I have listened to him with open mind but regret to advise that Hafiz Saeed has a closed mind. He puts all the blame on USA including secession of East Pakistan. I was in Pakistan at that time and can vouch that Hafiz Saeed is totally wrong here. Separatist movement in East Pakistan started with the language riots in 1948, formation of One Unit to counter higher Bengali population and finally refusal of Bhutto to sit in the National Assembly where Awami League was in majority and Yahya Khan siding with Bhutto. Indian attack was the nail in the coffin. If you expected US or any other country to help you as occupying power over the Bengalis, you are living in cuckoo land.
Haifz Saeed party is a sectarian party. He never once condemned target killing of Hazaras or Shias in Giligit. The people who attacked Sri Lankan team stayed at Jamaat Dawa rest houses. He is a strong Taliban sympathizer.
Naturally some things he said are correct but his refusal to condemn Saudi Arabian for fanning sectarian terrorism in Pakistan, active support of Israelis attack on Iraq etc. shows his bigotry.
Hafiz Saeed represents the forces that rubbish Quaid and Muslim League (you will never hear any praise of Quaid from his mouth). He never once condemned people who killed 40,000 Pakistanis but out this blame on US as well. It is like saying that actual killer is innocent but all the blames lies with the person who bribes the killer; when both are equally guilty. His view typifies the tragedy of Pakistans situation which is also manifest in some of the members of this august forum.
A very poignant article is noted below:
65 and still not sure of its identity
Babar Ayaz
Friday, August 24, 2012
Pakistan turned 65 this Aug 14 and is still not sure of its identity. The good thing is that the debate about its identity continues. But both the people of Pakistan and its leaders are confused whether Pakistan is an Islamic state, or should it be a secular democratic state. And there is a third equally strong strand which tries to synthesise the irreconcilable two: the Islamic state with Islamic laws and a democratic state with the laws and values of the 21stcentury polity.
Why is Pakistan still trying to find its identity like a child entering adolescence? We will probably find the answer to this if we study the making of Pakistan. The history of the Muslim League movement makes it apparent that the struggle was for achieving maximum autonomy for the elite of the Muslim majority provinces.
What had initially started as a struggle for power between the Muslim Salariats and feudal class on one side and Hindu rising bourgeoisie, on the other, within the frame work of India, eventually evolved in the division of India on a communal basis.
The turning point was the 1937 elections in which the All India Muslim League (AIML) suffered humiliating defeat. To rally the support of the Muslim masses of India the emotive religious propaganda was used as a means to achieve an end ie the right to rule the Muslim majority areas. Consequently, the means have become stronger and are now consuming Pakistan slowly and painfully. Todays Pakistan is caught in its own religious propaganda web.
All historical evidence shows that the Muslims of India were living in the subcontinent for over a thousand years and were practicing their religious rights according to their religion. The issue of autonomous Muslim majority states within the federation of India emerged in the early 20th century, only when it was realised that the British were willing to give some powers to the people of India.
Consequently, the AIML was formed, with emphasis on the political rights of the Muslims of India and not to impose Islamic laws. This is also evident from Nawab Salimullahs scheme. There was no mention of Islam and its value system in the charter presented by him to the British. Next take a look at 1929 Jinnahs 14 points, which laid down the demands of the Muslims. Again the only reference to Muslim laws was given in point 12; the rest of the points talked about political rights.
Islam and Sharia was not the main issue even when the Government of India 1935 Act was promulgated. It was only after the dismal defeat in the 1937 elections that Quaid-e-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah changed his tactics and started identifying himself with the Muslim symbolism wearing the sherwani and Karakuli cap instead of his usual Savoy suits. And the Muslim League turned to solicit the support of the ulemas and the pirs.
David Gilmartin (1989) has documented the important role that some leading pirs in Punjab played, in popularising the idea of Pakistan. The fact that the central Deoband leadership was allied to the Congress meant that the Muslim League was rendered attractive, to their much bigger and more influential rivals, the Barelvis, who entertained their own ambitions of establishing an Islamic state. The tables were turned when the Barelvi ulema and pirs of Punjab, the NWFP and Sindh joined the Muslim League.
The trouble with the contemporary discourse is that it is mostly within the framework of the Two-Nation Theory, Islamic ideology and at best within the parameters set by Quaid-e-Azam and his colleagues. Many liberals in search of Jinnahs Pakistan are heavily relying on his speech of August 11, 1947 and his interviews to the foreign media in which he said that Pakistan will not be a theocratic state or that the state has nothing to do with religion. But at times Jinnah gave out contradictory messages to different audiences. To the foreign press he gave a clear message that Pakistan will not be a theocratic state, which implicitly meant not based on religious tradition. While his message to the ulema was that Pakistan would be a country where Islam and Sharia laws would apply.
His August 11 speech does talk about equal rights for citizens of Pakistan irrespective of their religion which is quintessential to establish a secular democracy. Reference to the British history of sectarianism alludes to the secular solution. Indeed this speech was delivered from the position of power and from an important platform only three days before Pakistans independence. He did not need the support of the pirs and ulemas at that stage as their role to provide peoples support ended with the achievement of the end that was Pakistan.
But Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan in his speech in 1951 elaborated the Islamist agenda: Pakistan came into being as a result of an urge felt by the Muslims of this subcontinent to secure territory, however limited, where the Islamic ideology and way of life could be practiced and demonstrated to the world. A cardinal feature of this ideology is to make Muslim brotherhood a living reality. He gave in to the clerics pressure and accepted the Objectives Resolution.
The founding leaders were not aware of the fact, that it is not easy to go back to secular rationale after inciting people in the name of Islam. It was a clear evidence of the short-sightedness or lack of understanding of the political and social processes in a society. What the secularists overlook is that Jinnahs speech on August 11, 1947 cannot turnoff the religious fervour created in the 10 years from 1937 to1947 by the statements in favour of the Islamic system.
Now the ensuing discussion since this speech and today has been what are the essential principles of Islam which Jinnah had talked about in his address to the Karachi Bar? Who will decide the principles of Islam parliament, the ulema, the religious parties? Or is it the prerogative of the Supreme Court to define the Islamic laws incorporated in the constitution mainly by a military regime of Zia?
Emphasis on religiosity in Pakistan has influenced the countrys dangerous foreign and national security. The natural corollary of this policy was giving more space and a free hand to the religious extremists in the countrys politics and building a large army to counter the perceived India threat.
The troubles of Pakistan thus started compounding because of this officially supported narrative. The pure secular objective of having maximum autonomy within the framework of India got lost in the religious propaganda campaign. The end does not justify the means in political and social evolution process; the means start dictating to another end. Thats is precisely what is happening in Pakistan.
The writer is a senior journalist and communication expert. Email: ayazbabar@ gmail.com
65 and still not sure of its identity - Babar Ayaz
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