China-US Geopolitics: News & Discussions

[ahojunk]

China, U.S. still in talks on trade pact despite challenges: Chinese commerce official
Fri Aug 26, 2016 12:18am EDT


China and the United States are still in frequent discussion about a bilateral trade pact, despite a challenging global trade environment, a Chinese commerce official said on Thursday.

China is keen to maintain open markets for its goods as its economy grows at its slowest pace in 25 years, but it faces rising trade tensions as its imports deteriorate faster than exports, setting it up for another record trade surplus.

Last year, the U.S. trade deficit with China was $336.2 billion, according to the U.S. Trade Representative's office. Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump threatened on Wednesday to slap tariffs on Chinese products to show Beijing the United States is "not playing games anymore".

The United States - China's second-largest trade partner after the European Union - has imposed anti-dumping and countervailing duties on Chinese products and also brought cases against China at the World Trade Organization.

"The global economy has not emerged from its difficulties, which has led a lot of countries to adopt trade protectionist policies," China's Ministry of Commerce spokesman Shen Danyang said in a rare conversation with reporters over coffee in a Starbucks cafe near Tiananmen Square.

Chinese steel exports have surged this year even as global growth remains weak, prompting complaints that China was dumping excess capacity.

"There is no evidence China is dumping steel products. Growth in exports is due to greater competitiveness of Chinese firms, as costs have fallen," Shen said.

In response to claims by the head of the U.S. Export-Import Bank (EXIM) Chairman Fred Hochberg that China gave its exporters 10 times more financing than the United States did in 2015, Shen said there are disagreements on what constitutes subsidies.

If there are disputes, the two sides can take it to the WTO, he said.

Shen did not offer any details on plans announced on Tuesday to open more sectors to foreign investment, but said foreign companies are not investing in China as much as before because competition from Chinese companies is increasing.

China is not part of the U.S.-backed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) accord involving 12 Pacific Rim countries. TPP members have said the pact is not meant to target China, which does not feel it is targeted. Beijing is separately pursuing a regional framework with its trade partners that omits the United States.

The biggest challenge facing China's economy is the need to effectively implement supply-side reform to improve the structure of the economy, he said.

"There is demand for quality products, but that has to be met with effective supply. It requires innovation, which is difficult," Shen said.

"In the past, when facing slowing growth, we would stimulate demand - loosen monetary policy, use fiscal measures. Now we are focusing primarily on using structural supply-side reform. This is the right direction, but it's not easy."


(Reporting by Elias Glenn; Editing by Jacqueline Wong)

 

[ahojunk]

The two big boys met before the actual G20 summit. How about that?

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Xi meets Obama ahead of G20 summit
Source: Xinhua | September 4, 2016, Sunday |

Chinese President Xi Jinping (R) meets with US President Barack Obama, who is here to attend the G20 summit, in Hangzhou, capital city of east China's Zhejiang Province, Sept. 3, 2016.

CHINESE President Xi Jinping on Saturday said China is willing to work with the United Statesto ensure bilateral ties stay on the right track.

Xi made the remarks in a meeting with his US counterpart Barack Obama in the eastern city of Hangzhou on the eve of the G20 summit.

He urged the two countries to follow the principles of non-conflict, non-confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation, deepen mutual trust and collaboration, and manage and control their differences in a constructive manner, in order to push forward continuous, sound and stable development of bilateral ties.

Noting that the city of Hangzhou holds historic significance to Sino-US relations, Xi spoke highly of his previous meetings with Obama since 2013, which "produced important consensus."

In particular, the decision to build a new type of major-country relations between China and the United States has led to a series of concrete achievements in bilateral ties, Xi said.

Two-way trade, investment and personnel exchanges are at historical highs, he said, and both countries have worked together in combating climate change, advancing negotiations on a bilateral investment treaty, and establishing a mutual trust mechanism between the two militaries.

Important progress was also made in fighting cyber crimes, coping with the Ebola epidemic in Africa, and facilitating a comprehensive agreement on the Iranian nuclear issue, Xi said.

"All these have showcased the strategic importance and global influence of Sino-US relations," the Chinese president said.

Xi said China and the United States have carried out fruitful cooperation under the G20 framework, and the two sides have maintained close coordination and communication with regard to the preparation of the G20 Hangzhou summit.

China appreciates the cooperation and support from the US side, he said, adding that holding a successful summit is the global community's shared expectation, as well as the due responsibility of China and the United States as the world's two largest economies.

He said China hopes to work with the United States and other parties to achieve fruitful results during the summit to inject momentum to the global economy while lifting confidence.

 

[ahojunk]

What the US and China are fighting over in South China Sea
Fu Ying
PUBLISHED SEP 3, 2016, 5:00 AM SGT

As the leaders of China and the United States meet in Hangzhou ahead of this weekend's Group of 20 summit, many would like to know whether differences over the South China Sea will cloud the bilateral relationship. The question is, what exactly are the two nations competing over in the area? And more importantly, can they find a mutually acceptable way to move forward?

The US claims that its interest in the South China Sea is to ensure freedom of navigation. Indeed, critical shipping lanes run through the area, and keeping them open is important to all countries. China, a major global trading power, attaches no less importance to freedom of navigation than the US, perhaps even more.

Obviously, however, that is not all the US is concerned about. It is worried mainly about preserving freedom of navigation for naval warships and other non-commercial vessels. Here, admittedly, there is a gap between how China and the US each interprets the relevant provisions in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos), as well as corresponding customary rules of international law.

In particular, the two sides have significantly differing views on the kind of military activities allowed within another country's 200- nautical-mile exclusive economic zone, or EEZ. China, as a developing country, highly values its national sovereignty and security. It holds that, under Unclos, the principle of freedom of navigation should not be used to undermine the security of coastal countries. On the other hand, the US, as a global maritime power, has traditionally believed that its military is entitled to absolute freedom of navigation in other countries' EEZs - including for oceanographic surveying, surveillance and military exercises.

