Ababeel SSM - Pakistan gains MIRV technology.

[The Deterrent]

Does Pakistan’s Ababeel Medium Range Ballistic Missile Really Have MIRV Capability?
3429 By Rajaram Nagappa - February 3, 2017

It is not unusual to see news of a Pakistani ballistic missile launch close on the heels of an Indian ballistic missile event. The launch of Agni 5 took place on 26 December last year followed by the launch of Agni 4 a week later. For the Pakistani missile establishment, the year 2016 was a comparatively quiet year and one did expect a response to the Agni launches. Sure enough, Pakistan carried out a missile test – it was not another training or pre-deployment test of Shaheen 2 or Shaheen 3, but the test of a new missile called Ababeel on 24 January 2017. The missile is claimed to have a range of 2200 km and is said to be capable of carrying Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRV).
Unlike the Shaheen 2, the new missile has three stages. The Ababeel thermal fairing (heat shield) has a larger diameter than its core vehicle. The extra volume thus available is consistent with the requirements for MIRV capabilities. It must however, be noted that there are a number of technical constraints that have to be overcome before one can infer that Pakistan has succeeded in developing MIRV capability.
MIRV, as the name implies replaces a unitary warhead with a larger number of smaller warheads, with each of them programmed for different targets. It is therefore a more potent and powerful attack system. In a global scenario where a number of countries are developing Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) Systems, MIRV capability is needed to overwhelm such defences. Many BMD systems have capability limitations when it comes to dealing with multiple incoming warheads and may fail to engage all of them. By increasing the number of warheads along with decoys deployed with the real ones, BMD systems can be saturated. The US and Russia field such MIRV weapon systems and the numbers they field are governed by the strategic arms limitation treaty between them. The Chinese are also said to have incorporated MIRV in their DF 5, DF-31 and the JL 2 (the submarine launched version of the DF-31) ballistic missiles.
Over the last several years India has carried out a number of tests related to terminal phase BMD. These involve the interception of the warhead outside the atmosphere just before the re-entry of the incoming missile. For a country confronted with such an adversary, developing MIRV capability is the logical technology growth route to follow. One is therefore not surprised if Pakistan were to adopt such a route.
The rhetoric in the Pakistani establishment against Indian ABM capability is indicative of this. Sartaj Aziz, Pakistan’s advisor on Foreign Affairs is reported to have commented in June last year that India’s testing of anti ballistic missile system could lead to ‘unexpected complications’ . He is further stated to have told the Pakistani senate that Pakistan has serious concerns over these developments and will take ‘all necessary measures to augment its defence capabilities’.
Has Pakistan really overcome the technological challenges?
Though it is easy to express a need for the development of MIRV capabilities realizing it requires significant advances in a number of key technologies. The question to ask before we come to any conclusion is ‘Has Pakistan been able to master and overcome all the technical issues?’ In this regard, a critical assessment of the following issues is particularly necessary.
1. Weapon miniaturization: For MIRV requirements both the warhead and the re-entry vehicle (RV) need to be smaller and lighter. The US Minuteman-3 missile warhead had three Mk-12A RVs. The RVs had a base diameter of about 0.5 metre (m) and a length of approximately 1.81 m. Three such RVs could be accommodated within the missile shroud, which had a diameter of approximately 1 m.
2. Ababeel has a bulbous fairing at the top with a diameter estimated to be 1.7 m in which it may be physically possible to house three to four MIRVs of the Mk-12A type. The warhead fitting into this RV must have dimensions lower than that of the 0.5 m diameter. Has Pakistan managed such a miniature design and if so, how reliable is it?
3. The tests carried out by Pakistan on 28 and 30 May 1998 were all based on highly enriched uranium. Pakistan till-date not carried out any plutonium based weapon tests. The Plutonium route for warhead design is needed for developing smaller warheads required for MIRV. Without testing such a device the design confidence, performance repeatability, as well as system reliability is likely to be low. This raises the question of credibility behind Pakistan’s claims of MIRV developments.
4. A major requirement for a MIRV system will be the Post-Boost Control Vehicle (PBCV). The MIRV’s need to be supported on top of the PBCV, which houses a bank of liquid thrusters for 3-axis stabilization and for providing the axial thrust needed for maneuvers. In addition, each MIRV has to be positioned and released at different times during the trajectory based on the various targets that need to be reached. The MIRVs also act as a thermal protection system for their miniature warheads and protects them from the heat generated during reentry into the atmosphere.
