1973 Ramadan war: Plans of liquidation of the "gap" - comprehensive "Chaamil" plan

[Ceylal]

Sadat went to war not to reconquérir what Egypt lost in 67, but to establish himself as a full Egyptian leader. His felt diminished y his skin color and said it himself in his book, being a Nubi, he wanted to earn his rightful place among the Egyptian élite, who looked dawn on him as an inferior Egyptian.
He went to war for that purpose, he lied to his army ( and the devastation that followed the removal of shazly)and he lied to the Muslim states that reinforced the Egyptian, and mainly Syria who paid a dear price...to this day!
We can hash and rehash the Egyptian/Israelis wars, disect them, and revisit them thru the eyes of the one who participated in different level and different areas and who had occupied important positions in their respective government, who wrote books or gave interviews, all of them without exception, came to the same conclusion, that Egypt lost every war with Israel and the worst of the defeat is that of 73 , here Egypt not only lost, but gave its sovereignty on a swath of her territories , and sold all the countries that helped her ..by transferring large quantities of military equipments, for the US and indirectly to Israel to train against..

 

[The SC]

1. "Israel's victory came at the cost of heavy casualties, and Israelis criticized the government's lack of preparedness." :
YOM KIPPUR WAR: OCTOBER 1973
When the fourth Arab-Israeli war began on October 6, 1973, many of Israel’s soldiers were away from their posts observing Yom Kippur (or Day of Atonement), and the Arab armies made impressive advances with their up-to-date Soviet weaponry. Iraqi forces soon joined the war, and Syria received support from Jordan. After several days, Israel was fully mobilized, and the Israel Defense Forces began beating back the Arab gains at a heavy cost to soldiers and equipment. A U.S. airlift of arms aided Israel’s cause, but President Richard Nixon (1913-94) delayed the emergency military aid for a week as a tacit signal of U.S. sympathy for Egypt. On October 25, an Egyptian-Israeli cease-fire was secured by the United Nations.

YOM KIPPUR WAR: AFTERMATH
Israel’s victory came at the cost of heavy casualties, and Israelis criticized the government’s lack of preparedness. In April 1974, the nation’s prime minister, Golda Meir (1898-1978), stepped down.

Although Egypt had again suffered military defeat at the hands of its Jewish neighbor, the initial Egyptian successes greatly enhanced Sadat’s prestige in the Middle East and gave him an opportunity to seek peace. In 1974, the first of two Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreements providing for the return of portions of the Sinai to Egypt were signed, and in 1979 Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin (1913-92) signed the first peace agreement between Israel and one of its Arab neighbors. In 1982, Israel fulfilled the 1979 peace treaty by returning the last segment of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt.

For Syria, the Yom Kippur War was a disaster. The unexpected Egyptian-Israeli cease-fire exposed Syria to military defeat, and Israel seized even more territory in the Golan Heights. In 1979, Syria voted with other Arab states to expel Egypt from the Arab League.

2. "The 1973 war thus ended in an Israeli victory, but at great cost to the United States."
The 1973 Arab-Israeli War
The 1973 Arab-Israeli War was a watershed for U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East. It forced the Nixon administration to realize that Arab frustration over Israel’s unwillingness to withdraw from the territories it had occupied in 1967 could have major strategic consequences for the United States. The war thus paved the way for Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s “shuttle diplomacy” and ultimately, the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty of 1979.

The Nixon Administration and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969–1973

President Richard Nixon came into office convinced that the Arab-Israeli standoff over the fate of the occupied territories could damage America’s standing in the Arab world and undermine prospects for U.S.-Soviet détente. In attempt to break the deadlock, he ordered Secretary of State William Rogers to negotiate with the Soviets on the parameters of a Middle East settlement, with the goal of reaching an agreement that each superpower could sell to its regional clients. By December 1969, however, the Soviet Union, Egypt, and Israel had all rejected the so-called “Rogers Plan,” which called for Israeli to withdraw to the 1949 armistice lines, with “insubstantial alterations,” in return for peace.

