chinese army v indian army

[metro]

Pakistani ancestors nothing to do with india, correction......

History channel doesnt believe ure history.. cry us a river..

 

[Rafi]

History channel doesnt believe ure history.. cry us a river..

Leave it for indians to cry, but if the history channel needs to visit the battlefield, guess where they have to go.

 

[metro]

Leave it for indians to cry, but if the history channel needs to visit the battlefield, guess where they have to go.

Battle field doesnt matter.. vat matters is the soldiers'.. who were proud Indians...

 

[rashtriya.rifles]

History channel doesnt believe ure history.. cry us a river..

as has been quoted by some... these loosers have to continuously run just to be at their places.. that's drains them of any logical thinking capability..

 

[Shinigami]

Pakistani ancestors nothing to do with india, correction......

Pakistani ancestors?

watch the video again. count how many times they say 'pakistani' and how many times they say indian.

Battles BC - Alexander Lord of War - YouTube

 

[ChinaToday]

Interesting question. Wonder if anyone will answer this.

The "Human Wave" tactic is a complete myth, yes, COMPLETE. The closest and most accurate synonym should be large-scale organized/tactical offensive. If you read any books written about the Korean War or analyzed Chinese communist military tactics and history you would realize that nothing in the form of "waves" of chinese charging in unorganized fashion like brain-washed monkeys ever occurred.

A few obvious and logical evidence to disprove this myth are as follows:

if "human wave" tactics as perceived by stereotype were in fact used. The casualty rate would be millions and millions. In WW2 Stalingrad, it is recorded that the Soviet Union did in fact use "human wave" tactics, therefore the casualty rate for that single battle area alone numbered in the millions. Western and Chinese sources place Chinese casualty rates in Korea at 700,000 maximum and 300-500,000 minimum, and this is for an entire war.

the communist leaders and commanders defeated the Japanese, the KMT, and US to some extent with only minimal equipment and manpower in many cases. The "human wave" tactic was never a very feasible strategy. Read Mao's guerilla tactics writings and you'll clearly see the doctrines elaborating on how to conduct warfare in disadvantaged postions, "human wave" tactics are nowhere in any of those books.

so in conclusion: organized large-scale attacks that often resulted in huge casualties (according to western standards), yes. Brainless waves of chinese charging with sticks and stones. No.

Tactics of the Chinese Communists in the Korean War

The first job of Chinese Communist forces when they invaded North Korea [in autumn 1950] was to stop the United Nations advance, which was nearing the Yalu River.

Although extremely limiting in some respects, the Chinese dependence upon the backs of animals and soldiers liberated them from roads and permitted troops to fight anywhere they could walk, whether in front, on the side, or behind the enemy lines. UN forces, on the other hand, were tied to the roads because their supplies arrived by truck. The roads, therefore, were vulnerable to being cut by roadblocks.

During the Chinese civil war, Mao Zedong and his commanders had developed a highly effective method of dealing with more heavily armed Nationalist troops. Peng Dehuai now adapted these tactics to the Americans and their allies.

The Chinese tried whenever possible to infiltrate through enemy positions in order to plant a roadblock on the supply line, in hopes of inducing the enemy to retreat to regain contact with the rear. If UN forces stayed in position, the roadblocks still were useful in cutting off escape routes and supply.

In infiltration and assaults against front-line positions, the Chinese moved largely at night to avoid air strikes and reduce aerial observation. In attacks they tried to isolate individual outposts, usually platoons, by striking at the fronts, while at the same time attempting to outflank them. The purpose was to defeat forces in detail by gaining local superiority. If they could not destroy enemy positions, they hoped to induce the opponent to withdraw. When this failed, they got as close as possible to the enemy so that, when daylight came, U.S. aircraft would be unable to bomb them for fear of hitting friendly troops.

Advancing Chinese units generally followed the easiest, most accessible terrain in making their approaches: valleys, draws, or streambeds. As soon as they met resistance, they deployed, peeling off selected small units to engage the opposition. However, if they met no resistance, the whole column often moved in the darkness right past defensive emplacements deep into the rear of enemy positions. There were many examples of this in Korea. In some cases entire Chinese regiments marched in column formation into the UN rear.