Now, just as there is no dispute over allowing freedom of navigation for commercial ships in the South China Sea, there is no reason the two sides cannot also wisely manage their differences over the rules for naval vessels.

What the US really wants, though, goes beyond its expressed concerns. In fact, it views friction with China from a geostrategic perspective, seeing the South China Sea dispute as a test of which power will predominate in the Asia-Pacific. Ever since US leaders started talking about a pivot or rebalance to Asia, they have worked under the assumption that a stronger China will inevitably pursue expansionism - and thus needs to be countered.

Against this background, any move by China naturally looks like an attempt to weaken US strategic primacy in the region. And at the same time, American rhetoric and activities clearly targeted at China are bound to trigger a strong Chinese reaction. Given such a "security dilemma", the risk of escalated China-US confrontation or even conflict is becoming increasingly serious.

The recent arbitration ruling in the case brought by the Philippines against China has aroused strong rhetorical reaction in China, which is not opposed to Unclos or even to arbitration as a means of dispute settlement, but simply to the way this particular tribunal was constituted and chose to rule, which has been perceived as an abuse of power.

Hopefully, given the fierce debate over the tribunal's verdict, people in the region will see the wisdom of dealing with such issues through friendly dialogue rather than confrontational means.

The countries bordering the South China Sea surely appreciate that the tension stands in the way of regional integration and economic cooperation, to no one's benefit. Recently, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte appointed former president Fidel Ramos as a special envoy to China for an ice-breaking trip. When I was invited to meet Mr Ramos privately in Hong Kong, I clearly sensed the new Philippine administration's willingness to improve relations with China. China and the Philippines are both Asian countries and I believe that as long as there is good faith, it is not beyond our reach to restore a relationship marked by friendship and cooperation.

Whether the South China Sea remains peaceful is, however, to a large extent dependent on how the US and China choose to interact with each other. Specifically, when China's sovereignty and maritime rights and interests are deemed to conflict with what the US sees as its core national interests, it is vital that the two countries read the situation accurately, be clear about the stakes and find an appropriate angle from which each other's position can be appreciated.

There is room for both China and the US to manage their relations better. The US lacks experience in dealing with powers that are "neither ally nor foe", while China has never interacted with the world's superpower from a position of strength. Both sides are still exploring, and what they say and do will shape each other's opinions and actions. They both need to remain humble, keep learning and avoid simply resorting to old beliefs and behaviour.

The South China Sea is too vast to be controlled by any single country. Any attempt to build an exclusive sphere of influence may lead to possible confrontation and even military conflict. The only way forward is to seek coexistence and an overall harmonisation of power, interests and rules.

China is the biggest coastal state bordering the South China Sea. It has sovereignty claims over the Nansha (or Spratly) archipelago and controls several islands and reefs there. It is only fair that China is also entitled to legitimate maritime rights and interests in the area. The US should respect these and should not hamper efforts by China and neighbouring countries to seek peaceful ways to address their differences.

In the meantime, China and the US must continue to pursue meaningful dialogue, based on a shared commitment to ensure the maintenance of peace, security and unimpeded access to shipping lanes in the South China Sea. The best way to address their differences on maritime rules is by talking to each other, instead of posturing or dangerously testing each other with their military forces.

A persistent concern troubling the US is that China is attempting to replace it as leader of the world order. What the US strives to preserve, however, is a US-led world order, which rests upon American values, its global military alliance structure and the network of international institutions centred on the United Nations.

China is excluded from this order in at least two aspects: First, China is ostracised for having a different political system; second, America's collective defence arrangements do not cover China's security interests. Should China and the US wish to avoid sliding into the so-called Thucydides trap of a head-on clash between a rising power and an established power, they will need to create a new concept of order that is more inclusive and can accommodate the interests and concerns of all countries, providing a common roof for all.

For China, in particular, it is imperative that we make ourselves better understood by the rest of the world. China has grown from a poverty-stricken country into the world's second- biggest economy in a little over 30 years. Its modernisation has been compressed to a degree previously unheard of. However, it is not so easy to compress progress in thinking and discourse. We in China must improve our ideas and ways of thinking faster and form a broader international vision, with more effective modes of expression and behaviour.

In this way, the rest of the world will be able to better appreciate our culture and the reasons why we talk and act the way we do. This will also help them to understand China's foreign-policy goals as we move into a new era where China inevitably plays a major role in global affairs.


The writer is the former vice-minister for foreign affairs in China. She is now chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, National People's Congress of China.

 

[ahojunk]

What Comes after U.S. Primacy

America has to wake up to the new normal.

Christopher Layne
The National Interest
September 8, 2016

On both sides of the Atlantic, Britain’s vote to leave the European Union has triggered anguished hand wringing, and gnashing of teeth, among foreign policy elites who believe that Brexit heralds the end of the post-1945 liberal international order. For sure, the powerful domestic forces welling up in Europe and the United States—a populist backlash against the elite-driven globalization project—are undermining support for liberal internationalism. But the liberal international order has been wobbling for some time for more fundamental reasons.

What foreign policy experts call the liberal international order is, in fact, thePax Americana, which was constructed after 1945, and rested on the foundation of preponderant U.S. power. In 1945—America’s first unipolar moment—the United States accounted for half of the world’s manufacturing output, controlled two-thirds of the world’s gold and currency reserves, and possessed powerful global power projection capabilities. And the United States had a monopoly of atomic weapons. It this combination overwhelming of military, financial and economic muscle that enabled it create the security and economic institutions—the United Nations, NATO, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization—that underpinned the postwar order (and still do), rebuild the shattered economies of western Europe and Japan, and to play a pacifying and stabilizing role in Europe and East Asia.