The failure of the Rogers Plan led Nixon to suspend efforts to reach a settlement with the Soviets and lent credence to National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger’s argument that the United States should not push Israel for concessions so long as Egypt, the leading Arab state, remained aligned with the Soviets. In the summer of 1970, Nixon broke with Kissinger and allowed Rogers to present a more limited initiative to halt the Israeli-Egyptian “War of Attrition” along the Suez Canal, in which the Soviets had become militarily involved. “Rogers II,” which called for Israel and Egypt to agree to a three month ceasefire and negotiations under the auspices of U.N. mediator Gunnar Jarring, was accepted by both parties, who stopped fighting on August 7. Yet Nixon’s appetite for diplomacy was spoiled by Egyptian and Soviet efforts to move anti-aircraft missiles closer to the Canal and Syrian intervention in Jordan’s civil war. Until February 1971, Kissinger’s arguments against prematurely rewarding Soviet clients again held sway.

In February 1971, however, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat presented the Nixon administration with a new opportunity for Arab-Israeli peacemaking. Sadat proposed that Egypt would reopen the Suez Canal if the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) pulled back from the Canal’s east bank and later agreed to a timetable for further withdrawals. He also indicated that he would renounce all claims of belligerency against Israel if the IDF withdrew to the international border. Rogers’ efforts to capitalize on Sadat’s statements by working toward an interim settlement, however, were opposed by the Israelis, and received little support from Kissinger and Nixon. Kissinger believed that Egyptian proposals for an interim settlement, along with a Soviet peace plan tabled that September, would be rejected by the Israelis, and did not want discord over the Middle East to undermine efforts at détente before the Moscow summit of May 1972. For Nixon, such reasoning was reinforced by a desire to avoid a crisis in U.S.-Israeli relations before the 1972 presidential elections.

In the wake of the Moscow summit, where the Americans and the Soviets deliberately avoided discussing the Middle East, Sadat made two more moves to get the Nixon administration to break the Arab-Israeli stalemate. In July 1972, he decided to expel Soviet military advisors from Egypt, and opened a backchannel to Kissinger through Hafiz Isma‘il, his national security advisor. In February 1973, Isma‘il met with Kissinger and informed him that Egypt would be willing to sign a separate peace agreement with Israel that could involve demilitarized zones on both sides of the international border and peacekeepers in sensitive locations like Sharm al-Shaykh. However, Egyptian-Israeli normalization would have to wait until Israel withdrew from all the territories it had conquered in 1967. The Israelis responded haltingly, and Nixon and Kissinger made little effort to change their minds. Despite Sadat’s public displays of frustration, as well as warnings from Jordan’s King Hussein and Soviet Secretary-General Leonid Brezhnev, Nixon and Kissinger believed that given the military balance, Egypt and Syria would not attack Israel, a view supported by much of the U.S. intelligence community. Until the fall of 1973, the President and Kissinger held that any American diplomatic initiative would have to wait until after Israel’s elections that October.

The War and its Consequences

On October 6, 1973, Egypt and Syria attacked Israel’s forces in the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights. Despite initial Israeli setbacks, Kissinger, now both Secretary of State and National Security Advisor, believed that Israel would win quickly. He feared that a rout of the Arabs could force the Soviets to intervene, raising their prestige in the Arab world and damaging détente. Thus, he proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union call for an end to the fighting and a return to the 1967 ceasefire lines. The Soviets, who were uneager to intervene on behalf of their clients, agreed, but the Egyptians rejected the ceasefire proposal. Wanting to avoid both an Arab defeat and military intervention, the Soviets then began to resupply Egypt and Syria with weapons. By October 9, following a failed IDF counter-attack against Egypt’s forces, the Israelis requested that America do the same for them. Not wanting to see Israel defeated, Nixon agreed, and American planes carrying weapons began arriving in Israel on October 14.

With the American airlift underway, the fighting turned against the Arabs. On October 16, IDF units crossed the Suez Canal. Sadat began to show interest in a ceasefire, leading Brezhnev to invite Kissinger to Moscow to negotiate an agreement. A U.S.-Soviet proposal for a ceasefire followed by peace talks was adopted by the UN Security Council as Resolution 338 on October 22. Afterward, however, Kissinger flew to Tel Aviv, where he told the Israelis that the United States would not object if the IDF continued to advance while he flew back to Washington. When Kissinger returned to the United States, he agreed to a Soviet request to seek another ceasefire resolution, which the Security Council adopted on October 23. Yet the Israelis still refused to stop. On October 24, Brezhnev sent Nixon a hotline message suggesting that the United States and the Soviet Union send troops to Egypt to “implement” the ceasefire. If Nixon chose not to do so, Brezhnev threatened, “We should be faced with the necessity urgently to consider the question of taking appropriate steps unilaterally.” The United States responded by putting its nuclear forces on worldwide alert on October 25. By the end of the day, the crisis abated when the Security Council adopted Resolution 340, which called for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of all forces to their October 22 positions, and U.N. observers and peacekeepers to monitor the ceasefire. This time, the Israelis accepted the resolution.