Once fully committed, the Chinese seldom halted their attack, even when suffering heavy casualties. Other Chinese came forward to take the place of those killed or wounded. The buildup continued, often on several sides of the position, until they made a penetration ---either by destroying the position or forcing the defenders to withdraw. After consolidating the new conquest, the Chinese then crept forward against the open flank of the next platoon position. This combination of stealth and boldness, usually executed in darkness against small units, could result in several penetrations of a battalion front and could be devastating.

Since the Chinese tried to cut the defending force into small fractions and attack these fractions with local superiority in numbers, they favored the ambush over all other tactical methods. As a rule attacking Chinese forces ranged in size from a platoon to a company (50 to 200 men) and were built up continually as casualties occurred.

The best defense was for the UN force somehow to hold its position until daybreak. With visibility restored, aircraft could attack the Chinese and usually restore the situation. However, Chinese night attacks were so effective that the counsel often went unheeded and defending forces were overrun or destroyed.

Excerpt: Tactics of the Chinese Communists in the Korean War

Source: http://www.defence.pk/forums/world-affairs/183803-korean-war-retreat-hell-17.html#ixzz1wkSRSvF5

 

[Joe Shearer]

The "Human Wave" tactic is a complete myth, yes, COMPLETE. The closest and most accurate synonym should be large-scale organized/tactical offensive. If you read any books written about the Korean War or analyzed Chinese communist military tactics and history you would realize that nothing in the form of "waves" of chinese charging in unorganized fashion like brain-washed monkeys ever occurred.

A few obvious and logical evidence to disprove this myth are as follows:

if "human wave" tactics as perceived by stereotype were in fact used. The casualty rate would be millions and millions. In WW2 Stalingrad, it is recorded that the Soviet Union did in fact use "human wave" tactics, therefore the casualty rate for that single battle area alone numbered in the millions. Western and Chinese sources place Chinese casualty rates in Korea at 700,000 maximum and 300-500,000 minimum, and this is for an entire war.

the communist leaders and commanders defeated the Japanese, the KMT, and US to some extent with only minimal equipment and manpower in many cases. The "human wave" tactic was never a very feasible strategy. Read Mao's guerilla tactics writings and you'll clearly see the doctrines elaborating on how to conduct warfare in disadvantaged postions, "human wave" tactics are nowhere in any of those books.

so in conclusion: organized large-scale attacks that often resulted in huge casualties (according to western standards), yes. Brainless waves of chinese charging with sticks and stones. No.

Tactics of the Chinese Communists in the Korean War

The first job of Chinese Communist forces when they invaded North Korea [in autumn 1950] was to stop the United Nations advance, which was nearing the Yalu River.

Although extremely limiting in some respects, the Chinese dependence upon the backs of animals and soldiers liberated them from roads and permitted troops to fight anywhere they could walk, whether in front, on the side, or behind the enemy lines. UN forces, on the other hand, were tied to the roads because their supplies arrived by truck. The roads, therefore, were vulnerable to being cut by roadblocks.

During the Chinese civil war, Mao Zedong and his commanders had developed a highly effective method of dealing with more heavily armed Nationalist troops. Peng Dehuai now adapted these tactics to the Americans and their allies.

The Chinese tried whenever possible to infiltrate through enemy positions in order to plant a roadblock on the supply line, in hopes of inducing the enemy to retreat to regain contact with the rear. If UN forces stayed in position, the roadblocks still were useful in cutting off escape routes and supply.

In infiltration and assaults against front-line positions, the Chinese moved largely at night to avoid air strikes and reduce aerial observation. In attacks they tried to isolate individual outposts, usually platoons, by striking at the fronts, while at the same time attempting to outflank them. The purpose was to defeat forces in detail by gaining local superiority. If they could not destroy enemy positions, they hoped to induce the opponent to withdraw. When this failed, they got as close as possible to the enemy so that, when daylight came, U.S. aircraft would be unable to bomb them for fear of hitting friendly troops.