As scholars of international politics would say, following World War II, the United States was in a position of primacy, or hegemony. Even during the Cold War, U.S. dominance was never seriously challenged. Lacking the economic and technological capabilities to close the power gap with the United States, the Soviet Union was more a Potemkin superpower than a real one. The Soviet collapse in 1989–91 left the U.S. more ascendant geopolitically than ever, and caused febrile minds to believe—“the end of history”—that the liberal international order had become a permanent feature of international politics.

We now know this vision was illusory. The liberal international order is fraying because the global balance of power is shifting, and the foundation of U.S. power on which the Pax Americana was built is cracking. In fact, America’s edge in relative power has been declining since the 1960s. The implications of this were masked because, in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, the U.S. advantage was being whittled down by its allies in Europe and Japan (although in the 1980s, Japan’s economic gains provoked—a false—alarm that Tokyo was going to displace the United States as the world’s leading power). The Soviet Union’s dramatic collapse also shielded from view the macro-historical forces that already were eating away at the foundations of American power.

Some analysts—notably David Calleo, Robert Gilpin and Paul Kennedy—did grasp the nature of the geoeconomic transformation that was taking shape. Kennedy’s blockbuster 1987 book, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, catalyzed a debate about the relative decline of American power. He made two key points. First, since the beginning of the modern international system (1500) all great powers have experienced a similar life cycle: they emerge, rise, reach the apogee of their power and then experience relative decline. Second, therefore, no great power—not even the most dominant—has been able to remain Number One forever. Kennedy’s claim that the United States was not exempt from this process of great power rise and decline caused a furor among the U.S. foreign-policy establishment The ensuing debate about U.S. decline that Kennedy sparked ended abruptly ended abruptly, however, when the Soviet Union (America’s geopolitical rival) collapsed, and when Japan (the chief U.S. economic rival) experienced the bursting of its economic bubble.

The most potent challenge to the Pax Americana’s staying power already was percolating in the 1980s: the beginning of China’s economic rise. Deng Xiaoping inaugurated the sweeping economic reforms that led to China’s rapid emergence as an economic powerhouse. China’s rise has been breathtaking. Since 2010, China has surpassed the United States as the world’s largest trading nation, and the world’s largest manufacturing nation. And in 2014, according to the IMF and World Bank, it leapfrogged the United States as the world’s largest economy (measured by purchasing power parity). Meanwhile, the United States is facing its own challenges, including an aging population, stagnant productivity and political polarization.

The United States faces a looming fiscal crisis in the early 2020s and beyond. And long-term forecasts are that the American GDP will grow only at about 2 percent, annually. Having already eclipsed the United States in GDP measured by PPP, it is only a matter of time before China also vaults ahead of the United States in GDP measured by market exchange rate.

For sure, China today is hitting some speed bumps economically, and faces other headwinds such as an aging population and environmental degradation. Nor, in many respects, has China’s economy caught up with the United States in qualitative metrics of economic and technological power. But it is narrowing the gap. Already, China’s economic emergence is transforming the geopolitical balance between itself and the United States. This is why the handwriting is on the wall for the liberal international order. China (and others) are rising, and America’s relative power is declining. This is part of a bigger picture: the fulcrum of global power is moving away from the Euro-Atlantic world to Asia, a power transition that is being driven being driven by the big, impersonal forces of historical change.

The English scholar E. H. Carr understood the dynamics that are causing the U.S.-led liberal international order to wobble. In his classic study of interwar international relations, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, Carr demonstrated that geopolitical crisis of 1930s was caused by the growing gap between the international order established by the Versailles Treaty after World War I, and ensuing changes in the actual distribution of power in Europe. He made two key geopolitical points. First, international orders reflect the balance of power that existed at their creation, and the interests of the dominant power(s) that created them. Second, international orders never outlast major changes in the balance of power that existed when they were created. Carr warned that fast-rising challengers and declining defenders of the status quo are on a collision course. The state(s) that created the prevailing international order love the status quo because it privileges their interests. Rising challengers, however, have no attachment to the existing order, and they seek to revise it to gain the prestige, status and geopolitical prerequisites commensurate with their growing power.

The most insightful defenders of the liberal international order—G. John Ikenberry is a good example—acknowledge that the era of American primacy is coming to a close. However, for two reasons, they claim the United States can cling to a kind of zombie hegemony where the rules, norms, and institutions embodied in Pax Americana can outlive the decline in U.S. power. First, they claim that the international order is “rules-based” and that all states that join benefit. This overlooks a vital point: in international politics, who rules makes the rules. Certainly, the benefits of post-1945 international order were distributed widely. However, it was the United States that gained the most, which is exactly what Washington intended when it designed the postwar system.

Second, it is claimed that China will not challenge or overturn the liberal international order, because it rose geopolitically and economically within that system. China, indeed, has risen within the Pax Americana but it has not emerged as a great power for the purpose of preserving it. An increasingly powerful China will do what rising challengers invariably do: it will seek to remake the international order to reflect its own interests, norms and values—not those of the United States.

Were he alive today, Carr would not be surprised that in East Asia, China is challenging the Pax Americana by pursuing its own claims for regional dominance. Similarly, in eastern Europe, Carr would understand why Moscow is trying to reassert its sway in places that—going back to czarist times—were part of Russia’s sphere of influence. And he would understand why China and other emerging powers are attempting to revamp international institutions and rules by aligning them with emerging power realities, and by constructing an alternative international order that exists parallel to the Pax Americana. The United States needs to adjust to the reality that the balance of forces that underpinned the liberal international order is withering. If it fails to do so, and instead tries rigidly to uphold the fading post-1945 status quo, it risks accelerated relative economic decline at home, and major conflict abroad.

This is the eleventh in a series of essays on the future of American primacy. You can read the previous essay, “Why Primacy Is a Bad Strategy for America” by Harvey M. Sapolsky, here.

Christopher Layne is University Distinguished Professor of International Affairs and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A&M University.

 

[ahojunk]

The two big boys have multiple avenues for cooperation.
When they comes to an agreement, unfortunately sometimes the smaller countries may be sacrifice.