The 1973 war thus ended in an Israeli victory, but at great cost to the United States. Though the war did not scuttle détente, it nevertheless brought the United States closer to a nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union than at any point since the Cuban missile crisis. The American military airlift to Israel, moreover, had led Arab oil producers to embargo oil shipments to the United States and some Western European countries, causing international economic upheaval. The stage was set for Kissinger to make a major effort at Arab-Israeli peacemaking.

3. (p. 6) "For most Egyptians the war is remembered as an unquestionable victory- militarily as well as politically ... The fact that the war ended with Israeli troops stationed in the outskirts of Cairo and in complete encirclement of the Egyptian third army has not dampened the jubilant commemoration of the war in Egypt." (p 11) "Ultimately, the conflict provided a military victory for Israel, but it is remembered as 'the earthquake' or 'the blunder'"
The Yom Kippur War: Politics, Legacy, Diplomacy
Asaf Siniver

4. "the Arab has suffered repeated military defeats at the hand of Israel in 1956, 1967, and 1973"
The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Guide for the Perplexed Ian Bickerton

5. among-st the greatest evidences I presented here is this one:

According to Chernyaev, on 4 Nov 1973, the Soviet leader Brezhnev said:

We have offered them (the Arabs) a sensible way for so many years. But no, they wanted to fight. Fine! We gave them technology, the latest, the kind even Vietnam didn’t have. They had double superiority in tanks and aircraft, triple in artillery, and in air defense and anti-tank weapons they had absolute supremacy. And what? Once again they were beaten. Once again they scrammed [sic]. Once again they screamed for us to come save them. Sadat woke me up in the middle of the night twice over the phone, "Save me!" He demanded to send Soviet troops, and immediately! No! We are not going to fight for them.
Anatoly Chernyaev. "Diary of Anatoly Chernyaev, 1973" National Security Archive. National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 430. p. 69.(so you don't accidentally miss it)


I could literally use only my last example to end this stupid debate here and now but I still brought up 4 more only for the heck of it, now I personally don't see the Yom Kippur victory as something glorious for all the young men whose lives were lost, but a victory non-the-less. I rest my case habibi move along now.

General Aharon Yariv, former director of Israeli military intelligence, says:

There is no doubt that the Arabs have emerged victorious from the war. As we came out we were crushed and weak.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Here is the full 1973 diary of Anatoly Chernyaev

Where he talks about:
Brezhnev: "They can go to hell! We have offered them a sensible way for so many years.
But no, they wanted to fight. Fine! We gave them technology, the latest, the kind even
Vietnam didn’t have. They had double superiority in tanks and aircraft, triple in artillery, and in air defense and anti-tank weapons they had absolute supremacy. And what? Once again they were beaten. Once again they scrammed. Once again they screamed for us to come save them. Sadat woke me up in the middle of the night twice over the phone, “Save me!” He demanded to send Soviet troops, and immediately! No! We are not going to fight for them. The people would not understand that. And especially we will not start a world war because of them. So that’s that. We will act like I said."

A statement that totally contradicts this one:

"If Nixon chose not to do so, Brezhnev threatened, “We should be faced with the necessity urgently to consider the question of taking appropriate steps unilaterally.” The United States responded by putting its nuclear forces on worldwide alert on October 25."

Plus

A U.S.-Soviet proposal for a ceasefire followed by peace talks was adopted by the UN Security Council as Resolution 338 on October 22. Afterward, however, Kissinger flew to Tel Aviv, where he told the Israelis that the United States would not object if the IDF continued to advance while he flew back to Washington.
The Yom Kippur War: Politics, Legacy, Diplomacy
Asaf Siniver
http://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB430/Chernyaev 1973 final PDF version.pdf
These are politics, on which you can't conclude any outcome.and all of it has happened before the subject of this thread..
Near Cairo is an obvious joke..the IDF was contained in a few km west of the Suez canal.. take a look at the maps and stop believing in your BS statement from propaganda articles..

This thread is about military facts of the war, militarily speaking..Where all the Usraeli forces positions are shown on maps, and the ready Arab forces to destroy them..This is the only truth and fact that forced IDF to retreat in order to save its soldiers from total destruction..

