Every SAM system has a "range." Another factor is which areas have SAM coverage and which do not.
Contrary to prevalent ignorance, PAC-3 systems have very good missile intercept record in the battlefield.
While undoubtedly more capable in the missile defense role than previous Patriot iterations, the capabilities of the PAC-3 still needed to be demonstrated in combat. The United States tested the PAC-3 on a small scale during Operation Iraqi Freedom, when Patriot successfully intercepted all nine SCUD missiles encountered.
A much larger body of data was obtained recently, when Saudi Arabia, which had purchased a large number of PAC-3 systems, had a chance to test the system’s mettle during the Yemeni Civil War. Houthi rebels in Yemen had a modest number of SCUD (or SCUD copy) missile systems, some likely supplied by Iran, which were fired at Saudi military targets as well as population centers.
In Saudi service, Raytheon has claimed a 100% success rate for the PAC-3 system. Astute observers will note that some SCUD missiles did inflict damage upon Saudi Arabia and its allies; however, these targets were not defended by Patriots and thus cannot be counted as failures to intercept.
The alleged success of the Saudi Patriot batteries is a landmark achievement in missile defense. Patriot PAC-3 is the first missile defense system in the world to intercept dozens of ballistic missiles back-to-back without failure, and the record is especially convincing when the flawless performances in Iraqi Freedom and Saudi service are combined. The performance of the Saudi Patriots serves to further vindicate the system after the PAC-2’s poor performance in the Gulf War. It is worth noting that Patriot’s successes have been against SCUD and similar missiles, which are more challenging to intercept than the simple rockets and mortars often intercepted by Israeli missile defense systems.
The news of PAC-3’s success in Saudi service could not come at a better time. Poland recently inked a deal to procure Patriot systems, and Germany is considering extending the service of the Patriot instead of adopting Lockheed Martin’s new MEADS system. In addition, PAC-3 Mid-Segment Enhancement (MSE), which boosts range by 15km and maximum altitude by 50%, is under development. The combat record of the Saudi Patriots will go a long ways towards reassuring current and prospective Patriot customers that the system is capable of handling ballistic missile threats effectively and that funding MSE development is worthwhile. In addition, the Raytheon engineers will be able to use information gleaned by the Saudis to improve Patriot’s performance even further, and Patriot engineers can now boast that their PAC-3 design is extensively combat-tested and proven against SCUD-type threats.
Source:
https://whitefleet.net/2016/07/16/r...s-rate-for-patriot-missiles-in-saudi-service/
PLEASE NOTE: A “strike” as indicated in the timeline does not necessarily equate a failed intercept, as many missile strikes have occurred in areas not protected by missile defense forces.
Details of intercepts here:
https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile-war-yemen/
I am failing to see the relevance of this text you posted. How is that relevant to the point I was making that NONE OF THE HOUTHIS FIRED BM's Inside Saoodiland has iranian origin ? PAC is performing or not and how Raytheon is trying to market the system by boosting it has no relevance to our discussion here.
Yemen had large quantity of Soviet supplied SS-1C/D/E (300+) and there are known sites inside Yemen which can easily carry out modification on lines of how baathists did with Al-Hussein to increase the range. Yemeni army had stockpiles of Scuds they fired it successfully in 1994 war as well. It was a trained army with technicians trained abroad. These people are now fighting against Saoodi, so there is a level of skill and training that comes into play.
For the sake of discussion and regardless of your posted text's relevance here, credibility of the posted text is questionable because Iran so far has never supplied anything to Houthis in name of BMs. IRGC operates solid fueled accurate GRVs in the SRBM category (Fateh family, Zolfaghar, Persian gulf AshBM). Have we seen that being fired from Yemen ? Only time an Iranian rocket has been fired by Houthis did turn out to be unguided Rocket Artillery Zelzal, but thats no BM. While the author is claiming that Houthis have been supplied Scuds by Iran which is laughable because last time Iran actually had real soviet Scuds was in 80s during war. Basic most Shahab-2 in early 90s were later disputed among the missile e-community to be local TOT of of North Korean origin (Hwasong-6). Even that missile saw evolution later (Finless SRBM Qiam-1 and now probably a GRV is installed on it). So where would Iran buy Scuds from to supply them to Yemen which had more SS-1 than anyone else already?
Independent researchers have concluded that Houthis have only fired the following BMs so far:
SS-1C (Purchased from USSR/Russia)
SS-1D (Purchased from USSR/Russia)
SS-1E (Purchased from USSR/Russia)
Bokran (SS-1E with a elongated fuel tank probably) Local modification.
SS-21 Scarab ((Purchased from USSR/Russia)
CSS-8 branded as Qaher-1 (Chinese made)
I have yet to see indigenous Iranian BMs like Fateh, Qiam, Zolfagahr, Sejjil , Ghadr, Shahab-3 etc being used in Yemen.
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As for interception rate, look what a senior intelligence officer and an independent analyst wrote in his published paper in Missile defense advocacy alliance (MDAA).
Houthi rebels and Salah loyalist forces have probably launched over 100 ballistic missiles or long-range rockets and a small number of ASCMs against targets since June 2015. Coalition air forces continue to strike SSM forces in Yemen . However, most sorties occur in the aftermath of missile launches, and coalition attack operations target launch points of origin which have probably been vacated by missile crews and their equipment.
Coalition ballistic missile defense operations have also been ineffective in denying Houthi or Saleh loyalist missile attacks or limiting their damage. Saudi and UAE missile defense units have intercepted, at most, 50 percent of the ballistic missiles reportedly fired at GCC targets.
According to Brigadier General Ahmad Asiri, a military adviser to Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Saudi Arabia has intercepted 36 ballistic missiles fired indiscriminately by the Houthis as of 24 January 2017. (A Saudi general himself is saying that)
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So technically out of 80-100 BM strikes, How many have been intercepted by US supplied Saoodi AD ? more or less 40-50 %. Do we know where the rest are going ?
They are all local missiles (purchased from Russia or modified locally) and how do we know that ? Read here
Coalition counter force attack operations have failed to defeat periodic missile strikes by Houthi and army missile crews . Since the coalition’s initial attempt to destroy the Yemen Army brigade’s missile capabilities, Saleh loyalists in this unit and Houthi rebels have sustained offensive missile fires against enemy targets.
The stockpiles of Yemen's missiles have survived and they have shown the capability of launching and hitting targets.
Also the claim in your posted text that Houthis have targeted population center is wrong.
A wide range of military targets have been attacked with in Yemen and in Saudi Arabia; on a few occasions, they have also fired missiles against offshore naval targets. To a lesser extent, the Houthis and their allies have also attacked civilian power and desalination plants, Saudi oil company assets, a UAE military leased ship carrying humanitarian aid , and international airports used by Saudi military forces. Most missile or rocket attacks have occurred in response to coalition air strikes within Yemen.
