1973 Ramadan war: Plans of liquidation of the "gap" - comprehensive "Chaamil" plan

[mahatir]

The douche bag is that what your mother uses to get high and the asshole is your food point of entry!
after zouk el Arab, seif the crabs, you become Mahatir now...

I see your frustration ya 7'awal , rabina yeshfeek .

 

[Amun]

الجيش المصري اداة بيد الطغاة و لا يختلف عن غيره من جيوش العرب

صعب على دولكم وجيوشكم الطائفيه ان تفهم عقيدة الجيش المصري.... انا التمس لك العذر

 

[SALMAN F]

صعب على دولكم وجيوشكم الطائفيه ان تفهم عقيدة الجيش المصري.... انا التمس لك العذر

Loooool

 

[Ceylal]

I see your frustration ya 7'awal , rabina yeshfeek .

Which frustration ,you are talking about? If it wasn't for Algerian troop, nothing would have stopped the Tsahal to own Egypt from Rafa all the way to the Lybian border...ya h'mar..frustrated Nannek!

صعب على دولكم وجيوشكم الطائفيه ان تفهم عقيدة الجيش المصري.... انا التمس لك العذر

Kama foga3et el ghorab..teshbeh kabira wa djamila min ashen el foga3, hata ta3fess 3aliha, la chay e takhrouj minha, bel ghobar...

 

[mahatir]

الجيش المصري اداة بيد الطغاة و لا يختلف عن غيره من جيوش العرب

الجيش المصري اداة بيد الطغاة و لا يختلف عن غيره من جيوش العرب

I can't

Which frustration ,you are talking about? If it wasn't for Algerian troop, nothing would have stopped the Tsahal to own Egypt from Rafa all the way to the Lybian border...ya h'mar..frustrated Nannek!

Kama foga3et el ghorab..teshbeh kabira wa djamila min ashen el foga3, hata ta3fess 3aliha, la chay e takhrouj minha, bel ghobar...

Algerian army ?

Which frustration ,you are talking about? If it wasn't for Algerian troop, nothing would have stopped the Tsahal to own Egypt from Rafa all the way to the Lybian border...ya h'mar..frustrated Nannek!


Kama foga3et el ghorab..teshbeh kabira wa djamila min ashen el foga3, hata ta3fess 3aliha, la chay e takhrouj minha, bel ghobar...

Seriously this guy is crazy , I thought he was just trolling .

 

[Falcon29]

Same applies on Syria , Lebanese , Egyptians and even Libyans , they deny their


SC explained in detail how Egypt won the war with facts and maps. IF you believe otherwise you should refute the arguments he presented . Egypt plan was to advance and hold a region 10-15 KM inside sinai and control canal Suez entrance which was achieved and then regain remaining occupied land through negotiation . They succeeded in Achieving their military and diplomatic goals which means they won at the end .

Today Israel is not really Egypt's enemy , the real enemy targeting and harming Egypt interests are Islamist groups like MB funded by Qatar . These are the very same groups that destroyed Iraq , Syria and Libya .

Unforenately I was fooled by this Arab spring , turned out it was more of an Islamist spring .

What are you rambling about, Emirate idiot? Why are you trying to come off as important? MB responsible for Iraq, Syria and Libya? While Egypt is fighting against Iranian funded extremists and every ideology which wasn't under realm of Gulf nations is failed? You're so insecure that you keep attempting to reassure yourself with this warped view on reality, lame.

 

[mahatir]

What are you rambling about, Emirate idiot? Why are you trying to come off as important? MB responsible for Iraq, Syria and Libya? While Egypt is fighting against Iranian funded extremists and every ideology which wasn't under realm of Gulf nations is failed? You're so insecure that you keep attempting to reassure yourself with this warped view on reality, lame.

of-course MB are responsible for the crises in Iraq , Syria and Libya , thanks to their deadly ideology splinter groups like Alqauda and isil appeared on the arena . In syria MB branch Ahrar el sham worked closely and harbored Al-Nusra front till they eventually militarily took over the Syrian revolution and wiped all most moderate elements within FSA in Idlib and Aleppo and other areas .

