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China-US Geopolitics: News & Discussions

Why Only dollar$ is acceptable as international currency? It is the supremacy of USA, because of it USA is a supa pawa, I ask why?


It's post-WWII world order, a legacy
  1. Since early 20th century US has risen to become the world's largest creditor, and holds the title for 70 years, till late 1980's (Reagan times)
  2. The position was further strengthened after WWII when US was the only viable economy, largest industrial machine, largest exporter, largest trader ...... when rest of the world was leveled to debris.
  3. Also read about the Bretton Woods system (1st and 2nd), petrol-dollar peg (KSA & OPEC) and reserve strategies of East Asian creditor nations (Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and post-1990's Mainland China).

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The era of global dominance is coming to an end for the world's largest debtor nation, US.
Everything boils down to money.


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The Era of American Global Dominance Is Over
Huffington Post
09/15/2016 07:15 pm ET

Graham E. Fuller
Former vice chairman, CIA’s National Intelligence Council;
Author “Breaking Faith”

You might recall the term “Eurasia” from high school geography classes. The term isn’t used much anymore in political discussions in the West, but it should be. That is where the most serious geopolitical action is going to be taking place in the world as we move deeper into the 21st century. The U.S., focused so intently on “containment“ of Russia, the so-called Islamic State and China, will be missing the bigger Eurasian strategic picture.

Eurasia is the greatest landmass of the world, embracing Europe and all of Asia — some of the oldest and greatest centers of human civilization.

So what is Eurasianism? It has meant different things at different periods. A century ago, the Kissingers of the time spun theories about a deep and inevitable strategic clash between seaborne power (U.K./U.S.) and continental/land-based powers (Germany, Russia.) “Eurasia” then meant mostly Europe and western Russia. Indeed, what need was there to talk then about Asia itself? Most of Asia was underdeveloped and lay under the control of the British Empire (India, China) or the French (Indochina) and had no independent will. Japan was the only real “Asian power” — that ironically developed its own imperial designs, mimicking the West, and thus came to clash with American imperial power in the Pacific

Today, of course, all that is different. Eurasia increasingly means “Asia” in which the “Euro” part figures modestly. Furthermore, China has now become the center of Eurasia as the world’s second-largest economy. Not surprisingly, China — like the Muslim world — projects a decidedly “anti-imperial” bent based on what it sees as its humiliation at the hands of the West (and Japan) during its 200-year eclipse — during one of its dynastic down cycles. But China is very much back now into a classic “up-cycle” mode of power and influence again and is determined to project its weight and influence. India, too, now is now a rapidly developing power with regional reach. And Japan, while quiescent, still represents formidable economic power, perhaps to be augmented by greater military regional reach.

The significance of the term “Eurasian” has changed a good deal, but it still suggests strategic rivalry. At a time when the U.S. formally declares its intent to militarily dominate the world (“full spectrum dominance“ was the official Pentagon doctrine in 2000) the concept of Eurasianism is responding with vigor. And not just in China, but in its new significance for countries like Russia, Iran and even Turkey. It suggests a sense of the eclipse of dominant western power in the face of new Asian power.

It’s not all just about military and money. It’s also cultural. Russian culture has for two centuries maintained a lively debate about whether Russia belongs to the West, or embodies a distinctly Eurasian (yevraziiskaya) culture that is separate from the West. Eurasianists represent a significant force within Russian strategic and military thinking (although Putin, interestingly, does not fully embrace this worldview.)

The idea is a vague but culturally important one; it grapples with Russian identity. It speaks of a Slavic culture but with deep Eurasian roots even in an old Turkic and Tatar past. Remember that historically it is the modern West that torched Russia twice: witness the invasions of Napoleon and Hitler up to the gates of Moscow. NATO today probes ever more deeply all around the Russian periphery. The Eurasianists are suspicious of, if not hostile to, the West as a permanent threat to “Holy Mother Russia.” “Eurasianism” will always lurk just beneath the surface in the Russian strategic worldview.

That is what Russia’s new Eurasian Economic Union is all about, a goal to at least economically unite Belarus, the Central Asian states and others into a greater Eurasian economic whole. (Oil-rich Kazakhstan was actually the author of the concept; it will seek to maintain ties with the West, but look at it its place on a world map to see where Kazakhstan’s real long-term options lie. Russia may not now be the best economic star to tie one’s future to, but it is just one of many Eurasian vehicles out there and they are not mutually exclusive. Options bring greater security.

China is moving in stunningly ambitious directions in creating the new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (that 57 states have signed onto including most European states, Canada and Australia — but conspicuously without Japan so far, or the U.S.) This creates a new Eurasian-focused central banking instrument with strong Chinese influence. China is also projecting massive new transportation networks (the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road — “One Belt, One Road“) across Eurasia to China linking China to Europe, the Middle East, Central and South Asia and the Far East by rail, road and sea. China’s “Eurasian strategy” is already a burgeoning reality. Yes, suspicions and rivalries exist between Russia and China and India and Japan. But the strong economic and developmental thrust of these proposals differ markedly from the American more “security” focused organization with its worrisome military implications.

Not only has Washington fought these Chinese and Eurasian initiatives unsuccessfully, but it is U.S. policies in particular — that identify both Russia and China as the presumptive enemy — that have helped bring Russia and China together on many issues, linked now by shared distrust of U.S. global military ambitions.

Japan, incidentally, before World War II had its own doctrine of “Eurasianism” — an effort to identify with and stir up Asian peoples and territories against western colonial domination. This strategy could have been quite effective had it not been accompanied by Japan’s own brutal military invasions of East Asian countries, destroying the credibility of the Japanese “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” Today Japan hasn’t moved its location; it will still have to deal with the reality of Chinese power in the East. And what Japanese leader would seriously pursue a long range policy of hostility to China in support of a U.S. Pacific strategy that is inherently designed to bottle up China? Especially when China and Japan are huge mutual trading and investment partners?

Iran is keenly interested in balancing against geopolitical pressures from the U.S. and seeks membership in these Russian and Chinese economic development institutions. Iran is a natural “Eurasian “ and “Silk Road” power.

