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Zathura said:
when did the green berets of the army switch to AK?
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It's Marines not NOHED. Marine standard issue rifle is AK-133/KL-133.

Zathura said:
Still begs the question. The army is set on G3. When did they switch to AK for the army? be it for a small portion.
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Ground force rapid reaction brigades and navy marines and stopped using G3s
 
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GrandBotBoi said:
Ground force rapid reaction brigades and navy marines and stopped using G3s
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never used AK-133, but when i was conscripted G3 was a gun that i was sure i hit the target with it , other guns (MP-5 and AK-47) were lucky shot if it hit the target . i really liked G3
 
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Hack-Hook said:
answer me one thing , if the new deal with Russia only consist helicopter and spares for ka-52 then which deal is better one , the one we had for AH-1jj or the one we will get for KA-52 ?
Click to expand...

When it comes to evaluating how beneficial a contract of this kind will be for the customer, a study of the legal terms alone will not be sufficient. Indeed, depending on the customer's domestic capabilities and its strategic policy orientation, the concrete impact of those terms can be like night and day.

In that sense, Russia supplying nothing but a batch of Ka-52's in 2023 will benefit Iran more than a Bell utility helicopter assembly line might have. Because the Iran of today is nothing like the Iran of the Pahlavis or Saudi Arabia for that matter: whoever's willing to sell any sort of military equipment to Iran, nay whoever's an enemy and deploys weaponry against the Islamic Republic which may end up getting seized much to the aggressor's humiliation, such as the USA's then classified RQ-170 UAV, understand in advance that Iranian engineers are going to subject said material to utmost technical inspection and while they're at it, may then opt for reverse-engineering too.In any case they will learn from and integrate the acquired technology for use in domestic projects.

This is a capability which was lacking prior to the Islamic Revolution, and reason for that was the Pahlavi regime's subservience to the USA. Which stands in sharp contrast to contemporary Iran's staunch attachment to independence and principled pursuit of self-sufficiency, direct corollaries of the IR's anti-imperialist Resistance ideology.

Given the hard work accomplished under the inspired guidance of the Islamic Leadership, to Iran transfer of technology is no longer a precondition for the indigenization of military technology - Iranian engineers and technicians operating under the IR's doctrine of self-sufficiency, can be trusted to deliver all by themselves.

This is not to say that ToT has now entirely devolved into a redundant sort of exercise: it still could be of use to Iran insofar as it would tend to speed up domestic research and manufacturing, specifically in two areas of activity:

A- Top of the line technology of exceptional complexity, such as aircraft engines.
B- Sectors not prioritized by Iran where domestic production is bound to advance slowly, in conformity with the level of funding.

While potentially helpful, ToT is thus no longer an indispensable precondition for advancement. The situation in this regard was diametrically opposed before 1979, when Iran used to be an archetypal client state of the empire, a not too enviable status the Saudi regime continues to incarnate.

One key feature of an imperial client is that it will stay fully dependent on the imperial overlord's goodwill under any and all circumstances, including with regards to the development of the most circumscribed of domestic industries, intended to project an illusion of independence. What's more, the empire will determine a minimalistic framework within which its client will be allowed some conditional and permanently revocable autonomy of sorts, while ensuring that this restricted autonomy won't affect the client's overall dependency. Concretely, there are two pillars to this specific process of imperial governance:

A- Local production for the client will essentially amount to assembly. Not to ground up manufacturing of weapons systems. In particular, the technologically most sensitive components will forever remain off limits to the client, doomed as the latter will be to source those same components from its imperial patrons.

To cite a comparable example from the civilian realm, the west has allowed its Saudi clients to produce gas turbines similar to the ones made by Iran's MAPNA, not least because NATO regimes are continually compelled to contain the powerful appeal of the Islamic Revolution's anti-imperial paradigm with nations of the global south, and to try their best to cover up the actual, inept nature of the Al-e Saud / Pahlavi model of subordination. What they'll publicize less therefore, is that the turbine blades and other critical parts do not happen to be manufactured in Saudi Arabia but in the west. In Saudi they're simply mounted onto the rest of the machine. MAPNA on the other hand has proceeded to indigenize said parts because the Islamic Republic is a free and pronouncedly independent polity, emancipated from the shackles of neo-colonial servitude since one fresh winter day of 1979.

