1965 analysed.

[fatman17]

Published 5 years ago, but still Valid today.

APRIL 24, 2015

Why India and Pakistan Must Get Together

by BRIAN CLOUGHLEY

India-Pakistan relations remain fraught with danger and mistrust. Since October 2014, there have been regular exchanges of fire between their troops across the ‘Line of Control’ which has run through contested Kashmir since Indian independence and the simultaneous birth of Pakistan in 1947. Turbulent times could lie ahead.

– British Foreign Office Brief to Parliament, 29 January 2015

On Wednesday, Al-Jazeera programs in India were replaced by a sign saying the channel would not be available until 27 April, ‘as instructed by the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting.’

India says maps used by the channel are incorrect, as they show the region of Kashmir as divided between Pakistan, India and China.

Kashmir is claimed by both India and Pakistan in its entirety..

– BBC News April 23, 2015

Voutenay sur Cure, France.

January’s touchy-feely embrace between US President Obama and India’s Prime Minister Modi was probably just a tacky photo-opportunity but it had resonance and the picture went round the world. It sent a convincing message that India and the US are intent on good relations and that all the old-fashioned morality-based stuff about Modi being denied a US visa on the grounds that he was responsible for “severe violations of religious freedom” is now water under the bridge of economic imperatives and political expediency. All in all, the clinch was a pleasant gesture, if a bit contrived, and all was sweetness and light.

And there would be even more sweetness and light cast upon this troubled world if there could be a similar hug between prime ministers Narendra Modi of India and Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan.

In spite of much media hype, nothing of importance was agreed between Modi and Obama, but that didn’t matter. The important thing was that there had been bonding and understanding. It was overdone; but camera-attracting vulgarity has its uses. The main thing is the new atmosphere.

On the other hand the atmosphere between India and Pakistan is becoming more dangerously polluted day by day. There doesn’t seem to be a single thing they can agree on, and it’s not entirely the fault of one side or the other. Obama didn’t help, unfortunately, by telling the magazine India Today that “Indians were tragically killed on 9/11 as were Americans on 26/11 [in terrorist attacks in Mumbai]. . . I’ve made it clear that even as the United States works with Pakistan to meet the threat of terrorism, safe havens within Pakistan are not acceptable and that those behind the Mumbai terrorist attack must face justice.”

He didn’t mention the eight Pakistan nationals who were killed in the Twin Towers or the fact that none of the nineteen 9/11 killers were Pakistanis, but were 15 Saudis, a Lebanese, an Egyptian and two Emirates’ citizens.

His statement was not well regarded in Islamabad, naturally enough, as no doubt Obama well knew it would be, but there was a message for all Pakistan that was loud and clear and unmistakable in its intention: Pakistan is out to the far side of the US field of interest, and India is in the center.

Over the years Obama has changed his attitude to the sub-continent completely and his November 2008 statement about wanting to help resolve the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan is now dead and deeply buried. At that time he said that the US “should probably try to facilitate a better understanding between Pakistan and India and try to resolve the Kashmir crisis so that they can stay focused not on India, but on the situation with those militants,” but India’s reaction to such a common sense approach was decidedly negative and Obama has never again uttered a word that would even slightly upset India.

Britain is notably supportive of India but nowadays irrelevant concerning India-Pakistan relations, as are other EU countries. Of more importance, Russia and China have their own decided interests to follow. Both wish to cooperate with Pakistan over Afghanistan in order to make the best of the shambles caused by the west’s war in that unfortunate country, but although China is notably supportive of Pakistan (“all-weather friend” and so forth, as evidenced during the visit to Pakistan last week by Chinese President Xi Jingping) it is not going to go out on a limb by offering unconditional backing over Kashmir. Russia is being pragmatic about relations with Delhi and Islamabad but in its current economic circumstances is anxious to maintain arms sales to India. Moscow’s newly pragmatic approaches to Pakistan are most welcome but there is no question of it interceding politically against India in Pakistan’s behalf.

There is no country willing to become involved in diplomacy that would assist in ending or at least reducing the growling ill-will between two neighbours that would benefit enormously in every conceivable fashion from cooperation and harmony. The standoff is economic madness. So there is only one way forward, and that is for the governments of India and Pakistan to grit their teeth — but not in the usual snarl against each other — and take some domestically uncomfortable but positive and potentially enormously beneficial measures to improve their relations.

The dispute over the territory of Kashmir is the greatest stumbling block along the boulder-strewn path to reduction of tension. Certainly Pakistan has withdrawn its former ill-conceived support for militant groups fighting for independence in Indian-administered Kashmir, but there is scarcely an Indian citizen who believes this to be so. And the Bharatiya Janata Party government is adamant that the Indian-held region of Kashmir will never, ever, be permitted to have a vote concerning its own future.

It does not seem to be understood in Pakistan that for India to relinquish anyterritory would be a political catastrophe. Such a decision would destroy the initiating government and probably result in internal upheaval on a major scale. It is simply not possible for India to give up any of the area of Kashmir that it considers — however unjustifiably — to be its own. The ‘Line of Control’ dividing the areas administered by India and Pakistan is to all intents and purposes a border.

The greatest prime minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, told the Indian Parliament on 12 February 1951 that concerning Kashmir “We have taken the issue to the United Nations and given our word of honor for a peaceful solution. As a great nation, we cannot go back on it. We have left the question for final solution to the people of Kashmir and we are determined to abide by their decision.” As the BBC put it concisely : “When Lord Mountbatten, India’s first Governor-General, accepted Kashmir’s accession, he said it should eventually be ‘settled by a reference to the people’. India’s Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, also pledged a plebiscite or referendum for Kashmir under international auspices. This was later enshrined in UN Security Council resolutions.”

But this isn’t going to happen. Few things are uncontestably predictable in this world, but it is obvious to all but the most ingenuous of unworldly optimists that India will never allow a plebiscite. The United Nations Security Council has had the matter on its books for seventy years and is never going to permit a democratic solution to the Kashmir problem.

Yet Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif declared at the UN General Assembly in September 2014 that

More than six decades ago, the United Nations passed resolutions to hold a plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir. The people of Jammu and Kashmir are still waiting for fulfilment of that promise . . .

For decades, attempts have been made, both under UN auspices and bilaterally in the spirit of the Lahore Declaration, to resolve this dispute.

The core issue of Jammu and Kashmir has to be resolved. This is the responsibility of the international community. We cannot draw a veil on the issue of Kashmir, until it is addressed in accordance with the wishes of the people of Jammu and Kashmir.

Pakistan is ready to work for resolution of this problem through negotiations. Our support and advocacy of the right to self-determination of the people of Jammu and Kashmir is our historic commitment and a duty; as a party to the Kashmir dispute.

While Nawaz Sharif is unwilling to draw a veil over Kashmir he can hardly pass over the fact that two months after his exceptionally well-intentioned Lahore Declaration of 21 February 1999, during his second prime ministership, there was open conflict along the Line of Control between Indian-administered and Pakistan-administered Kashmir that was unquestionably initiated by Pakistan. Mr Sharif was prime minister at the time, and if he didn’t know about his army commander’s intentions as regards crossing the Line then he was either stupid or incompetent. And no matter what one might think about Mr Sharif it has to be admitted he is neither. Devious, certainly; and viciously revengeful to a degree that would have excited the admiration of Hamlet, Mrs Gandhi or even Richard Nixon. But he’s not a fool, and must have known that the Kargil adventure would destroy the Lahore Agreement. No wonder Delhi became even more paranoid about Pakistan’s policies and intentions. And little wonder, too, that it dug its heels in even further about the future of Kashmir.

And this is where I part company with Pakistan’s Kashmir policy.

I have known Kashmir for over thirty years and lived for two and a half years in that delightful region in the areas administered by India and Pakistan. As with most people who know Kashmir I wish only that it could once again be tranquil and serene.

President/General Musharraf said a decade ago that “If we want to normalize relations between Pakistan and India and bring harmony to the region, the Kashmir dispute will have to be resolved peacefully through a dialogue, on the basis of the aspirations of the Kashmiri people. Solving the Kashmir issue is the joint responsibility of our two countries.”

The unlikely meeting of minds between Sharif and Musharraf is remarkable, but they both miss or deliberately avoid the main point, which is that there is no possibility whatever that the “wishes of the people of Kashmir” will be taken into account by India, simply because if there were to be a plebiscite then India would lose Kashmir in one way or another. Kashmiris on the Pakistan-administered side would vote to stay with Pakistan while those on the Indian-administered side might not vote to join Pakistan, but most certainly would vote to leave India, in one way or another. Naturally enough, India will not permit any sort of poll that might indicate the feelings of the people most directly concerned.

So in the interests of peace — and, above all, of the interests of the people of Kashmir — the compromise, hard to accept as it would be, is for Pakistan to accept India’s illegal occupation of the Valley and its surrounds. The Line of Control, with local modifications specified by a UN-appointed body of experts, should become the international border, extending from its current terminus in a straight line to the border with China.

This would be a bitter pill for many millions to swallow, but it is the only way forward if the rabid hostility between India and Pakistan is to begin to diminish. It must be emphasized that in the present state of relations there is real possibility of nuclear war in the sub-continent.

It is in the best interests of the world as a whole to bring pressure to bear for settlement of the Kashmir dispute.

Bilateral agreement between the countries would result in the UN Security Council being discredited for failing to abide by its own principles in insisting on a plebiscite, as agreed so many years ago; but this would barely matter, as the Council has been reduced to a grubby forum for hostility and partiality. The positive side is that the Council would have a major role in furthering peace, at least in this instance, by producing a plan for physical division of Kashmir predicated on the Line of Control.

Then we might see a hug between prime ministers Narendra Modi and Nawaz Sharif as they congratulate each other on being awarded their well-deserved Nobel Peace prizes.

Brian Cloughley writes about foreign policy and military affairs. He lives in Voutenay sur Cure, France.

A version of this piece appeared in the April edition of Blue Chip, Pakistan’s quarterly magazine on economics and world affairs.

More articles by:BRIAN CLOUGHLEY

 

[Signalian]

 

[Joe Shearer]

He cannot get away from the mandatory opening statement,"....when Bharat attacked Pakistan - although it was a retaliatory attack, it was across the International Border...."

That is always helpful to set the tone.

That is however not to say that this could be avoided by a Pakistani Army retired commentator; he would face a great deal of criticism, to say the least, using any other formulation. It does not matter what we think in private; discourse on some such subjects is tightly constrained to norms of patriotism laid down by almost-criminal civilian elements on both sides.

On our side, it has in recent times been dictated by the social refuse that is now being wiped out in the local elections in New Delhi, after the incendiary campaign that it conducted almost exclusively on the threat represented to the state by Muslims. By all Muslims, not just indoctrinated ones, a new swoop into the gutters of public discourse by - let us continue to say 'refuse', and avoid punishment by a scandalised administration.

 

[fatman17]

THE LAST WORD(S).


DEFENCE NOTES
The Anatomy of Indo-Pak Wars

A Strategic and Operational Analysis

Columnist A H AMIN makes a case study of Indo-Pak Wars.

India and Pakistan have fought three declared wars and many undeclared wars of proxy or low intensity wars. This article is a brief analysis of the essence of these wars at the strategic and operational level.

1947-48 Kashmir War

The 1947-48 War was an improvised war fought on an ad hoc basis. It began with some tangible operational strategy and little definite strategy on the Pakistan side and a definite operational strategy on the Indian side. At the onset Mr Jinnah the Governor General of Pakistan ordered the British Acting C in C Pakistan Army to order two brigades into Kashmir, one on the Sialkot-Jammu Axis and the other on Murree-Muzaffarabad-Srinagar-Axis. This was a tangible plan based on a precise strategy of severing Indian landward and aerial lines of communication to Kashmir. The plan was rendered null and void since the Britisher refused to obey Jinnah’s order.

This was followed by a hastily scrambled series of actions with regular Pakistan Army officers leading irregulars, irregulars besieging Indian/Dogra garrisons and conducting mini-wars against Chamb, Naushera, Srinagar, Skardu, Leh etc. In April 1948 the regular Pakistan Army entered the scene. At this stage the Indians were in a strategically disadvantageous position. Leh being cut off, Poonch besieged, Skardu besieged, Naushera threatened etc. At this stage the Pakistani strategy was to contain Indian Army advance towards Muzaffarabad, capture Poonch and safeguard Pakistan’s soft underbelly opposite Gujrat. No one at this stage thought of a ceasefire, which would have been of great strategic advantage to Pakistan. The Indians conceived a fine plan to outflank Muzaffarabad and executed a brilliant brigade level march across against the 3,000 metres plus high Nastachun Pass, thus unexpectedly forcing their way with great ease to Tithwal. The Pakistani official history noted “Brigadier Harbux Singh, commander of the 163 Brigade waited at Tithwal for two days to let the rest of his brigade join him there . He lingered a little longer to prepare for his next move and perhaps also to coordinate his moves with that of the Indian offensive in the Jhelum Valley for a two pronged push towards Muzaffarabad. This delay changed the subsequent course of history in Kishanganga Valley, as it enabled the first two companies of 4/16 Punjab under Major Mohammad Akbar Khan to reach by a forced march in the vicinity of Tithwal and take up positions there”1. The Pakistanis saved their position by reinforcing it with a brigade.