5. The PBCV is essentially a missile stage housing liquid propellant tanks, pressurization tanks and banks of thrusters with intricate plumbing. Though Pakistan has exposure to liquid propulsion technology through the Ghauri missile, the same cannot directly be applied to PBCV. PBCV related developments require expertise in design and fabrication of small thrusters, fabrication of propellant and gas tanks, precision fabrication of valves, high-pressure plumbing, quality control and storable liquid propellants.
From media reports, it would appear that Pakistan has been working on liquid propulsion systems for use on missiles. The coverage of the successful launch of Shaheen-1A in the Dawn Newspaper of 25 April 2012 included a statement that suggested the missile possessed a ‘post-separation attitude control system’ . The post-separation attitude control system (PSAC) is essentially a liquid propulsion package used for providing thrust in the axial direction as well as for stabilizing the RV. RV of Shaheen-2 by extension would incorporate this system. Shaheen-3 flight-tested twice in 2015 is said to have a range of 2750 km. The additional range seems to have been achieved by combining in the PSAC the functions of a third stage as well as stabilization. System engineering from this to a PBCV therefore seems doable.
As argued above, the technical feasibility of a liquid propulsion package is possible, but the possibility of external help either from China or North Korea cannot be ruled out. The fact that design-engineering, testing, qualification and incorporation in three missile systems has been achieved in record time is also indicative of external support including material, component and sub-system supply.
6. The Notice to Mariners issued by the Pakistan Navy earmarks the missile flight range safety zone and in this case the farthest points of the safety zone are located at 1100 km from the launch range at Winder and far short of the claimed range of 2200 km. This could mean that the Ababeel flight of 24 January was a proving test of a new missile system. The lower range was the result of achieved design parameters (e.g. higher inert mass, lower propellant energetics) or by trajectory shaping. One usually expects to test a missile to its the full potential on the first developmental flight and not for a shorter range.
To Conclude
In summary, it would appear that Pakistan is in the process of putting together the building blocks for a MIRV capable missile. However, their assertion of possessing miniaturized warheads is open to doubt. The Chinese transfer of the CHIC-4 nuclear weapon design to Pakistan , which even involved orchestrating a test of the system for Pakistan in 1990, is well documented. According to Thomas Reed, co-author of the book ‘The Nuclear Express – A Political History of the Bomb and Its Proliferation’, the speedy response by Pakistan to the Indian nuclear tests of May 1998 was on account of the fact that they had a ‘carefully engineered device in which they had great confidence’. This confidence emanated from the receipt of the CHIC-4 design, training received by them and the test carried out by China for Pakistan in 1990 . China’s interests today are economic; China is close to achieving big power status; and has no major stake in furthering Pakistani nuclear weapon capability. Pakistan may therefore have to depend upon itself for achieving the required miniaturization of weapon systems for use in MIRVs.
The US has built and tested a large number and variety of weapon systems. Consequently, when they undertake a re-design or reliability upgrade programme, they have reams of test data to back their design effort. In spite of this they have had number of problems and many issues related to safety. The description of accidents during carriage and other near-miss situations that US nuclear weapons have been involved in is lucidly described in the book ‘Command and Control’ authored by Eric Schlosser. Seen in this light, the reliability of an untested weapon system is open to question.
While one can question whether the recent Ababeel can deliver on all the claims made by Pakistan there is no doubt that Pakistan will move towards maneuverable and MIRV missiles to counter Indian BMD systems. From an Indian perspective, it is necessary to continuously monitor and assess the evolution of Pakistan’s capabilities and the connections these capabilities have with Pakistan’s war-making and deterrence strategies. This will ensure that Indian responses are measured, responsible and aligned with Pakistan’s true capabilities.
Missiles from Pakistan, irrespective of the type of warheads they carry pose a problem for India. Their very short flight times make it imperative that India develop systems for the early detection of missile launches for activating Indian countermeasures.. India will need to supplement its ground-based detection with space-based detection systems to better manage shortcomings in early warning capabilities.
Rajaram Nagappa is Professor and Dean of the International Strategic and Security Studies Programme, National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bengaluru. A noted expert on missile technology, Prof. Nagappa has specialized in aerospace propulsion and has worked extensively in the design and development of solid propellant rockets. He has made major research contributions to the analysis of Pakistani ballistic missile production capability. His recent work includes an assessment of Pakistani cruise missiles and an assessment of the Iranian satellite launch vehicle Safir.

