How Do You Plan To Counter Phalcon Threat?

[indian_musing]

And the Indian AWACS is several times larger than the Pakistani system, it represents a bigger radar signature hence a juicer target. Easy to pick up and not difficult to miss.

Looks like AWACS will stay at same place and guide incomming pakistan missile to bang on it.

 

[S-A-B-E-R->]

a question ...the datalink ...well does it transfers data straight frm AEWC to HUD of the fighter? or is it just verbal or written commands?

 

[AZADPAKISTAN2009]

We already have 1000 anti awac missiles

 

[thebrownguy]

Only way to target it when it is on the ground, from the air, or usin special force ground units like commandos, rest is all rant!!

 

[raveolution]

We already have 1000 anti awac missiles

Bro are u serious??!!

 

[shehbazi2001]

The purpose I think is not to counter Phalcon or an AWACS but to avoid detection. If someone succeeds in avoiding detection by AWACS, there is not guarantee that he would also avoid detection by ground-based radar. It is important to know that AWACS are complimented by other assets like ground-based radars in an integrated air defence system.

An AWACS or AEW is essentially a radar mounted on an aircraft and the coutermeasures developped against ground radars can be used, albeit with reduced effectiveness, against AWACS too. For example, stealth is not only effective against ground radar but also against AWACS. Some tactics used to cheat the ground Doppler radars, like flying at a constant range, may not work against AWACS.

Till now, I think AWACS has not been lost in war due to enemy action. Also, a hard kill is not always necessary when soft kill would accomplish your objective. Jamming, fooling or forcing AWACS to run away or shut down its radar will negate the advantage to opposing pilots. According to AFM, some Serb J-22 Orao pilots managed to avoid detection by AWACS during the war against Serbia.

When we talk of jamming, its clear that noise or spot jamming will not be possible against more powerful radar of AWACS but feeding wrong information to AWACS like velocity or range gate stealing may be possible.

Additionally, as drones have been used for the past few decades against SAM radars, they can be equally used against AWACS. Drone does not need to be a small aircraft, it can be a pilot-less full sized fighter. A desperate solution is to go "Kamikaze". Volunteer pilots would not be hard to find.

 

[pak-yes]

^^^Wooo.Spoken like a true think tank.

 

[gambit]

a question ...the datalink ...well does it transfers data straight frm AEWC to HUD of the fighter? or is it just verbal or written commands?

You will not like the answer -- it depends on the technological sophistication of the HUD in the first place.

Here is a good primer on HUD technology, symbology and usage...

Code One Magazine Online: Month-Year - Title

Not all HUDs are created equal.

We talk of using the HUD to perform certain tasks, to provide information, and to make life simpler. Joe Bill and I refer primarily to the F-16 HUD. However, I will comment on HUDs in general because it’s important to note that specifications and standards have not been rigorously applied. So what you have are HUD capabilities and characteristics that vary greatly between aircraft types. Originally, the HUD was not envisioned to fulfill a requirement for instrument flight indication. The classic control, performance, and navigation instruments essentially satisfied those needs. The HUD was designed as an air-to-air and/or air-to-ground weapon delivery reference. As such, symbology, layout, fields of view, and information sources varied greatly. But it soon became apparent that the flight path marker or velocity vector information, if accurately displayed, provided both control and performance indication without a requirement to interpret and integrate separate indications. As a result, pilots flying airplanes with more capable HUDs (the A-7D or A-7E, for instance) soon included the flight path marker in their instrument scan. Many pilots progressed further to making the flight path marker/pitch ladder combination the hub of their scan (instead of the ADI) and now included the ADI as just another instrument in the scan. This transition was crucial since it affected the pilot’s control strategy. No longer did he have to control one or two indications and then interpret five or six others in estimating the airplane’s performance state. Now he could use the same indication to control the main performance parameter, the flight path.

Since HUDs have not been integrated into the aircraft to provide an instrument flight reference, each HUD has to be independently assessed to determine whether (or to what extent) it can be used for instrument flying. The F-16, particularly the C/D model, has the necessary HUD capabilities for safe and precise instrument flight. The HUD is reliable, provides failure indications, contains accurate and usable symbology, and (in the C/D) has a good field of view. And the so-called primary flight instruments provide both an adequate cross check (should you feel the need) and system redundancy in case a failure occurs in the HUD, in its display generator, or in an information source (that is, in the central air data computer).

So when anyone addresses the topic of the HUD or using HUDs, he must qualify the specific capability to which he is referring. Some level of standardization is required in HUDs. But in the meantime, individual HUDs can be independently assessed as to their instrument flight reference capability.