On the operational level the Pakistanis did well by capturing Pandu a position of tactical importance in the Jhelum Valley by a brilliant infiltration plan conceived by Commander 101 Brigade Brigadier Akbar Khan DSO with the indomitable Major Ishaq MC as his Brigade Major. Akbar deputed Lt Col Harvey Kelly, commanding 4/10 Baluch to plan the attack in detail.2 Pandu, however, was an operational episode of great tactical significance but limited strategic value.

From April 1948 to December 1948 the Pakistani GHQ merely reacted tactically moving companies and battalions while the Indians moved strategically. In Phase One, they recaptured Rajauri the gateway to Poonch with a single tank squadron! In Phase Two, they achieved two strategic triumphs! They forced their way through Zojila Pass driving on to relieve Leh and capture Kargil Dras and they relieved Poonch which was a mini-Indian East Pakistan surrounded from all sides by Pakistani troops.

At this stage the Pakistani GHQ had conceived the Operation Venus. Venus was a thrust against the Indian line of communication leading to Poonch Valley with an infantry and a heavy tank brigade in Naushera-Beri Patan area. At this stage the Indians were involved in the relief of Poonch and Leh and strategically off balance. The official account of 1970, however, maintains that the aim of Venus was not to sever the Indian line of communication to Poonch but merely to force the Indians for ceasefire which they did and which came into effect on night 31 Dec 1948/01 January 1949. If ceasefire was the aim then the Pakistani strategy was barren since a ceasefire in July 1948 would have been far more strategically desirable! This was so since in April 1948 Zojila (captured by Gilgit Scouts under Lieut Shah Khan on 7th July 1948) the gateway to Srinagar as well as Ladakh in Pakistani hands, the frontline near Rajauri and Poonch surrounded by Pakistani troops/irregulars. It is not clear what the Pakistani GHQ advised the civilians at this stage but no records have been made public which prove that they gave any advice!

In the 1960s General Fazal-i- Muqeem asserted that the ceasefire of 1948 took place to the army’s horror since the army was close to a great victory. However, this point is refuted by the Pakistan Army’s Official account of 1970. Much later in 1976 General Sher Ali who was commanding a brigade of the Venus Force asserted that had the operation been launched Pakistani tanks would have been in Jammu within no time! This has to be taken with a pinch of salt once we compare it to the performance of armour in an offensive role in 1965 and 1971!

The Kashmir War ended with the Indians as masters of Poonch Valley, Srinagar Valley and Leh Valley but with a communication to all three valleys running precariously close to the Pakistani border! Thus strategically the Indian position despite all their strategic triumphs was not secure since their line of communications offered multiple objectives to any single Pakistani thrust. One tank brigade with a twenty mile thrust could threaten the existence of a whole Indian army corps. The Indians took no care to remedy this state of affairs despite many war games held in their Kashmir Corps to show that the Pakistanis could threaten the Indian line of communication in Poonch Valley.3

1965 War

The 1965 War was a comical affair! Civilians at the foreign ministry assessed that the Indians could be knocked out at the strategic level while soldiers at the highest military level and political level, the president being a soldier were not interested in any military adventure. The civilian hawks led by Bhutto, however, were in league with a group of generals and brigadiers within the army and finally succeeded in persuading the president

(famous for tactical timidity in Burma) into embarking on a military adventure. Musa the army chief had little strategic insight and was against any military adventure in which he may be forced to exercise his qualities of leadership! Musa had rudimentary understanding of strategy and tank warfare since he was a political choice appointed more because he was seen as politically no threat rather than for any military strategic or operational talent!

The Pakistani offensive plan i.e. a thrust against Indian line of communication at Akhnur in case of a limited war in Kashmir or/and against Indian line of communication between Indian Corps holding Ravi-Sutlej Corridor at Jandiala Guru on Amritsar-Jullundhur road in case of an all out war was brilliant in conception. This was so because if successful any of the two plans would have forced the Indians to sue for peace at best and to surrender at worst. No less an authority than the Indian Western Command C in C Harbaksh Singh thus confessed

“A Blitzkrieg deep into our territory towards the Grand Trunk Road or the Beas Bridge would have found us in the helpless position of a commander paralysed into inaction for want of readily available reserves while the enemy was inexorably pushing deep into our vitals. It is a nightmarish feeling even when considered in retrospect at this stage”.

To the Pakistan Army’s misfortune a plan which was brilliant at the strategic and operational level failed simply because those who were leading the military machine at the highest level lacked the strategic insight as well as resolution! The first opportunity was thus missed in Chamb-Jaurian Sector, when even a foreigner i.e. Chinese Foreign Minister visiting Pakistani thought that Akhnur5 was the key!

The second and most serious operational failure occurred in Khem Karan.This had more to do with poor execution at the divisional and brigade level and poor initial higher organization and composition of troops at the divisional level. The first being an operational failure and the second being an organizational failure at the higher command level.

At the operational and tactical level three events stand out in the war i.e. the Grand Slam Operation in Chamb-Jaurian, blunting of Indian offensive at Chawinda at Gadgor on 8th September when one lone tank regiment gave a severe mauling to two tank regiments out of a total available Indian force of an armoured division, and a brigade level counter attack in Lahore Sector.

Grand Slam failed because of change of command! Not because Akhtar Malik was better than Yahya but because one man either Akhtar or Yahya should have conducted the whole operation! The Indians admitted that their position was saved because of the pause of 48 hours, which occurred at Tawi after the Pakistani Chief Musa ordered change of horses in the mid stream!

Now the battle of Gadgor. Technically Gadgor was 24 Infantry Brigade Group versus 1st Indian Armoured Division. In reality the contest was 25 Cavalry versus Poona and Hodsons Horse since 24 Brigade Commander told Colonel Nisar to “do something”6 the vaguest order of 1965 War! Nisar had no idea of what was in front but by a miraculous coup d oeil deployed his tank regiment 25 Cavalry in a manner which would produce an instant nervous breakdown in an instructor who taught tank tactics at the armour school! 25 Cavalry was deployed by Nisar like a thin line of steel! Like a thin net to catch a whale! The manoeuvre if it can be called one succeeded because the Indian brigade commander was paralysed by the fog of war! Thus Commander Indian 1st Armoured Brigade saw a finger as a mountain! He saw a threat to his flanks which in reality was a half squadron of Indian 62 Cavalry which had lost its way and fired at Indian Artillery opposite Rangre! What Nisar deployed after the “Do Something” order was seen by the Indian brigade commander as a tank brigade! Thus he lost the will to use two uncommitted tank regiments to outflank the Pakistani position! Gadgor was a psychological defeat inflicted on K.K Singh by Nisar with Nisar not knowing what was in front of him and K.K Singh over estimating three times what was really in front of him. Thus in cognitive terms, at Gadgor was a tank regiment commander who did not know what was in front of him against a tank brigade commander who was overawed by what he assessed was in front of him and was reduced into a state of total inertia and indecision. The important factor in this decisive battle was the fact that tangibly K.K Singh had the third tank regiment as well as three uncommitted squadrons within his two committed tank regiments with which he could have easily outflanked Nisar and got to his rear! Nisar had tangibly no reserves with which he could have countered K.K’s outflanking manoeuvre.

The counter attack of Brigadier Qayyum Sher in Lahore Sector was a successful divisional battle ordered by Major General Sarfaraz MC and executed by Brigadier Qayyum Sher most resolutely! It produced a crisis on the Indian side and threw the Indians off balance! Both retired in the same rank sometimes after the war!

1971 War

The 1971 War was a strange war! The Indians won great glory but failed to strategically solve their military problems! They overran East Pakistan creating a new state of Bangladesh but merely reduced Pakistan’s defence problems and increased their own problems by creating a new state which became more hostile to India and is far more difficult to militarily to deal with than the old East Pakistan!

The Indians, and an authority no less eminent than their 1971 GOC Western Command General Candeth have admitted that had the Pakistanis started a pre-emptive war in October 1971 all their plans to attack East Pakistan would have been thrown to the winds!7 But strategic insight had not been inculcated yet in the Pakistan Army! The Pakistanis waited and allowed the Indians to attack them in December 1971.

Much has been said about a Pakistani counter offensive in December 1971 to save East Pakistan. At this stage the Indian 1 Corps was in position and the Pakistani Higher Command like K.K Singh on 8th September to gamble their last card! There was a reason for this inaction. One that the cost was too heavy and the second that armour higher commanders (the CGS Gul Hassan and GOC 1st Armoured Division) as Yahya Khan asserts had lost the will to launch an attack.

Two cases of operational brilliance and one case of a Gadgor type tactical heroic stand out in 1971. These are the cases of the Pakistani 23 Division offensive in Chamb, the Indian defence of Poonch and the Barapind-Jarpal Battle. In Chamb Pakistan’s General Eftikhar successfully fought a divisional battle in which he deliberately manoeuvred a force of two plus tank regiments inflicting a severe mauling on the Indians forcing them to abandon Chamb. Eftikhar was firmly in control at all stages. When his initial tank thrust was checked at Maandiala he did not sink into inertia or indecision like K.K Singh at Gadgor or Pakistan’s Naseer at Khem Karan! Nor did Eftikhar tell his armoured brigade commander to “Do Something”! Eftikhar did not abdicate the conduct of operational strategy to any tank regiment of tank brigade commander! He resolutely regrouped his command and launched another attack from the south emerging victorious! The second case was the Indian stand at Poonch. The Pakistanis conceived a fine plan to capture Poonch but the Indian brigade commander at Poonch was too resolute while the Pakistani divisional and brigade commanders at Poonch lost their nerve!

The third case of a Gadgor type battle occurred at Barapind! Here the Pakistani tank brigade commander gave a simple order to resort to counter penetration to his tank regiment commander who on his own converted it into an attack! Unfortunately he carried out a piece meal attack, first sending in a squadron and then two more! The Indians admit that had 13 Lancers attacked with all three squadrons8 they would have broken through despite nominal artillery support. The hero of this battle was not the Indian brigade or regiment commander but the Indian squadron who blunted the attack and the Indian troop leader Arun Khetarpal who stopped the attack by skin of his teeth losing his life in the process! In words of Indian Armoured Corps historian the Indian success was attributable to a ‘last ditch stand by just one tank troop leader’.

1984 Crisis

The 1984 Crisis was a calculated Indian response against alleged Pakistani involvement in the Sikh Insurgency in Punjab. Tangibly the Indian position was far superior to Pakistan since Pakistan Army was still equipped with the old T-59s. The situation was saved by two Individuals who polished off the Indian ‘Durga Devi’ thus leading to a swift de-escalation of the crisis.

Siachen Crisis
1984-To Date
A case of zero strategic insight on the Indian side and of personal ambition on part of two and three star Indian generals to start private wars to gain promotion. Both sides gained nothing and one Indian Division and one Pakistani brigade is committed to a mad sentry duty role since 1984!

1987 Crisis

The 1987 Crisis was a case of over enthusiasm at the military level with little outward enthusiasm at the highest political level. The Indian Chief Sundarji was living in visions of Glory and visualized that a military manoeuvre would escalate into a war which would lead to a successful Indian military thrust severing the Pakistani line of communication in Rahimyar Khan Sector thus leading to the emergence of a new state in Pakistani Sindh and the creation of a second Indian Field Marshal after Manekshaw i.e Sundarji!

Comically Sundarji’s visions of glory were not matched by strategic insight! Thus he was overawed into inaction and inertia like K.K Singh at Gadgor, once the Pakistani High Command relocated the Pakistani reserves northwards in a purely defensive move!

1987 was a watershed and marked the Indian Army at its lowest position in the eyes of the highest Indian political leadership

vis-a-vis the high position of 1971. Sundarji destroyed all that the Indian Army had gained in 25 years with one night of irresolution and inertia!

1999 Crisis

The 1999 Crisis in Kargil were the result of an audacious Pakistani plan to inflict a sharp but highly subtle psychological defeat on the Indians by threatening the Indian line of communication to Leh and Siachen by placing a small Pakistani force on the heights overlooking the Dras-Kargil-Leh Road. The execution at tactical level was brilliant albeit marked by poor logistic arrangements at divisional level! The Pakistani political leadership lost the resolution to press home the move to its final conclusion. Full facts are not available about what the Pakistan Army’s highest leadership wanted at this point in time.

The Indians payed a heavy price in terms of casualties for an intelligence failure. What Pakistan gained or lost is not clear although a debate continues about who was Kargils winner. Kargil stands out as merely one stage in a long series of actions in Pakistani military history. If Kargil was a political failure then logically the army should have packed off the political leadership in June 1999! Yet it chose to blame Nawaz only later on like it blamed Liaquat for calling off Operation Venus in 1948! Have things changed or we changed!

Conclusion

Indo-Pak Military history is a continuous story of strategic failures and a mix of operational successes and failures. At the tactical level both the armies fought well.

The reasons for the strategic failures are historical. Both states are successor states of the British Colonial Indian Empire. Indians were not groomed or trained for making strategic decisions. Strategic insight is the result of a process spread over many generations. The German General Staff was not created by a sudden flight. Even the British Empire was not created by the strategic genius of one man! Militarily the failure of both armies at the higher level is more easy to understand. Both were the continuation of a colonial army designed for internal security and brigade level actions. The Indian Army in WW Two either fought as part of a larger British Army or in circumstances of immense material superiority with massive US military aid as in Burma! The political failure in Pakistan is equally simple to explain since in words of Mr Jinnah most of the Muslim politicians would not do anything without consulting the DC (Deputy Commissioner)! That may be a reason why Nawaz Sharif went to DC!