Turkey has gotten into the Eurasian game, again. Going back to the early days of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s ruling Justice and Development Party foreign policy — in the vision of then-foreign minister Davutoğlu — Turkey was no longer limited to being a western power, but also proclaimed its geopolitical interests (nearly a hundred years after the fall of the Ottoman Empire) in the Middle East, and indeed, Eurasia. (After all, the Turks originally come from Eurasia, having migrated west from Lake Baikal a thousand years ago.) That means serious ties with Russia, combined with deep ethnic, cultural and historical ties with Central Asia, and with China. Turkey (like Iran and Pakistan) seeks to be part of these Russian and Chinese networks. And, among some Turkish nationalist politicians and military officers (including many secular Kemalists) there is strong “Eurasianist“ leaning to expand Turkey’s geopolitical options to explore strategic and cultural ties with Eurasia. It also reflects an expression of distrust of western and U.S. efforts to dominate the region.

For Turkey this is not an either/or issue. It can seek to be part of Europe — including NATO — but will not relinquish the broad geostrategic alternative options to the East, with its ever greater economic clout, and roads and rails to link it.

In short, the new Eurasianism is no longer about 19th century land and sea power. It is an acknowledgment that the era of western —- and especially U.S. — global dominance is over. Washington can no longer command — or afford — a longer-term bid to dominate Eurasia. In economic terms, no state in the region, including Turkey, would be foolish enough to turn its back on this rising “Eurasian” potential that also offers strategic balance and economic options.

There are, of course, huge fault lines across Eurasia — ethnic, economic, strategic and some degree of rivalry. But the more Washington attempts to contain or throttle Eurasianism as a genuine rising force, the greater will be the determination of states to become part of this rising Eurasian world, even while not rejecting the West.

All countries like to have alternatives. They don’t like to lie beholden to a single global power that tries to call the shots. America’s narrative of what the global order is all about is no longer accepted globally. Furthermore, it is no longer realistic. It would seem short-sighted for Washington to continue focus upon expanding military alliances while most of the rest of the world is looking to greater prosperity and rising regional clout. (China’s military expenditures are about one-quarter of U.S.spending.)

This article first appeared on GrahameFuller.com

"The Era of American Global Dominance Is Over" is like a jaming bomb.

It's post-WWII world order, a legacy
  1. Since early 20th century US has risen to become the world's largest creditor, and holds the title for 70 years, till late 1980's (Reagan times)
  2. The position was further strengthened after WWII when US was the only viable economy, largest industrial machine, when rest of the world was leveled to debris.
  3. Also read about the Bretton Woods system (1st and 2nd), petrol-dollar peg (KSA & OPEC) and reserve strategies of East Asian creditor nations (Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and post-1990's Mainland China).

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America in two world wars gamble two sides at the same time, finally it gained all victorious fruits.
 
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It's post-WWII world order.

Since early 20th century US has risen to become the world's largest creditor, the position was further strengthened after WWII when US was the only viable economy, largest industrial machine, when rest of the world was leveled to debris. Also read about the Bretton Woods system (1st and 2nd), petrol-dollar (KSA & OPEC) and reserve strategies of East Asian creditor nations (Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and post-1990's Mainland China).

The US holds the title as world's largest creditor nation for 70 years, till late 1980's (Reagan times).
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Unfortunately, today US is the largest debtor nation in the world. Its debt is fast approaching 20 trillion dollars.

Remember - there was once an unsinkable Titanic.

Prior to the sinking of the Titanic, everybody said that it was unsinkable.

Edit: creditor ---> debtor.
 
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"The Era of American Global Dominance Is Over" is like a jaming bomb.



America in two world wars gamble two sides at the same time, finally it gained all victorious fruits.


Read about the Dawes Plan of 1924, and involvement of Wall Street in Germany between WWI and WWII.

@victor07

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Unfortunately, today US is the largest creditor nation in the world. Its debt is fast approaching 20 trillion dollars.

Remember - there was once an unsinkable Titanic.


You mean largest Debtor Nation? Yes, the Net International Position (external assets less liabilities) of United States at the end of the first quarter of 2016 was a shocking −$7.525.6 trillion, and sinking at a break-neck speed of $1 trillion per year.


The debt which is fast approaching $20 trillion you mentioned is National Debt (owed by the US Federal Government). And yes, it's also largest in the world.
 
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You mean largest Debtor Nation? Yes, the Net International Position (external assets less liabilities) of United States at the end of the first quarter of 2016 was a shocking −$7.525.6 trillion, and sinking at a break-neck speed of $1 trillion per year.

That's scaringly incredible. One wonders where the incurred debt is channeled into now that real wages in the US have not grown for some two decades.

The debt which is fast approaching $20 trillion you mentioned is National Debt (owed by the US Federal Government). And yes, it's also largest in the world.

I guess China holds about 1.7 trillion share of it. Donald Trump said default would be unthinkable; but he seems to believe that China is in need of the US (to sell stuff) more than the US is in need of China (to buy stuff). Hence he argues that he can coerce China into negotiating more opening up of China's market into the US products, stopping "currency manipulation," and giving up on "stealing US innovation."

Trump also promises to bring back US manufacturing. Basically, he believes that the trade deficit would be reduced if China bought more and sold less, made its exports expensive and send high-value US manufacturing back home.

Seems to me a tall order.
 
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Barack Obama’s Asia pivot is sinking beneath Pacific waves
By M.K. Bhadrakumar on September 21, 2016 in AT

The fate of Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement remains uncertain even as US President Barack Obama tries to get congressional passage for the bill. The trade deal, which is a strategic and geopolitical drive to contain China and maintain US hegemony in the Asia-Pacific, is facing hurdles as Vietnam is delaying its ratification. Hanoi’s rethink came soon after Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc’s recent six-day visit to China. US dominance in Asia-Pacific is challenged by Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte who is cozying up to Beijing. If other leaders follow suit, the US will soon lose its hold on Asia.

In his final address to the UN General Assembly annual session in New York on Tuesday, US President Barack Obama failed to list amongst his legacies what should have been the crowning glory of his presidency – Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), the mother of all trade deals covering 40% of world’s GDP. Does it mean this extraordinary statesman is walking out of the world arena with nothing to show by way of a historic Asian legacy?

obama-1.jpg

U.S. President Barack Obama listens to applause following his address to the United Nations
General Assembly in New York September 20. REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque


Obviously, Obama is unsure which way the wind is blowing. TPP’s fate hangs in the balance. What ought to have been another platinum grade trade deal, Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, just capsized, hitting the rock of popular opposition in Europe.

The TPP can meet a similar fate, hitting an American iceberg. The populist mood in America regarding trade deals has become unfriendly, given their dubious reputation for creating wealth for corporate industry while taking away jobs.