What a HUD does is to provide information that are of immediate need, such as in fighting against another aircraft or in delivering ordnance to a ground target. As all things involving symbols, or the proper term is 'semiotics'...

Semiotics - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Semiotics, also called semiotic studies or semiology, is the study of sign processes (semiosis), or signification and communication, signs and symbols,...

...The field of view, or real estate, available is important for the display of information. HUD real estate is very limited AFTER basic flight information such as speed, altitude, angle-of-attack or navigation have been allocated. In aviation, HUD symbology is a serious specialty.

Datalinking between a controller (AWACS) and clients are more for general situational awareness than for immediate flight information. The larger 'the big picture' the more time is available to formulate a response and that is what first generation datalink does. As the technology gets more sophisticated, from controller to clients, something must increase commensurately. HUD real estate and more sophisticated symbology must follow. Unfortunately, this is lagging and the result is that 'the big picture' datalink information must be displayed at the instrument panel level.

Datalinking between controller and unmanned aircrafts such as cruise missiles are different in that these devices are incapable of analysis of 'the big picture' view. As such the datalinks between controller and these clients are generally for (re)assignment of certain flight and mission profiles.

 

[dbc]

When we talk of jamming, its clear that noise or spot jamming will not be possible against more powerful radar of AWACS but feeding wrong information to AWACS like velocity or range gate stealing may be possible.

Range Gate Stealing is effective only against radar operating at low or medium PRFs(Pulse Repetition Frequency) since the interpulse period on a radar capable of operating at high PRF like the IAI EL/M-2075 Phalcon is short.

Velocity or Range Gate stealing is best employed against fire-control radar or radar guided missiles to introduce errors in the velocity, range and angle of the target. These techniques are employed not to avoid detection but to avoid getting blown out of the sky.

 

[TexasJohn]

Gambit and Death by Chocolate,

Is the secure datalink on the Phalcon real time between it's fighters? Or is it one the pilot can coose to refresh at will? Any advantage to having the command center on the AWAC as opposed to on the ground?

How exactly do the ground troops take advantage of real time info from the sky? They have to be network centric also don't they? And to what extent? only what pertains to them?

Educate me!

 

[dbc]

Is the secure datalink on the Phalcon real time between it's fighters?

I'm not sure, but I have read that the Su 30 MKI is capable of exchanging data using APD-518 or TKS-2/R-098 IFDL (Intra Flight Data Link). Since the MKI is a mashup of Russian/Israeli/French tech I'd be very surprised if the Phalcon is not already data linked with the MKI. Perhaps Indian members like Screaming Skull or Sancho can enlighten us?

Any advantage to having the command center on the AWAC as opposed to on the ground?

Assuming the absence of real time satellite or over the horizon communication, a ground command center puts the AWACS on a short leash since it must always be in line of sight to the ground command center(s) for secure communication. This is not such a huge disadvantage when you are the home team or have smaller volumes to monitor. Also consider that a ground command center is more vulnerable to attack.

 

[gambit]

Gambit and Death by Chocolate,

Is the secure datalink on the Phalcon real time between it's fighters? Or is it one the pilot can coose to refresh at will?

I'm not sure, but I have read that the Su 30 MKI is capable of exchanging data using APD-518 or TKS-2/R-098 IFDL (Intra Flight Data Link). Since the MKI is a mashup of Russian/Israeli/French tech I'd be very surprised if the Phalcon is not already data linked with the MKI.

Battlefield dynamics are uncertain to start, this demands that datalinks be 'real time' or as immediate as the hardware compatibility and capability between controller and clients allow.

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/ea/F-22-raptor-16.jpg

As we can see from the F-22's cockpit example above, instrument panel real estate are very limited. In theory, threat warnings and/or situational awareness information issued by the controller should comply to the display capability of the client. In reality, the technological diversity between controllers and clients with the clients' being structurally constrained, fancy words for 'no room', required the controller-client relationship be limited to very few platforms.

To go very basic...When an AWACS operator issued a potential threat alert to an F-15 from so-and-so direction, that radio transmission is a datalink. The F-15 pilot then must divert attention to his RWR scope, perhaps even make a few gain adjustments in order to see that threat symbol, and formulate a response. The information was very 'real time' but the response came after a lag created by the pilot's cockpit actions.

http://ftp.rta.nato.int/public//PubFulltext/RTO/AG/RTO-AG-300-V17///AG-300_V17-02.pdf

2.3.5 Display Quality

How “smoothly” a display changes when threats appear or change angle is very important to a pilot’s ability to interpret the data being presented. How quickly the RWR will update the display to show relative position and priority changes can also be critical to the pilot’s situational awareness. These features are difficult to analyze and usually not detailed in a specification.

