I have been receiving some extremely cogent comments from a Pakistani citizen elsewhere, and am taking the liberty of reproducing four passages from that.
JS: Joe Shearer
ANO: A N Other
JS: Very insightful. I think that the safest way to deal with the Chinese is with pragmatism and directness, and, finally, responsive to their behaviour, rather than to their spoken word.
There is one major difference between the LAC and the LOC. Except in Arunachal Pradesh, perhaps in one or two cases, there are no populated locations on either side of the LAC. There are, in contrast, extensive populations on either side of the LOC.
ANO: Indeed that is the best way to look at their actions rather than their words and frankly, it may send a better message if India, whenever it feels itself stronger, initiates a couple of Salami Slices itself wherever it can even if two months later you withdraw, it wouldn't matter because it would send a message that India is not a pushover.
Of course both lines are very different however, i have read accounts where India did not confront Chinese encroachment to avoid conflict. Match this with Pakistan, where even a movement of an Inch is met with an answer, and you will understand the reaction of both. Pakistan and India both know that encroachment is not possible on LOC unless a very tactical or a bloody operation is held. They are aware of each other and this vigilance keeps them in their line. I know that LAC becoming LOC is not good for India and also not good for Pakistan, as i have stated above in my notes, why i feel as such.
I am trying to understand chinese boldness. India is not say Nepal, a weak and small nation. It is a large and strong nation so why does another Strong and large nation, not be vary of it?
ANO (cont.): needless to say there should be a full inquiry and investigation ( proper one not the JIT ones we have
) as to why China was allowed to build such strong structures?
why werent intrusions seen beforehand?why were strategic grounds left abandoned to chinese aggression? where did the strategy fail and what was the strategy for such actions? armies have generals and officers not just to lead them to battle or wear shiny medals, their job is to make tactical and strategic planning, plan responses, create patterns and find weakness and make turn them into strengths. I mean, we got our excuse that our generals are busy with DHA so strategic failures and response failures are natural, what do your generals have to say?
If nothing else, such inquiry will at least reveal what needs to be done and what should be done. You get an image of steps to take short term and long term.
just saying we will train new divisions isnt good enough. Where to train them? how to equip them? what will be their number? what terrain will they be trained in, i mean you have snowy mountains, rocky mountains, dry mountains, green mountains e.t.c e.t.c. you send a guy trained in arid mountain warfare into snowy mountains and he is not coming back. Who will be their officer? what is his experience? where will be the bases, their supply routes, first fall back point, second fall back point, third fall back point, reinforcement juncture, major base, air support base? so many aspects without inquiry will only lead to blunders and corruption. Inquiry will help plug a few holes and give advantage to the poor farmer boy that will be deployed there.
the IAF may make strikes either to prevent a dangerous build-up of Chinese resources at a point, or to intervene if the Army is taking a beating.