Advancing Chinese units generally followed the easiest, most accessible terrain in making their approaches: valleys, draws, or streambeds. As soon as they met resistance, they deployed, peeling off selected small units to engage the opposition. However, if they met no resistance, the whole column often moved in the darkness right past defensive emplacements deep into the rear of enemy positions. There were many examples of this in Korea. In some cases entire Chinese regiments marched in column formation into the UN rear.

Once fully committed, the Chinese seldom halted their attack, even when suffering heavy casualties. Other Chinese came forward to take the place of those killed or wounded. The buildup continued, often on several sides of the position, until they made a penetration ---either by destroying the position or forcing the defenders to withdraw. After' consolidating the new conquest, the Chinese then crept forward against the open flank of the next platoon position. This combination of stealth and boldness, usually executed in darkness against small units, could result in several penetrations of a battalion front and could be devastating.

Since the Chinese tried to cut the defending force into small fractions and attack these fractions with local superiority in numbers, they favored the ambush over all other tactical methods. As a rule attacking Chinese forces ranged in size from a platoon to a company (50 to 200 men) and were built up continually as casualties occurred.

The best defense was for the UN force somehow to hold its position until daybreak. With visibility restored, aircraft could attack the Chinese and usually restore the situation. However, Chinese night attacks were so effective that the counsel often went unheeded and defending forces were overrun or destroyed.

Excerpt: Tactics of the Chinese Communists in the Korean War

Source: http://www.defence.pk/forums/world-affairs/183803-korean-war-retreat-hell-17.html#ixzz1wkSRSvF5

At last, a knowledgeable reply.

However, I wish you had quoted the descriptions of battle tactics from participants in the India-China border conflict. That would have proved the point with striking relevance.

For instance, your paragraph on the use of terrain and the PLA use of the Bailley Trail. In war games earlier, Thorat and Kumaramangalam are reported to have simulated Chinese attacks, of the sort that actually took place. My sources told me that K took the Chinese side, and used the Bailley Trail; he won three times out of three.

 

[Shinigami]

The "Human Wave" tactic is a complete myth, yes, COMPLETE. The closest and most accurate synonym should be large-scale organized/tactical offensive. If you read any books written about the Korean War or analyzed Chinese communist military tactics and history you would realize that nothing in the form of "waves" of chinese charging in unorganized fashion like brain-washed monkeys ever occurred.

A few obvious and logical evidence to disprove this myth are as follows:

if "human wave" tactics as perceived by stereotype were in fact used. The casualty rate would be millions and millions. In WW2 Stalingrad, it is recorded that the Soviet Union did in fact use "human wave" tactics, therefore the casualty rate for that single battle area alone numbered in the millions. Western and Chinese sources place Chinese casualty rates in Korea at 700,000 maximum and 300-500,000 minimum, and this is for an entire war.

the communist leaders and commanders defeated the Japanese, the KMT, and US to some extent with only minimal equipment and manpower in many cases. The "human wave" tactic was never a very feasible strategy. Read Mao's guerilla tactics writings and you'll clearly see the doctrines elaborating on how to conduct warfare in disadvantaged postions, "human wave" tactics are nowhere in any of those books.

so in conclusion: organized large-scale attacks that often resulted in huge casualties (according to western standards), yes. Brainless waves of chinese charging with sticks and stones. No.

Tactics of the Chinese Communists in the Korean War

The first job of Chinese Communist forces when they invaded North Korea [in autumn 1950] was to stop the United Nations advance, which was nearing the Yalu River.

Although extremely limiting in some respects, the Chinese dependence upon the backs of animals and soldiers liberated them from roads and permitted troops to fight anywhere they could walk, whether in front, on the side, or behind the enemy lines. UN forces, on the other hand, were tied to the roads because their supplies arrived by truck. The roads, therefore, were vulnerable to being cut by roadblocks.

During the Chinese civil war, Mao Zedong and his commanders had developed a highly effective method of dealing with more heavily armed Nationalist troops. Peng Dehuai now adapted these tactics to the Americans and their allies.

The Chinese tried whenever possible to infiltrate through enemy positions in order to plant a roadblock on the supply line, in hopes of inducing the enemy to retreat to regain contact with the rear. If UN forces stayed in position, the roadblocks still were useful in cutting off escape routes and supply.