The MB in Libya used force to stay in power after they lost elections in 2014 which lead to the rise of Haftar and other nationalist groups that resisted their attempt to take over the whole country .

As for Iraq MB elements have offered indirect support for isis and facilitated their take over of Sunni cities and today we see the disastrous outcome of this policy.

Egypt does not have shia native populations that Iran can influence and use against the Egyptian state , while on the other hand MB could easily play religion card on conservative local Sunni Egyptians against the state , and thats has been the group policy since its existence .

Egypt is only fighting Iranian/Qatari funded groups operating in Sinai/Egypt and Eastern Libya but Hamas after being under severe siege and losing most of their under ground tunnels gave up and decided to work on Egypt terms by cutting ties with such groups in return for opening Gaza border after the deal with Dahlan .

https://www.ft.com/content/acd76b40-872d-11e7-bf50-e1c239b4578

Egypt has good ties with Syrian and Iraqi regimes as both are fighting pretty much the same enemy Egypt is targeting MB/Isil whatever you call it , they are all the same .

 

[Ceylal]

I can't


Algerian army ?



Seriously this guy is crazy , I thought he was just trolling .

Ask the Msarwas who you are defending, who saved their aces...not ounce but twice..Ain't Saudi Arabia or the other nitwit Arabs..save Syriens..

 

[Falcon29]

of-course MB are responsible for the crises in Iraq , Syria and Libya , thanks to their deadly ideology splinter groups like Alqauda and isil appeared on the arena . In syria MB branch Ahrar el sham worked closely and harbored Al-Nusra front till they eventually militarily took over the Syrian revolution and wiped all most moderate elements within FSA in Idlib and Aleppo and other areas .

The MB in Libya used force to stay in power after they lost elections in 2014 which lead to the rise of Haftar and other nationalist groups that resisted their attempt to take over the whole country .

As for Iraq MB elements have offered indirect support for isis and facilitated their take over of Sunni cities and today we see the disastrous outcome of this policy.

Egypt does not have shia native populations that Iran can influence and use against the Egyptian state , while on the other hand MB could easily play religion card on conservative local Sunni Egyptians against the state , and thats has been the group policy since its existence .

Egypt is only fighting Iranian/Qatari funded groups operating in Sinai/Egypt and Eastern Libya but Hamas after being under severe siege and losing most of their under ground tunnels gave up and decided to work on Egypt terms by cutting ties with such groups in return for opening Gaza border after the deal with Dahlan .

https://www.ft.com/content/acd76b40-872d-11e7-bf50-e1c239b4578

Egypt has good ties with Syrian and Iraqi regimes as both are fighting pretty much the same enemy Egypt is targeting MB/Isil whatever you call it , they are all the same .

Looool,

Sure buddy, keep believing in your warped reality and delusions. No one here wants to hear your rhetoric, character assassination and ramblings. The usual Iran and MB responsible for everything in region blah blah blah. I don't even care about both, I just find your rambling hysterical. And no, ISIS and Al Qaeda comes from you guys, Saudi Arabia and Gulf Arab school of thought. They are not Shafi'i or Sufi Muslims like the Syrians, Lebanese, Palestinians or Egyptians. They are Salafi and their ideology originates from you guys. This is why you supported them in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and in Syria(Which recently cut the funding). All those Salafi groups in Syria are not supported by Levant nations. The only MB official group in Syria was Liwa Al Tawhid which I'm sure has been dissolved by now.

 

[Ilay]

I want to set one thing straight here - I do not intend to get in to racial superiority or lecturing about ideology, but if there is ONE single army here who can claim they've managed to hold their own for a fair amount of time against Israel in that war is non other the the Iraqi Army that aided Syria once the Syrian attack failed and the Israeli counter attack towards Damascus had been undergoing. Iraq was one of, if not the, reason the war didn't end up having Damascus under Israeli occupation.

 

[Ceylal]

I want to set one thing straight here - I do not intend to get in to racial superiority or lecturing about ideology, but if there is ONE single army here who can claim they've managed to hold their own for a fair amount of time against Israel in that war is non other the the Iraqi Army that aided Syria once the Syrian attack failed and the Israeli counter attack towards Damascus had been undergoing. Iraq was one of, if not the, reason the war didn't end up having Damascus under Israeli occupation.