Donald Trump pledges to scupper the TPP, while Hillary Clinton succumbs to populist politics and intends to renegotiate the terms of the deal to make it more agreeable to American interests. Of course, Obama himself, famous for his audacity of hope, is escalating the struggle to get congressional passage for the TPP.

On Friday, he took a meeting of TPP supporters drawn from Republicans and Democrats, business leaders, governors and mayors, national security figures and military leaders to send the message that the trade deal is important not only for the US economy but also “for our national security and our standing in the world.”

The emergent salience is that the TPP, which so far was touted as a flag carrier of free trade values, is being acknowledged, finally, for what it is – a strategic and geopolitical drive to contain China.

Some Asian allies traveled to Washington to canvass support for the TPP among America’s political class and opinion makers – Singapore, Australia, New Zealand and Japan. They stressed that TPP forms part of the US’ pivot to Asia and aims at making China subordinate to American interests.

They conceded that the great game is about maintaining US hegemony in the Asia-Pacific. Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe warned that the success or failure of the TPP will “sway the direction of… strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific”.

Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong warned that ratification of the TPP by the US Congress will be regarded in the region as a “test for your credibility and seriousness of purpose.” The Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull saw TPP to be as powerful as “ships and planes” for exerting US influence in the Asia-Pacific.

But doubt is growing in the Asia-Pacific as to whether TPP will see the light of day. Nothing else can explain the last-minute rethink in Hanoi to shelve the ratification of TPP at the forthcoming session of Vietnamese parliament. (TPP negotiations were finalized in October and must be ratified by all 12 signatories within the next two years.)

The Chairman of the Vietnamese Parliament Nguyen Thi Kim Ngan noted that the decision to defer ratification has been taken in view of needs to examine the global situation, assess actions of the other country members and wait for the result of the US presidential election.

Hanoi’s decision comes in the downstream of the recent six-day visit to China by Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc (who succeeded the famously ‘pro-West’ Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung), which has raised hopes of a qualitatively new level of mutual trust and confidence in Sino-Vietnamese relations.

To be sure, the regional security setting has become highly fluid, which in turn buffets the US’ overall standing in Asia. Obama’s final Asian tour last month didn’t go well.

While the G-20 summit in Hangzhou ended up as an assertive Chinese narrative, the ASEAN summits that followed were a setback for US diplomacy to drum up public show of resistance to China in the South China Sea disputes.

The mercurial Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte has since ended joint patrols with the US in the South China Sea, opened Track II to Beijing, invited Chinese trade and investments (and even arms supplies), demanded the pull-out of US Special Forces in Mindanao, and is voicing his country’s “independent foreign policies”.

The Manila Times newspaper disclosed on Tuesday that the Philippine Council for Foreign Relations sent a mission to China for a series of dialogues from September 13 to 15, comprising retired ambassadors, military officials, businessmen and academics, to supplement Duterte’s Track I initiative such as the appointment of former President Fidel Ramos as special envoy to China.

While in Beijing, the Track II delegation called on Liu Zhenmin, vice-minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ambassador Wu Hailong, president of the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs, amongst others.

Liu was cited expressing the hope that “Philippines can meet China halfway, handle the dispute appropriately, and place relations back on track through dialogue, consultations and cooperation.”

Liu cautioned Manila that there are bound to be “bumps along the road to reconciliation due to vested economic, not to mention third-country interests, which may be at work to try to derail the process towards reconciliation.”

Evidently, the ground beneath the feet of the US’ rebalance is dramatically shifting. An opinion piece in the Financial Times newspaper on Monday caught the sombre mood:

- Throughout the Obama years, the US has attempted to reassure all its Asian allies that America has both the means and the will to remain the dominant military power in the Asia-Pacific… But Mr Duterte has now directly challenged the idea… If others take his view, power could drain away from Washington… The sense that America’s ‘pivot’ to Asia is in trouble is compounded by the growing doubts about the fate of the Trans-Pacific Partnership… Unfortunately, long-term strategic thinking is almost impossible in the current maelstrom of American politics. As a result, President Obama faces the sad prospect of leaving office with his signature foreign-policy initiative – the pivot to Asia – sinking beneath the Pacific waves.

In the unkindest cut of all, Duterte stated recently: “China is now in power and they have military superiority in the region.” Factually, it is incorrect to say so. Don’t Americans have 11 aircraft carriers, while China has only one?

But then, three-quarters of the great game has always been about perceptions, and the growing perception in Asia is that the American aircraft carriers are potentially very vulnerable.

This is where the 8-day long China-Russia naval exercises in the South China Sea, which concluded on Monday, would have a multiplier effect. The grand finale of the exercises was a spectacular amphibious and air landing operation on an island off the coast of China’s southern Guangdong Province, which the region watched with riveting attention.

The challenging drill was carried out in near-live combat situation with the Russian and Chinese navies indulging in barely-concealed military posturing that demonstrated their common interest to support each other and push back at the US.

Shortly before the drills, Russian President Vladimir Putin also introduced a game changer, expressing support for China’s position in relation to the international arbitration tribunal’s verdict on South China Sea. He made it a point to speak from Hangzhou, on Chinese soil.

Ambassador MK Bhadrakumar served as a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service for over 29 years, with postings including India’s ambassador to Uzbekistan (1995-1998) and to Turkey (1998-2001). He writes the “Indian Punchline” blog and has written regularly for Asia Times since 2001.

(Copyright 2016 Asia Times Holdings Limited, a duly registered Hong Kong company. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
 
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That's scaringly incredible. One wonders where the incurred debt is channeled into now that real wages in the US have not grown for some two decades.

I guess China holds about 1.7 trillion share of it. Donald Trump said default would be unthinkable; but he seems to believe that China is in need of the US (to sell stuff) more than the US is in need of China (to buy stuff). Hence he argues that he can coerce China into negotiating more opening up of China's market into the US products, stopping "currency manipulation," and giving up on "stealing US innovation."

Trump also promises to bring back US manufacturing. Basically, he believes that the trade deficit would be reduced if China bought more and sold less, made its exports expensive and send high-value US manufacturing back home.

Seems to me a tall order.
You mean "debtor" nation . The $20 trillion is just what is counted for. Look at the unfunded liabilities:

http://nationalinterest.org/blog/th...debt-shocker-100-trillion-owed-unfunded-16581


Even without accounting for the unfunded liabilities in medicare, social security and pension as per GAAP, the cash-on-hand basis reporting of federal debt alone is already approaching an unprecedented $20T. Do you remember a couple of years ago US government came to Beijing and "reassured" on fiscal discipline?