End Notes

1Page-144-Chapter 18-Indian Summer Offensive-1-Tithwal Battle-The Kashmir Campaign-1947-48-Historical Section-General Staff Branch-General Headquarters-GHQ Rawalpindi-1970.

2Page-190-Ibid.

3Page-28-Behind the Scenes- Major General Joginder Singh-Lancer International-New Delhi-1993.

4Page-161-War Despatches-Lieut Gen Harbaksh Singh-Lancer-New Delhi-1991.

5Page 184-Memoirs of a Bystander-Iqbal Akhund-Oxford University Press-Karachi-1996.

6Page - 148- The Pakistan Army-War 1965-Shaukat Riza-Army Education Press-1984). “At about 0600 hours 24 Brigade received the news that 3 FF had been overrun. Brigadier Ali Malik got on to Col Nisar and ordered 25 Cavalry to do “something”. Article Battle of Chawinda-Brigadier Nisar HJ-Pakistan Army Journal-Summer 1997.

7Page-28-The Western Front-Lt Gen P.K Candeth-Allied Publishers-New Delhi-1984.

8Pages-490 to 499- The Indian Armour-History of the Indian Armoured Corps-1941-1971-Maj Gen Gurcharan Singh Sandhu-Vision Books-New Delhi-1993.

9Page-499-Ibid.

 

[Signalian]

He talks about 3 Blauch Regt deployment in 1965 war. I had read the use of bull cart to cover a 106mm RR gun many years ago in Hilal magazine to stop Indian Army tanks from entering Lahore which he mentions in the video. AT some stage in his career he underwent SSG course in Cherat.
Next, he mentions a simple life of a Bengali in East Pakistan and how they were not given due consideration. Finally he talks about Urdu language.

 

[fatman17]

Tank Battle at Khem Karan
Major General Syed Ali Hamid revisits some of Pakistan’s critical armoured clashes with Indian forces in 1965

by Major General Syed Ali Hamid
September 6, 2019


Pakistani M47 Pattons crossing the Rohi Nullah after the engineers had improved the crossing site



“One of the greatest ironies of the 1965 War is the unjust criticism heaped on 1 Armoured Division after the War. The bitter truth of the 1965 War is that 1 Armoured Division was never fully employed either at Khem Karan or at Sialkot.”

(from History of the Indo-Pak War – 1965 by Lt. Gen. Mahmud Ahmed)

In our memory of the 1965 war, the names of two places standout – Asal Uttar/Khem Karan and Chawinda. Both are associated with tank battles fought by the Pakistan Army; the first a failure but the second a great success.


The failure of the counteroffensive launched from the area of Khem Karan was primarily due to the manner in which the armoured division was employed and the area selected for the offensive by the highest levels of command.

On the other hand, the success of the defensive battle at Chawinda was largely a result of the resilience of commanders and the determination of tank crews, as well as the excellent support provided by the artillery and the Pakistan Air Force (PAF).

Brig. Anthony (Tony) Lumb commanded the 4th Armoured Brigade at Khem Karan, 1965
Both battles were fought very differently by the two adversaries. In order for the reader to understand why the first succeeded and the second failed, I neeed to take us back in time to how the Pakistan Army grew after Independence and how its operational thinking developed.

Compared to India, the army that Pakistan inherited at Independence was badly fractured and poorly equipped. To support the Burma Theatre during the Second World War, the British had established the bulk of their training bases and logistical infrastructure in areas that formed part of post-Independence India. All of this went to independent India’s armed forces. Moreover, compared to the Indians, our leadership was inexperienced. Iftikhar Khan, who was being groomed as the first Pakistani Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C), was promoted from a lieutenant colonel to major general within two years after Independence. Consequently, in 1965, Indian commanders at the division level and above had some 8-9 years more service and experience than their counterparts in Pakistan.

Column of M47 Pattons with .50 anti-aircraft machineguns at the ready, Khem Karan Sector
The shortage of experienced officers was particularly pronounced in the armoured corps and until well past the 1965 war, the premier armoured formations of the Pakistan Army were mainly commanded by officers from the infantry – only a few of whom had any idea of the training and employment of armour.

Within our share of six armoured regiments, only three were equipped with Sherman tanks of Second World War vintage. The rest had light tanks and armoured cars. In 1952, when the Americans allowed us to purchase 352 up-gunned and refurbished Shermans and 75 M-36 Tank Destroyers at seven percent of their value, the Pakistan Armoured Corps became an all-tracked force. However, what gave us a big lead over the Indians in quality and quantity were 500 M-47/48 Pattons and 110 M-24 light reconnaissance tanks that were supplied through a US Military Assistance Program (MAP) during the 1950s and into the early 1960s. With this equipment, the armoured corps tripled in size to 18 regiments, of which 10 were equipped with Pattons. In comparison, the Indians had 16 regiments, of which only 4 were equipped with British Centurion tanks that could match the M-47/48s and the rest were mainly WW2-era Shermans. The Pakistani regiments were grouped into one heavy and one light armoured division and there were a number of regiments of Shermans supporting the infantry divisions. The artillery had done even better, with a fivefold increase from eight regiments at Independence to a staggering 41 by 1959.

Division commanders were hard pressed to find troops to defend their large frontages and though the army had devised a New Concept of Defense to address this, there were strong reservations on its viability and it did not survive the first shots of the 1965 war

There were two major weaknesses faced by our army that would have a significant impact in the 1965 war, particularly in the offensive at Khem Karan. Pakistan did not have the finances to add an additional corps headquarters to the one funded by the US and therefore, faced a serious problem in the control of the two armoured (including one light) and five infantry divisions facing the Indians in West Pakistan. The equipment and firepower of the infantry divisions improved substantially under the MAP but the number remained the same because the Americans were not willing to equip more – and again Pakistan ostensibly did not have the money. Division commanders were hard pressed to find troops to defend their large frontages and though the army had devised a New Concept of Defense to address this problem, there were strong reservations on its viability and it did not survive the first shots of the 1965 war.

The opening shots of the conflict were fired far south in the Rann of Kutch in March 1965. In a border clash, a regular infantry division of the Pakistan Army, supported by a regiment of new M-48s, put to flight what were primarily Indian border troops. Pakistan claimed a victory and erroneously decided that the Indians did not have the will to fight. This strengthened the hands of the hawks within the government and the army who conceived a plan for liberating Kashmir. The purpose of this article is not to trace the entire conduct of the war and it is sufficient to say that Operation GIBRALTAR, the plan conceived for launching raiders into Kashmir in August 1965, ended up as an unmitigated disaster. To retrieve the situation, the Pakistan Army launched Operation GRANDSLAM to capture Akhnur and sever the main Indian Line of Communication to Kashmir. The offensive was only a partial success and it not only sucked in 7th Division, which had been earmarked to support the 1st Armoured Division, it also led to an all-out war.

A .50 Brwning quad deployed in sugarcane fields around Khem Karan, 1965
Within a day of the Indian attack in the Lahore sector, the Pakistan Army launched a counter-offensive opposite Khem Karan with the 1st Armoured Division and 11th Infantry Division.

1st Armored Division was a heavy formation with three armoured brigades, an artillery brigade of self-propelled artillery and six combat and service support battalions. It was a well-trained formation which four years earlier had been tested during Exercise TEZGAM, when it advanced 180 km in an area north of Sargodha. Following TEZGAM, the optimists were of the opinion that the division could penetrate even further during a war. Since the Rann of Kutch incident, the armoured division had moved to Changa Manga Reserve Forest close its operational area and along with 7th Infantry Division carried out detailed planning and coordination as well as extensive border reconnaissance for a counteroffensive. The preferred option was the area of Fazilka where the terrain was suitable for tanks and lightly held by the Indian Army. However, when 7th Division was sent to Chhamb, GHQ made a last minute decision to group 11th Infantry Division with the armoured division and launch a counter-offensive from opposite Kasur. The armoured division was so unprepared for adopting this direction that as late as the 6th of September it did not have any maps of the area. The history of the Second World War is replete with examples where formations responded rapidly and efficiently to changes of mission and direction, but the Pakistan Army was not a battle-hardened force.

Lt Col Sahib Zad Gul of the 6th Lancers is considered one of the finest armoured regiment commanders during the 1965 War. He fell in battle while commanding his troops and was awarded the Sitara-e-Jurat
The area chosen for the counter-offensive was like a funnel with Khem Karan at the nozzle end. It was a poor selection. The funnel severely restricted the space for the armour to fan out and develop multiple axes to penetrate deep into the rear of the Indian defenses. The area was extensively irrigated and subsequently parts were flooded by the tanks breaking the banks of distributaries. In September it was heavily cultivated with sugarcane, which gave the Indian tanks and antitank weapons excellent cover to engage the large M-47s that the Pakistani armoured division was equipped with. Like most US tanks, the M-47s were fuel-guzzlers that were showing their age. They had been discarded by the Americans 10 years ago and had been extensively operated by our 1st Armoured Division in field exercises.

Headquarters of I Corps was controlling the battle in the area of Sialkot/ Chawinda and with no other corps headquarters, GHQ gave the overall responsibility of the counter-offensive to 11th Infantry Division. To add to its burden, 5th Armoured Brigade of the armored division was place under its command and the overall mission was to capture the line of Bhikiwind-Patti, 40 kilometres away. 5th Armoured Brigade, commanded by Bashir Ahmed, was a light brigade with only 24th Cavalry (which had cut its teeth in the Kutch operations with its Pattons) and 1st Frontier Force Battalion. The brigade was reinforced with 6th Lancers, an M-47 regiment and a reconnaissance squadron from 15th Lancers.

It was too much to expect of an infantry division that had been cobbled together as late as May 1965 with two under-strength brigades to defend the area south of Lahore. The situation was, on the whole, a recipe for disaster. The final straw was that no formation was assigned or took the responsibility of organizing the movement of a mass of vehicles – tanks, armoured personnel carriers, trucks, jeeps, etc. – from their assembly areas near Raiwind into the bridgehead. The only formation that had the resources to establish a traffic and crossing control organization was the armoured division which shed all responsibility for the operations of its armoured brigade. If a corps headquarters had been overseeing the operation, it would have tasked the armoured division from the outset.

The end result was a horrendous snarl-up, more on which later.

The bridge that the engineers constructed over the BRB Canal was delayed primarily because many of the vehicles carrying essential components of the bridge were caught in the snarl-up. 6th Lancers finally got the go-ahead to cross but its leading tank fell off the bridge – killing the the squadron commander – and all movement stalled. When the bridge was finally declared safe, the regiment pushed across but was held up just a kilometer ahead by the Rohi Nullah which had steep banks. The leading tank stalled and had to be towed as well as the rest. The presence of this nullah was unknown because there had been no time for reconnaissance which would have also revealed the presence of an excellent crossing site just a kilometre downstream. By now it was bright daylight and the congestion of a variety of vehicles attempting to get across presented a very lucrative target for the Indian Air Force (IAF). Three Mystère aircraft made a low pass but they were received by a hail of fire from heavy and medium machineguns and one was shot down. Thereafter, the IAF kept well away.

On the night of the 6th of September, the 2nd Frontier Force Battalion had created a lodgment a mile in length and breadth. It was no small achievement for a single infantry battalion, but nowhere close to the size required to achieve a bridgehead for an armoured brigade. This lodgment was very vulnerable and to improve the perimetre of security, it was decided to conduct a raid in the direction of Khem Karan. This raid, which began at 3 pm, was carried out by a company of 1st Frontier Force, a rifle troop of 15th Lancers and the first six tanks of 6th Lancers which had ultimately managed to cross the Rohi Nullah. Both the commanding officers accompanied the raid. It struck a troop of 9th Deccan Horse and two Indian companies that were being extricated from a position that they had been holding astride the main Kasur – Khem Karan axis. Two Indian tanks were destroyed and there are conflicting accounts to the casualties suffered by the Indian infantry.

5th Armoured Brigade was to breakout by 6 am on the morning of 7th September but with successive delays at the bridging site, the congestion of tanks and vehicles and heavy Indian shelling, at last light the leading elements were just two kilometres ahead of the customs post at Khem Karan. Ultimately, the brigade broke out a day later on the 8th of September on two axes. The M47s of 6th Lancers under their indomitable commanding officer Sahib Zad Gul made good progress on the right towards Valtoha and advanced about 10 kilometres. 24th Cavalry led by Ali Imam only arrived in the bridgehead on the morning of the breakout and, advancing on the left, met stiffer opposition from the Shermans of 9th Deccan Horse, the only Indian armoured regiment in the area.

By the afternoon, 24th Cavalry was hammering the western flank of the Indian 4th Mountain Division at Asal Uttar and a maneuver by two squadrons forced the 1/9th Gurkha Battalion to abandon its defenses in panic. Unfortunately, there was no infantry to occupy the captured area when the armoured regiments pulled back at night for an urgently needed replenishment. The success achieved by a hard day of fighting was lost and the environment had changed for the worst by the time the brigade resumed a delayed advance in the afternoon of the 9th of September. The defenses of 4th Mountain Division at Asal Uttar had been reinforced by 3rd Cavalry with its Centurion Mk7s along with the headquarters of the 2nd Armoured Brigade.

