Maps can't tell you the true power of Chinese Missiles
2011-05-16 (China Military News cited from the-diplomat.com and written by James R. Holmes) -- Writing in Orbis, the journal of the Foreign Policy Research Institute at the University of Pennsylvania, former American Institute in Taiwan chairman Richard Bush takes stock of cross-strait affairs. Bush issues a guardedly optimistic verdict on the islands future while observing that dysfunctional politics hampers efforts to meet pressing challenges. In passing, he speculates about one area in which China may be showing restraintthe deployment of short-range ballistic missiles, or SRBMs. As evidence, he proffers the Pentagons annual reports on Chinese military power. Last year, the authors refrained from upping their estimate of the number of missiles positioned opposite Taiwan. They pegged the total at 1,050-1,150 birds in both the 2009 and 2010 reports. (Spokesmen in Taipei typically give a higher figure. 1300 is an estimate bandied about on the island.)
Bush maintains that the evident pause in new Chinese Second Artillery Corps SRBM deployments is less significant than it seems. Just so. He notes that Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) rocketeers have an increasing array of cruise missiles at their disposal. For example, the PLA added some 100 cruise missiles to the inventory in 2009-2010, a sum not included in SRBM figures. Bush also points out that Chinas ability to frustrate US intervention to defend Taiwan increases apace, meaning that Beijing is increasingly comfortable with its strategic position vis-à-vis prospective foes. Why add surplus capacity? And the Second Artillery has continued upgrading the quality of its missile force, boosting its birds accuracy and lethality. In short, the PLA has apparently kept augmenting its combat capability despite the lull in fielding new SRBMs. Theres more to combat strength than raw numbers of weapons.
Let me add to Bushs sound military analysis. The Defence Departments China reports usually include a map of Asia depicting the ranges of various ballistic missiles fielded by the PLA. Colour-coded swathes of the map show the areas adjoining Chinas borders that can be reached by missiles stationed along the frontier. The width of this belt equals the range of a given missile. This is an excellent way to chart the growing capability of such weaponry as the Second Artillerys new CSS-5 antiship ballistic missile, or ASBM. A glance at the map reveals that truck-fired ASBMs positioned along the frontier could strike well beyond the first island chain, throughout the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca, and well into the Indian Ocean. Indeed, the entire Bay of Bengal and parts of the northern Arabian Sea now fall within the ASBM threat arc.
But the Pentagons map misleads in a way.
That is, the map implies that Chinese missiles are located at fixed sites around the periphery. In reality, they can remain well inland while retaining their ability to strike at important targets, whether on Taiwan, at US bases in Japan, or on the high seas. If Chinese commanders contented themselves with menacing shipping in the waters immediately surrounding Taiwan, they could do so from ASBM launchers positioned hundreds of miles inland. Or, they could have it both ways. Since mobile ballistic missiles are mobile, the Second Artillery can reconfigure its missile deployments with relative ease. This increasingly flexible capability means that the PLA could conduct strikes on Taiwan with far more birds than the SRBM figures suggest. The force will only become more flexible as Chinese weapons engineers refine their hardware, further extending the rangeand thus the combat punchof PLA missiles.