On the external position, with sustaining trade (and current account) deficits, US is the world's largest debtor nation.


The US is not just a scaled up version of PIIGS, she is the issuer of dollar, value (exchange rate vs other currencies, vs commodities) of which concerns not just American public but also the international community of creditors, China included. I hope the new US government can stabilize the financials by increasing tax (from currently 35% of GDP to at least 40%+), and drastically cut back on social/medicare spendings. Defence spendings are untouchable so leave that out. The only spending increase should be interests on debt, anticipating rate hikes (the Fed should facilitate).
 
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drastically cut back on social/medicare spendings

This would put et another pressure on the already strained class/race relations. But, as you say, given that military spending cannot be meaningfully reduced (and both candidates promise further tax cuts), the only remaining option is to cut spending on other items.

The way the US goes, I predict them to increase spending on internal security (even larger, mightier police force like they have been doing right now in Chicago), as well.
 
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Even without accounting for the unfunded liabilities in medicare, social security and pension as per GAAP, the cash-on-hand basis reporting of federal debt alone is already approaching an unprecedented $20T. Do you remember a couple of years ago US government came to Beijing and "reassured" on fiscal discipline?


On the external position, with sustaining trade (and current account) deficits, US is the world's largest debtor nation.


The US is not just a scaled up version of PIIGS, she is the issuer of dollar, value (exchange rate vs other currencies, vs commodities) of which concerns not just American public but also the international community of creditors, China included. I hope the new US government can stabilize the financials by increasing tax (from currently 35% of GDP to at least 40%+), and drastically cut back on social/medicare spendings. Defence spendings are untouchable so leave that out. The only spending increase should be interests on debt, anticipating rate hikes (the Fed should facilitate).

Rate hikes not likely. I had an argument with a former professional here a few years ago. He said US is going to raise rates, I said no. US cannot raise interest rates or it will kill the already fragile stock market and create another housing crisis.

Now we are seeing negative interest rates in some countries.
 
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This would put et another pressure on the already strained class/race relations. But, as you say, given that military spending cannot be meaningfully reduced (and both candidates promise further tax cuts), the only remaining option is to cut spending on other items.

The way the US goes, I predict them to increase spending on internal security (even larger, mightier police force like they have been doing right now in Chicago), as well.
Rate hikes not likely. I had an argument with a former professional here a few years ago. He said US is going to raise rates, I said no. US cannot raise interest rates or it will kill the already fragile stock market and create another housing crisis.

Now we are seeing negative interest rates in some countries.


@TaiShang Fiscal discipline (stop the deficit and debt mounting) should be top priority for US govt:
  • Defense-related expenditure (DoD, CIA ops, war, foreign military "aid") will maintain or even increase, reasons we both know, it's untouchable.
  • Debt servicing should increase, anticipating rate hike, see the next paragraph. This is s small price to pay compared to maintaining dollar value, which is of paramount importance.
  • The above two will only increase, hence social security, medicare, must be cut back drastically.
  • Cutting expenditure wouldn't be enough, tax revenue (state, local and federal) is now 35% of GDP, I believe the American public can accept an increase.
@Jlaw Yes I agree, what should happen and what would happen are two different things. The Fed monetary policy should be responsible to the dollar, not government or interest groups. Will the Fed raise interests to reward dollar savers, dollar creditors? I don't know, but they should.

 
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This is an excellent and comprehensive article that sums up the geo-political situation of the region.

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/sep/25/obama-failed-asian-pivot-china-ascendant

Barack Obama’s ‘Asian pivot’ failed. China is in the ascendancy
Simon Tisdall

Tsai Ing-wen is new to the job and the strain is beginning to show. Elected president of Taiwan in a landslide victory, she took office in May, buoyed by high approval ratings. Yet in a few short months, Tsai’s popularity has plunged by 25%. The reason may be summed up in one word: China. Suspicious that Tsai’s Democratic Progressive party, which also won control of parliament, harbours a pro-independence agenda, Beijing suspended official and back-channel talks with its “renegade province” and shut down an emergency hotline.

More seriously, for many Taiwanese workers, China also curbed the lucrative tourist trade, which brought millions of mainland visitors to the island during the accommodating presidency of Tsai’s predecessor, Ma Ying-jeou. Cross-strait investment and business have also been hit.

Tsai faces contradictory pressures. The public wants the benefit of closer economic ties with China but Beijing’s intentions are rightly distrusted by a population that increasingly identifies itself as Taiwanese, not Chinese. Given President Xi Jinping’s ominous warnings that reunification cannot be delayed indefinitely, China’s military build-up and hawkish suggestions that Beijing may resort to force, Taiwanese ambivalence is wholly understandable.

This dilemma – how to work constructively with a powerful, assertive China without compromising or surrendering national interests – grows steadily more acute. It is shared by states across the east and southeast Asian region. From Indonesia and the Philippines to Vietnam, Japan, Seoul, Malaysia and Singapore, the quandary is the same. But the answers proffered by national leaders are different and sometimes sharply at odds.

The China dilemma is felt strongly in Washington. The US has striven in recent years to strengthen Asian alliances, increase trade and raise its regional military profile – Barack Obama’s so-called rebalance or pivot to Asia – in a bid to contain and channel China’s ambitions peacefully. But analysts say the pivot appears to be in trouble. For Europeans fixated on Syria and immigration, this may not seem especially worrying or relevant. That’s shortsighted. If Obama and future US presidents get China wrong, the resulting damage could be global, threatening the security and prosperity of all.

Obama is already badly off-track. His grand plan to promote interdependent economic self-interest across the Pacific Rim while excluding China – the Trans-Pacific Partnership or TPP (similar to the controversial US-Europe Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership or TTIP) – is in deep trouble.

Shinzo Abe, Japan’s prime minister, declared last week that the TTP was a crucial “pillar” of future US influence. “Success or failure will sway the direction of the global free trade system and [shape] the strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific,” Abe said.

His warning reflected alarm in Tokyo that a risk-averse Obama is again proving an unreliable partner and will fail to get the deal ratified by Congress. It has already been disowned by both his most likely successors, Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump.