The 9th of September was also the day when the leading elements of 4th Armoured Brigade – which was commanded by Brig. Tony Lumb – started crawling into the bridgehead. The previous night, GHQ had decided to induct the armoured division with an open-ended mission to “overrun maximum enemy territory.” The vehicle congestion was still chaotic and from the bridge at Rohi Nullah it stretched three kilometres back to Kasur. The two armoured brigades were now compressed into a small area and controlled by different headquarters which violated the basic principle of unity of command. 5th Armored Brigade was operating astride the main road from Khem Karan and in the afternoon, 4th Armoured Brigade launched a wider maneuver from the west with two battle groups. The gains by the two brigades to skirt the Indian defenses at Asal Uttar were unspectacular, however: on the right the leading squadron of 6th Lancers managed to penetrate all the way till Valtoha and practically bypassed the Indian defenses at Asal Uttar.

To quote Napoleon, “There is a moment in every battle at which the least maneuver is decisive and gives superiority, as one drop of water causes overflow.”

This was possibly that moment, but neither the division nor the brigade made an effort to capitalize on this window of opportunity. Unfortunately, the commanding officer of 6th Lancers was martyred and with no orders being received, the tanks of 6th Lancers struggled back through the night. In three days of operations the armour had penetrated only 10 kilometres.

On the night of 9/10 September, 5th Armored Brigade finally reverted to the armoured division. Next morning the division launched a two-pronged advance which did not differ much from the previous day. However 4th Armoured Brigade swung even wider with 4th Cavalry to outflank the enemy and cut the road to Bhikiwind at Milestone 32. The Indian 2nd Armoured Brigade was well prepared for this thrust around its western flank and kept observing and engaging 4th Cavalry as it battled forward.

Having determined the direction of the thrust of 4th Cavalry, around midday the Indians deployed two squadrons of Centurions of 3rd Cavalry in an arc ahead of Milestone 32 and backed them up with a Sherman squadron of Deccan Horse. The Indians held their fire until the tanks of 4th Cavalry were within killing range. In spite of taking more casualties and tanks being bogged, 4th Cavalry pushed forward and by sunset was within two kilometers of the elusive Milestone 32, but there “like a spent and bruised athlete it collapsed altogether.” Barely 10 tanks managed to reach the finish line, of which only six were fit to fight, three were bogged in a nearby field and the fourth had run out of fuel. The unit’s vehicles with fuel and ammunition had arrived in the brigade headquarters, but an unexpected withdrawal by some troops of another battle group created a panic and many vehicles rushed back to Rohi Nullah. During the night, a number of crews of 4th Cavalry abandoned their tanks and quite a few were taken prisoner. The regiment lost all but seven of its tanks – some destroyed, the rest bogged all along the route it had taken.

4th Cavalry cannot be faulted for lacking determination and was one of the few in the armoured division that arrived anywhere close to the assigned objective, albeit at a huge cost.

Like all the previous days, 5th Armoured Brigade made a late start. Its vehicles of fuel and ammunition used to get late coming forward and the regiment could only resume operations by midday. With 6th Lancers down to 21 tanks, the brunt of operations fell on 24th Cavalry, which was launched with three infantry companies to capture Asal Uttar and exploit up to Chima. The objective was the core of the defense of the Indian 4th Mountain Division, and the first attack was checked on the fringes by tanks and recoilless rifles.

Major Samiuddin, who was one of the squadron commanders, recollects that a cloud of dust raised by the intense artillery fire enveloped the combat zone, making it difficult for the tank crews to acquire targets. All that was visible were the barrels of the tanks’ guns and the flashes of their fire. A second attack was aborted when the brigade commander was ambushed. His absence, coupled with a panic created by the return of some tanks which had been sent for his rescue, left the brigade in disarray. In a repeat of what had occurred with the other armoured brigade, a large number of vehicles including those of the headquarters of 5th Armored Brigade also rushed back towards the bridge over the Rohi Nullah.

The operations of the armoured division on the 10th of September were its swan song. A crisis had emerged in the Ravi-Chenab Corridor and the armoured division was ordered to suspend operations in this sector and with 4th Armored Brigade move north post-haste. As the withdrawal commenced, the Indians launched a number of attacks to recover lost ground. However, they seriously underestimated the strength of Pakistani forces. In the first attack on the 12th of September by an infantry brigade supported by a squadron, the large portion of a Sikh battalion attacking Khem Karan from the east was caught between the tanks of 6th and 15th Lancers and surrendered. Three companies of the Frontier Force supported by 24th Cavalry checked a second battalion attacking down the main road. Some Indian tanks managed to break through but Maj. Khadim Hussain who had brought up the supply echelons to replenish 24th Cavalry chanced upon an anti-tank recoilless rifle whose crew had been killed. Assisted by a Naik of 5th Frontier Force, he destroyed one tank at 500 meters and a second even closer but a third killed the officer and the Naik. The officer was awarded a posthumous Sitara-e-Jurat.


A few hours later, a third battalion supported by Shermans assaulted from the east of the main road and met strong fire from the defending companies of 5th Frontier Force. A squadron of M-24s from 12th Cavalry, commanded by Rafi Alam, was covering the right flank of the defenses and was ordered to support 5th Frontier Force. It swung west and as it reached the Khem Karan Distributary, it struck the flank of the Indian armour, destroyed two tanks and forced the others to withdraw. Rafi Alam was also awarded a Sitara-e-Jurat.

It seemed that the armoured corps was more adept at fighting a defensive battle and its subsequent performance at Chawinda restored its prestige.

One of the more famous maxims of Clausewitz, the father of modern military thinking is: “Errors of conception cannot be rectified on the field of battle.”

What this means is that it is very difficult for formations and units to compensate for serious errors in a plan and achieve their mission. There are no shortcuts to success, especially in war. That is exactly what the topmost leadership attempted to do. And so, unfortunately, GHQ laid the blame for the failure of the counteroffensive on 1st Armored Division.

Tags: History

 

[fatman17]

DEFENCE NOTES

Handling of Armour in Indo-Pak War

Pakistan Armoured Corps as a Case Study

Part–I

Maj (Retd) AGHA HUMAYUN AMIN from WASHINGTON DC makes an excellent presentation of how Pak armour was handled in our wars with India.

Introduction

Poor handling of armour at and beyond brigade level in all Indo Pak Wars fought from 1947-48 till 1971 stands out as the principal cause of stagnation and lack of decisiveness in the final outcome of all three Indo Pak wars. On the face value this may appear to be an oversimplified view , however a dispassionate study of the British-Indian military tradition proves that this assertion is far more closer to truth than many military observers and analysts may have realised in actual on ground military analysis as far as military history writing in the Indo Pak scenario is concerned.

In this brief article, we will survey the entire canvas of British-Indo Pak military tradition from the eighteenth century till to date and endeavour to arrive at certain analytical conclusions which may help us in improving doctrine operational philosophy and handling of armour in a future war, or at least in military training.

THE PRE 1947 LEGACY

CAVALRY IN PRE WW ONE BRITISH INDIAN WARS

Cavalry was the decisive arm of battle till at least the 1740s in India. It may be noted that the “superiority of the infantry-artillery team based European way of war, over the cavalry charge based Asiatic way of warfare”1, was, for the first time demonstrated at the Battle of Saint Thome in 1746, where the French-Native troops of the French East India Company, under the Paradis, a Swiss soldier of fortune on the French East India Company’s payroll, brushed aside the much larger and at least outwardly awesome cavalry heavy army of, Anwaruddin, the Nawab of Carnatic. Thus in words of the Cambridge historian “Cavalry could make no impression on troops that kept their ranks and reserved their fire” The terror of Asiatic armies had disappeared2! Cavalry, however, retained its own decisive role at the tactical level as a flank protection and limited attack role on the battlefield and as a protective element and strategic screen /raiding and harassing force at the strategic level. Since the Marathas and Mysore forces of Hyder Ali relied heavily on cavalry as a strategic screen and as a raiding force the British were also forced to raise regular native cavalry regiments. This process started from 1672 but was assumed a significant shape from once the Moghal Horse was raised at Patna in July 1760 under Sardars Mirza Shahbaz Khan and Mirza Tar Beg3. It may be noted that this unit was officered entirely by Indians. The British attitude at this time was that “cavalry was a rather flashy extravagance”4 and they preferred getting it on loan from native rulers rather than having their own Native cavalry units. Thus, in the south the Nawab of Arcot and in the north the Nawab of Oudh were asked by the British to supply cavalry and raise cavalry units for war service with the English East India Company. The British discovered that cavalry taken on loan from the Nawab of Arcot and Nawab of Oudh was unreliable under fire and raised their own native cavalry units in Bengal and Madras officered by Europeans from the mid and late 1770s.5 Cavalry was first seriously recognised as an arm of decision once General Gerard Lake who was basically an infantryman arrived in India in 1801 as C in C Bengal Army . General Lake for the first time organised cavalry as brigades of two units 6. Lake decided to do so since he felt that Maratha cavalry was too efficient vis a vis the company’s cavalry and there was a need for reorganisation and reform. Lake thus gave serious thought to cavalry training and the first major cavalry training manoeuvres in the Company’s military history were held in 1802. Cavalry units were trained hard and the standard set was 45 miles in 24 hours. Lake also increased cavalry’s firepower by attaching two six pounder galloper horse artillery guns to each cavalry regiment.7

The reader may note that while the Bengal Infantry from the beginning was Hindu dominated, cavalry at the outset was a wholly Muslim arm. Such was the Muslim dominance that even the British C in C of Bengal Army8 (also C in C India) Major John Carnac declared that “The Mughals ( Muslim of Central Asian/West of Khyber ancestry) .....are the only good horsemen in India”9. The Bengal infantry from the very beginning had no Bengalis since the English Company had the choice to recruit soldiers of fortune of “Jat” “Rohilla (Hindustani Pathan or anyone with a Pathan ancestry)” Buxarries (Hindu Bhumihar Brahmans from Buxar area in modern Bihar province who had been recruited in Mughal Army also10) Jats (largely Hindustani Hindu but possibly some Muslims) Rajputs (mostly Hindustani Hindu from Oudh and Bihar) and Brahmans11. Even in Britain cavalry was seen as a feudal dominated arm and known as the “arm of fashion and wealth”.12

Cavalry was decisively employed by General Lake in the Second Maratha War, notably at Fatehgarh which was an all cavalry battle.13 Lake brilliantly used cavalry as a lightning leading force to reconnoitre otherwise impregnable Maratha defensive oppositions so that infantry and artillery were used with maximum effect at the decisive moment. Lake often used cavalry to the point of rashness. At the Battle of Delhi he brilliantly employed his cavalry in a feint withdrawal tempting the French trained and led Marathas to leave an otherwise impregnable defensive position to attack the supposedly withdrawing cavalry, while Lake brought up his infantry to counterattack the overconfident Marathas! The Maratha War was a lesson for the British in cavalry’s capabilities as well as limitations. At Laswari where Lake finally decisively defeated the Maratha main army under the Hindustani Pathan Sarwar Khan14, he advanced single-handed with his cavalry against a Maratha army which Lake thought was retreating . His cavalry initially achieved a breakthrough, but was then held up by Maratha artillery fire and Lake was able to finally defeat the Marathas only after his infantry joined him at midday.15 Laswari once again proved that cavalry was not as much of an arm of decision as infantry, for it was the British Indian infantry that finally saved the day at Laswari.

Cavalry was again significantly employed in the Third Maratha/Pindari War. This was essentially a cleanup operation covering thousands of miles and was essentially a war of movement suiting the cavalry. Cavalry was used to locate the Pindaris while infantry was later used to attack and destroy them. The most notable cavalry action of this war took place at Sitabaldi where the 6th Bengal Native Cavalry defeated a much larger combined Maratha-Arab Muslim force singlehandedly.16

Cavalry’s importance started declining from 1817 onwards . Although it performed important reconnaissance and protection duties in the First Afghan War the mountainous terrain and poor logistics limited its role severely. The Sikh Wars were also wholly infantry dominated wars in which Sikhs dug themselves up into entrenchments which were stormed by the British at great human cost. The Second Sikh War was particularly unfortunate for Indian cavalry because of flight of a cavalry brigade of two British and two native units at Chillianwalla which led to a serious British reverse. Cavalry’s role by 1857 was reduced to escorting artillery siege trains, supply convoys and flank protection. Since most of the battles of the Sepoy Rebellion were fought in built up areas cavalry had a limited role.