The ideal situation would have the aircraft, F-15 or F-22 or the future death ray equipped X-wing fighter, send the controller the display status of the its RWR scope, the RWR receiver process the information received from the AWACS, make the necessary display adjustments to indicate the threat's distance and alert the pilot. All the pilot has to do is divert his attention with his eyes. His hands never came off the stick and throttle.

The voice radio transmission make for a very wide controller-client relationships. Anyone with a radio can receive the information, request more information and so on. This is a two-way street. But not every RWR system can communicate with the controller. Voice communication require the information to pass through intermediaries -- pilots. Again a very wide controller-client relationships but the response lag times can be fatal for some. Purely electronic data that can be processed at the speed of light require the burden of communication removed from those intermediaries. A narrow range of controller-client relationships.

Any advantage to having the command center on the AWAC as opposed to on the ground?

Assuming the absence of real time satellite or over the horizon communication, a ground command center puts the AWACS on a short leash since it must always be in line of sight to the ground command center(s) for secure communication. This is not such a huge disadvantage when you are the home team or have smaller volumes to monitor. Also consider that a ground command center is more vulnerable to attack.

True...There is no absolute advantage that would give the presence of an airborne detection system an automatic veto over any decision in a battle. However, precisely because that airborne detection platform has a far greater field-of-view, visual and electronic, a wise ground commander should cede that part of the battlefield to his airborne counterpart. This flexibility by the West was proven superior to the Soviet style of centralized ground command and control no matter what mentality.

 

[shehbazi2001]

Range Gate Stealing is effective only against radar operating at low or medium PRFs(Pulse Repetition Frequency) since the interpulse period on a radar capable of operating at high PRF like the IAI EL/M-2075 Phalcon is short.

Velocity or Range Gate stealing is best employed against fire-control radar or radar guided missiles to introduce errors in the velocity, range and angle of the target. These techniques are employed not to avoid detection but to avoid getting blown out of the sky.

I would like to quote a book on Electronic Warfare.....its "Introduction to Electronic Defense Systems" By Filippo Neri. Go to pages 436,437 and 438.

On page 437, velocity range stealing is effective against tracking systems exploiting CW signals and Doppler Effect.........

By invoking PRF, your referred either to pulsed radars or pulsed radar mode. Not to speak of high PRF, the technique is valid even against CW radar modes.

Although I could not verify the same for Range gate stealing but its said to be effective against a radar using random PRFs or say that its useful against frequency agile radars too.

ECCMs do exist against these techniques but if simultaneously and in combination with cross-eye jamming for example, it can increase your chances of survival.

Still thanks for your input. Your overall point is reasonable.

 

[dbc]

I would like to quote a book on Electronic Warfare.....its "Introduction to Electronic Defense Systems" By Filippo Neri. Go to pages 436,437 and 438.

On page 437, velocity range stealing is effective against tracking systems exploiting CW signals and Doppler Effect.........

By invoking PRF, your referred either to pulsed radars or pulsed radar mode. Not to speak of high PRF, the technique is valid even against CW radar modes.

Although I could not verify the same for Range gate stealing but its said to be effective against a radar using random PRFs or say that its useful against frequency agile radars too.

Continuous wave transmission cannot provide range information, modulation of radio waves in short pulses is required to measure the echo returns. Much like the bat is able to navigate by sending a short pulse of inaudible sound wave and analyzing the return to identify obstacles in its flight path.

I am a bit perplexed by your response? Are we still discussing the IAF Phalcon and strategies to counter it? Like I said before the measures you described is effective against fire control radars. RGS and VGS techniques are usually employed to compel your adversary to waste missiles by preventing accurate calculation of missile fuse times, launch zones and lead angles. These are not effective against a large powerful AESA radar such as the IAI EL/M-2075 Phalcon which is quite capable of overwhelming the jammer on a suspicious bogie attempting to falsify range and velocity data by aggressively probing the suspicious aircraft.

 

[shehbazi2001]

Continuous wave transmission cannot provide range information, modulation of radio waves in short pulses is required to measure the echo returns. Much like the bat is able to navigate by sending a short pulse of inaudible sound wave and analyzing the return to identify obstacles in its flight path.

In a CW radar mode, range is calculated through frequency modulation. Its such an open fact that I dont need to give you a reference. Just search in google. Yes without frequency modulation, then you can't get range. I think you must do some research before posting.

Your second point is valid that RGS and VGS are useful against fire-control radars. Even if they work against AWACS, its of less consequence as AWACS only needs to know approximate location.

And yes why dont you suggest some counter to Phalcon?