Probably one reason...but that is not all the reasons...The losses Israel suffered West the canal..brought the Israelis chieftain to reality..loosing Ariel Sharon tank brigade along with over 700 of this best trained troops, to the Algerian 8Th BB was a wake up call for Israel....

 

[The SC]

Sadat and Kissinger

President Sadat said in his book «Self-searching the story of my life»:

"In December 1973, I was ready to close the gap. Our forces began the war of attrition, and their pressure on the gap did not stop for a moment, which made us gain new ground every day, sometimes in meters, sometimes in kilometers," President Sadat said in his book " .. But I was always winning .. I was really ready to clear the gap, especially as it is not in front of a channel to cross the line and Barlev to fight with me, but the danger that was before me was the intervention of America .. On December 11 came Henry Kissinger (Secretary of State of America) I said to him, "I'm not ready to accept the method they are using."

He told me: "Before I came you, I knew you are ready. I asked for a picture of the situation from the Pentagon. They gave me a full report. Your missile wall consists of such a battery. Your tanks around the gap are 800 tanks ... Your guns are so numerous and you can actually clear the gap, but know if you do this, the Pentagon will hit you. "

 

[Ilay]

Sadat and Kissinger

President Sadat said in his book «Self-searching the story of my life»:

"In December 1973, I was ready to close the gap. Our forces began the war of attrition, and their pressure on the gap did not stop for a moment, which made us gain new ground every day, sometimes in meters, sometimes in kilometers," President Sadat said in his book " .. But I was always winning .. I was really ready to clear the gap, especially as it is not in front of a channel to cross the line and Barlev to fight with me, but the danger that was before me was the intervention of America .. On December 11 came Henry Kissinger (Secretary of State of America) I said to him, "I'm not ready to accept the method they are using."

He told me: "Before I came you, I knew you are ready. I asked for a picture of the situation from the Pentagon. They gave me a full report. Your missile wall consists of such a battery. Your tanks around the gap are 800 tanks ... Your guns are so numerous and you can actually clear the gap, but know if you do this, the Pentagon will hit you. "

BS. You think this is by any means true because why - Sadat wrote it? He also claimed - falsly - he won that war.

 

[The SC]

Here is the total of Israeli false myths and false propaganda removed by the October War forever:

1- The fall of the legend of the Barlev line, which cracked the heads of the whole world with an empty conscience about the immunity of its fortifications and the impossibility of penetrating or passing through it.

2- The Fall of the myth of the Israeli Air Force (the legendary too) with a long arm that touches any spot in the Arab world and is equipped with the latest Western military arsenals of the Phantoms, the Hawk and the Mirage. This long arm was cut down by our air force and air defense during the historic war with the Zionist enemy in October 1973

3- And even the myth of the superiority of their intelligence (Mossad), which they reported that it knows the intentions and look for what is in the conscience of Egyptians and Arabs, fell as the other pieces of broken glass on the solid ground after being subjected to various stages of strategic deception by the Egyptian General Intelligence Service overthrowing the intelligence of the enemy After making him cover in a deep sleep and a false security, while preparing to motivate the Egyptian crowd and hide our intentions in preparation for war through the plans and operations to slip under the skin of the enemy and inside his bones to get all the secrets of Israel's military and politics and the hypnosis of its leadership, and blinding the eyes of the Israeli Mossad that they claimed was always guarding and never slept, who became blind and could not see the enemy, this is how the Israeli intelligence failed in knowing the Egyptian army's plans and intentions, and swallowed the bait given to it. Hence another false Israeli myth ended...

4- The fall of the myth (the army that can not be defeated) and has earned a military reputation that was not worthy of the myth, and the other myth of the Israeli soldier supernatural Super Man, who can not be killed, captured and ever defeated, which placed him above human level.

5- The eternal myth of Arab underdevelopment and the inability of the Arab soldier to assimilate modern technology have fallen forever after they have almost become firmly established in the collective conscience of the entire Western world as a result of Israel's attempt to assert this false premise on unfounded basis.