The most decisive change in Indian Cavalry which started from 1858 was the mixing up of the class composition by the British with a view to reducing chances of any further rebellion. This was done because the Sepoy Rebellion was largely led and sparked by the Hindustani Pathan/Ranghar Muslim units of the Bengal Army. Most notable of all being the seizure of Delhi in the early hours of 11th May 1857, by the 3rd Bengal Native Light Cavalry (raised in 1776) after reducing into shock and inertia a British garrison of one Royal British Army infantry and one cavalry regiment at Meerut on 10th May 1857. The British adopted a firm policy not to have a Muslim dominated cavalry. Thus Cavalry was made a mixed arm after 1857 with almost equal proportions of Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs in each unit The only exception to this rule being two one class units of Muslims and one of Hindus.17

WW ONE

Cavalry remained an arm dominated by rich men more interested in polo and pig sticking from the 1860s till the First World War. Two Indian cavalry divisions were sent to France as part of the allied cavalry corps, but remained largely unemployed with few exceptions like the Hodson’s Horse which was used in mounted infantry role18. One controversial albeit tangible way of gauging Cavalry’s contribution in WW One and Two may be the fact that the lone Victoria Cross won by an Indian cavalry man/Tankman in both world wars out of the total 35 won by Indians was won in France by a Hindu Rajputana Rajput in WW One while performing the duties of a despatch rider19! Indian Cavalry was relatively more decisively used in the Mesopotamian and Palestine Campaigns notably in the final allied offensive in 1918 when General Allenby successfully used cavalry with great effect in the battles of Gaza, Beersheeba etc along with eight British manned tanks20. The Turks were heavily outnumbered in the Palestine Campaign of 1917-18 and there was far more freedom of manoeuvre for cavalry to be employed for carrying out raids and outflanking marches21. The main fighting was, however, done by the infantry and cavalry remained an important but essentially second important arm.

The First World War marked a turning point in warfare. Infantry failed to achieve a breakthrough on the Western Front and its place as the arm of decision was challenged seriously for the first time since the Battle of Crecy (1346). Introduction of tanks in 1916 broke the stalemate despite faulty employment doctrine. However, tanks despite their relatively significant role in the German defeat in World War One failed to achieve a major victory because of mechanical failures and poor employment doctrine.22 The British Army was an infantry/cavalry dominated army and till the end of WW One tanks were still viewed as an important but not as decisive an arm as infantry23. Tanks found an antidote soon. It was at Battle of Cambrai where tanks for the first time, at one of the five points of breakthrough, were effectively engaged and destroyed by a single German Field Artillery Battery which destroyed many tanks by direct fire.24 Tanks played a crucial role at Battle of Amiens in 1918 which was termed by military analysts as turning point of the war and as the “Black Day” of the German Army by General Ludendorff. The true worth of tanks, however, was still not appreciated, since the Germans were able to stabilise their front, thanks to conservative British doctrine of exploiting breakthroughs.25 Although the Royal Tank Corps was created from 28 July 1917, 26 Tanks as an entity did not have any Godfather in the British military hierarchy and this ensured that their true significance was not appreciated at least in the British and Indian Army. Once the allied armies were demobilised the tank was forgotten and the old generals once again elevated infantry to the role of arm of decision.

INTER WAR

YEARS-1918-39

First World War brought very few changes in the Indian Army and the Indian Army remained an infantry cavalry army retaining twenty one Horse Cavalry regiments27 after the 1920-21 reorganisation. Indians thus had nothing to do with tanks till 1937-3828 when, keeping in view the growing German military threat and relative backwardness of the Indian Army it was decided to mechanise two Indian cavalry units i.e 13 Lancers and 14 Scinde Horse29. Both were given a squadron each of Vickers Light Tanks and Crossley Armoured Cars, phased out from British units 30 . The reader may note that the main problem in mechanisation of Indian cavalry in the interwar years was not essentially conservatism but lack of funds. Three of the five Indian Army chiefs in the inter war years were from cavalry31 and wanted to mechanise the Indian Cavalry. Their efforts to do so failed because of lack of funds and economic depression of the inter war years.32 Thus on the eve of WW Two in 1939 just two Indian cavalry units were mechanised. The outbreak of World War Two forced the British to speed up mechanisation but initially mechanisation for Indians meant only trucks or armoured cars. There was one important measure which the British undertook and which most probably attracted the best available manpower to try to enrol in the Indian Armoured Corps.This was an almost doubling of the pay of the Armoured Corps soldiers from around 18 rupees to 33 rupees per month.33 This was done in October 1942, once General Martel who was visiting India in order to reorganise the Indian Armoured Corps was told that “India had a mercenary army” and that the best men in India would not join he Indian Armoured Corps if they were paid Rs 18 per month which was the average monthly pay of an Indian soldier.

SECOND WORLD WAR

THE BURMA FRONT

It was Burma where the Indians for the first time thanks to US military aid to Britain were given the latest tanks of World War Two. Both the Indian tank brigades i.e. 254 (which led 33 Corps advance) and 255 (which led 4 Corps advance) were equipped with Grant and Sherman tanks.These brigades however had a limited infantry support role. It cannot be said that the Indians who fought as tankmen learnt anything really worthwhile about modern armoured warfare. The tank warfare conducted in Burma was a one sided show with the British Indian Army having 300 most modern Grant and Sherman tanks34 against just one Japanese Tank Regiment35 consisting of tanks which could not have the firepower or capability to destroy the Grants and Shermans of the Indian tank brigades!36 Mostly they were in support of infantry and the Japanese in front of them had hardly any tanks to match the heavy Shermans etc with which the Indian cavalry regiments were equipped. Thus there were hardly any tank to tank fights since the Japanese hardly possessed anything to oppose the latest Sherman and Grant tanks. The only resistance that these tanks encountered was from Japanese anti tank guns and artillery at very close ranges and these were relatively rare since the British always enjoyed numerical superiority in the later stages of the Burmese campaign and the British Indian infantry was always in close support of their tanks. In war once the enemy is vastly undergunned and underequipped to oppose you, little can be learned in terms of tactical or operational lessons. Brigadier Riaz ul Karim whose unit 5 Horse was equipped with Shermans in Burma has claimed that he was the only Indian who commanded a tank squadron in actual action in Burma and also won an MC. If this is true then the only Pakistani officer who actually commanded a tank squadron (not armoured car or tracked carrier) in WW Two was a sidelined man in the Ayubian era before 1965 war broke out!37 In any case Indian or Pakistani officers could have learnt little about armour tactics in Burma which was essentially an infantry man’s war and in which the enemy was vastly outnumbered both qualitatively as well as quantitatively as far as the tanks were concerned.

NORTH AFRICAN THEATRE

In the North African theatre the Indian armour experience was also quite limited. The Indian 3rd Motor Brigade that reached North Africa in early 1941 was equipped with soft skinned wheeled vehicles and did little except evading getting captured by the tanks of Rommel’s Afrika Korps!38 Even their British masters were so inept in handling of tanks that the Germans inflicted various major defeats on them despite the fact that the British were numerically as well as qualitatively superior to the Germans! In such an environment Indians could have learnt little about armoured warfare. The British tanks in North Africa were famous for doing one of the two things. Either they would recklessly charge a well prepared German or Italian position, without any deliberate support from the despicable artillery, and return with a bloody nose or would exercise extreme caution once restrained by “Take no Risk, do nothing till you enjoy overwhelming numerical superiority” policy of commanders like Ritchie or Montgommery as happened in various operational situations throughout the North African campaign from 1941 to 1943, thus allowing the enemy to counter attack decisively and turn the scales or to disengage and occupy another sound defensive position. In any case the Indians were organised as infantry divisions or as Light Recce elements in motorised brigades and did not have tanks in this sector, which ensured that their experiences were limited as far as true armoured warfare was concerned. The Indian whose battle performance was most distinguished in this sector in tangible terms was Major Rajendarsinhji then a squadron commander of 2nd Gardner’s Horse who was awarded a Distinguished Service Order in 1941 for breaking out and capturing 300 enemy troops as prisoners.39 The South African official historian correctly observed that “.....the armoured car regiments were employed almost exclusively in observation which they performed with commendable efficiency, but there was little else in the desert campaigns that they were equipped to do. The armour of their cars was inadequate, being vulnerable to everything save rifle fire, and their armament a machine gun at best was useless save for shooting up thin skinned and defenceless transport”. 40

OTHER THEATRES

Indian armour was deployed in other theatres like Italy, Sudan Malaya etc but here too their role was scouting and observation rather than anything more significant and the few armour officers who served in these theatres could have learnt very little about real tank battles even at squadron and unit level. The operations in these areas were infantry dominated in any case and in Italy warfare had degenerated to the positional battles of WW One.

POST 1947 DEVELOPMENTS

1947-1965

INITIAL ORGANISATION

Pakistan Army, as a result of the division of the pre 1947 British Indian Army on a communal basis, inherited six armoured regiments at the time of transfer of power and partition of India. These six units were constituted from Muslim manpower of units transferred to Pakistan and those transferred to India as the following two tables indicate 41:—

ORIGINAL CLASS COMPOSITION OF ARMOURED UNITS ALLOTTED TO PAKISTAN

REGIMENT

RANGHAR/RAJPUT MUSLIM (HINDUSTANI MUSLIMS) PATHAN MUSLIM PUNJABI MUSLIM SIKHS HINDU DOGRAS HINDU JAT


13 LANCERS

1 1 1
GUIDES

1 1 1
11 CAVALRY

1 1 1
5 HORSE

1 1 1
6 LANCERS

1 1 1
19 LANCERS

1 1 1
TOTAL

2 2 4 6 2 2
18 SQUADRONS

The deficiency of 10 Muslim Squadrons was made up by inter unit transfers from the following units allotted to India:—

REGIMENT

PUNJABI MUSLIMS HINDUSTANI MUSLIMS (RANGHARS) KAIMKHANI (MUSLIMS (RAJPUTS) PATHAN MUSLIMS
17 POONA HORSE

1 (TO 19 LANCERS)
14 SCINDE HORSE

1 (TO 13 LANCERS) 1 (TO GUIDES)
4 HODSON HORSE

1 (TO GUIDES)
2 LANCERS

PARTS TO 11 CAVALRY
9 DECCAN HORSE

SOME MEN TO 11 CAVALRY AND 1 SQUADRON TO 5 HORSE
7 CAVALRY

1 (TO 6 LANCERS)
8 CAVALRY

1 (TO 6 LANCERS) PARTS TO 11 CAVALRY
1ST SKINNERS HORSE

1 (TO 11 CAVALRY)
18 CAVALRY

1 SQUADRON TO 5 HORSE
CENTRAL INDIA HORSE

1 (TO 19 LANCERS)
TOTAL

5. 5 SQUADRONS 1. 5 SQUADRONS 2 SQUADRONS 1 SQUADRON
The above thus made the class composition of the Pakistan Armoured Corps as following :—

ETHNIC GROUP

PATHAN MUSLIMS-RECRUITED ONLY FROM 1846 PUNJABI MUSLIM RECRUITED ONLY FROM 1846 RAJPUT/HINDUSTANI/KAI MKHANI/RANGHAR MOSTLY FROM UNITS RAISED IN 1804-1846
NUMBER OF SQUADRONS

3 9. 5 5. 5
General Messervy the first Britisher C in C of the Pakistan Army was a cavalryman from 4 Hodson’s Horse/13 Lancers42, along with Gracey as Chief of Staff and his team of Pakistani and British officers had organised the Pakistani General Headquarters at Rawalpindi in the old buildings that had once housed the pre 1947 headquarters of the old Northern Command. By January 1948 Messervy had reorganised the armoured regiments as following43:—

FORMATION

LOCATION UNIT ALLOTTED REMARKS
7 DIVISION

HQ AT RAWALPINDI 11 CAVALRY LIGHT ARMOURED REGIMENT
8 DIVISION

HQ AT KARACHI NIL NIL
9 (F) DIVISION

HQ AT PESHAWAR 10 GUIDES CAVALRY HEAVY ARMOURED REGIMENT
10 DIVISION

HQ AT LAHORE 6 LANCERS LIGHT ARMOURED REGIMENT
3RD INDEPENDENT

HQ AT RISALPUR 13 LANCERS MEDIUM ARMOURED REGIMENT
ARMOURED BRIGADE

5 HORSE
19 LANCERS

MEDIUM ARMOURED REGIMENT
EMPLOYMENT OF ARMOUR IN 1947-48 WAR

Although 3rd Armoured Brigade was equipped with Shermans, Pakistani General Headquarters did not employ any Pakistani tanks in the 1947-48 Kashmir War. Mr Jinnah the Governor General wanted to conduct the war aggressively,and had the vision but not the energy . He was a dying man and had too many things to do. Unfortunately he was not supported by his ethnically divided as well highly incompetent and irresolute cabinet of weak men who had neither the vision nor the resolution to function as a war cabinet! The Pakistan Army on the other hand was commanded by a non interested Britisher.

The 11 Cavalry equipped with armoured cars were the only unit employed in the war. The GHQ assigned the unit an essentially defensive and passive role but the indomitable Colonel Tommy Masud commanding the unit was too resolute a man to be restrained 44. The unit thus took a prominent part in operations in Bhimbhar-Mirpur area under Tommy Masud, but its role remained limited since it was not allowed to conduct any major offensive operation to support the militia by an over cautious general headquarters.

The Indians on the other hand employed their armour much more aggressively and imaginatively in Kashmir. Armoured cars of the 7th Light Cavalry saved Srinagar in November 194745. The Indians also employed tanks decisively in recapture of strategic towns like Jhangar and Rajauri of which the latter was captured single-handedly by a tank squadron of Central India Horse46. The greatest Indian strategic success by employment of tanks was the recapture of the otherwise impregnable 11,578 feet high Zojila Pass on 1st November 194847 which enabled them to relieve Leh and recapture the vast bulk of Ladakh. These areas without Zojila Pass were for all purposes lost to the Indians. Today the Pakistan Army is still paying the price for loss of Zojila with approximately three infantry brigades committed in Pakistan held Kashmir opposite Indian held Ladakh.