In infiltration and assaults against front-line positions, the Chinese moved largely at night to avoid air strikes and reduce aerial observation. In attacks they tried to isolate individual outposts, usually platoons, by striking at the fronts, while at the same time attempting to outflank them. The purpose was to defeat forces in detail by gaining local superiority. If they could not destroy enemy positions, they hoped to induce the opponent to withdraw. When this failed, they got as close as possible to the enemy so that, when daylight came, U.S. aircraft would be unable to bomb them for fear of hitting friendly troops.

Advancing Chinese units generally followed the easiest, most accessible terrain in making their approaches: valleys, draws, or streambeds. As soon as they met resistance, they deployed, peeling off selected small units to engage the opposition. However, if they met no resistance, the whole column often moved in the darkness right past defensive emplacements deep into the rear of enemy positions. There were many examples of this in Korea. In some cases entire Chinese regiments marched in column formation into the UN rear.

Once fully committed, the Chinese seldom halted their attack, even when suffering heavy casualties. Other Chinese came forward to take the place of those killed or wounded. The buildup continued, often on several sides of the position, until they made a penetration ---either by destroying the position or forcing the defenders to withdraw. After consolidating the new conquest, the Chinese then crept forward against the open flank of the next platoon position. This combination of stealth and boldness, usually executed in darkness against small units, could result in several penetrations of a battalion front and could be devastating.

Since the Chinese tried to cut the defending force into small fractions and attack these fractions with local superiority in numbers, they favored the ambush over all other tactical methods. As a rule attacking Chinese forces ranged in size from a platoon to a company (50 to 200 men) and were built up continually as casualties occurred.

The best defense was for the UN force somehow to hold its position until daybreak. With visibility restored, aircraft could attack the Chinese and usually restore the situation. However, Chinese night attacks were so effective that the counsel often went unheeded and defending forces were overrun or destroyed.

Excerpt: Tactics of the Chinese Communists in the Korean War

Source: http://www.defence.pk/forums/world-affairs/183803-korean-war-retreat-hell-17.html#ixzz1wkSRSvF5

a sensible post from a troll? i've seen everything

can you show me any skirmish where outnumbered chinese troops won?

 

[Joe Shearer]

a sensible post from a troll? i've seen everything

can you show me any skirmish where outnumbered chinese troops won?

Shinigami, please check the total numbers involved on each side in 62. Please also check what happened on the ground in the Tawang- Bomdi La - Se La sector. It was a copybook implementation of what has been described in para 9, 10 and 11 of China Today's comment.

A belligerent attitude is no substitute for homework.

 

[Hulk]

Shinigami, please check the total numbers involved on each side in 62.

A belligerent attitude is no substitute for homework.

What was the numbers involved in 62, I have heard we neither had equipment nor numbers.

 

[Joe Shearer]

What was the numbers involved in 62, I have heard we neither had equipment nor numbers.

Equipment was absolutely true; it was murder, the PLA had massed artillery, and were completely all over us; in personnel, it was not so. Th numbers at the macro level were almost equal, but the Chinese used the precise tactics described in China Today's note. It is the best I have seen since Chauism's.

 

[Rafi]

Pakistan

 

[gubbi]

Leave it for indians to cry, but if the history channel needs to visit the battlefield, guess where they have to go.

They show stories of ancient India by visiting present day Pakistan. Does that solve the riddle for ya?

 

[Rafi]

They show stories of ancient India by visiting present day Pakistan. Does that solve the riddle for ya?

Na they refer to a geo-graphic area, nothing to do with india the modern nation state. But everything to do with Pakistan the modern nation state - Like #i said the battle is part of Pakistani Punjabi history.

 

[gubbi]

Na they refer to a geo-political entity,

Precisely, with a little correction! Just like the present day countries which were once a part of the ancient Roman empire, or the Ottoman empire etc! However, the present day political entities do not precisely celebrate the era and look upon the Romans as foreigners.

nothing to do with india the modern nation state. But everything to do with Pakistan the modern nation state - Like #i said the battle is part of Pakistani Punjabi history.

Just like ancient Roman empire's exploits are a part of the modern day Italy's history, so is the history of ancient India a part of modern day India. Pakistan never existed till 1947. Period.