An image from United States Navy video purportedly shows Chinese dredging vessels in the waters around Mischief Reef in the disputed Spratly Islands.
Photograph: HANDOUT/Reuters

Washington’s painfully obvious inability to curb China’s controversial island-building programme straddling the international shipping lanes of the South China Sea is seen as further evidence that the pivot is failing. Each week seems to bring news of another Chinese airstrip or newly fortified reef. Ignoring neighbouring countries’ rival claims, Chinese has effectively unilaterally annexed 80% of the sea’s area, through which passes $5tn of world trade annually. “Freedom of navigation” patrols by US warships, soon to be backed by Japan’s navy, have had little discernible impact while increasing the risk of direct military confrontation.

China has flatly rejected a precedent-setting UN court ruling that deemed its claim to own the Spratly Islands, also claimed by the Philippines, to be illegal. Beijing has taken a similarly intransigent stance in its dispute with Japan over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands in the East China Sea.

Some observers detect ulterior motives. China’s military construction on the Spratlys and “its effort to exhaust and eventually displace Japan in a contest for the Senkakus can be seen as an attempt psychologically and physically to isolate Taiwan and to prepare the battle space for China’s possible use of military force to unify the PRC and Taiwan”, an analysis by the International Institute for Strategic Studies said.

Perceived American weakness has led some allies to take matters into their own hands. It emerged last week that Taiwan’s military is also engaged in island fortification, at Itu Aba, its sole possession in the South China Sea.

More dramatically still, the maverick Philippines president, Rodrigo Duterte, switched sides last week, announcing Manila would cease maritime co-operation with the US. China, he said, was the stronger partner. Duterte’s shift reflects his anger at American criticism of human rights abuses rather than a deep strategic rethink. But it will certainly hearten Beijing.

Other regional players are more cautious, an attitude encouraged by Beijing’s divide-and-rule tactics. Vietnam’s prime minister, Nguyen Xuan Phuc, meekly agreed in talks with Xi this month that “maritime co-operation through friendly negotiations” was the best way forward. But like China, Hanoi is rapidly building military capacity and cementing alliances with India, among others, in anticipation of less amicable times ahead.

Similar diplomatic hedging of bets was on display in Laos this month, when an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) summit deliberately avoided mention of the UN court ruling. This feeble anxiety to play down differences – and evident lack of confidence in US leadership – plays into China’s hands.

The China dilemma extends far beyond the South China Sea. Having made nuclear disarmament a top priority in 2009, Obama has failed dismally to halt North Korea’s accelerating pursuit of nuclear weapons. The threat was underscored by Pyongyang’s biggest ever test explosion earlier this month. China, the only country with real leverage, has helped impose additional UN sanctions on North Korea. But it has consistently balked at taking game-changing measures, such as cutting off fuel oil supplies, which could force Kim Jong-un to think again. Beijing also says it will block “unilateral” measures by other countries.

Obama’s impotence has intensified questions in Japan and elsewhere about the credibility of the American security umbrella, encouraging nationalists who argue that Tokyo should re-arm in earnest – or even deploy its own nuclear weapons. But their main concern is not North Korea – it is China.

Xi is not looking for a fight. His first-choice agent of change is money, not munitions. According to Xi’s “One Belt, One Road” plan, his preferred path to 21st-century Chinese hegemony is through expanded trade, business and economic partnerships extending from Asia to the Middle East and Africa. China’s massive Silk Road investments in central and west Asian oil and gas pipelines, high-speed rail and ports, backed by new institutions such as the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, are part of this strategy, which simultaneously encourages political and economic dependencies. Deng Xiaoping once said to get rich is glorious. Xi might add it is also empowering.

Western neoliberals are optimistic. They typically argue that market-based economic exchanges can produce a win-win situation for rival states. In this way, China’s rise may be peacefully accommodated, they say.

Xi must also calculate that time is on China’s side. “China’s economic development and military modernisation programmes have witnessed dramatic progress since the early-1980s,” said Karl Eikenberry in the American Interest. “China’s aggregate GDP in 1980 was the seventh largest in the world… By 2014, China’s GDP had multiplied 30 times to more than $9tn and is now the second largest in the world… The PRC’s military spending, less than $10bn in 1990, grew to more than $129.4bn in 2014, second only to that of the US.” On current trends, China’s 2035 GDP could be a third larger than the US, Eikenberry said.


People watch a TV news showing an image that North Korea’s Rodong Sinmun newspaper reports of the ground test of a high-powered engine of a carrier rocket at the country’s Sohae Space Centre in Seoul, South Korea. Photograph: Ahn Young-joon/AP

Yet for less sanguine analysts, this prospective disparity, this growing lack of balance, plus the expanding number of potential flashpoints in the South China Sea,Taiwan and elsewhere, point only one way – towards future military conflict between the US and China. The Pentagon now officially refers to the Chinese “threat”.

This is the so-called “Thucydides Trap”, a reference to the Athenian historian’s account of the seemingly inevitable conflict between the rising city-state of Athens and the status quo power Sparta in the fifth century BC. Nowadays, the US is the status quo power and China the bumptious usurper.

Open conflict is not inescapable, but it is under active discussion. A recent study by the Rand Corporation made a detailed examination of who might “win” such a military showdown. It concludes that it would probably be catastrophic for both sides. Yet the study also suggests that, if war cannot be avoided, the US might be best advised to strike first, before China gets any stronger and the current US military advantage declines further.

The dilemma is clear: amid rising nationalism in both countries, China is not willing to have its ambitions curbed or contained and the US is not ready to accept the world number two spot. These two juggernauts are on a collision course. It’s unclear who or what can prevent a pile-up.

The other players in the conflict between Beijing and Washington
JAPAN

Faced by what it perceives to be a growing threat from China, Japan’s government, led by its conservative prime minister, Shinzo Abe, has sought greater freedom to project military force beyond the country’s borders. This is controversial, since it involves the “reinterpretation” of Japan’s postwar pacifist constitution. Concrete steps include joint naval patrols with the US in the South China Sea and direct help for coastal states such as the Philippines.

VIETNAM
The communist one-party regime in Hanoi is an unlikely partner for the US, given still painful memories of the Vietnam war. But Vietnam has been wooed by Obama and George W Bush as part of Washington’s attempts to control and channel China’s regional ambitions. Vietnam has been involved in deadly fishing grounds clashes with China, with whom it fought a war in 1979. It has also sought help elsewhere. Earlier this month, the Indian prime minister, Narendra Modi, offered a $500m credit line for defence co-operation. But Hanoi is also carefully hedging its bets by keeping diplomatic lines open to Beijing.