An 'expert' who believes that complex weapon systems like ballistic missiles are test-launched for the first time as a 'response', and cannot differentiate between a heat shield and a payload fairing is no better than the news anchors blabbering like baboons.

 

[waz]

An 'expert' who believes that complex weapon systems like ballistic missiles are test-launched for the first time as a 'response', and cannot differentiate between a heat shield and a payload fairing is no better than the news anchors blabbering like baboons.

Don't forget the idiot is flogging the dead horse of Pakistan's "uranium" weapons, when the plutonium program is now what Pakistan's weapons are based off.

 

[Praise Kek]

An 'expert' who believes that complex weapon systems like ballistic missiles are test-launched for the first time as a 'response', and cannot differentiate between a heat shield and a payload fairing is no better than the news anchors blabbering like baboons.

But you yourself said a few pages back that no MIRVs were tested in this particular test.

 

[The Deterrent]

But you yourself said a few pages back that no MIRVs were tested in this particular test.

I'm afraid that you misinterpreted my posts because of inadequate knowledge. It is one thing to not deploy any RV at all, another to jettison MIRVs as multiple RVs around the same target area, and completely another to deploy MIRVs at distinct target areas.

 

[Safriz]

The psychological effect of Ababee MIRVl and Babur,-3 SLACM has been immense upon India.
All their internet experts and media channels were busy trying to find solace in debunking both the above missiles.
They pretend they don't believe Pakistan can have such complex technologies which they don't have. But on the other hand their ABM program has gone on steroids after these two Pakistani tests.

 

[Aylith]

Have to wonder if India is interested in a sea-based ABM capability in response. SM-3 block IIA, fresh off its first successful interception, in its first interception test, has a range of 1500km and an altitude of over 700km. Basing options include shore batteries like Aegis Ashore.

This arrangement is of little benefit to India which faces the dual threat of China and Pakistan being based right on its border, versus Aegis Ashore being aimed at missiles from Iran, Russia and other regional state actors outside of Europe proper, and away from Romania and Poland where Aegis Ashore is based. Fixed, requiring mammoth investments in infrastructure as well as supporting assets, such a setup in India would be a coffin.

However SM-3 can also be based at sea.

PACIFIC OCEAN (Feb. 3, 2017) The U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA), the Japan Ministry of Defense (MoD), and U.S. Navy Sailors aboard the guided-missile destroyer USS John Paul Jones (DDG 53) successfully conducted a flight test Feb. 3 (Hawaii Standard Time), resulting in the first intercept of a ballistic missile target using the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IIA off the west coast of Hawaii.

Not only does this provide greater survivability as the missile is based on a moving ship packed with countermeasures of its own, likely operating as part of a unified fleet, but it affords the ability to respond to a threat profile beyond India too, such as supporting operations in the Western Pacific.

So far India's at sea defense assets include Barak 8, so-so against terminal ballistic missiles, a step down from SM-2Block IV. But the range of a weapon like SM-3 could allow it to reach deep into Pakistani airspace while the launching ship remains outside of the range of all but the most long-legged of Pakistan's aircraft and AShMs, where the range affords the ship and its fleet greater amounts of time to track and respond to incoming threats versus a shore-based system like AAD or Aegis Ashore.

Though in its infanty compared to Russian and American counterparts, and being out-paced by China too, I've no doubt India's national missile defense planners are examining or actively developing a Multi-Object Kill Vehicle analog.