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Spotlight: China, U.S. still hopeful of wrapping up investment talks under Obama administration
Source: Xinhua | 2016-09-12 05:36:34 | Editor: huaxia

Photo provided by the Center for China and Globalization, a Chinese leading social think tank, shows that China's former chief negotiator for World Trade Organization (WTO) entry Long Yongtu (4th L, first row) attending a lunch event about China-U.S. trade relations with former U.S. trade officials and think tank experts in Washington D.C., the United States on Sept. 10, 2016. (Xinhua)


WASHINGTON, Sept. 11 (Xinhua) -- China and the United States are still hopeful that the two countries could conclude negotiations on a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) under the Obama administration, a former Chinese official has said.

The Chinese negotiating team will come to Washington D.C. for a new round of BIT talks with the U.S. side in the coming week, China's former chief negotiator for World Trade Organization (WTO) entry Long Yongtu said Saturday here at a lunch event about China-U.S. trade relations hosted by the Center for China and Globalization, a Chinese leading social think tank.

"That means the Obama government still wants to get it done before he leaves office," Long told former U.S. trade officials and China experts with Washington-D.C. based think tanks.

In China, the BIT talks enjoy strong and wide support from the top leadership to the private sector, said the former Chinese vice minister for trade, adding that "there's a good chance" that the two countries could wrap up the eight years of talks under the Obama administration.

A total of 28 rounds of BIT talks have been held since China and the United States started negotiations in 2008 to increase mutual investment, which only accounted for a tiny share of their respective overseas investment.

The two sides have recently exchanged "the third revised and significantly improved negative list offers" of sectors that remain closed to foreign investment, and "made further progress in all aspects of the negotiation", according to the outcome list released after a recent meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and his U.S. counterpart Barack Obama in Hangzhou, China.

China and the United States commit to "further intensify the negotiation with a view to concluding a mutually beneficial and high-standard treaty" , the outcome list said.

While provisions regarding the state-owned enterprises remain a sticking point in the BIT talks, Long believed the two sides would "find a way" to reach a deal.

He also suggested that American trade negotiators should be "a little bit less aggressive" trying to manage specific issues in the BIT negotiations, but he didn't elaborate further.

As part of the so-called second-track dialogue of China-U.S. relations, Long had met campaign teams of Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump and Democratic presidential nominee Hillary Clinton in the past two days, trying to figure out the future direction of bilateral relations after the general election in November.

Long expressed his concern about the rise of anti-trade and anti-globalization in the current U.S. presidential campaign. But he believed the forces of globalization "remain strong" with the fast development of new technologies, particularly the Internet, and transnational corporations, which bring investment and trade to every corner of the world.

With the help of the Internet, many small and medium-sized enterprises have also started to join the forces of globalization, which will reinforce the trend toward globalization, he said.

China will remain a driver of globalization and continue pursuing the policy of opening up to the outside world, the former Chinese official said, noting that a significant majority of Chinese people have benefited from that process.

Chinese government also sets up a fund to assist those unemployment workers hurt by certain trade agreements, Long said. "This is the government responsibility. If we don' t do that, people will be against trade agreements and globalization."

"I think we have done it quite well. That' s why in China we do not hear strong voices against globalization, we do not hear strong voices against opening up to the outside world," he said, suggesting the United States could learn from China to help those workers hurt by trade agreements and globalization.

"It's not the fault of those protesters against trade agreements. It's the fault of the government which does not do sufficiently to address those issues," he said.

Reflecting back on China' s accession to the WTO in 2001, Long said China's entry into the WTO has not only brought tremendous benefits to China but also brought significant benefits to the United States and other countries.

China has become the largest export market of American agricultural goods, helping create at least 160,000 jobs in the United States, he said, adding that the two countries should continue expanding cooperation in trade and investment.

The world's two largest economies have become more closely connected over the past few years, as China has become a huge and growing market for U.S. businesses and Chinese investment in the United States has rapidly accelerated.

The investment treaty is expected to continue to expand two-way trade and investment and cement the foundation of China-U.S. economic ties.

 

[ahojunk]

The era of global dominance is coming to an end for the world's largest debtor nation, US.
Everything boils down to money.

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The Era of American Global Dominance Is Over
Huffington Post
09/15/2016 07:15 pm ET

Graham E. Fuller
Former vice chairman, CIA’s National Intelligence Council;
Author “Breaking Faith”

You might recall the term “Eurasia” from high school geography classes. The term isn’t used much anymore in political discussions in the West, but it should be. That is where the most serious geopolitical action is going to be taking place in the world as we move deeper into the 21st century. The U.S., focused so intently on “containment“ of Russia, the so-called Islamic State and China, will be missing the bigger Eurasian strategic picture.

Eurasia is the greatest landmass of the world, embracing Europe and all of Asia — some of the oldest and greatest centers of human civilization.

So what is Eurasianism? It has meant different things at different periods. A century ago, the Kissingers of the time spun theories about a deep and inevitable strategic clash between seaborne power (U.K./U.S.) and continental/land-based powers (Germany, Russia.) “Eurasia” then meant mostly Europe and western Russia. Indeed, what need was there to talk then about Asia itself? Most of Asia was underdeveloped and lay under the control of the British Empire (India, China) or the French (Indochina) and had no independent will. Japan was the only real “Asian power” — that ironically developed its own imperial designs, mimicking the West, and thus came to clash with American imperial power in the Pacific

Today, of course, all that is different. Eurasia increasingly means “Asia” in which the “Euro” part figures modestly. Furthermore, China has now become the center of Eurasia as the world’s second-largest economy. Not surprisingly, China — like the Muslim world — projects a decidedly “anti-imperial” bent based on what it sees as its humiliation at the hands of the West (and Japan) during its 200-year eclipse — during one of its dynastic down cycles. But China is very much back now into a classic “up-cycle” mode of power and influence again and is determined to project its weight and influence. India, too, now is now a rapidly developing power with regional reach. And Japan, while quiescent, still represents formidable economic power, perhaps to be augmented by greater military regional reach.