INDONESIA
The world’s most populous Muslim country, Indonesia has vast human and natural resources and is seen as one of the new 21st-century economic players. Anxious to balance development needs and national pride, President Joko Widodo recently visited the Natuna Islands in the southern South China Sea, scene of repeated, minor fishing boat clashes with Chinese vessels. Widodo vowed to defend “sovereign territory” against foreign encroachment. But, officially, Indonesia calls itself a “non-claimant” country and says it is not formally in dispute with Beijing. This suits both countries, at least for now. By sidestepping their differences, they can get on with business.

SOUTH KOREA
The Seoul government is more worried about its unpredictable northern neighbour than it is about China. Its defence minister said last week that South Korea has plans in place to assassinate Kim Jong-un and the North Korean leadership if the nuclear threat becomes critical. Seoul sticks close to the US, which maintains military bases in the country. But abiding South Korean distrust of Japan, Washington’s other key east Asian ally, dating back to the Second World War, has undermined attempts to present a united front to Beijing – with which Seoul maintains friendly relations.

INDIA
Like China, India is rapidly expanding its military capabilities, spending an estimated $100bn on new defence systems since Narendra Modi became prime minister in 2014. Like China, its ambition is to project itself as a regional superpower looking both east and west. This potentially brings the two countries into conflict. They have long-standing border disputes in the Kashmir/Xinjiang and Arunachal Pradesh areas. In a forerunner to Obama’s pivot to Asia, George W Bush’s administration launched a strategic partnership with Delhi, partly as a counterbalance to China. For its part, Beijing maintains close ties with Pakistan, India’s historical foe.

RUSSIA
China and Russia are old enemies dating back to the cold war, but these days, they claim to be close friends. A visit to Beijing by President Vladimir Putin in June saw the launching of a number of trade and oil deals worth up to $50bn. China sees Russia as a valuable provider of raw materials but also as a political and military partner in relation to the US. In defiance of Washington, the two countries held large-scale war games in the South China Sea last week, practising taking over islands in disputed waters. Putin also values collaboration as a way of circumventing sanctions imposed by the US and EU after Russia’s invasion of Crimea.
 
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Bombing Everything, Winning Nothing: What Can the US Military Even Do?

While the US military looks formidable, it isn’t particularly useful.

Fred Reed

Sat, Sep 24, 2016

Originally appeared at The Unz Review


What, precisely, is the US military for, and what, precisely, can it do? In practical terms, how powerful is it? On paper, it is formidable, huge, with carrier battle groups, advanced technology, remarkable submarines, satellites, and so on. What does this translate to?

Military power does not exist independently, but only in relation to specific circumstances. Comparing technical specifications of the T-14 to those of the M1A2, or Su-34 to F-15, or numbers of this to numbers of that, is an interesting intellectual exercise. It means little without reference to specific circumstances.

For example, America is vastly superior militarily to North Korea in every category of arms–but the North has nuclear bombs. It can’t deliver them to the US, but probably can to Seoul. Even without nuclear weapons, it has a large army and large numbers of artillery tubes within range of Seoul. It has an unpredictable government. As Gordon Liddy said, if your responses to provocation are wildly out of proportion to those provocations, and unpredictable, nobody will provoke you.

An American attack by air on the North, the only attack possible short of a preemptive nuclear strike, would offer a high probability of a peninsular war, devastation of Seoul, paralysis of an important trading partner–think Samsung–and an uncertain final outcome. The United States hasn’t the means of getting troops to Korea rapidly in any numbers, and the domestic political results of lots of GIs killed by a serious enemy would be politically grave. The probable cost far exceeds any possible benefit. In practical terms, Washington’s military superiority means nothing with regard to North Korea. Pyongyang knows it.

Or consider the Ukraine. On paper, US forces overall are superior to Russian. Locally, they are not. Russia borders on the Ukraine and could overrun it quickly. The US cannot rapidly bring force to bear except a degree of air power. Air power hasn’t worked against defenseless peasants in many countries. Russia is not a defenseless peasant. Europe, usually docile and obedient to America, is unlikely to engage in a shooting war with Moscow for the benefit of Washington. Europeans are aware that Russia borders on Eastern Europe, which borders on Western Europe. For Washington, fighting Russia in the Ukraine would require a huge effort with seaborne logistics and a national mobilization. Serious wars with nuclear powers do not represent the height of judgement.

Again, Washington’s military superiority means nothing.

Or consider Washington’s dispute with China in the Pacific. China cannot begin to match American naval power. It doesn’t have to. Beijing has focused on anti-ship missiles–read “carrier-killer”–such as the JD21 ballistic missile. How well it works I do not know, but the Chinese are not stupid. Is the risk of finding out worth it? Fast, stealthed, sea-skimming cruise missiles are very cheap compared to carriers, and America’s admirals know that lots of them arriving simultaneously would not have a happy ending.

Having a fleet disabled by China would be intolerable to Washington, but its possible responses would be unappealing. Would it start a conventional war with China with the ghastly global economic consequences? This would not generate allies. Cut China’s oil lanes to the Mid-East and push Beijing toward nuclear war? Destroy the Three Gorges Dam and drown god knows how many people? If China used the war as a pretext for annexing bordering counties? What would Russia do?

The consequences both probable and assured make the adventure unattractive, especially since likely pretexts for a war with China–a few rocks in the Pacific, for example–are too trivial to be worth the certain costs and uncertain outcome. Again, military superiority doesn’t mean much.

We live in a military world fundamentally different from that of the last century. All-out wars between major powers, which is to say nuclear powers, are unlikely since they would last about an hour after they became all-out, and everyone knows it. In WWII Germany could convince itself, reasonably and almost correctly, that Russia would fall in a summer, or the Japanese that a Depression-ridden, unarmed America might decide not to fight. Now, no. Threaten something that a nuclear power regards as vital and you risk frying. So nobody does.

At any rate, nobody has. Fools abound in DC and New York.

What then, in today’s world, is the point of huge conventional forces?

The American military is an upgraded World War II military, designed to fight other militarizes like itself in a world like that which existed during World War II. The Soviet Union was that kind of military. Today there are no such militaries for America to fight. We are not in the same world. Washington seems not to have noticed.