Russia currently uses nuclear interceptors against mass object attacks, but is developing a similar system. China is largely an unknown, while the US uses GMD and is developing a second generation MOKV (Gen 1 shown above) to counter MIRV assaults by peer adversaries. It too previously used nuclear interceptors including the Nike series, Sprint and Spartan.

Pakistan, like Russia facing the threat of PAC-3, THAAD, SM-2 and SM-3 (at sea and on land) can respond through the increased use of quasi-ballistic missiles like NASR or through the increased use of cruise missiles like Ra'ad and Babur, though the survivability of the later is questionable given India's advances and procurement of advanced air-defense systems like Spyder.

Traveling in a depressed trajectory, able to make radical mid-flight maneuvers including top-attack, mirroring a cross between a cruise and ballistic missile, a system like ATACMS or Iskander-M, with a range greater then NASR and greater levels of maneuverability and accuracy would complicate any interception by India markedly. They're able to make unpredictable movements which complicate even the most advanced of fire-control and tracking systems used by ABM missiles, which predict where a target is going to be at a given time and lead themselves towards it, using guidance systems like IIR and MMW radars to keep their eyes on the target and make any necessary corrections to their tracking calculations.

However, especially radical maneuvers can complicate their ability to intercept targets and quasi-ballistic missiles, flight low and fast and being maneuverable, were designed to do just that.

Another option, one Pakistan kind of already has, but one that could see greater levels of sophistication and intelligence, is the use of "smart" cruise missiles able to take radial, unpredictable flight paths and make similar maneuvers. Again, the Russians provide a blueprint with Iskander-K, a missile designed to counter European, American and allied missile defense networks.

Babur is a fair replacement, but its lacks the sophistication and intelligence of the Iskander-K system. Augmenting or updating its brains would go a long way to complicating India's interception capabilities. Norway's JSM is another weapon capable of making radical, random terminal and mid-flight maneuvers designed to complicate tracking and interception.

Ababeel is a good stepping stone, but ultimately I believe it shouldn't represent an operational capability. Rather, it should be a developmental platform to test, evaluate and refine and the technologies of MRV, MaRV, MBRV and MIRV warhead buses, leading to a more refined design later.

Interesting times on either side of the border. Both have options against the other, both are willing to play the long-game and it'll be interesting to watch the steps either takes to improve the calculus in their favor.

Just my two cents.

They pretend they don't believe Pakistan can have such complex technologies which they don't have. But on the other hand their ABM program has gone on steroids after these two Pakistani tests.

Both sides need to work more. India's ABM capabilities are lacking against the complex array of targets Pakistan and China can throw at them, but then, Pakistan has more work to do to demonstrate a valid MIRV capability which is still largely questionable.

Both sides are making progress and the real test is who can make greater progress more quickly, outpacing the other and seizing a critical advantage for themselves?

An 'expert' who believes that complex weapon systems like ballistic missiles are test-launched for the first time as a 'response', and cannot differentiate between a heat shield and a payload fairing

The analysis have been juvenile at best, that's true. But it also can be difficult to tell the difference between a cap-shroud (as opposed to the clam-shell design of the GBI system) and heat-shield.

A close look, even by an amateur like myself clearly indicates Ababeel is making use of cap-style payload shroud like Peacekeeper or Jupiter and not a single, unitary MRV or warhead utilizing a heat shield for re-entry, unlike Jupiter-C where the nose-cone did reenter along with the warhead and featured an ablative heat shield. Jupiter-C was a developmental program however, designed to test materials to be used on MIRV warheads in later programs and was not an operational missile system (research yes, but military no).

France's retired S3 IRBM also helps show this. Without the cutaway it can be a tad difficult to tell the difference, though that doesn't excuse the amateurish assessments being made either. Generally the warhead itself is encased in its own heat shield, which again, S3 shows.

Any MIRV and most MBRVs do not have heat shields around their warhead bus, just hardened warheads themselves as the shroud will be jettisoned long before reentry. Of course I don't need to tell you this, given how well versed you are on the matter, but it's a helpful reminder for others too.

 

[Incog_nito]

Pakistan needs to work properly on space program and on ballastic missiles.