The rule of the thumb of the 1947-48 War was the fact that all Indian successes had a deep connection with presence of tanks or armoured cars while all Pakistani failures were attributable to the absence of tanks or armoured cars! Indians stopped only where either the gradient became too steep for their tanks or where there were bottlenecks like the Indus or the Jhelum valley and tank or armoured cars could not make an impression.

The Pakistani GHQ finally moved the 3rd Armoured Brigade near Bhimbhar, for a projected counterstroke at Indian communications to Poonch, but was glad and relieved, at not employing it, when the Indians made a unilateral offer of ceasefire on 30 December 1947.48

DEVELOPMENT’S DURING 1948 -1965

The Pakistan Armoured Corps was equipped almost wholly with US tanks. These tanks as earlier discussed were supplied by the US in WW Two for the defence of Burma. The armoured cars were mostly of British origin but had proved obsolete even in WW Two and were slowly phased out in the period 1950-58 as US aid enabled the armoured corps to wholly switch to tanks from 1954 onwards. It appears that the policy makers in the Pakistan Army in 1954 did not really appreciate the importance of tanks. The first US military team, which came to Pakistan and surveyed the Pakistani military requirement ments after liaison and discussions with Pakistani officers thus, reported to the US Joint Chiefs Committee that the Pakistan Army needed equipment for one armoured brigade and four infantry divisions. The US Joint Chiefs added another armoured division to this estimate making the proposed four and half division plan the famous “Five and Half Divisions Plan”49.

The developments and changes that took place in Pakistani armour can be gauged from the following table:—

PERIOD

CUMULATIVE NUMBER OF ARMOURED REGIMENTS REMARKS
1947-48

6 13 Lancers,10 Cavalry,11 Cavalry,19 Lancers, 6 Lancers,5 Horse
1949-1955

8 15 Lancers and 12 Cavalry raised in 1955.
1956-1962

14 4, 22,23,24 ,25 Cavalry and 20 Lancers.
1962-1965

18 30,31,32 and 33 TDU.

1947-1956

1956-1965 REMARKS
3RD INDEPENDENT ARMOURED BRIGADE

1ST ARMOURED DIVISION COMPRISING 1ST ARMOURED DIVISON RAISED IN 1956

3 AND 4 ARMOURED BRIGADES. AS PART OF 5 AND HALF DIVISION PLAN.

5 ARMOURED BRIGADE ADDED LATER THE DIVISON WAS ADDED ON INITIATIVE OF US JCS.
THREE DIVISIONAL TANK REGIMENTS

100 ARMOURED BRIGADE CODE NAME OF 6 ARMOURED DIVISION RAISED SHORTLY BEFORE THE WAR RAISED FOR DEFENCE OF AREA NORTH OF RAVI SINCE 1ST ARMOURED DIVISION WAS GIVEN A ROLE SOUTH OF RAVI.


DIVISIONAL TANK REGIMENTS AND ONE CORPS RECCE REGT 12 CAVALRY, 15 AND 20 LANCERS RECCE REGIMENTS.
100 ARMOURED BRIGADE/ LATER 6 ARMOURED DIVISION

IN EXISTENCE SINCE THE FIFTIES BUT REDESIGNATED AS THE 6 ARMOURED DIVISION IN 1965 UNITS LOCATED IN THE FIFTIES AT NOWSHERA, PESHAWAR, MANSAR ETC BUT FINALLY LOCATED AT KHARIAN BEFORE THE 1965 WAR.


FOUR TANK DELIVERY REGIMENTS RAISED IN 1965 TO AUGMENT ARMOUR RESOURCES OF INFANTRY DIVISIONS TWO WITH FIFTEEN DIVISION IN SIALKOT-SHAKARGARH BULGE AND ONE EACH WITH 10 AND 11 DIVISION IN RAVI-SUTLEJ CORRIDOR.
We have seen that the Pakistani armoured division was a gift of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff since the US Military advisory group had recommended a four and half division plan, which included, only one armoured brigade. There is little doubt that in the hearts of their hearts the senior Pakistani lot, with men like Musa, described by Gul as selected for “dependability rather than merit “50 feared employing this division, in actual operations, more than the Indians! The problem with the army of that time, was not as Gul suggests, that it was infantry dominated. This as a matter of fact is the case with all armies, since infantry is the largest arm and thus has the maximum number of officers. The problem was that historically, by virtue of conservative British traditions and the colonial legacy, there were very few officers, armour or non armour, who really understood tank warfare beyond squadron level. Whatever the reason, the only major armoured divisional training manoeuvre with troops, as per General Gul, held before the 1965 war was one in 196151 (Gul has probably got the year wrong since both Musa and A.R Siddiqi cite 1960) as to test the 1 Armoured Division and this as per Gul’s description was a Quixotic episode.52 The exercise was nicknamed “Tezgam” and according to both Gul and A.R Siddiqi was an utter fiasco,53 in the sense that despite ample, warning time the armoured division being exercised did no reconnaissance and tanks were launched in boggy country as a result of which a very large part of the armoured division got bogged down.54 The reader may note that “Exercise Tezgam” was no haphazard affair, having been planned in advance and mentioned by Fazal Muqeem as one which “will be held”55 at the time of writing his book on the army.

The only positive aspect of this exercise not mentioned by Gul was reduction of the size of an armoured regiment from 75 to 44 Tanks56. This was a positive improvement since an armoured regiment with 75 Tank was an administrative nightmare and difficult to tactically control. The tanks rendered surplus were used to raise four more armoured regiments which were allotted to the infantry divisions and certainly improved their battle potential. As a result four more armoured regiments (22,23,24 & 25 Cavalry) were raised in 1962.57

During the period 1954-65 various Pakistani armour officers were sent to attend courses at the US Armour School Fort Knox . These courses however played limited role in the development of the Pakistanis since the US way of warfare was lavish and totally different from that of the Indo Pak scenario in terms of terrain, comparative level of infantry mobility etc. However, some officers who were assigned to revise tank manuals did employ US manuals apart from British tank manuals to good use as this scribe discovered while serving in the Tactical Wing of the School of Armour in the period 1990-91! 58

Again during the same period professionalism in tank regiments varied from unit to unit. There was the case of a unit that painted the muzzle ends of the barrel of its main gun where cuttings are made to bore sight the guns and, would have been not very effective, had it been employed in the 1965 war! There were cases of newly raised units led by some excellent officers like the 25 Cavalry. Thus on one side there were units who were as as non professional as British cavalry who were notoriously incompetent in fame for lopping off their own horses heads59 instead of the enemy’s, because of poor cavalry swordmanship standards. On the other hand there were units where professional efficiency was higher due to force of tradition or by virtue of having excellent commanding officers. In this regard the British system of each tank regiment having its own idiosyncrasies worked mostly in a negative manner! As I discovered much later that each tank regiment was as distinct from another as one Hindu caste from another and this was even in terms of training, operating procedures etc! The point is that the transformation from cavalry to mechanisation was thus not fully incorporated neither in the British Army nor in the British Indian Army, and the Indian tank experience against the hopelessly undergunned and ill equipped Japanese tanks in Burma in WW Two also was not helpful in developing levels of professional competence necessary in mechanised units.

The period 1951-1965 i.e the Ayubian era, was a period when one man dominated the army and as history has proved, dictators prefer working with men they know, and can trust. This was not helpful for the tank corps since the ruling clique was infantry dominated. I am not hinting that armour as an arm suffered Vis a Vis infantry as Gul’s memoirs imply. Nor I am suggesting that there were no potential Guderians or Von Thomas. The point that is being driven home is, that the emphasis was on thrusting men on the armoured division who were not very imaginative or professional, but were essentially , loyal and dependable men. The same was true for infantry too, but armour despite being a highly specialised arm was treated as no different from infantry. In the process some relatively gifted armour officers without good family connections and without having the advantage of belonging to the ruling cliques regimental groups were sidelined. War record for promotion to higher ranks was no criteria at that time as has remained the case till to date, since its Godfather had the most dubious war record in the Indian Army of WW Two!

The Pakistan Armoured Corps thus remained a ceremonial but much neglected arm during the period 1951-65. No serious thought was given to developing a special Indo Pak doctrine of employment of the armoured division in the framework of a corps. The emphasis in the Ayubian army was on the “New Concept of Defence” which revolved around the infantry division and as per one general officer of that time “did not last even for the first day of 1965 War”!60 The ideas of the senior officers of that time about armour were vague but it was generally thought that Pakistani armour would perform roles similar to those of the German armour of 1940! The concept of friction and the independent will of the enemy was not really understood by these men who were of the firm conviction that by virtue of having martial races and better US tanks, it would not be very difficult to teach the Indians a good lesson in case of war! It was fashionable to read or pose to read “Rommel Papers”61 and Liddell Hart’s “Strategy the Indirect Approach” 62 but no serious attempt was made in the armoured corps ,as the tank manuals and journals of that time amply prove, to understand the real mechanics of tank warfare or the essence of Blitzkrieg.

Even at the armoured brigade level no credible doctrine/tactics of the armoured battle at brigade level was developed . Each unit jealously guarded its traditions and remained a closed entity for other armoured units even within the same brigade. The armoured brigade commanders developed a similar to infantry brigade commanders with fixed field headquarters with reliance on despatch riders and liaison officers whereas mobile operations demanded that the armoured brigade commander stayed close to the leading regiment while his staff looked after the brigade headquarters.

The emphasis thus remained on the thinking that each unit must increase its battle honours while training at brigade and divisional level was neglected. Gul states that many of the armour commanders who performed miserably in 1965 were never tested in peacetime training. Thus while commenting on the pathetic handling of armour in Khem Karan in 1965 Gul said “It seems (commenting on Khem Karan operations) that the two Headquarters (11 Division and 1st Armoured Division) were paralysed by the very dimension of their undertaking........Had they physically handled their commands on manoeuvres in more normal times,they would have been either found out, and should have been sacked, or the enormity of the task that confronted them later in the war would not have benumbed them”.63

On the eve of 1965 war the Pakistan Armoured Corps was organised as following64:—

1 ARMOURED DIVISION

6 ARMOURED DIVISION RECCE REGIMENTS INFANTRY DIVISIONAL TANK REGIMENTS INFANTRY DIVISIONAL TDU REGIMENTS
6 LANCERS

10 GUIDES CAVALRY 15 LANCERS (WITH 11 DIV) 23 CAVALRY (WITH 10 DIV) 30 TDU ( WITH 10 DIV)
31 TDU ( WITH 15 DIV)

19 LANCERS

11 CAVALRY 20 LANCERS (WITH 15 DIV) 25 CAVALRY (WITH 15 DIV)
5 HORSE

22 CAVALRY 13 LANCERS (7 DIV) 32 TDU (WITH 11 DIV)
12 CAVALRY (RECCE REGT)

33 TDU (WITH 15 DIV)
4 CAVALRY


24 CAVALRY


EMPLOYMENT IN 1965 WAR OPERATION GRAND SLAM

Operation Grand Slam i.e the plan to capture Akhnur via a major divisional level attack supported by two armoured regiments was the first major tank battle of Pakistan Armoured Corps. Chamb had always been a sensitive area since 1947 and in 1948 war the Indians had taken special care to station tanks here . However, in 1965 due to some phenomenally incompetent thinking at the higher level the Indians ignored this important sector and wishfully believed that the main Pakistani attack in the area will come in Jhangar area. As a matter of fact as early as 1955-56 the Indian 80 Brigade commander had appreciated the importance of Chamb-Jaurian-Akhnur area and had identified it as a weak area65 which needed to be defended in greater strength. In 1956 an Indian Corps exercise setting was based on the scenario that Pakistanis had captured Akhnur66. The Indian High Command was as naive as the Pakistani GHQ in thinking that the Pakistanis will “not cross the international border (in Chamb area) because that would constitute an attack on India67”, thus in words of Gurcharan the southern half of the Chamb border (opposite the internationally recognised border) was rendered “sacrosanct”68. Chamb was held by a lone infantry brigade and was reinforced by a tank squadron of AMX-13 Light Tanks only in August 1965 69.

Pakistani armour enjoyed a marked qualitative and quantitative superiority over Indian armour in this operation. There were two Pakistani Patton regiments against one Indian light tank squadron in the battle . The single Indian AMX-13 squadron defending the area possessed relatively effective firepower (in terms of armour penetration) but was far inferior to the five Pakistani Patton squadrons in terms of protection (armour thickness) and was further dispersed since its area of responsibility was more than even that of one tank regiment. Thus while too wide an area of responsibility nullified the chances of its concentrated employment, poor armour protection gravely increased its vulnerability and seriously reduced its ability to manoeuvre or even jockey. The principal Indian advantage was bad terrain which enabled their anti tank guns (recoilless rifles) to engage Pakistani armour. However, this was balanced by surprise since the Indians were not expecting an armoured brigade size force in the sector.