A World War II military is intended to destroy point targets of high value—aircraft, ships, factories, tanks—and to capture crucial territory, such as the enemy’s country. When you have destroyed the Wehrmacht’s heavy weaponry and occupied Germany, you have won. This is the sort of war that militaries have always relished, having much sound and fury and clear goals.

It doesn’t work that way today. Since Korea, half-organized peasant militias have baffled the Pentagon by not having targets of high value or crucial territory. In Afghanistan for example goatherds with rifles could simply disperse, providing no point targets at all, and certainly not of high value. No territory was crucial to them. If the US mounted a huge operation to take Province A, the resistance could just fade into the population or move to Province B. The US would always be victorious but never win anything. Sooner or later America would go away. The world understands this.

Further, the underlying nature of conflict has changed. For most of history until the Soviet Union evaporated, empires expanded by military conquest. In today’s world, countries have not lost their imperial ambitions, but the approach is no longer military. China seems intent on bringing Eurasia under its hegemony, and advances toward doing it, but its approach is economic, not martial. The Chinese are not warm and fuzzy. They are, however, smart. It is much cheaper and safer to expand commercially than militarily, and wiser to sidestep martial confrontation—in a word, to ignore America. More correctly it is sidestepping the Pentagon.

Military and diplomatic power spring from economic power, and China is proving successful economically. Using commercial clout, she is expanding her influence, but in ways not easily bombed. She is pushing the BRICS alliance, from which the US is excluded. She is enlarging the SCO, from which America is excluded. Perhaps most importantly, she has set up the AIIB, the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, which does not include the US but includes Washington’s European allies. These organizations will probably trade mostly not in dollars, a serious threat to Washington’s economic hegemony.

What is the relevance of the Pentagon? How do you bomb a trade agreement?

China enjoys solvency, and hegemonizes enthusiastically with it. Thus in Pakistan it has built the Karakoram Highway from Xian Jiang to Karachi, which will increase trade between the two. It is putting in the two power reactors near Karachi. It is investing in Afghan resources, increasing trade with Iran. . When the US finally leaves, China, without firing a shot, will be predominant in the region.

What is the relevance of aircraft carriers?


Beijing is talking seriously about building more rail lines, including high-speed rail, from itself to Europe, accompanied by fiber-optic lines and so on. This is not just talk. China has the money and a very large network of high-speed rail domestically. (The US has not a single mile.) Google “China-Europe Rail lines.”

What is the Pentagon going to do? Bomb the tracks?

As trade and ease of travel from Berlin to Beijing increase, and as China prospers and wants more European goods, European businessmen will want to cuddle up to that fabulously large market—which will loosen Washington’s grip on the throat of Europe. Say it three times slowly: Eur-asia. Eur-asia. Eur-asia. I promise it is what the Chinese are saying.

What is the Pentagon’s trillion-dollar military going to bomb? Europe? Railways across Kazakhstan? BMW plants?

All of which is to say that while the US military looks formidable, it isn’t particularly useful, and aids China by bankrupting the US. Repeatedly it has demonstrated that it cannot defeat campesinos armed with those most formidable weapons, the AK, the RPG, and the IED. The US does not have the land forces to fight a major or semi-major enemy. It could bomb Iran, with unpredictable consequences, but couldn’t possibly conquer it.

The wars in the Mid-East illustrate the principle nicely. Iraq didn’t work. Libya didn’t work. Iran didn’t back down. ISIS and related curiosities? The Pentagon is again bombing an enemy that can’t fight back—its specialty—but that it seems unable defeat.

Wrong military, wrong enemy, wrong war, wrong world.


@Economic superpower , @Sinopakfriend , @Chinese-Dragon , @AndrewJin , @terranMarine
 
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Bombing Everything, Winning Nothing: What Can the US Military Even Do?
All of which is to say that while the US military looks formidable, it isn’t particularly useful, and aids China by bankrupting the US.


The US public should support the high military spend by solid action - increase tax, drastically cut back on medical/social benefits, raise interests rate - dollar maintains high purchasing power vs others, and the most indebted nation on this planet will remain as the so-called "only superpower".
 
Last edited:
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Bombing Everything, Winning Nothing: What Can the US Military Even Do?

While the US military looks formidable, it isn’t particularly useful.

Fred Reed

Sat, Sep 24, 2016

Originally appeared at The Unz Review


What, precisely, is the US military for, and what, precisely, can it do? In practical terms, how powerful is it? On paper, it is formidable, huge, with carrier battle groups, advanced technology, remarkable submarines, satellites, and so on. What does this translate to?

Military power does not exist independently, but only in relation to specific circumstances. Comparing technical specifications of the T-14 to those of the M1A2, or Su-34 to F-15, or numbers of this to numbers of that, is an interesting intellectual exercise. It means little without reference to specific circumstances.

For example, America is vastly superior militarily to North Korea in every category of arms–but the North has nuclear bombs. It can’t deliver them to the US, but probably can to Seoul. Even without nuclear weapons, it has a large army and large numbers of artillery tubes within range of Seoul. It has an unpredictable government. As Gordon Liddy said, if your responses to provocation are wildly out of proportion to those provocations, and unpredictable, nobody will provoke you.

An American attack by air on the North, the only attack possible short of a preemptive nuclear strike, would offer a high probability of a peninsular war, devastation of Seoul, paralysis of an important trading partner–think Samsung–and an uncertain final outcome. The United States hasn’t the means of getting troops to Korea rapidly in any numbers, and the domestic political results of lots of GIs killed by a serious enemy would be politically grave. The probable cost far exceeds any possible benefit. In practical terms, Washington’s military superiority means nothing with regard to North Korea. Pyongyang knows it.

Or consider the Ukraine. On paper, US forces overall are superior to Russian. Locally, they are not. Russia borders on the Ukraine and could overrun it quickly. The US cannot rapidly bring force to bear except a degree of air power. Air power hasn’t worked against defenseless peasants in many countries. Russia is not a defenseless peasant. Europe, usually docile and obedient to America, is unlikely to engage in a shooting war with Moscow for the benefit of Washington. Europeans are aware that Russia borders on Eastern Europe, which borders on Western Europe. For Washington, fighting Russia in the Ukraine would require a huge effort with seaborne logistics and a national mobilization. Serious wars with nuclear powers do not represent the height of judgement.

Again, Washington’s military superiority means nothing.