 

[The Accountant]

Does Pakistan’s Ababeel Medium Range Ballistic Missile Really Have MIRV Capability?
3429 By Rajaram Nagappa - February 3, 2017

It is not unusual to see news of a Pakistani ballistic missile launch close on the heels of an Indian ballistic missile event. The launch of Agni 5 took place on 26 December last year followed by the launch of Agni 4 a week later. For the Pakistani missile establishment, the year 2016 was a comparatively quiet year and one did expect a response to the Agni launches. Sure enough, Pakistan carried out a missile test – it was not another training or pre-deployment test of Shaheen 2 or Shaheen 3, but the test of a new missile called Ababeel on 24 January 2017. The missile is claimed to have a range of 2200 km and is said to be capable of carrying Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRV).
Unlike the Shaheen 2, the new missile has three stages. The Ababeel thermal fairing (heat shield) has a larger diameter than its core vehicle. The extra volume thus available is consistent with the requirements for MIRV capabilities. It must however, be noted that there are a number of technical constraints that have to be overcome before one can infer that Pakistan has succeeded in developing MIRV capability.
MIRV, as the name implies replaces a unitary warhead with a larger number of smaller warheads, with each of them programmed for different targets. It is therefore a more potent and powerful attack system. In a global scenario where a number of countries are developing Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) Systems, MIRV capability is needed to overwhelm such defences. Many BMD systems have capability limitations when it comes to dealing with multiple incoming warheads and may fail to engage all of them. By increasing the number of warheads along with decoys deployed with the real ones, BMD systems can be saturated. The US and Russia field such MIRV weapon systems and the numbers they field are governed by the strategic arms limitation treaty between them. The Chinese are also said to have incorporated MIRV in their DF 5, DF-31 and the JL 2 (the submarine launched version of the DF-31) ballistic missiles.
Over the last several years India has carried out a number of tests related to terminal phase BMD. These involve the interception of the warhead outside the atmosphere just before the re-entry of the incoming missile. For a country confronted with such an adversary, developing MIRV capability is the logical technology growth route to follow. One is therefore not surprised if Pakistan were to adopt such a route.
The rhetoric in the Pakistani establishment against Indian ABM capability is indicative of this. Sartaj Aziz, Pakistan’s advisor on Foreign Affairs is reported to have commented in June last year that India’s testing of anti ballistic missile system could lead to ‘unexpected complications’ . He is further stated to have told the Pakistani senate that Pakistan has serious concerns over these developments and will take ‘all necessary measures to augment its defence capabilities’.
Has Pakistan really overcome the technological challenges?
Though it is easy to express a need for the development of MIRV capabilities realizing it requires significant advances in a number of key technologies. The question to ask before we come to any conclusion is ‘Has Pakistan been able to master and overcome all the technical issues?’ In this regard, a critical assessment of the following issues is particularly necessary.
1. Weapon miniaturization: For MIRV requirements both the warhead and the re-entry vehicle (RV) need to be smaller and lighter. The US Minuteman-3 missile warhead had three Mk-12A RVs. The RVs had a base diameter of about 0.5 metre (m) and a length of approximately 1.81 m. Three such RVs could be accommodated within the missile shroud, which had a diameter of approximately 1 m.
2. Ababeel has a bulbous fairing at the top with a diameter estimated to be 1.7 m in which it may be physically possible to house three to four MIRVs of the Mk-12A type. The warhead fitting into this RV must have dimensions lower than that of the 0.5 m diameter. Has Pakistan managed such a miniature design and if so, how reliable is it?
3. The tests carried out by Pakistan on 28 and 30 May 1998 were all based on highly enriched uranium. Pakistan till-date not carried out any plutonium based weapon tests. The Plutonium route for warhead design is needed for developing smaller warheads required for MIRV. Without testing such a device the design confidence, performance repeatability, as well as system reliability is likely to be low. This raises the question of credibility behind Pakistan’s claims of MIRV developments.
4. A major requirement for a MIRV system will be the Post-Boost Control Vehicle (PBCV). The MIRV’s need to be supported on top of the PBCV, which houses a bank of liquid thrusters for 3-axis stabilization and for providing the axial thrust needed for maneuvers. In addition, each MIRV has to be positioned and released at different times during the trajectory based on the various targets that need to be reached. The MIRVs also act as a thermal protection system for their miniature warheads and protects them from the heat generated during reentry into the atmosphere.