6- We will not forget to mention the fall of the myth of what was known as the safe borders and the theory of Israeli security and the importance of Sharm el-Sheikh to Israel.

7- The disappearance of the myth of the the Arab inability to unite their plans and efforts in launching a joint war against Israel, as well as conceal their intentions and secrets about the Israeli enemy by waging war in coordination between Egypt and Syria and then Iraq after, and then the use of the Petroleum weapon in the battle.

8- Finally the fall of the lie of Israel's victory in the gap - he last of its lies - after its troops suffered a crushing defeat at the gates of the cities of Ismailia and Suez and failed to eliminate the third field army or even subjugating it, and subjected the Israeli units located west of the channel to the risk of destruction or capture by the Egyptian forces besieging it, and was forced in the end to withdraw its troops from the west of the canal after the signing of the disengagement agreement in January 1974.

The Israeli writer (Eitan Hever) admits very recently on Maariv pages that Israel did not face Arab armies except in the fourth war of 1973 says:
"For many years we have fought wars (de Lux), where we demonstrated ... mobilizing a fight for a few days, ending with a swift victory, returning home to father, wife and work.
In the Yom Kippur War, the situation was very different. Preparedness in the army and beyond put pressure on the psyche of soldiers who still find it very difficult to understand the new situation created by the Kppur war. Today we need great efforts in the field of media. Soldiers ask many questions with no answers to them. And most of the answers to them are not true."

General Aharon Yariv, former director of military intelligence, says:

There is no doubt that the Arabs have emerged victorious from the war. As we came out we were crushed and weak

Dr. Amnon Kabiuk in Hamshar newspaper considers that what characterized the Arabs in their goals and their war is that they are more realistic.

General Aharon Yariv, former director of military intelligence, says:

There is no doubt that the Arabs have emerged victorious from the war. As we came out we were crushed and weak

Dr. Amnon Kabiuk in Hamshar newspaper considers that what characterized the Arabs in their goals and their war is that they are more realistic.

Aaron Geva The Jerusalem Newspaper Davar: The Arabs do not give in to force

 

[Ilay]

1. "Israel's victory came at the cost of heavy casualties, and Israelis criticized the government's lack of preparedness." :
YOM KIPPUR WAR: OCTOBER 1973
When the fourth Arab-Israeli war began on October 6, 1973, many of Israel’s soldiers were away from their posts observing Yom Kippur (or Day of Atonement), and the Arab armies made impressive advances with their up-to-date Soviet weaponry. Iraqi forces soon joined the war, and Syria received support from Jordan. After several days, Israel was fully mobilized, and the Israel Defense Forces began beating back the Arab gains at a heavy cost to soldiers and equipment. A U.S. airlift of arms aided Israel’s cause, but President Richard Nixon (1913-94) delayed the emergency military aid for a week as a tacit signal of U.S. sympathy for Egypt. On October 25, an Egyptian-Israeli cease-fire was secured by the United Nations.

YOM KIPPUR WAR: AFTERMATH
Israel’s victory came at the cost of heavy casualties, and Israelis criticized the government’s lack of preparedness. In April 1974, the nation’s prime minister, Golda Meir (1898-1978), stepped down.

Although Egypt had again suffered military defeat at the hands of its Jewish neighbor, the initial Egyptian successes greatly enhanced Sadat’s prestige in the Middle East and gave him an opportunity to seek peace. In 1974, the first of two Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreements providing for the return of portions of the Sinai to Egypt were signed, and in 1979 Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin (1913-92) signed the first peace agreement between Israel and one of its Arab neighbors. In 1982, Israel fulfilled the 1979 peace treaty by returning the last segment of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt.

For Syria, the Yom Kippur War was a disaster. The unexpected Egyptian-Israeli cease-fire exposed Syria to military defeat, and Israel seized even more territory in the Golan Heights. In 1979, Syria voted with other Arab states to expel Egypt from the Arab League.