Or consider Washington’s dispute with China in the Pacific. China cannot begin to match American naval power. It doesn’t have to. Beijing has focused on anti-ship missiles–read “carrier-killer”–such as the JD21 ballistic missile. How well it works I do not know, but the Chinese are not stupid. Is the risk of finding out worth it? Fast, stealthed, sea-skimming cruise missiles are very cheap compared to carriers, and America’s admirals know that lots of them arriving simultaneously would not have a happy ending.

Having a fleet disabled by China would be intolerable to Washington, but its possible responses would be unappealing. Would it start a conventional war with China with the ghastly global economic consequences? This would not generate allies. Cut China’s oil lanes to the Mid-East and push Beijing toward nuclear war? Destroy the Three Gorges Dam and drown god knows how many people? If China used the war as a pretext for annexing bordering counties? What would Russia do?

The consequences both probable and assured make the adventure unattractive, especially since likely pretexts for a war with China–a few rocks in the Pacific, for example–are too trivial to be worth the certain costs and uncertain outcome. Again, military superiority doesn’t mean much.

We live in a military world fundamentally different from that of the last century. All-out wars between major powers, which is to say nuclear powers, are unlikely since they would last about an hour after they became all-out, and everyone knows it. In WWII Germany could convince itself, reasonably and almost correctly, that Russia would fall in a summer, or the Japanese that a Depression-ridden, unarmed America might decide not to fight. Now, no. Threaten something that a nuclear power regards as vital and you risk frying. So nobody does.

At any rate, nobody has. Fools abound in DC and New York.

What then, in today’s world, is the point of huge conventional forces?

The American military is an upgraded World War II military, designed to fight other militarizes like itself in a world like that which existed during World War II. The Soviet Union was that kind of military. Today there are no such militaries for America to fight. We are not in the same world. Washington seems not to have noticed.

A World War II military is intended to destroy point targets of high value—aircraft, ships, factories, tanks—and to capture crucial territory, such as the enemy’s country. When you have destroyed the Wehrmacht’s heavy weaponry and occupied Germany, you have won. This is the sort of war that militaries have always relished, having much sound and fury and clear goals.

It doesn’t work that way today. Since Korea, half-organized peasant militias have baffled the Pentagon by not having targets of high value or crucial territory. In Afghanistan for example goatherds with rifles could simply disperse, providing no point targets at all, and certainly not of high value. No territory was crucial to them. If the US mounted a huge operation to take Province A, the resistance could just fade into the population or move to Province B. The US would always be victorious but never win anything. Sooner or later America would go away. The world understands this.

Further, the underlying nature of conflict has changed. For most of history until the Soviet Union evaporated, empires expanded by military conquest. In today’s world, countries have not lost their imperial ambitions, but the approach is no longer military. China seems intent on bringing Eurasia under its hegemony, and advances toward doing it, but its approach is economic, not martial. The Chinese are not warm and fuzzy. They are, however, smart. It is much cheaper and safer to expand commercially than militarily, and wiser to sidestep martial confrontation—in a word, to ignore America. More correctly it is sidestepping the Pentagon.

Military and diplomatic power spring from economic power, and China is proving successful economically. Using commercial clout, she is expanding her influence, but in ways not easily bombed. She is pushing the BRICS alliance, from which the US is excluded. She is enlarging the SCO, from which America is excluded. Perhaps most importantly, she has set up the AIIB, the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, which does not include the US but includes Washington’s European allies. These organizations will probably trade mostly not in dollars, a serious threat to Washington’s economic hegemony.

What is the relevance of the Pentagon? How do you bomb a trade agreement?

China enjoys solvency, and hegemonizes enthusiastically with it. Thus in Pakistan it has built the Karakoram Highway from Xian Jiang to Karachi, which will increase trade between the two. It is putting in the two power reactors near Karachi. It is investing in Afghan resources, increasing trade with Iran. . When the US finally leaves, China, without firing a shot, will be predominant in the region.

What is the relevance of aircraft carriers?


Beijing is talking seriously about building more rail lines, including high-speed rail, from itself to Europe, accompanied by fiber-optic lines and so on. This is not just talk. China has the money and a very large network of high-speed rail domestically. (The US has not a single mile.) Google “China-Europe Rail lines.”

What is the Pentagon going to do? Bomb the tracks?

As trade and ease of travel from Berlin to Beijing increase, and as China prospers and wants more European goods, European businessmen will want to cuddle up to that fabulously large market—which will loosen Washington’s grip on the throat of Europe. Say it three times slowly: Eur-asia. Eur-asia. Eur-asia. I promise it is what the Chinese are saying.

What is the Pentagon’s trillion-dollar military going to bomb? Europe? Railways across Kazakhstan? BMW plants?

All of which is to say that while the US military looks formidable, it isn’t particularly useful, and aids China by bankrupting the US. Repeatedly it has demonstrated that it cannot defeat campesinos armed with those most formidable weapons, the AK, the RPG, and the IED. The US does not have the land forces to fight a major or semi-major enemy. It could bomb Iran, with unpredictable consequences, but couldn’t possibly conquer it.

The wars in the Mid-East illustrate the principle nicely. Iraq didn’t work. Libya didn’t work. Iran didn’t back down. ISIS and related curiosities? The Pentagon is again bombing an enemy that can’t fight back—its specialty—but that it seems unable defeat.

Wrong military, wrong enemy, wrong war, wrong world.


@Economic superpower , @Sinopakfriend , @Chinese-Dragon , @AndrewJin , @terranMarine

TaiShang, my dear friend,

There is no business like the war business for the global empire of chaos and destruction.

Qui bono?

In this business model victory is abstraction. A victory is bad for such a business model. Permanent war can only happen when there is no victory. The war machine is designed for permanent chaos and destruction... which it achieves rather well.

@Shotgunner51 has consistently prescribed the medcine for the well being of the dollar system. Yet I doubt the medcine that the good doctor is prescribing will be adminsitered.


So fundamental question here that needs our attention is:

How can a military machine or a business model fight a war with someone i.e. China who are not interested in war?

How can the shaped win over the shapeless? Rigid over the soepel?


Here in we can clearly see the policy instruments that have been developed by China over past decades and now have reached such a maturity level that the war machine has become useless even the use of proxies is ineffective.

The paradigm did not came out of the blue. Behind this paradigm lies decades of internal debates, research and analysis... testing each and every hypothesis till the principle became clear and validated...and it could then become a policy instruement.

I could have advised just following of the Way...but then you and I both know... I am just nobody!


Your critique is always a delight, over to you!
 
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