Regardless of all rhetoric about Grand Slam’s brilliance, armour was under-utilised and poorly employed. The vast numerical advantage of six to one in armour, was partially nullified by dividing the two tank regiments between two brigades who in turn dished out each tank squadron to one infantry battalion. Thus instead of using the armour as a punch it was used like a thin net, as a result of which its hitting power was vastly reduced while the Indians were able to engage tank squadrons made to charge them in a piecemeal manner! Thus while the Pakistani victory, thanks to tank numerical and qualitative superiority was a foregone conclusion, the cost in terms of equipment and loss of manpower was too high as the table included in the footnotes indicates.

Thus Shaukat Riza despite being granted limited autonomy to use his independent mind was forced to very tactfully admit while only citing the artillery aspect, that the attack plan lacked concentration. Shaukat thus wrote, “ The guns had to be distributed to support attacking troops on a front of 30,000 yards. The Indians had only covering troops on the border outposts. The distribution of our artillery fire enabled them to delay our crossing of Munawar Tawi on 1st September”.70

Later events have led to some oversights in analysing “Operation Grand Slam” and writers have only talked about the change of command of the division which led to a literal “suspension of action” of full 24 hours in the division’s advance. The first serious failure, however occurred on the first day of attack i.e 1st September due to faulty execution and lack of understanding of the key operational concept within 12 Division at brigade level. It was as a result of this misunderstanding that 12 Division failed to cross Tawi the first day despite the fact that it had reached it opposite Chamb at 0830 or 0855 hours on the morning of 1st September 1971.71 The Pakistani failure in crossing Tawi on the first day and securing Pallanwalla thereby throwing the Indians off balance can be squarely ascribed to poor execution of plans at brigade level and divisional level. Brigadier A.A.K Chaudhry states in his book that the unnecessary delay occurred since the infantry brigade commander insisted on capture of Burjeal despite the fact that Gen Akhtar Hussain Malik had categorically ordered him to bypass it .72 This serious lapse led to delay of one day in crossing of Tawi and enabled the Indians to conduct an orderly withdrawal across Tawi during night 1st/2nd September 1965. Thus the Indians were pushed back but not routed which was within 12 Divisions capability had the infantry brigade commander not got obsessed with Burjeal .

The beauty of the Grand Slam plan i.e the fact that the Pakistani Commander had the benefit of overwhelming numerical superiority of 6 to 1 in armour and the additional advantage of having no natural obstacle between the start line and Akhnur was thus lost on the very first day .Speed was the essence of the issue since the frontage of advance became narrower as the attackers advanced eastwards with the river Chenab closing in from the south, and the high mountains closing in from the north making the defenders task easier and the attackers task more difficult.

By 2050 Hours 1st September 191 Brigade defending Chamb started withdrawal towards Chamb while the 41 Mountain Brigade was ordered to occupy the Troti-Jaurian intermediate position. The Pakistani position despite all these imperial blunders was formidable when change of command was ordered and the Indians got another 24 hours to prepare their intermediate defence position at Troti-Jaurian. From 3rd September onwards progress of operations became slower although qualitative advantage in tanks enabled the Pakistanis to capture Jaurian , surprise was lost and the Indians were able to reinforce the sector with a third infantry brigade and a third AMX squadron. Surprise was lost and armour’s freedom of manoeuvre became more and more limited as the total available frontage of advance became reduced by one sixth due to Chenab in the south and the mountains in the north.

This is not the proper place to go into further details, which are the subject of an article, devoted entirely to Grand Slam in a future issue.

The Indian anti tank rifles caused maximum armour casualties on the first day of the battle. These were entirely avoidable had the bulk of the armour been concentrated and tasked to straight go for Pallanwalla rather than distributing it till battalion level. The real hero of the first day of Grand Slam was the rank and files both infantry and armour on both sides. The Indians were saved from total riot by the sheer grit and determination of their anti tank gunners and the most vulnerable AMX crews while Pakistanis lost their chance to rout the enemy because of inability to concentrate and obsession with Burjeal.

BATTLE OF CHAWINDA

The tank battles fought between Chawinda and Charwa from the 8th to 16th September are fit to be made subject of a Shakespearean comedy of errors. The Indian armour, at brigade level and divisional level, was handled in a highly incompetent and irresolute manner on 8th September ,despite the fact that both the commanders were from the armoured corps! The Indians enjoyed a five to one superiority, but unlike Grand Slam it was in number of tank regiments rather than number of tank squadrons , which makes the superiority thrice as much effective!

Pakistan was saved by sheer coup d oeil by one man i.e Lieutenant Colonel Nisar of 25 Cavalry who in the classic Clausewitzian description was guided by a spark of purpose and a ray of hope in an intensely obscure situation at a time when no Pakistani headquarter, brigade, divisional or corps was aware, and I would say with conviction, thankfully so, of the exact operational situation. The Indians fought as bravely as the Pakistanis till tank regiment level but their rot started from brigade and division downwards! Nisar deployed two of his squadrons between Gadgor and Degh Nala in an extended line and his regiment engaged the Indians in such a terrific manner that the Indians in words of their tank corps historian lost more tanks that day than were held in total by 25 Cavalry opposing them and were blocked by just two tank squadrons!73 These are words of praise from the enemy, for a man who was promoted to the rank of brigadier with great difficulty and was dumped later, while many far more incompetent and clerk type men rose to much higher ranks after both 1965 and 1971!

Nisar and his regiment, some of whom are now bent upon taking the whole credit while portraying Nisar as an innocent bystander at best, imposed such a caution by their 8th September stand that the Indians withdrew their entire tank division and sank into total suspension of action from 8th to 11th September. The Pakistanis thus got three valuable days to bring up more tank regiments and the battles from 11th to 16th September were fought under conditions which commenced with near parity in tanks and soon transformed by 16th September into superiority in tanks in favour of Pakistanis . The fact that Indians enjoyed superiority in infantry was largely irrelevant since Pakistani tanks had limited their space for manoeuvre and the Indian infantry superiority could have been effective in only a post breakout phase. But breakout after 12th September was not possible since Pakistan’s 1st Armoured Division had reinforced the Pakistani position.

BATTLE OF KHEM KARAN VALTOHA

Battle of Khem Karan-Valtoha proved that although politically Pakistan and India were two nations, intellectually both were one nation composed of highly incompetent men beyond colonel level. Here Pakistani armour enjoyed a seven to one superiority in tanks in terms of total troops available but were unable to pump their armour inside the enemy territory in time thus enabling the Indians to recover from surprise from 8th September onwards. The Indians were initially so demoralised that their infantry division commander requested to be relieved by another division.74

Pakistan’s 5th Armoured Brigade could have outflanked the Indian 4th Mountain Division on the 7th and 8th of September had it concentrated its tank strength and developed the battle from one direction. Instead one tank regiment was sent towards the right while one was sent towards the left and centre, thus reducing the potential superiority to near parity. All gains made by armour during the daytime were squandered since the armoured brigade commander insisted that all tanks be parked in front of his brigade headquarter after last light! This as a matter of fact was a British tradition 75 but even the rationale why the British did so mostly in North Africa was not applicable in the Indo-Pak scenario. (See Analysis for further elaboration). By 10th September the Indians had reinforced the sector and although they were outnumbered in tanks by five to two till the end, bad terrain and inability of the Pakistani armour to breakout of the bottle neck between Nikasu Nala and Rohi Nala while the Indians were demoralised in vastly outnumbered in number of total available tanks from 6th to 8th September led to a stagnation and stalemate by 11th September. Thus all the advantages of initial surprise and superiority in numbers were nullified due to poor staff work, poor initial planning, faulty execution as a result of which numerical superiority was not fully realised due to poor terrain and lack of freedom of manoeuvre.

BATTLE OF LAHORE

The role of armour in the battle for Lahore was limited . Indian armour was divided down to squadron level and played a negligible role on 6th and 7th September. In any case their Shermans were no match to Pakistan’s Pattons of which the 23 Cavalry held two squadrons.

The Pakistani tank/infantry counterattack on 8th September however produced a crisis of operational level in the 15 Indian Division. On 8th September as a result of Pakistani armour/infantry counterattack an Indian infantry brigade became so demoralised that two of its units simply abandoned their defences and bolted away, leading to a situation where the Indians had to reinforce it with a fresh infantry brigade76, however certainly did cause an operational crisis in the 15 Indian Division on 8th September thereby seriously weakening the Indian resolve to capture Lahore. The Indian armoured corps historian did not take a similar view77, however as cited earlier this fact is well attested in the “War Despatches” of General Harbaksh Singh. Absence of Pakistani tanks at Dograi due to poor map reading and confusion in orders78 however played a major part in Indian recapture of Dograi on 21/22 September 1965. In short, tanks played a relatively significant but limited role in the battle of Lahore since the BRB strictly limited their mobility.

INTER WAR YEARS-1965-1971

The following table illustrates the inter war changes in the armoured corps:—

EXISTING REGIMENTS TILL 1965

REGIMENTS RAISED FROM 1965 TILL DECEMBER 1971 REMARKS
13 Lancers,10 Guides Cavalry,

26 Cavalry, 27 Cavalry, 30,31,32 & 33 TDU were redesignated as cavalry regiments after the 1965 War . 29 Cavalry was stationed in East Pakistan.Some ad hoc squadrons were also raised one of which later became 39 Cavalry and one i.e 5 Independent Squadron survived the reorganisation after the war by becoming training squadron of School of Armour.
11 Cavalry, 6 Lancers.5 Horse,

28 Cavalry, 29 Cavalry,
19 Lancers, 12 Cavalry,15 Lancers,

38 Cavalry,51 Lancers.
4 Cavalry ,20 Lancers, 22 Cavalry,


23 Cavalry,24 Cavalry, 25 Cavalry,


30 TDU,31 TDU,32 TDU,33 TDU.


EXISTING HEADQUARTERS IN 1965

HEADQUARTERS RAISED FROM 1965 TO 1971
1ST Armoured Division

2nd Armoured Brigade 2nd and 8th Independent Brigade HQ were raised in 2nd Half of 1970.8th Armoured Brigade was corps reserve of 1 Corps while 2nd Armoured Brigade was under command 23 Division in the war. 3rd Armoured Brigade was directly under HQ 4 Corps in Ravi-Sutlej Corridor.7th and 9th Armoured Brigades were part of 6th Armoured Division and 4th and 5th Armoured Brigades were part of 1st Armoured Division.
6th Armoured Division

7th Armoured Brigade
3rd Armoured Brigade

8th Armoured Brigade
4th Armoured Brigade

9th Armoured Brigade
5th Armoured Brigade


REFERENCES AND ENDNOTES

Introductory Note:— Many details may not be accurate since the author does not have access to historical records. The author welcomes any positive suggestions/corrections/pointing out of any factual errors. The author welcomes any battle account from any veteran of WW Two pertaining to combat administrative or other issues like man management relations between officers and ranks etc. Any account received by the author will be sent to the Imperial War Museum and some other universities where military historians of international repute can make use of them .This is important, author feels that in few years time all valuable records will be destroyed in case no effort is made to preserve them; since the major interest in Pakistan and India seems to be in other non military pursuits. Maps which have been conceived and drawn by the author in free hand are based either on Survey of Pakistan maps or on Map Number TPC G-7D, Scale 1:500,000 , as far as Chamb-Jaurian area is concerned, prepared under the direction of the Defence Intelligence Agency and published by the Aeronautical Chart and Information Centre.US Airforce, St Louis ,Missouri-63118. Compiled from maps and intelligence information available as of November 1967. These maps are available to public on nominal payment and are used by civilian pilots.

1 Page- 14- Pakistan Army Till 1965- Major A.H Amin-Strategicus & Tacticus- 17 Aug 1999-P.O Box 13146- Arlington- VA-22219-U.SA

2 Page-326-Ibid and Page-122- Cambridge History of India-Volume Five-British India-1497-1858 -H.H Dodwell-Reprinted by S.Chand and Company-New Delhi- 1987.

3 Page-451- A Sketch of the Services of the Bengal Army- Lieut F.G Cardew-Revised and Edited in the Military Department of the Government of India- Office of the Superintendent of Government Printing-Calcutta-1903.

4 Page-140-A Matter of Honour - Philip Mason- Jonathan Cape-London-1974.

5 Page- 141-Ibid and Pages-109 & 110 -So they Rode and Fought - Major General Syed Shahid Hamid (Retired)- Midas Books- Kent-UK-1983. Two native cavalry regiments were raised by the Nawab of Oudh on the Company’s orders in 1776 (Refers-Page-451-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit) under British officers and transferred to the English East India Company’s service in 1777 and designated as 1st and 2nd Bengal Native Cavalry. (Refers-Page-110-Shahid Hamid-Op Cit ) .Similarly 16 Light Cavalry the oldest surviving Indian Cavalry unit was raised in Carnatic by the Nawab of Arcot for service with the Madras Army. It was taken over permanently by the East India Company in 1784 and became the 3rd Regiment of Madras Native Cavalry (Refers-Page-147-Ibid ).

6 Page-159 and 160- A Concise Dictionary of Military Biography - Martin Window and Francis. K . Mason-Osprey Publishing Limited-Berkshire -GB-1975. Page-79-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit.