2. "The 1973 war thus ended in an Israeli victory, but at great cost to the United States."
The 1973 Arab-Israeli War
The 1973 Arab-Israeli War was a watershed for U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East. It forced the Nixon administration to realize that Arab frustration over Israel’s unwillingness to withdraw from the territories it had occupied in 1967 could have major strategic consequences for the United States. The war thus paved the way for Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s “shuttle diplomacy” and ultimately, the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty of 1979.

The Nixon Administration and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969–1973

President Richard Nixon came into office convinced that the Arab-Israeli standoff over the fate of the occupied territories could damage America’s standing in the Arab world and undermine prospects for U.S.-Soviet détente. In attempt to break the deadlock, he ordered Secretary of State William Rogers to negotiate with the Soviets on the parameters of a Middle East settlement, with the goal of reaching an agreement that each superpower could sell to its regional clients. By December 1969, however, the Soviet Union, Egypt, and Israel had all rejected the so-called “Rogers Plan,” which called for Israeli to withdraw to the 1949 armistice lines, with “insubstantial alterations,” in return for peace.

The failure of the Rogers Plan led Nixon to suspend efforts to reach a settlement with the Soviets and lent credence to National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger’s argument that the United States should not push Israel for concessions so long as Egypt, the leading Arab state, remained aligned with the Soviets. In the summer of 1970, Nixon broke with Kissinger and allowed Rogers to present a more limited initiative to halt the Israeli-Egyptian “War of Attrition” along the Suez Canal, in which the Soviets had become militarily involved. “Rogers II,” which called for Israel and Egypt to agree to a three month ceasefire and negotiations under the auspices of U.N. mediator Gunnar Jarring, was accepted by both parties, who stopped fighting on August 7. Yet Nixon’s appetite for diplomacy was spoiled by Egyptian and Soviet efforts to move anti-aircraft missiles closer to the Canal and Syrian intervention in Jordan’s civil war. Until February 1971, Kissinger’s arguments against prematurely rewarding Soviet clients again held sway.

In February 1971, however, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat presented the Nixon administration with a new opportunity for Arab-Israeli peacemaking. Sadat proposed that Egypt would reopen the Suez Canal if the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) pulled back from the Canal’s east bank and later agreed to a timetable for further withdrawals. He also indicated that he would renounce all claims of belligerency against Israel if the IDF withdrew to the international border. Rogers’ efforts to capitalize on Sadat’s statements by working toward an interim settlement, however, were opposed by the Israelis, and received little support from Kissinger and Nixon. Kissinger believed that Egyptian proposals for an interim settlement, along with a Soviet peace plan tabled that September, would be rejected by the Israelis, and did not want discord over the Middle East to undermine efforts at détente before the Moscow summit of May 1972. For Nixon, such reasoning was reinforced by a desire to avoid a crisis in U.S.-Israeli relations before the 1972 presidential elections.

In the wake of the Moscow summit, where the Americans and the Soviets deliberately avoided discussing the Middle East, Sadat made two more moves to get the Nixon administration to break the Arab-Israeli stalemate. In July 1972, he decided to expel Soviet military advisors from Egypt, and opened a backchannel to Kissinger through Hafiz Isma‘il, his national security advisor. In February 1973, Isma‘il met with Kissinger and informed him that Egypt would be willing to sign a separate peace agreement with Israel that could involve demilitarized zones on both sides of the international border and peacekeepers in sensitive locations like Sharm al-Shaykh. However, Egyptian-Israeli normalization would have to wait until Israel withdrew from all the territories it had conquered in 1967. The Israelis responded haltingly, and Nixon and Kissinger made little effort to change their minds. Despite Sadat’s public displays of frustration, as well as warnings from Jordan’s King Hussein and Soviet Secretary-General Leonid Brezhnev, Nixon and Kissinger believed that given the military balance, Egypt and Syria would not attack Israel, a view supported by much of the U.S. intelligence community. Until the fall of 1973, the President and Kissinger held that any American diplomatic initiative would have to wait until after Israel’s elections that October.