 

[Ilay]

There is just no way to put this in your head is it? Attacking us on the holiest day of the year for the Jews on two separate fonts with with assisting forces from Morocco, Algeria, Libya, pilots from North Korea, Soviet AA crews, Egypt, delayed Jordanian forces,terror attacks from Lebanon, Syrian army, Cuban infantry, Iraqi army, volunteers from Muslim nations like Pakistan and in the end we still had forces closer to Damascus and Cairo since from before the war had started, explain me this. Arabs had royally screwed-up what could have been an astonishing victory and made it into another typical failure as expected of their nations. Arab Victory... sure thing. All the while Sadat has been rubbing it in his people faces as reasons for his dictatorship he ran off and singed the peace treaty and had been filled with bullets for doing so by his own people.

 

[The SC]

There is just no way to put this in your head is it? Attacking us on the holiest day of the year for the Jews on two separate fonts with with assisting forces from Morocco, Algeria, Libya, pilots from North Korea, Soviet AA crews, Egypt, delayed Jordanian forces,terror attacks from Lebanon, Syrian army, Cuban infantry, Iraqi army, volunteers from Muslim nations like Pakistan and in the end we still had forces closer to Damascus and Cairo since from before the war had started, explain me this. Arabs had royally screwed-up what could have been an astonishing victory and made it into another typical failure as expected of their nations. Arab Victory... sure thing. All the while Sadat has been rubbing it in his people faces as reasons for his dictatorship he ran off and singed the peace treaty and had been filled with bullets for doing so by his own people.

Noway you can put it in your head that you have lost the war.. all the Arab forces that have joined in were symbolic.. you have lost the war in 6 hours..and continued to try to prove yourselves..to no avail..
this was your Military intelligence chief saying it:

General Aharon Yariv, former director of Israeli military intelligence, says:

There is no doubt that the Arabs have emerged victorious from the war. As we came out we were crushed and weak.

So just swallow your false pride and go play with kids somewhere else..there is nothing more to be said.. go talk to your General and try to convince him with your empty and arrogant opinion..

 

[MastanKhan]

General Aharon Yariv, former director of Israeli military intelligence, says:

There is no doubt that the Arabs have emerged victorious from the war. As we came out we were crushed and weak.

Hi

Believe in it at your own peril.

 

[The SC]

Hi

Believe in it at your own peril.

What do you mean? I want to hear your opinion or facts on what you based your comment..
It is not only him who said that.. just too many Usraeli and foreign personalities said the same..

 

[Ceylal]

What do you mean? I want to hear your opinion or facts on what you based your comment..
It is not only him who said that.. just too many Usraeli and foreign personalities said the same..

Israel is the friend of KSA, you should obey your king and write the name of Israel as it is spelt...There is no such a word as USrael...Israel help KSA in destroying everything that was arms worthy of Yemen, that kept the Houthis from chewing Kat in Riyadh .

 

[Ilay]

Noway you can put it in your head that you have lost the war.. all the Arab forces that have joined in were symbolic.. you have lost the war in 6 hours..and continued to try to prove yourselves..to no avail..
this was your Military intelligence chief saying it:

General Aharon Yariv, former director of Israeli military intelligence, says:

There is no doubt that the Arabs have emerged victorious from the war. As we came out we were crushed and weak.

So just swallow your false pride and go play with kids somewhere else..there is nothing more to be said.. go talk to your General and try to convince him with your empty and arrogant opinion..

Habibi, I still haven't heard your answer - If we lost the war "lost the war in 6 hours", then why were we close to Cairo and Damascus then we were ever before? I mean "we lost" then how could we possibly be fighting in Africa outskirts of Damascus? How haven't the Egyptians had Sinai within those 6 hours or the Syrians didn't have the Golan in those 6 hours (and managed to keep it that way obviously) if we had "lost"?

Israel is the friend of KSA, you should obey your king and write the name of Israel as it is spelt...There is no such a word as USrael...Israel help KSA in destroying everything that was arms worthy of Yemen, that kept the Houthis from chewing Kat in Riyadh .

The Arabs nationals like Naser or the stuck-up rich monarchs from the Arabian Peninsula used to do everything within their power to attempt to destroy Israel - now they all serve quietly beneath the Zionists and are happy this way. The only thing this Saudi has in his power to do is saying "Usrael" instead of Israel... ohhh what a rebel.