5. The PBCV is essentially a missile stage housing liquid propellant tanks, pressurization tanks and banks of thrusters with intricate plumbing. Though Pakistan has exposure to liquid propulsion technology through the Ghauri missile, the same cannot directly be applied to PBCV. PBCV related developments require expertise in design and fabrication of small thrusters, fabrication of propellant and gas tanks, precision fabrication of valves, high-pressure plumbing, quality control and storable liquid propellants.
From media reports, it would appear that Pakistan has been working on liquid propulsion systems for use on missiles. The coverage of the successful launch of Shaheen-1A in the Dawn Newspaper of 25 April 2012 included a statement that suggested the missile possessed a ‘post-separation attitude control system’ . The post-separation attitude control system (PSAC) is essentially a liquid propulsion package used for providing thrust in the axial direction as well as for stabilizing the RV. RV of Shaheen-2 by extension would incorporate this system. Shaheen-3 flight-tested twice in 2015 is said to have a range of 2750 km. The additional range seems to have been achieved by combining in the PSAC the functions of a third stage as well as stabilization. System engineering from this to a PBCV therefore seems doable.
As argued above, the technical feasibility of a liquid propulsion package is possible, but the possibility of external help either from China or North Korea cannot be ruled out. The fact that design-engineering, testing, qualification and incorporation in three missile systems has been achieved in record time is also indicative of external support including material, component and sub-system supply.
6. The Notice to Mariners issued by the Pakistan Navy earmarks the missile flight range safety zone and in this case the farthest points of the safety zone are located at 1100 km from the launch range at Winder and far short of the claimed range of 2200 km. This could mean that the Ababeel flight of 24 January was a proving test of a new missile system. The lower range was the result of achieved design parameters (e.g. higher inert mass, lower propellant energetics) or by trajectory shaping. One usually expects to test a missile to its the full potential on the first developmental flight and not for a shorter range.
To Conclude
In summary, it would appear that Pakistan is in the process of putting together the building blocks for a MIRV capable missile. However, their assertion of possessing miniaturized warheads is open to doubt. The Chinese transfer of the CHIC-4 nuclear weapon design to Pakistan , which even involved orchestrating a test of the system for Pakistan in 1990, is well documented. According to Thomas Reed, co-author of the book ‘The Nuclear Express – A Political History of the Bomb and Its Proliferation’, the speedy response by Pakistan to the Indian nuclear tests of May 1998 was on account of the fact that they had a ‘carefully engineered device in which they had great confidence’. This confidence emanated from the receipt of the CHIC-4 design, training received by them and the test carried out by China for Pakistan in 1990 . China’s interests today are economic; China is close to achieving big power status; and has no major stake in furthering Pakistani nuclear weapon capability. Pakistan may therefore have to depend upon itself for achieving the required miniaturization of weapon systems for use in MIRVs.
The US has built and tested a large number and variety of weapon systems. Consequently, when they undertake a re-design or reliability upgrade programme, they have reams of test data to back their design effort. In spite of this they have had number of problems and many issues related to safety. The description of accidents during carriage and other near-miss situations that US nuclear weapons have been involved in is lucidly described in the book ‘Command and Control’ authored by Eric Schlosser. Seen in this light, the reliability of an untested weapon system is open to question.
While one can question whether the recent Ababeel can deliver on all the claims made by Pakistan there is no doubt that Pakistan will move towards maneuverable and MIRV missiles to counter Indian BMD systems. From an Indian perspective, it is necessary to continuously monitor and assess the evolution of Pakistan’s capabilities and the connections these capabilities have with Pakistan’s war-making and deterrence strategies. This will ensure that Indian responses are measured, responsible and aligned with Pakistan’s true capabilities.
Missiles from Pakistan, irrespective of the type of warheads they carry pose a problem for India. Their very short flight times make it imperative that India develop systems for the early detection of missile launches for activating Indian countermeasures.. India will need to supplement its ground-based detection with space-based detection systems to better manage shortcomings in early warning capabilities.
Rajaram Nagappa is Professor and Dean of the International Strategic and Security Studies Programme, National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bengaluru. A noted expert on missile technology, Prof. Nagappa has specialized in aerospace propulsion and has worked extensively in the design and development of solid propellant rockets. He has made major research contributions to the analysis of Pakistani ballistic missile production capability. His recent work includes an assessment of Pakistani cruise missiles and an assessment of the Iranian satellite launch vehicle Safir.