The War and its Consequences

On October 6, 1973, Egypt and Syria attacked Israel’s forces in the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights. Despite initial Israeli setbacks, Kissinger, now both Secretary of State and National Security Advisor, believed that Israel would win quickly. He feared that a rout of the Arabs could force the Soviets to intervene, raising their prestige in the Arab world and damaging détente. Thus, he proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union call for an end to the fighting and a return to the 1967 ceasefire lines. The Soviets, who were uneager to intervene on behalf of their clients, agreed, but the Egyptians rejected the ceasefire proposal. Wanting to avoid both an Arab defeat and military intervention, the Soviets then began to resupply Egypt and Syria with weapons. By October 9, following a failed IDF counter-attack against Egypt’s forces, the Israelis requested that America do the same for them. Not wanting to see Israel defeated, Nixon agreed, and American planes carrying weapons began arriving in Israel on October 14.

With the American airlift underway, the fighting turned against the Arabs. On October 16, IDF units crossed the Suez Canal. Sadat began to show interest in a ceasefire, leading Brezhnev to invite Kissinger to Moscow to negotiate an agreement. A U.S.-Soviet proposal for a ceasefire followed by peace talks was adopted by the UN Security Council as Resolution 338 on October 22. Afterward, however, Kissinger flew to Tel Aviv, where he told the Israelis that the United States would not object if the IDF continued to advance while he flew back to Washington. When Kissinger returned to the United States, he agreed to a Soviet request to seek another ceasefire resolution, which the Security Council adopted on October 23. Yet the Israelis still refused to stop. On October 24, Brezhnev sent Nixon a hotline message suggesting that the United States and the Soviet Union send troops to Egypt to “implement” the ceasefire. If Nixon chose not to do so, Brezhnev threatened, “We should be faced with the necessity urgently to consider the question of taking appropriate steps unilaterally.” The United States responded by putting its nuclear forces on worldwide alert on October 25. By the end of the day, the crisis abated when the Security Council adopted Resolution 340, which called for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of all forces to their October 22 positions, and U.N. observers and peacekeepers to monitor the ceasefire. This time, the Israelis accepted the resolution.

The 1973 war thus ended in an Israeli victory, but at great cost to the United States. Though the war did not scuttle détente, it nevertheless brought the United States closer to a nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union than at any point since the Cuban missile crisis. The American military airlift to Israel, moreover, had led Arab oil producers to embargo oil shipments to the United States and some Western European countries, causing international economic upheaval. The stage was set for Kissinger to make a major effort at Arab-Israeli peacemaking.

3. (p. 6) "For most Egyptians the war is remembered as an unquestionable victory- militarily as well as politically ... The fact that the war ended with Israeli troops stationed in the outskirts of Cairo and in complete encirclement of the Egyptian third army has not dampened the jubilant commemoration of the war in Egypt." (p 11) "Ultimately, the conflict provided a military victory for Israel, but it is remembered as 'the earthquake' or 'the blunder'"
The Yom Kippur War: Politics, Legacy, Diplomacy
Asaf Siniver

4. "the Arab has suffered repeated military defeats at the hand of Israel in 1956, 1967, and 1973"
The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Guide for the Perplexed Ian Bickerton

5. among-st the greatest evidences I presented here is this one:

According to Chernyaev, on 4 Nov 1973, the Soviet leader Brezhnev said:

We have offered them (the Arabs) a sensible way for so many years. But no, they wanted to fight. Fine! We gave them technology, the latest, the kind even Vietnam didn’t have. They had double superiority in tanks and aircraft, triple in artillery, and in air defense and anti-tank weapons they had absolute supremacy. And what? Once again they were beaten. Once again they scrammed [sic]. Once again they screamed for us to come save them. Sadat woke me up in the middle of the night twice over the phone, "Save me!" He demanded to send Soviet troops, and immediately! No! We are not going to fight for them.
Anatoly Chernyaev. "Diary of Anatoly Chernyaev, 1973" National Security Archive. National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 430. p. 69.(so you don't accidentally miss it)


I could literally use only my last example to end this stupid debate here and now but I still brought up 4 more only for the heck of it, now I personally don't see the Yom Kippur victory as something glorious for all the young men whose lives were lost, but a victory non-the-less. I rest my case habibi move along now.