Farsi below his own signature, reading: "Sincere to Mr. Abbas [Araghchi] and Mr. Majid [Takht-Ravanchi]." There's no printed mention of date and place, no printed reference to the countries being represented by the signatories. And signatures in an international agreement are not supposed to appear on the cover page. This is not how an agreement is signed, and it has zero legal value.
 
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starting from the last part, yes, cause from the beginning, air to air combat was the duty of army airforce. you can't count on Havanirooz for supporting the border guards, our borders are too much stretched for that.
for that role, army should have developed it's armed drones, even quick reaction armed propeller planes, yet, we didn't saw such a thing till IRGC developed it's Mohajer-6 drones.
Borders are in hand of IRGC and police not army . The problem is communication between forces . Not army can't respond in time. And by the way still that role fall on army and IRGC aviation not airforces .

By the way there are some rumor that mohajer 6 is defense ministry project not IRGC or at least you can say it was a joint project between the two .


No, I meant development, our ballistic missile advancement was started by IRGC forces and Tehrani Moghaddam particularly, from the very first moment of reverse engineering scuds, to pin point accurate missiles.
yes, they may have used defense ministry support cause there was no IRGC aerospace force at the beginning, but it has always been IRGC troops. when leader wanted the accurate missiles, he called on Hajizadeh, not defense minister, that tells a lot.
You can say Our solid fuel missile program is older than liquid fuel program that was pursued by IRGC . It was resulted in some short range missile and was developed in defense ministry later solid and liquid fuel missile handed to Mr. Tehranimoqaddam and his group because they wanted to concentrate. All of them in one place and it resulted in advancement of the program but later showed that how problematic this approach can be and it's better have several group that share their work with each other.

AD reverse engineered MIM23, lazy air force borrowed it's engine, and used AIM54 body so that they can have a fake AIM54 without doing an actual R&D!
Well wasn't air defence part of airforce and also wasn't airforce was trying to convert mim-23 for air launch for several years ?
And no you can't made fakour without r&d
And why airforce must build the wheel again . Defense ministry already had the engine . Can you tell why they must not use that engine.
Don't forget if airforce used the seeker of Aim-54 then only f14 could use it but now any airplane that can carry it can use it
 
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In practice there's no difference between treaty and agreement in the terminology of international law. Both words (and others like accord, convention, contract etc) are used interchangeably.

Treaties can be referred to by a number of different names: international conventions, international agreements, covenants, final acts, charters, memorandums of understandings (MOUs), protocols, pacts, accords, and constitutions for international organizations. Usually these different names have no legal significance in international law (see next section for the difference in U.S. law). Treaties may be bilateral (two parties) or multilateral (between several parties) and a treaty is usually only binding on the parties to the agreement. An agreement "enters into force" when the terms for entry into force as specified in the agreement are met. Bilateral treaties usually enter into force when both parties agree to be bound as of a certain date.




It's simple, the JCPOA is not a properly signed document. Thence, it does not fulfill the conditions of an international treaty. Onto itself, it is therefore not legally binding in the order of international public law like a regular treaty or agreement would be. It generates no such legally binding power.

The US State Department is not the only source to confirm this. So do scholars of international law at legitimate universities as I showed in my previous post.



I am obliged to repeat then: nobody signed the JCPOA in the manner in which a treaty or agreement is supposed to be signed in order to be considered legally binding. None of the seven participants. There's no hypocrisy in mentioning this, since it's simply a cold hard fact. Whether the US invoked that cold hard fact as a justification for its refusal to honor its commitments isn't of import in this regard. For all its treachery and criminality, it's not the American regime's fault if the Rohani team portrayed the JCPOA as something entirely different from it actually is.

By the way, former Foreign Minister Zarif, when asked about a certain provision of the JCPOA, claimed he "did not know" that it was actually part of the deal! So when it comes to a concrete and verifiable technical fact about the document, I'd take Kerry's version over Zarif's any day.

Last but not least, guess what page in the original text is the only one to feature any kind of signature? Answer: its freaking cover page...! That's right, the cover page of the JCPOA document is the sole bearer of signatures - these are thus souvenirs, nothing more. Zarif even added a sentence in Farsi below his own signature, reading: "Sincere to Mr. Abbas [Araghchi] and Mr. Majid [Takht-Ravanchi]." There's no printed mention of date and place, no printed reference to the countries being represented by the signatories. And signatures in an international agreement are not supposed to appear on the cover page. This is not how an agreement is signed, and it has zero legal value.
"Properly signed" or not, Zarif's signature is in fact right there, which was the initial point of the discussion So, none of the things you said matter as that was the initial claim and it is indisputable that Zarif did sign the agreement.

Nevertheless, this "improperly signed" document has shut down our nuclear program for 10 years already and if it gets revived as it is discussed on social media and official newspapers, it's the same terrible deal for Iran extended for another 3 years. Meanwhile, Trump can get elected back into office in 2024 and this time he can simply go for the trigger mechanism in the JCPOA, officially reimposing all UN Security Council sanctions on Iran just a year before the expiration date of the JCPOA. So, good job defending the restoration of the JCPOA.

Also, even the parliament is constantly voicing their concern over the revival of the JCPOA. Just today:

Here's a photo for you:

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