You have mentioned some Muslim groups in China who fought with the Japanese, but the full scope of Imperial Japan's strategy in Xinjiang is not clear from your assertion. Here are some details:
The Soviets in Xinjiang (1911-1949)
Sheng justified his alliance with the Soviets by maintaining that Russia was "definitely not an aggressive country," was "ready to aid the weak races in the world," and was "non-aggressive towards Sinkiang," that China could "only be saved and liberated by perpetuating her intimate connection with Russia," that Xinjiang could "never afford to reconstruct itself without the help of Russia," that Xinjiang would "permanently remain a Chinese province if it succeeded in keeping the friendship of Russia," and that only the maintenance of a healthy relationsip with Russia would enable Xinjiang to "tread on the path of anti-imperialism" (
Sheng saw Japan as the chief imperialist threat to Xinjiang). 67
The maintenance of "a close Sino-Russian relationship" was quickly put into effect, as Soviet economic and military aid, troops, and advisors poured into the province. Russians were soon involved in everything from oil drilling to education to military training. In the areas that Sheng controlled, mostly in the north, Russian became the main foreign language studied in school, many young people were sent to the USSR to study, atheistic propaganda became commonplace, mosques were converted into social clubs or theatres, and religious leaders were persecuted. A secret treaty is said to have been signed, guaranteeing that the Soviets would assist Xinjiang "politically, economically and by armed force... in case of some external attack upon the province." 68 In the words of a former Soviet advisor in Xinjiang, "According to Stalin's plan, Sinkiang was to become a sphere of exclusive Russian influence and to serve as a bulwark of our power in the east.... Sinkiang was soon a Soviet colony in all but name." 69
In the spring of 1937, rebellion again broke out in southern Xinjiang. A number of factors contributed to the outbreak. In an effort to appease the Turkic Muslims, Sheng had appointed a number of their non-secessionist leaders, including Khoja Niyas Hajji and Yulbars Khan, another leader of the Kumul uprising, to positions of influence in the provincial government, both in Urumchi and Kashgar. At the same time, educational reforms, which attacked basic Islamic principles, and the atheistic propaganda program, which was being extended into the south, were further alienating the local population from Sheng's administration. In Kashgar. Mahmud Shih-chang, a wealthy Muslim and one of Sheng's appointees, became the focal point for opposition to the government.
Meanwhile, in Afghanistan, Muhammad Amin Bughra, the exiled leader of the TIRET, had approached the Japanese ambassador in 1935 with "a detailed plan proposing the establishment of an 'Eastern Turkestan Republic' under Japanese sponsorship, with munitions and finance to be supplied by Tokyo.... he suggested as the future leader of this proposed Central Asian 'Manchukuo' none other than Mahmud Shih-chang." However, this plan was aborted when Mahmud, fearful for his life, fled from Kashgar to India in April 1937.
Mahmud's flight sparked an uprising amongst his troops against provincial authorities. Those who were pro-Soviet in any way were executed and yet another independent Muslim administration was set up. As before, this revolt had a decidedly Islamic nature. At the same time, uprisings broke out amongst the Kirghiz near Kucha and once again in Kumul. In this context, Ma Hu-shan decided to make his move from Khotan and captured Kashgar from the rebels in June. However, the situation was not to last long. 5,000 Red Army troops, with airborne and armoured vehicle reinforcements, invited by Sheng to intervene, were already on their way to southern Xinjiang, along with Sheng's forces and mutinous Dungan troops. The Turkic rebels were defeated, Kashgar was retaken and Ma Hu-shan's administration collapsed. By October 1937, with the collapse of the Turkic rebellion and the Dungan "satrapy," Muslim control of the south once again came to an end. Shortly after, the rebellions in Kumul and amongst the Kirghiz were also put down, thus establishing Sheng, for the first time, as the actual ruler of the whole province.
"It soon became apparent, however, that the price of Sheng's supremacy was to be almost complete domination, both politically and economically, of Sinkiang by the Soviet Union." 70
A permanent Red Army unit, the 8th Regiment, was established at Kumul, ostensibly to guard against a possible Japanese strike via Inner Mongolia. Besides accomplishing this purpose, this move also erected a barrier to further influence from the three other forces that could challenge the USSR's control of the province: the GMD government in Nanjing; the "Five Ma" warlord group that controlled the adjacent provinces of Gansu, Qinghai, and Ningxia;71 and the local Muslim population, which had shown such an inclination to rebellion. 72 Soviet military presence in the province was increased as a result of the signing of the Sino-Soviet Non-Agression Pact in August 1937. This agreement guaranteed Soviet military assistance to the Nationalist government, in order to stem the tide of the Japanese invasion of northern China, and the obvious route for transporting arms and military vehicles from the USSR to China lay through Xinjiang. An airplane factory and flying school were soon established in the province.
