Pak Tribune - Kargil Debacle or Lost Opportunity
An ingenious tactical plan was pulled out of shelves and was set in motion. The plan called for occupying strategic peaks, on the Indian side of LOC, overlooking a long stretch of the Leh-Srinagar highway (NHA). The idea was to secure and hold vantage points overlooking the highway to direct Pakistani artillery fire for the purposes of intercepting and disrupting Indian logistical supply-lines. The highway was/is the lifeline of the Indian troops illegally occupying the Siachin Glacier. A suspension of supplies for few more weeks would have made it very difficult for the Indians troops in Siachin to have sustained the next winter. It was a brilliant tactical plan, but it was a lousy strategic plan. It was missing vital components of support from the political leadership, Foreign Office, and private TV channels – for the PR purposes
According to The Washington Post reporter, Pamela Constable, initially Indians claimed there were only dozen or two intruders who were to be dislodged within a week from few peaks. By the end of the conflict, Indians were literally swearing there were at least 5,000 Pakistani rebels commanding the heights. After the conflict, the Indians revised the numbers to 20,000 Indian troops (in the theater) vs. 1,500 so-called infiltrators. However, in 2002, Brig. Shaukat Qadir (Pakistani) claimed, the total number of Pakistani rebels never exceeded 1,000 from all ranks. The ratio of combatants was 20:1 in India’s favor. However, according to Global Security, at conflict’s peak, Indian troop strength in Kashmir ballooned to 730,000. The buildup included a handsome deployment of Indian Air Force personnel who were supporting the operations of around 60 frontline Indian aircraft.
It was quite evident that Indians were over their heads and nowhere close to a victory. Contrary to what the Indian propaganda machine was showing to the world, on emergency bases, their government was silently importing 3,500 caskets for their fallen men. In reality, Indians were nowhere even close to dislodging more than handful so-called intruders.
Mr. Sharif was incognizant of the immense advantage the Pakistanis enjoyed in the theater. Instead of trusting his military advisors, when Indians bluffed he folded. In short, Indian bluff of expanding the conflict unnerved Mr. Sharif. When the time came to show spine, he begged Washington to save him. He sold Pakistan’s advantage and honor for President Clinton’s word that he will take "personal interest" in the Kashmir dispute.
Had Mr. Sharif mustered little courage and waited another few weeks, snows would have returned to the area and India would have been forced to cease military operations. The status-quo would have left the Indian troops sitting in Siachin without any supplies to survive through the next winter.
Arthur Max, New Delhi bureau chief of Associated Press questioned, "How is it possible that casualties on the Pakistani side were higher -- as India claims -- when they had all the advantage of higher ground?” He appropriately reasoned, “The Indians should have suffered higher casualties than the Pakistanis."