 

[The SC]

Habibi, I still haven't heard your answer - If we lost the war "lost the war in 6 hours", then why were we close to Cairo and Damascus then we were ever before? I mean "we lost" then how could we possibly be fighting in Africa outskirts of Damascus? How haven't the Egyptians had Sinai within those 6 hours or the Syrians didn't have the Golan in those 6 hours (and managed to keep it that way obviously) if we had "lost"?


The Arabs nationals like Naser or the stuck-up rich monarchs from the Arabian Peninsula used to do everything within their power to attempt to destroy Israel - now they all serve quietly beneath the Zionists and are happy this way. The only thing this Saudi has in his power to do is saying "Usrael" instead of Israel... ohhh what a rebel.

Because that is a lie you like to turn in your head.. IDF was stopped at Syrian borders and could not advance, while taking heavy causalities.. in Egypt it was worst yet, the whole IDF forces were trapped near and around the gap.... read the first articles of this thread till it sinks in your head that you were defeated in 1973..

 

[Ilay]

Because that is a lie you like to turn in your head.. IDF was stopped at Syrian borders and could not advance, while taking heavy causalities.. in Egypt it was worst yet , the whole IDF forces were trapped near and around the gap.... read the first articles of this thread till it sinks in your head that you were defeated in 1973..

Ahhh but the third army which stopped advancing, taking heavier casualties then the Israelis on both fronts by 5-7.5 time more and surrounded with Sadat unwilling to head his generals and fall back - was somehow in a better position? And don't Start again with the "third army was having no problems what-so-ever with being surrounded" thinking of yours, its clear that you've never had any military experience to understand how lack of logistics and future tactics to the rest of the war will leave your plans crumbling when don't have any back-up plans if the situation is getting out-of-hand. If the Egyptian army was so successful then why couldn't they keep on and on with advancing inside the Sinai? What was stopping them, why not take it all instead of a few kilometers behind the canal? It was the Israeli rapid advancement towards Cairo is what made Sadat question his life choices when he realized his plan wasn't going how he came crawling humiliated and signed the cease-fire.

 

[The SC]

Israel recognizes the mistakes of its defeat in the October 1973 war

Head of State, Reuven Rivlin

"Voice of Israel" radio, Broadcast the Israeli president's remarks, Roovin Rivlin made on Sunday, he said that during the Yom Kippur War "October 1973" witnessed significant errors within the army and the Israeli leadership, the most important was to underestimate the enemy, "the Egyptian army."

He explained during the military ceremony which was held on Mount Herzl in Jerusalem, that the most important mistakes committed by the army of Israel was excessive vanity and disdain for the capabilities of the enemy and the lack of training and preparation of Israel's soldiers to fight against a strong army.

The Israeli President added, that after 41 years of the October war, we can not forgive or pardon the mistakes we made, and we do not have the time to search for negligence or accusation of the perpetrators of the defeat, but we must draw examples and lessons from the mistakes of the past.

For his part, the Israeli Defense Minister, Moshe Yaalon, said we should benefit from the lessons of the past, especially the war lessons of the Yom Kippur, stressing not to walk towards intellectual tyranny, and the need for permanent dialogue with all parties, particularly with regard to current events in the Middle East.

 

[MastanKhan]

What do you mean? I want to hear your opinion or facts on what you based your comment..
It is not only him who said that.. just too many Usraeli and foreign personalities said the same..

Hi,

Thanks for asking and not getting upset at me for my comments---.

When an israeli general commends the efforts of the arabs---his commendations are based on perception that the israelis have of the arab armies---.

Let me explain it in a scale of numbers of 1---10---where 1 is the worst and 10 is the best.

Obviously israel is a 10---and what their perception of arab armies is---it is anywhere from a 3 to a 5----so when the arab army of egypt performed between 6.5 to a 7---it shook the israeli up quite a bit---.

And for that they get the praise---.

The 2nd part of the equation is the deceit behind the praise---and that is most important---

A praise like that to someone who is of fickle personality will make him believe that he really is something---a superstar---which the arabs are---and in that belief they would not want to excel further from where they have gotten to---they will live satisfied with that praise and be content---.

And if you look at the israelis---they are working at 110% day in day out--to be better and better and better---and where are the arabs---still happily living out that praise.

 

[The SC]

Hi,

Thanks for asking and not getting upset at me for my comments---.