The significance of the term “Eurasian” has changed a good deal, but it still suggests strategic rivalry. At a time when the U.S. formally declares its intent to militarily dominate the world (“full spectrum dominance“ was the official Pentagon doctrine in 2000) the concept of Eurasianism is responding with vigor. And not just in China, but in its new significance for countries like Russia, Iran and even Turkey. It suggests a sense of the eclipse of dominant western power in the face of new Asian power.

It’s not all just about military and money. It’s also cultural. Russian culture has for two centuries maintained a lively debate about whether Russia belongs to the West, or embodies a distinctly Eurasian (yevraziiskaya) culture that is separate from the West. Eurasianists represent a significant force within Russian strategic and military thinking (although Putin, interestingly, does not fully embrace this worldview.)

The idea is a vague but culturally important one; it grapples with Russian identity. It speaks of a Slavic culture but with deep Eurasian roots even in an old Turkic and Tatar past. Remember that historically it is the modern West that torched Russia twice: witness the invasions of Napoleon and Hitler up to the gates of Moscow. NATO today probes ever more deeply all around the Russian periphery. The Eurasianists are suspicious of, if not hostile to, the West as a permanent threat to “Holy Mother Russia.” “Eurasianism” will always lurk just beneath the surface in the Russian strategic worldview.

That is what Russia’s new Eurasian Economic Union is all about, a goal to at least economically unite Belarus, the Central Asian states and others into a greater Eurasian economic whole. (Oil-rich Kazakhstan was actually the author of the concept; it will seek to maintain ties with the West, but look at it its place on a world map to see where Kazakhstan’s real long-term options lie. Russia may not now be the best economic star to tie one’s future to, but it is just one of many Eurasian vehicles out there and they are not mutually exclusive. Options bring greater security.

China is moving in stunningly ambitious directions in creating the new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (that 57 states have signed onto including most European states, Canada and Australia — but conspicuously without Japan so far, or the U.S.) This creates a new Eurasian-focused central banking instrument with strong Chinese influence. China is also projecting massive new transportation networks (the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road — “One Belt, One Road“) across Eurasia to China linking China to Europe, the Middle East, Central and South Asia and the Far East by rail, road and sea. China’s “Eurasian strategy” is already a burgeoning reality. Yes, suspicions and rivalries exist between Russia and China and India and Japan. But the strong economic and developmental thrust of these proposals differ markedly from the American more “security” focused organization with its worrisome military implications.

Not only has Washington fought these Chinese and Eurasian initiatives unsuccessfully, but it is U.S. policies in particular — that identify both Russia and China as the presumptive enemy — that have helped bring Russia and China together on many issues, linked now by shared distrust of U.S. global military ambitions.

Japan, incidentally, before World War II had its own doctrine of “Eurasianism” — an effort to identify with and stir up Asian peoples and territories against western colonial domination. This strategy could have been quite effective had it not been accompanied by Japan’s own brutal military invasions of East Asian countries, destroying the credibility of the Japanese “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” Today Japan hasn’t moved its location; it will still have to deal with the reality of Chinese power in the East. And what Japanese leader would seriously pursue a long range policy of hostility to China in support of a U.S. Pacific strategy that is inherently designed to bottle up China? Especially when China and Japan are huge mutual trading and investment partners?

Iran is keenly interested in balancing against geopolitical pressures from the U.S. and seeks membership in these Russian and Chinese economic development institutions. Iran is a natural “Eurasian “ and “Silk Road” power.

Turkey has gotten into the Eurasian game, again. Going back to the early days of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s ruling Justice and Development Party foreign policy — in the vision of then-foreign minister Davutoğlu — Turkey was no longer limited to being a western power, but also proclaimed its geopolitical interests (nearly a hundred years after the fall of the Ottoman Empire) in the Middle East, and indeed, Eurasia. (After all, the Turks originally come from Eurasia, having migrated west from Lake Baikal a thousand years ago.) That means serious ties with Russia, combined with deep ethnic, cultural and historical ties with Central Asia, and with China. Turkey (like Iran and Pakistan) seeks to be part of these Russian and Chinese networks. And, among some Turkish nationalist politicians and military officers (including many secular Kemalists) there is strong “Eurasianist“ leaning to expand Turkey’s geopolitical options to explore strategic and cultural ties with Eurasia. It also reflects an expression of distrust of western and U.S. efforts to dominate the region.

For Turkey this is not an either/or issue. It can seek to be part of Europe — including NATO — but will not relinquish the broad geostrategic alternative options to the East, with its ever greater economic clout, and roads and rails to link it.

In short, the new Eurasianism is no longer about 19th century land and sea power. It is an acknowledgment that the era of western —- and especially U.S. — global dominance is over. Washington can no longer command — or afford — a longer-term bid to dominate Eurasia. In economic terms, no state in the region, including Turkey, would be foolish enough to turn its back on this rising “Eurasian” potential that also offers strategic balance and economic options.

There are, of course, huge fault lines across Eurasia — ethnic, economic, strategic and some degree of rivalry. But the more Washington attempts to contain or throttle Eurasianism as a genuine rising force, the greater will be the determination of states to become part of this rising Eurasian world, even while not rejecting the West.

All countries like to have alternatives. They don’t like to lie beholden to a single global power that tries to call the shots. America’s narrative of what the global order is all about is no longer accepted globally. Furthermore, it is no longer realistic. It would seem short-sighted for Washington to continue focus upon expanding military alliances while most of the rest of the world is looking to greater prosperity and rising regional clout. (China’s military expenditures are about one-quarter of U.S.spending.)

This article first appeared on GrahameFuller.com

 

[ahojunk]

The US is pretty good in stirring up trouble all over the world.