However, Soviet influence was not only in the military realm. By this time, the economy was virtually completely under the monopoly of the Soviets as well. Besides oil, various other natural resources were being openly exploited by the USSR without the permission of the Nationalist government (which was hardly in a position to object, as it was undergoing the full brunt of the Japanese invasion in the east). The 1940 Tin Mines Agreement gave the Soviets "exclusive rights for the prospection, investigation and exploitation of tin and its ancillary minerals" 73 in the province. The financial reimbursement that Xinjiang received for this exploitation was minimal. At the same time, steps were taken to negate the influence of any other foreign power in Xinjiang. The British authorities, who had long since been eclipsed by the Soviets in terms of influence in Xinjiang, were subjected to increased harassment.
@
Banglar Lathial
Imperial Japan's use of racial ties between Japanese, Koreans, Manchu's and Mongols, the following shows the special case of Inner Mongolia:
http://hwww.smhric.org/From domesti...c identity in Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia.pdf
The situation of Inner Mongolia during the Republic of China era (19121949) was
extremely complex. Various alignments cut across international, ethnic and ideological
lines, which were all intertwined with Inner Mongolias aspiration to more autonomy
(Liu). Some sided with the KMT government in Nanjing, while others sided with the
CCP in Yanan. Prince Des self-determination movements, on the other hand, received
active support from the expanding Japanese Empire.
The Japanese colonial discourse
during its expansion into Northeast Asia emphasized the racial ties between the Japanese,
the Koreans, the Manchus, and the Mongols (Bulag,Collaborative Nationalism 41). In the
case of the Mongols, Japan even went so far as to claim Genghis Khan as a Japanese hero
so as to legitimize Japans colonial expansion, based on the belief that the Mongols were
crucial to its imperial project (Tanaka). Accordingly, Japan found in Prince De an ideal
candidate to gain the cooperation of the Mongols for its Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere.
Prince De was born in Shilingol to an aristocratic family that claimed descent from
Genghis Khan, which gave him great legitimacy among his followers to pursue Inner
Mongolian autonomy (Jagchid, The Last Mongol Prince 8). Responding to political
pressure on Inner Mongolia,14 in October 1933, Prince De organized a conference at
Beyile-Yin Sumu (Balingmiao) calling for Inner Mongolian autonomy. Later, in April
1934, he formed a Mongolian Local Autonomous Political Affairs Council (Mengzhenghui) and sent a list of demands to Chiang Kai-shek (Jagchid, The Last Mongol Prince
101). However, due to the weakness of the Mongols, this first attempt at Mongolian autonomy failed. As a result, Prince De was pushed to seek assistance from the invading
954 E. Han
Downloaded by [76.117.208.97] at 14:36 07 February 2013 Japanese army in Manchuria. Supported by the Special Service Offices of the Japanese
Kwantung Army and Japans Good Neighbor Association (Zenrin Kyokai), Prince De
managed to set up a Mongolian Military Government (Menggujunzhengfu) on 12 May
1936 (Jagchid, The Last Mongol Prince 149). In November 1937, the Japanese put him
in charge of the newly formed Mongolian Allied League Autonomous Government
(Mengjiang) (Jagchid, The Last Mongol Prince 189). Since then, a series of Inner Mongolian autonomous governments existed while Japan played the role of supreme advisors.
However, when the Japanese were defeated in 1945, Prince Des Mongolian autonomous
government immediately collapsed. By then, he had administered Inner Mongolia for
almost ten years, despite the Japanese occupation (Jagchid, The Last Mongol 318).
After the PRCs founding in 1949, Prince De fled to Ulaanbaatar, but the MPR soon extradited him back to China due to the alliance between the Soviet Union and the new communist regime in Beijing. The Inner Mongolian self-determination movements that Price
De led exemplified the peak of Inner Mongolian nationalism.15Due to the weakness of the
Mongols, their chance to achieve political autonomy depended heavily on the amount of
external support they could find. Yet, the support from Japan during the 1930s and 1940s
proved to be the only time a big power was willing to help Inner Mongolias cause, despite
Japans own imperial motives.