B- The type of arms they'll authorize a client state of the global south to localize manufacture of. Neither utility nor attack helicopters are game changing (in most realistic scenarii) or strategic tier weaponry. A complete range of domestically mass-produced missiles, air defence systems and UAV's however does fall under that category.

This is why one shouldn't be looking at the terms of an arms transfer agreement in isolation of domestic ground reality in the recipient country. It follows that elements such as the capitulation treaty are of relevance indeed, because the general conditions under which the USA regime would offer Iran those assets, precisely consisted in Iran foregoing her sovereignty through instruments like the capitulation treaty and others of the same kind. This in turn meant Iran could not use those helicopters without Washington's green light.

If the Bell deal "looks better" on paper, the underlying setting which made it conceivable in the first place was wholly unacceptable.

The secret of the IR's success lies in adequate development policies, efficient planning and allocation of funds but more importantly, it's the strong political will for independence and self-sufficiency coupled with the revolutionary Leadership's high amount of bravery which paved the way to where we stand by the Grace of the Almighty. In a world dominated by an oppressive but resourceful empire, opting for independence does take all the above qualities. They aren't too many to have it in them. Both Al-e Saud and the Pahlavis do not qualify; Imam Khomeini (r.A.) and his eminence seyyed Khamenei (h.A.) do.
 
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SalarHaqq said:
When it comes to evaluating how beneficial a contract of this kind will be for the customer, a study of the legal terms alone will not be sufficient. Indeed, depending on the customer's domestic capabilities and its strategic policy orientation, the concrete impact of those terms can be like night and day.

In that sense, Russia supplying nothing but a batch of Ka-52's in 2023 will benefit Iran more than a Bell utility helicopter assembly line might have. Because the Iran of today is nothing like the Iran of the Pahlavis or Saudi Arabia for that matter: whoever's willing to sell any sort of military equipment to Iran, nay whoever's an enemy and deploys weaponry against the Islamic Republic which may end up getting seized much to the aggressor's humiliation, such as the USA's then classified RQ-170 UAV, understand in advance that Iranian engineers are going to subject said material to utmost technical inspection and while they're at it, may then opt for reverse-engineering too.In any case they will learn from and integrate the acquired technology for use in domestic projects.

This is a capability which was lacking prior to the Islamic Revolution, and reason for that was the Pahlavi regime's subservience to the USA. Which stands in sharp contrast to contemporary Iran's staunch attachment to independence and principled pursuit of self-sufficiency, direct corollaries of the IR's anti-imperialist Resistance ideology.

Given the hard work accomplished under the inspired guidance of the Islamic Leadership, to Iran transfer of technology is no longer a precondition for the indigenization of military technology - Iranian engineers and technicians operating under the IR's doctrine of self-sufficiency, can be trusted to deliver all by themselves.

This is not to say that ToT has now entirely devolved into a redundant sort of exercise: it still could be of use to Iran insofar as it would tend to speed up domestic research and manufacturing, specifically in two areas of activity:

A- Top of the line technology of exceptional complexity, such as aircraft engines.
B- Sectors not prioritized by Iran where domestic production is bound to advance slowly, in conformity with the level of funding.

While potentially helpful, ToT is thus no longer an indispensable precondition for advancement. The situation in this regard was diametrically opposed before 1979, when Iran used to be an archetypal client state of the empire, a not too enviable status the Saudi regime continues to incarnate.

One key feature of an imperial client is that it will stay fully dependent on the imperial overlord's goodwill under any and all circumstances, including with regards to the development of the most circumscribed of domestic industries, intended to project an illusion of independence. What's more, the empire will determine a minimalistic framework within which its client will be allowed some conditional and permanently revocable autonomy of sorts, while ensuring that this restricted autonomy won't affect the client's overall dependency. Concretely, there are two pillars to this specific process of imperial governance:

A- Local production for the client will essentially amount to assembly. Not to ground up manufacturing of weapons systems. In particular, the technologically most sensitive components will forever remain off limits to the client, doomed as the latter will be to source those same components from its imperial patrons.