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People's Daily criticizes U.S. as "source of turmoil"
(Xinhua) 08:38, September 19, 2016

BEIJING, Sept. 18 -- The People's Daily, the official newspaper of the Communist Party of China, has criticized the United States as the "source of turmoil in the world."

The newspaper on Sunday published three articles by Chinese scholars to analyze the causes of expansive and hegemonic moves by the United States from systemic, ideological and strategic perspectives.

An editor's note on the page said that U.S. interventions are behind unrest and disputes in many places, including the Middle East, Eastern Europe and the South China Sea.

"The United States is keen to make messes in the world, cast shadows on order and stability in multiple regions and jeopardize peace and development in relevant countries," the note said.

An article by Yang Guangbin, a professor of politics at Renmin University, pointed out that the "military-industrial complex," which former U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower warned against, is "kidnapping U.S. domestic and diplomatic policy."

The "military-industrial complex" naturally demands war and military expansion, resulting in the Iraq war, "Arab Spring" uprisings and growing tensions with Russia and China, Yang said.

Yang also criticized the United States for selling its ideology, which has brainwashed the elite in some non-Western countries.

"Countries that have followed American-style 'liberty and democracy' are not turning into American-style states. Instead, their lives remain the same, or even become worse," the article said.

Yang said remarks by American diplomat George F. Kennan, who said the Soviet system "moves inexorably along the prescribed path, like a persistent toy automobile wound up and headed in a given direction, stopping only when it meets with some unanswerable force," is now applicable to the U.S. system.

"Over the years, the United States has developed a 'chariot system' like a perpetual motion machine driven by the 'monster' of capital power," the scholar wrote.

The article further criticized the opinions judging China based on a so-called "mainstream theory" and called for a greater voice for China that is commensurate with its standing in international society.

Another article by Li Wen, a researcher with an institute for the study of the theoretical system of "socialism with Chinese characteristics" under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, noted that the United States' eagerness to make trouble around the world is due to its "hegemonic anxiety."

It is "to a large degree, a reflection of a twisted mentality of an empire moving downhill," according to the article.

The United States no longer tends to build and protect world order and peace in order to improve its international status. Instead, it has turned into a disrupter of order and peace to maintain its status quo, the article read.

The United States is making mischief in the world to sustain the U.S. dollar's supremacy and the country's hegemony in military, political and cultural fields, the article said.

The scholar also denounced the United States' measures to contain China by causing trouble in East Asia.

A third article by Lin Hongyu, a professor at Huaqiao University, said U.S. maneuvers in the Asia-Pacific region are just part of its overseas expansion and interventionist diplomacy to maintain its leading international role.

The article called on Chinese authorities to manage disputes between China and the United States in a constructive way and to build a new type of major-country relationship together.

 

[ahojunk]

https://www.ft.com/content/12473188-7db4-11e6-8e50-8ec15fb462f4

America’s Pacific pivot is sinking
From South China Sea rivalry to an international trade agreement, the US policy is in trouble
Gideon Rachman

Rodrigo Duterte, the president of the Philippines, caused shock and sniggers around the world when he called Barack Obama the “son of a whore”. But the Duterte comment that will have really hurt the White House came a few days later. Announcing that he was ending joint naval patrols with the US in the South China Sea, the Philippines’ president stated: “China is now in power and they have military superiority in the region.”

That statement will sting in Washington. Throughout the Obama years, the US has attempted to reassure all its Asian allies that America has both the means and the will to remain the dominant military power in the Asia-Pacific region. President Obama set the tone in a landmark speech in 2011, when he firmly asserted that “the United States is a Pacific power and we are here to stay”. Since then America has transferred more of its navy to the region and Mr Obama has regularly made the long journey from Washington to East Asia.

But Mr Duterte has now directly challenged the idea that America is still the hegemon in the Pacific. If others take his view, power could drain away from Washington, as more countries in the region begin to defer to Beijing.

The Philippines’ president’s assessment of the military balance between the US and China is questionable. The Americans currently have 11 aircraft-carriers, while China has one — with another on the way. But Chinese military spending has been rising fast for decades. And Beijing has also invested in the kinds of equipment, including missiles and submarines, that potentially make America’s aircraft carriers very vulnerable.

Over the past year, China’s new confidence has been reflected in its programme of “island building” in the South China Sea, designed to reinforce Beijing’s controversial claim that roughly 90 per cent of that sea falls within its territorial waters. The Americans have been unable to stop this clear assertion of Chinese power and have restricted themselves to sailing past the disputed and increasingly militarised “islands” to signal that they do not accept China’s claims.

The importance that the US attaches to the South China Sea has been repeatedly emphasised by the Obama administration. In an article on “America’s Pacific century”, published in 2011, Hillary Clinton pointed out that “half the world’s merchant tonnage flows through this water”. The US fears that Beijing intends to turn these crucial waters into a “Chinese lake”.

The Americans have long insisted, reasonably enough, that their position on the South China Sea is about upholding international law rather than engaging in a power struggle with China. The Philippines has been vital to this law-based strategy. In July, Manila won an international legal challenge to Beijing’s claims over the South China Sea, a ruling that was widely seen as a major setback to China’s ambitions. Yet it is rather hard for America to defend the legal rights of the Philippines, when Mr Duterte curses Mr Obama in public and then curtails joint naval patrols.

The US does have other partners in the region. Last week Japan announced that it will carry out naval patrols with the US in the South China Sea. But a partnership with Tokyo, which is locked in a bitter rivalry with Beijing, makes the maritime issue look more like a power struggle with China, rather than a question of international law, particularly since the Russians and Chinese have just completed their own joint exercises in the South China Sea. Under the circumstances, many Southeast Asian countries will be tempted to stand to one side rather than risk being caught up in a clash of regional titans.

The sense that America’s “pivot” to Asia is in trouble is compounded by the growing doubts about the fate of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a trade deal promoted by the US.