Pakistan has already achieved miniturisation of warhead through nasar ... so wakeup man ... your denial mode will not change realities of the world ...

 

[Safriz]

You know what, this one was called Ababeel-1 and not Hatf or Shaheen with some number.
This is a new series of Missiles , and there will be Ababeel-2 .
The movie has just started.

 

[Ultima Thule]

TBH no MIRVs were tested in the Ababeel test in January.

how do you Know? are you a fake Indian expert

 

[asimnabeel0]

Masha allah , long live pakistan

 

[kabooter_maila]

TBH no MIRVs were tested in the Ababeel test in January.

Good for you! At least you should have no worries now after your 'honest' finding. Why all other Indians have loose motions then? Please try convincing them with your incredible discovery.

 

[Comrade]

Nice missile.....

 

[sparten]

The problem with Mid-Course interception for MIRV missile is that it is not practicable, at least for a ground based system. The way an MIRV bus works is that it is launched on a trajectory, like a Single warhead. So far so good. But the defensive system still has to acquire and target and vector the interceptor to the bus. Which means

i) Has to make a fire solution.
ii) Once that is done, it has to go through the entire atmosphere and defeat the force of gravity.
i, can see time improved with improved processing times; ii, is an inherent limitation, esepcially in the thicker lower atmosphere.

Making it worse while a Single Warhead will travel to its target on a known trajectory; an MIRV bus has motors/engines for thrust. It will release one RV, then burn to put itself on a different trajectory for the next RV release, burn again, release and so on until the warheads are all on their way. So the fire solution that I have mentioned above, is only good for the bus in cruise before it has released its warheads, or more accurately before its first burn to release warhead no 2. Afterwards, the Interceptor's firing solution will no longer be valid.

Not to mention when the first warhead hits; everyone on the ground is going to stop worrying about destroyed the incoming RV's and start trying not to die.

This is not even considering making a burn late in the Bus's coast and only then releasing the first RV. That takes care of that for any interceptor.

 

[The SC]

No personal comments

I read your all posts.

only this one is where you made something relevant to thread.



Going by the limit of NAVERA warning it means only one warhead was used.

If MIRVd
The missile is 3 staged and one PBV. This means the missile has released the RV somewhere close to 1500kms from Launchpad. And the PBV travelled another 300 kms to reach the hostile airspace. so not it is at 1800 kms.

For RVs to reach and hit 2200km mark , it should be released NOW. Because the ballistic coefficient (ß) needs to be between 1000 -5000 other wise either the warhead will burn while re entry or will lose the speed and fall off the sky( ß = lower than 1000) taking shape to be conical/blunt. The RV with above coefficient would travel another 280-310 kms before hitting the zone.

Now:
There won't be time left to release another two warheads as they will now either burn while re entry or not fall on the target or bounce back in space.

So there fore this missile for surely tested with single warhead/ no warhead.

Because this distance is too short for a ballistic coefficient (ß) to be between 1000-5000 which modern MIRV warheads have. The warhead will burn in the atmosphere during re entry because the angle of attack would be steep close to 75 degrees for this distance. And there won't be much time left to release the second one as the angle would be steeper or too flat.

This is why MIRV is used for ICBM or 3000+ km range! But for MRV equation is balanced.

Pakistani scientists know this beta coefficient, that is why they have tested let's say only one IRV from the 3 (with 2 others absent from the test) for the distance of the test _1200 km_ just to validate how MIRVs are injected in their individual suborbital trajectories, does that make sense to you NOW ?