To cite a comparable example from the civilian realm, the west has allowed its Saudi clients to produce gas turbines similar to the ones made by Iran's MAPNA, not least because NATO regimes are continually compelled to contain the powerful appeal of the Islamic Revolution's anti-imperial paradigm with nations of the global south, and to try their best to cover up the actual, inept nature of the Al-e Saud / Pahlavi model of subordination. What they'll publicize less therefore, is that the turbine blades and other critical parts do not happen to be manufactured in Saudi Arabia but in the west. In Saudi they're simply mounted onto the rest of the machine. MAPNA on the other hand has proceeded to indigenize said parts because the Islamic Republic is a free and pronouncedly independent polity, emancipated from the shackles of neo-colonial servitude since one fresh winter day of 1979.

B- The type of arms they'll authorize a client state of the global south to localize manufacture of. Neither utility nor attack helicopters are game changing (in most realistic scenarii) or strategic tier weaponry. A complete range of domestically mass-produced missiles, air defence systems and UAV's however does fall under that category.

This is why one shouldn't be looking at the terms of an arms transfer agreement in isolation of domestic ground reality in the recipient country. It follows that elements such as the capitulation treaty are of relevance indeed, because the general conditions under which the USA regime would offer Iran those assets, precisely consisted in Iran foregoing her sovereignty through instruments like the capitulation treaty and others of the same kind. This in turn meant Iran could not use those helicopters without Washington's green light.

If the Bell deal "looks better" on paper, the underlying setting which made it conceivable in the first place was wholly unacceptable.

The secret of the IR's success lies in adequate development policies, efficient planning and allocation of funds but more importantly, it's the strong political will for independence and self-sufficiency coupled with the revolutionary Leadership's high amount of bravery which paved the way to where we stand by the Grace of the Almighty. In a world dominated by an oppressive but resourceful empire, opting for independence does take all the above qualities. They aren't too many to have it in them. Both Al-e Saud and the Pahlavis do not qualify; Imam Khomeini (r.A.) and his eminence seyyed Khamenei (h.A.) do.
Click to expand...
I'm speechless
 
. . . .
Damir877 said:
If Russians wanted Iranian atgm weapons i think they would rather ask for Almaz than any Toophan version.
Click to expand...
Almaz may be working 24 hours / 7 days producing differents missiles. And probably same with uralvagonzavod and other major military industries.

Blue In Green said:
Good news honestly, the orders for Iranian made drones from Russia and other countries must have exceeded current production capacity.

Onwards and upwards!
Click to expand...
Maybe those buildings are for subassemblies of pieces, if you see the columns or pillars they have a small width of no more than 10 meters. I think it is not enough for a modern FAL for helicopters, maybe for drones, but not for helicopters, that is, by the way, the main service of that military base.
 
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Flotilla said:
Almaz may be working 24 hours / 7 days producing differents missiles. And probably same with uralvagonzavod and other major military industries.
Click to expand...
I was thinking of Iranian atgm "Almaz",copy of "SPike" not Russian company "Almaz-Antey".My bad since I am still not sure if it is called "Almaz' or "Almas".

E5rUPDeWYAEvBSF.jpg:large
 
. .
Damir877 said:
I was thinking of Iranian atgm "Almaz",copy of "SPike" not Russian company "Almaz-Antey".My bad since I am still not sure if it is called "Almaz' or "Almas".

E5rUPDeWYAEvBSF.jpg:large
Click to expand...


AlmAs = Diamond. I might get be mistaken what the intent of the Persian name is. Especially since it doesn’t follow conventional Iran mil naming conventions such as Islamic history, Persian myth, martyrs, etc.
 
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Hack-Hook said:
heavy attack helicopter yes , but the question is you prefer light attack helicopter that can engage enemy from 10km away or a heavy attack helicopter that will do that from 5km away ?

we need something like illushin-76 in more number , c-17 or y-20 are not suitable for our needs , they are big , can carry more . but they had one problem , for operation they need large well kept airfields and at the time of war it may be hard to keep all airfields in those condition on other hand Il-76 while is older generation transport aircraft and its aerodynamic is inferior to those two have the advantage of being able to land and fly on sort even unpaved airfields that make its operation a lot easier in war time
Click to expand...
Wrong, C17s can easily land on unpaved short runways easily.
 
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