The TPP brings together 12 nations, including Japan and the US, but excludes China. The deal is widely seen as a counter to China’s growing economic dominance in the Asia-Pacific region.

Pleading the case for the TPP before the US Congress, Shinzo Abe, Japan’s prime minister, argued: “Long term its strategic value is awesome.”

But the entreaties of Mr Abe and Mr Obama seem unlikely to save the TPP. Donald Trump and Mrs Clinton, the two main candidates for the US presidency, have come out against the deal. Mr Obama may still try to force it through Congress before he leaves office. But the chances of the TPP surviving the current climate of protectionism in America seem small.

If the US fails to pass the TPP, America’s Asian allies will feel badly let down. They have risked antagonising Beijing by signing up to a US-led initiative. Now Washington may jilt them at the altar. On a recent visit to the US capital, Lee Hsien Loong, the Singaporean prime minister, called the TPP a “litmus test of (American) credibility and seriousness of purpose” in Asia. He pointed out that the implications go well beyond trade, extending to the credibility of America’s security guarantees to its Asian allies.

Unfortunately, long-term strategic thinking is almost impossible in the current maelstrom of American politics. As a result, President Obama faces the sad prospect of leaving office with his signature foreign-policy initiative — the pivot to Asia — sinking beneath the Pacific waves.

gideon.rachman@ft.com

 

[Jlaw]

https://www.ft.com/content/12473188-7db4-11e6-8e50-8ec15fb462f4

America’s Pacific pivot is sinking
From South China Sea rivalry to an international trade agreement, the US policy is in trouble
Gideon Rachman

Rodrigo Duterte, the president of the Philippines, caused shock and sniggers around the world when he called Barack Obama the “son of a whore”. But the Duterte comment that will have really hurt the White House came a few days later. Announcing that he was ending joint naval patrols with the US in the South China Sea, the Philippines’ president stated: “China is now in power and they have military superiority in the region.”

That statement will sting in Washington. Throughout the Obama years, the US has attempted to reassure all its Asian allies that America has both the means and the will to remain the dominant military power in the Asia-Pacific region. President Obama set the tone in a landmark speech in 2011, when he firmly asserted that “the United States is a Pacific power and we are here to stay”. Since then America has transferred more of its navy to the region and Mr Obama has regularly made the long journey from Washington to East Asia.

But Mr Duterte has now directly challenged the idea that America is still the hegemon in the Pacific. If others take his view, power could drain away from Washington, as more countries in the region begin to defer to Beijing.

The Philippines’ president’s assessment of the military balance between the US and China is questionable. The Americans currently have 11 aircraft-carriers, while China has one — with another on the way. But Chinese military spending has been rising fast for decades. And Beijing has also invested in the kinds of equipment, including missiles and submarines, that potentially make America’s aircraft carriers very vulnerable.

Over the past year, China’s new confidence has been reflected in its programme of “island building” in the South China Sea, designed to reinforce Beijing’s controversial claim that roughly 90 per cent of that sea falls within its territorial waters. The Americans have been unable to stop this clear assertion of Chinese power and have restricted themselves to sailing past the disputed and increasingly militarised “islands” to signal that they do not accept China’s claims.

The importance that the US attaches to the South China Sea has been repeatedly emphasised by the Obama administration. In an article on “America’s Pacific century”, published in 2011, Hillary Clinton pointed out that “half the world’s merchant tonnage flows through this water”. The US fears that Beijing intends to turn these crucial waters into a “Chinese lake”.

The Americans have long insisted, reasonably enough, that their position on the South China Sea is about upholding international law rather than engaging in a power struggle with China. The Philippines has been vital to this law-based strategy. In July, Manila won an international legal challenge to Beijing’s claims over the South China Sea, a ruling that was widely seen as a major setback to China’s ambitions. Yet it is rather hard for America to defend the legal rights of the Philippines, when Mr Duterte curses Mr Obama in public and then curtails joint naval patrols.

The US does have other partners in the region. Last week Japan announced that it will carry out naval patrols with the US in the South China Sea. But a partnership with Tokyo, which is locked in a bitter rivalry with Beijing, makes the maritime issue look more like a power struggle with China, rather than a question of international law, particularly since the Russians and Chinese have just completed their own joint exercises in the South China Sea. Under the circumstances, many Southeast Asian countries will be tempted to stand to one side rather than risk being caught up in a clash of regional titans.

The sense that America’s “pivot” to Asia is in trouble is compounded by the growing doubts about the fate of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a trade deal promoted by the US.

The TPP brings together 12 nations, including Japan and the US, but excludes China. The deal is widely seen as a counter to China’s growing economic dominance in the Asia-Pacific region.

Pleading the case for the TPP before the US Congress, Shinzo Abe, Japan’s prime minister, argued: “Long term its strategic value is awesome.”

But the entreaties of Mr Abe and Mr Obama seem unlikely to save the TPP. Donald Trump and Mrs Clinton, the two main candidates for the US presidency, have come out against the deal. Mr Obama may still try to force it through Congress before he leaves office. But the chances of the TPP surviving the current climate of protectionism in America seem small.

If the US fails to pass the TPP, America’s Asian allies will feel badly let down. They have risked antagonising Beijing by signing up to a US-led initiative. Now Washington may jilt them at the altar. On a recent visit to the US capital, Lee Hsien Loong, the Singaporean prime minister, called the TPP a “litmus test of (American) credibility and seriousness of purpose” in Asia. He pointed out that the implications go well beyond trade, extending to the credibility of America’s security guarantees to its Asian allies.

Unfortunately, long-term strategic thinking is almost impossible in the current maelstrom of American politics. As a result, President Obama faces the sad prospect of leaving office with his signature foreign-policy initiative — the pivot to Asia — sinking beneath the Pacific waves.

gideon.rachman@ft.com

when did the American Pacific began? The world must have missed it

 

[TaiShang]

when did the American Pacific began? The world must have missed it

Pivot to Asia was bound to fail because it was laden with a jingoistic militarism and US-exceptionalism to please domestic audience in the US and prop up nationalist xenopohobism.