When an israeli general commends the efforts of the arabs---his commendations are based on perception that the israelis have of the arab armies---.

Let me explain it in a scale of numbers of 1---10---where 1 is the worst and 10 is the best.

Obviously israel is a 10---and what their perception of arab armies is---it is anywhere from a 3 to a 5----so when the arab army of egypt performed between 6.5 to a 7---it shook the israeli up quite a bit---.

And for that they get the praise---.

The 2nd part of the equation is the deceit behind the praise---and that is most important---

A praise like that to someone who is of fickle personality will make him believe that he really is something---a superstar---which the arabs are---and in that belief they would not want to excel further from where they have gotten to---they will live satisfied with that praise and be content---.

And if you look at the israelis---they are working at 110% day in day out--to be better and better and better---and where are the arabs---still happily living out that praise.

I got the praise part on the spot.. but the IDF perception thing for Arab armies was at 0 in that scale and them were at 10, when in reality they found themselves at 6 or 7 or lower and the Egyptians at 9 they had the shock of their lives (call to states for urgent help, Nuclear threats...etc) i can bring you much more testimonies from the leading military, political and intellectual Usraelis attesting to it from that time on....
The Arabs are not that gullible, the are some of the most suspicious creatures about praise, mostly if it comes from Usraelis
And as you can see from the tip of the iceberg on the Arab threads, they are working very hard to advance too.. there is a whole lot more to it than what you can see here on PDF.. You know that 2030 vision..it concerns every Arab nation..They are all working on their versions of it..

Cheers

PS: I never get mad at you, because we can discuss subjects objectively and realistically..

 

[Ilay]

Israel recognizes the mistakes of its defeat in the October 1973 war

View attachment 421380
Head of State, Reuven Rivlin

"Voice of Israel" radio, Broadcast the Israeli president's remarks, Roovin Rivlin made on Sunday, he said that during the Yom Kippur War "October 1973" witnessed significant errors within the army and the Israeli leadership, the most important was to underestimate the enemy, "the Egyptian army."

He explained during the military ceremony which was held on Mount Herzl in Jerusalem, that the most important mistakes committed by the army of Israel was excessive vanity and disdain for the capabilities of the enemy and the lack of training and preparation of Israel's soldiers to fight against a strong army.

The Israeli President added, that after 41 years of the October war, we can not forgive or pardon the mistakes we made, and we do not have the time to search for negligence or accusation of the perpetrators of the defeat, but we must draw examples and lessons from the mistakes of the past.

For his part, the Israeli Defense Minister, Moshe Yaalon, said we should benefit from the lessons of the past, especially the war lessons of the Yom Kippur, stressing not to walk towards intellectual tyranny, and the need for permanent dialogue with all parties, particularly with regard to current events in the Middle East.

Rivlin is a far-left politician that for some reasons of being beloved by many top-brass Israeli parliament members has gotten to the symbolic position of a president and made many idiotic statements so far, he has neither military expertise what-so-ever with him nor any connections to the decision makers of that war. The only defeat in that war was the collapse of the "Bar-Lev line". And @MastanKhan was correct in the perception of the Israelis towards the Egyptians in that war - we completely overestimated ourselves and got bitten in the a*s 'cuz of it when the surprise attack had begun yet keeping level headed we shifted the odds back at them.

 

[MastanKhan]

I got the praise part on the spot.. but the IDF perception thing for Arab armies was at 0 in that scale and them were at 10, when in reality they found themselves at 6 or 7 or lower and the Egyptians at 9 they had the shock of their lives (call to states for urgent help, Nuclear threats...etc) i can bring you much more testimonies from the leading military, political and intellectual Usraelis attesting to it from that time on....
The Arabs are not that gullible, the are some of the most suspicious creatures about praise, mostly if it comes from Usraelis
And as you can see from the tip of the iceberg on the Arab threads, they are working very hard to advance too.. there is a whole lot more to it than what you can see here on PDF.. You know that 2030 vision..it concerns every Arab nation..They are all working on their versions of it..

Cheers

PS: I never get mad at you, because we can discuss subjects objectively and realistically..

Hi,

If you can---read about Gen Sharon-----. he decimated the egyptian flank and then destroyed the egyptian army---and the cease fire was called and he did not stop for days---despite orders from top---.

Soldiers like that make the history of their nations proud---.

That action was similar to " Operation Linebacker 2 " in vietnam.