Yet, the tactics by the neo-fascist, Obama-led shadow Hillary government has come to bite the same party in the upcoming elections in the persona of Donald Trump.

Trumps has shown and essentially said that "if you are to be China-xenophobic, I will prove to be ultra-xenopohobic against practically anybody, beating you in your own little neo-liberal game."

Now, the xenophobism, strong-man-ism and nationalism has become national politics in the US, dividing people across race and class lines.

China, in this case, can comfortably sit back and be engaged with its own paradigm and discourse-creation route as the US is now turning xenophobic, exclusivist and isolationist.

Perfect time for the real China-Russia G2 to propose and promote an alternative order.

 

[Mangus Ortus Novem]

Pivot to Asia was bound to fail because it was laden with a jingoistic militarism and US-exceptionalism to please domestic audience in the US and prop up nationalist xenopohobism.

Yet, the tactics by the neo-fascist, Obama-led shadow Hillary government has come to bite the same party in the upcoming elections in the persona of Donald Trump.

Trumps has shown and essentially said that "if you are to be China-xenophobic, I will prove to be ultra-xenopohobic against practically anybody, beating you in your own little neo-liberal game."

Now, the xenophobism, strong-man-ism and nationalism has become national politics in the US, dividing people across race and class lines.

China, in this case, can comfortably sit back and be engaged with its own paradigm and discourse-creation route as the US is now turning xenophobic, exclusivist and isolationist.

Perfect time for the real China-Russia G2 to propose and promote an alternative order.

My friend,

Sino-Rus axis is moving systematically to construct global governance where bullying and intimidation has no place. At the same time this win-win axis is also deconstructing the global empirial order that has ruled over the world for last 500 years.

Only difference is that Sino-Rus are short on rhetoric and long action.

Empty pots make bigger noise, while the pot that is filled is quiet.

However, it will be strategic mistake to underestimate the troublemakers and their proxies.

Forbidden Palance was not created in one day.... this grand game of Go will take at least two decades for consolidation of results and helping the exceptional states to become normal.

The key here is Financial global governace and the new rules that necessary. What we need is new global currency.

 

[Götterdämmerung]

My friend,

Sino-Rus axis is moving systematically to construct global governance where bullying and intimidation has no place. At the same time this win-win axis is also deconstructing the global empirial order that has ruled over the world for last 500 years.

Only difference is that Sino-Rus are short on rhetoric and long action.

Empty pots make bigger noise, while the pot that is filled is quiet.

However, it will be strategic mistake to underestimate the troublemakers and their proxies.

Forbidden Palance was not created in one day.... this grand game of Go will take at least two decades for consolidation of results and helping the exceptional states to become normal.

The key here is Financial global governace and the new rules that necessary. What we need is new global currency.

Well said, but I'm very much against a new global currency. What we need are sound monetary rules for all backed by gold, silver and manufactured merchandise. The era of pushing fiat money from one account to another and call it economic activity must end.

 

[Mangus Ortus Novem]

Well said, but I'm very much against a new global currency. What we need are sound monetary rules for all backed by gold, silver and manufactured merchandise. The era of pushing fiat money from one account to another and call it economic activity must end.

`My dear friend,

I am equally against a global reserve currency which is debt based instead of sovereign credit.

What I envision is a global currency that is a solid store of value. Allow me to explain:


Take Euro..we work that means we get 'monney' in exchange for the labour we provide. That is to say you sell hours of your life in exchange for money. This then can be utilised for life i.e. food, shelter, education of kids ect. This is ture value.

However, our Euro is not store of value hence our lives. Everyday our Euro is less valuable than yesterday. This ongoing process will depreciate the value of our lives in such a way that value of our lives become finanncialised by the fiat money making scheme.

This wrong way to structure our societies. We must move towards a system that values life.

As one who values life deeply I rather like to see a system which is a safe store of the life for money exchange mechansim. Gold can be such store. But there is not enough gold in the world.

The only way forward is a global agreement of SDR type thing against which local currencies can rise and fall in managed manner. Speculation i.e gambling needs to stop.

That is why my contention is that we need a new global reserve currency in a fixed issue manner thus avoiding inflaction pressure on it. Furthermore, there has to be a global agreementen on the mechanisms of issuance of money.

As it stands today in the West we have no sovereign control over the issuance of money or credit. What we have is the non-sovereign monopoly of creation of debt by bookkeeping.

I wish to see a system where life is valuable.

 

[barbarosa]

Why Only dollar$ is acceptable as international currency? It is the supremacy of USA, because of it USA is a supa pawa, I ask why?

 

[ahojunk]

Chinese premier calls for more efforts to promote China-U.S. economic ties
2016-09-20 10:25 | Xinhua Editor: Mo Hong'e

Chinese Premier Li Keqiang on Monday called upon China and the United States to step up efforts to promote economic and trade ties between the two countries.

The statement was made when Li met with U.S. President Barack Obama in New York on the sidelines of the ongoing 71st session of the United Nations General Assembly that opened earlier last week.

Economic and trade cooperation is the "cornerstone" and "propeller" of China-U.S. relations, Li said.

The two sides should work together to ensure an early conclusion of negotiations on a China-U.S. bilateral investment treaty (BIT), expand market access to each other, and create better business environment and better cooperation prospect for enterprises from both sides, the premier said.

The two sides should also properly handle economic and trade frictions to prevent bilateral economic and trade ties from suffering unnecessary distractions, he added.

Meanwhile, the premier urged the U.S. side to relax restrictions on high-tech exports to China.

For his part, Obama said economic relations are the stabilizing factor of U.S.-China ties.

The U.S. president added that the U.S. side supports China's reform process, hoping the two sides make further progress in BIT negotiations.