7 Page-76-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit and Page- 23-Maj Gen Shahid Hamid-Op Cit.

8 Page-470-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit and Page- 532 -Fidelity and Honour- Lieut Gen S.L Menezes-Penguin Books -India-Delhi-1993. There were three armies but the C in C Bengal Army was also overall C in C India although the other two C in Cs of Bombay and Madras Armies enjoyed a very large measure of autonomy bordering on virtual independence of command. Initially however the Madras military establishment was seniormost (Refers -Page-327-Chapter Eleven- Imperial Gazetteer of India-Volume Four-Administrative - Based on material supplied by Lieut Gen Sir Edward Collen-Published under the authority of His Majesty’s Secretary of State for India in Council at the Clarendon Press-Oxford-1907) but by 1758 following Clive’s great victory at Plassey Bengal became the seniormost and supreme military establishment. Lord Clive , then Colonel Robert Clive was the first C in C of the Bengal Army from December 1756 and 25 February 1760 while also holding the charge of the Governor of Bengal (Refers-Page- 470-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit). Bengal had been a “ Presidency “ English East India Company since 1699. (Refers-Page-3 -Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit).

9 Page-23-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit. As per William Irvine in the Mughal Army the cavalry was largely composed of respectable Mohameddans and Rajputs (Refers-Page-162- The Army of the Indian Moghuls- William Irvine-London-1903 . See also A History of the British Cavalry-1816-1919-Volume Two -The Marquess of Anglesey-London-1975.

10 Page-167-William Irvine-Op Cit and Pages-84 & 85- The New Cambridge History of India-Volume-II.1-Indian Society and the making of the Indian Empire-C.A Bayly-Cambridge University Press-1988.

11 Page-5-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit and Page- 328-Imperial Gazetteer -Op Cit . Many Hindustani Pathans of Shinwari Yusufzai Sherwani and Bangash ancestry from this scribes maternal grandfather Sultan Khan’s family village Sikandara Rao in Aligarh District, (which has the notoriety of remaining loyal to the English East India Company albeit for pragmatic reasons as done by the Punjabis in 1857), served in the cavalry of the Nawabs of Oudh Farrukhabad , the Raja Scindia of Gwalior and the East India Company’s Bengal Army. The village did produce at least one general, (who was a noted member of the Riding Club of Aligarh Muslim University ), who served with distinction in Pakistan Armoured Corps. There were countless such villages from Hissar in the West till Allahabad in the east of Hindustani Pathan Muslims who supplied recruits to the cavalry units of the Marathas , the Nawabs of Oudh and the English East India Company’s armies.

12 Page-243- Britain and Her Army- Correlli Barnett- Penguin Books-London-1974.

13 Page-141-Philip Mason-Op Cit.

14 Page-169-The Battle Book- Bryan Perrett- Arms and Armour-London-1996.

15 Pages-82 to 90-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit.

16 Page-33- The Maratha and the Pindari War” - Lieutenant Colonel R.G Burton - Compiled for the General Staff - India -Government Monotype Press, Simla - 1910.

17 See Class Composition tables on Pages-329 & 405-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit.The Muslims dominated all ten regular units of the Bengal Army which rebelled or were disbanded in 1857. (See History of British Cavalry-Op Cit).The following table taken from Page- 45-Pakistan Army Till 1965-Op Cit.Calculated by the author from details given in the appendix of the Royal Commission on the reorganisation of the Indian Army-London-1858, shows the Muslim preponderance in cavalry right till 1857:-

ARMY TOTAL MUSLIM MUSLIM TOTAL MUSLIM TOTAL MUSLIM

STRENGTH TROOPS % age INFANTRY TROOPS CAVALRY TROOPS

MADRAS 45,341 17,880 39.43 % 45,725 OR 52 15,856 2,616 OR 7 2,024

ARMY REGIMENTS REGIMENTS



BOMBAY 26,894 2,630 5.8 % 25,433 OR 29 2,159 1,461 OR 3 471

ARMY REGIMENTS REGIMENTS

18 Pages-44, 46, 47 & 48- The Indian Army and the King’s Enemies-1900-1947- Charles Chenevix Trench-Thames and Hudson-London -1988.

19 Page-49-C.C Trench-Op Cit. The reader may note that the newly formed Royal Tank Corps did win four Victoria Crosses (Refers-Pages-22 & 23- Tank Commanders- George Forty-Firebird Books-Dorset-UK-1993) in WW One from 1917 till armistice and played a decisive role in the defeat of Germany.

20 Page-213- A Concise History of World War One- Brig Gen Vincent . J.Esposito-Pall Mall Press- London -1965.

21 Pages-91 to 99-C.C Trench-Op Cit.Pages-432 to 440-History of the First World War- B.H Liddell Hart-Pan Books-London-1972.

22 Page-941 & 942- Brassey’s Encyclopaedia of Military History and Biography- Edited by Col Franklin.D.Margotta-Brasseys-Washington-1994. Page-73- A Dictionary of Battles- David Eggenberger- George Allen and Unwin-London-1967.

23 Page-38-George Forty-Op Cit.

24 Page-102-Brig Esposito-Op Cit. Liddell Hart insists in his book that there were several German batteries who did it , however Liddell Hart is a Britisher and a tank enthusiast , I have not relied on his judgement since both national feeling and personal likes may have influenced his judgement in this case. The legend went that one German artillery officer knocked out sixteen tanks although Liddell Hart insists that only five tanks were knocked out. (Refers-Page-344-Liddell Hart-Op Cit).

25 Page-18-Eggenberger-Op Cit.

26 Page-22- George Forty-Op Cit.

27 Page-55-Shahid Hamid-Op Cit.

28 Page-135-C.C Trench and Page-56-Shahid Hamid-Op Cit.

29 Report of Auchinleck Modernisation Sub Committee -Ministry of Defence-Historical Section-New Delhi-1938.

30 Page-135 - C.C Trench -Op Cit.

31 Page-135-Ibid and Pages-534 & 535-Lieut Gen S.L Menezes-Op Cit.

32 Page-135 & 137-C.C Trench-Op Cit.

33 Pages-187 & 188- Our Armoured Forces- Lieutenant General G.L.Q Martel-Faber and Faber-London-1949.

34 Pages-277 & 278-C.C Trench-Op Cit.

35 Page-3 & 4-Campaign of the 14th Army in Burma-Compiled by 14th Army Headquarter-1945-Printed in Government Printing Press-Calcutta.Presented by Field Marshal Sir William Slim, Chief of the Imperial General Staff for use by the Pakistani Armed Forces. General Francis Tucker a veteran of WW Two admitted that the Japanese in Burma were “weak in armour and motor transport”. (Refers-Page-73-The Pattern of War- Lieutenant General Sir Francis Tucker-Cassell and Company Limited-London-1948.

36For the relative inferiority of the Japanese tanks see-Pages-240 to 251- Hand Book on Japanese Military Forces-US War Department-Technical Manual-TM-E-30-480 -1October 1944-United States Government Printing Office-Washington-1944-Reprinted by Louisiana State University Press-Baton Rouge-1995. Slim does not tell us anything about the overwhelming British tank superiority in his otherwise excellent book Defeat into Victory.Neither does General Gul Hassan who was then serving as an ADC and was to later lament about the anti armour bias in the Post 1947 Pakistan Army.

37Page-9- Article-Higher Conduct of 1965 War-Brigadier Riaz Ul Karim Khan, LOM, MC-Defence Journal-Volume Ten-Number-1-2-1984-Karachi. Riaz ul Karim was Director Armoured Corps in the General Headquarters once the 1965 broke out . Director Armoured Corps at that time or even now a post occupied by those in the run! This claim made by Riaz ul Karim may or may not be wholly accurate.The author welcomes any gentleman who is better informed and can point out any factual errors so that these can be incorporated for the sake of historical accuracy.

38 Some Indian cavalry units did have tanks at time like the Central India Horse ( Refers-Page-317-The Sidi Rezegh Battles-1941- J.A.I Agar Hamilton and L.C.F Turner-Oxford University Press-Cape Town-1957

39 Page-483-Rajendarsinhji later the Indian C in C was a remarkable man in many ways .He was offered to be the first Indian C in C but refused voluntarily stating that the decision should be taken on the basis of seniority as a result of which Cariappa became the first Indian C in C of the Indian Army (Refers-Page-448-Lieut Gen S.L Menezes-Op Cit) .Rajendarsinhji was also the first Indian to command an armoured regiment, although in a peacetime location from November 1943 to May 1945 (Refers-Page-557-The Indian Armour-1941-1971- Major General Gurcharan Singh Sandhu-Vision Books -Delhi-1990).

40Page-432-J.A.I Agar Hamilton-Op Cit.

41Pages-190 to 194- The Pakistan Army-1947-1949- Major General Shaukat Riza-Wajid Alis (Private Limited) -Lahore-Printed for Services Book Club-1989.Pages-59 to 105-Sons of John Company-John Gaylor-First Published in UK by Spellmount-1992-Reprint-Lancer International-New Delhi-1993.Pages-559 to 561-The Indian Armour-1941-1971-Op Cit. This table may not be wholly accurate.The author welcomes any gentleman who is better informed and can point out any factual errors so that these can be incorporated for the sake of historical accuracy. The reader may note that the second table may also not be wholly accurate . The author welcomes any gentleman who is better informed and can point out any factual errors so that these can be incorporated for the sake of historical accuracy.

42 Page-153-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit.

43 Pages-178 to 187-Shauakat Riza-Op Cit. This table may not be wholly accurate.The author welcomes any gentleman who is better informed and can point out any factual errors so that these can be incorporated for the sake of historical accuracy. Facts in the column “Remarks” are based on Annexure-”A”-Page -307-Ibid.

44 He lacked the qualities of slavishness or diplomacy to become a general officer in the Ayubian army ! This explains why he did not go beyond a brigadier! Tommy Masud who was a very famous figure in Lahore Gymkhana finally settled in Lahore where he died in the late 1990s. The unit conducted very aggressive actions under his able leadership , one of the proofs of which i.e two captured Indian Armoured cars of the 7th Light Cavalry still adorn the front of the unit quarter guard . Till 1983 when this scribe joined the unit Tommy Masud was remembered with great respect and admiration by many reservists and old timers both from the officers and the rank and file who were attached with or visited the unit .

45 Pages-275 to 277-The Indian Armour-Op Cit.

46 Pages-284 to 286-Ibid.

47 Page- 295-Ibid.

48 Pages-296 & 296-Shauakat Riza-Op Cit.

49 Refers-Pakistan MDA Programme- Memorandum for the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Arthur Radford by the Special Assistant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for MDAP Affairs Major General Robert.M.Cannon dated 23 November 1955. Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-Washington D.C.

50Page-134-Memoirs of General Gul Hassan Khan-Lieutenant General Gul Hassan Khan-Oxford University Press-Karachi-1993)

51Page-24-My Version-Indo Pakistan War 1965-General Musa Khan-Wajid Alis Limited-Lahore-1983.and Page-66- The Military in Pakistan-Image and Reality- Brig A.R Siddiqi-Vanguard Books-Lahore-1996.Gul Hassan cites 1961 (Page-142-Gul Hassan Khan-Op Cit) as the year but both Brig A.R Siddiqi and Musa cite 1960

52 Page-142-Gul Hassan Khan-Op Cit.

53 Page-142-Ibid and Page-66-Brig A.R Siddiqi-Op Cit.

54 Ibid.

55 Page-143-The Story of the Pakistan Army-Major General Fazal Muqeem Khan-Oxford University Press-Lahore -1963

56 Page-25-Musa-Khan-Op Cit. Brigadier Zaheer Alam Khan states that these changes in the organisation of the armoured regiment took place after “Exercise Milestone” held in 1962 (Refers-Page-126-The Way It Was- Brigadier Z.A Khan-Dynavis Private Limited-Pathfinder Fountain-Karachi-1998) and that these were taken on the initiative of Brigadier Bashir , the then Director Armoured Corps. Gul is unfortunately no longer alive to correct us but in all probability it appears that the changes in tank regiment organisation were initiated based on Exercise Tezgam held in 1960 as per Musa and Siddiqi or in 1961 as per Gul Hassan. As per Gen Mitha “Exercise Milestone” in 1961 in addition to the armoured division exercise (i.e Exercise Tezgam) was held to test the “New Concept of Defence” and 10 Division Plus took part in it. (Refers-Page-33-Fallacies and Realities-An Analysis of Gul Hassan’s “Memoirs”-Major General Aboobakar Osman Qasim Mitha-Maktaba Fikr O Danish-Lahore-1994.

57 Page-117-Brig Z.A Khan-Op Cit.

58 Comparison of Tank Platoon and Tank Company-FM-17-32 -Department of the Army-Field Manual-United States Government Printing Office-Washington D.C-1950 as discovered by this scribe in the store room of Tactical Wing Nowshera one very notoriously cold evening in January 1991 and General Staff Publication Number-1622- Troop Leading in Armoured Corps -1967 and General Staff Publication Number-1851- Troop Leading in Armoured Corps-1991-GHQ Rawalpindi. One glaring example is one of the ugliest and shabbiest map of a tank counter attack taken from the 1950 US manual and reproduced without any improvement in both the Pakistani publications of 1967 and 1991 ! Even a ten-year-old can draw a better and far neater map! There are pencil cuttings on the US manual which once incorporated by a typist typing a new draft , exactly match with the typed final proof of the Pakistani tank manual!

59 Page-243-Correlli Barnett-Op Cit.

60 Page-493-Article-Infantry Thinking-Lieutenant General Atiq Ur Rahman - Soldier Speaks-Selected Articles from “Pakistan Army Journal”-1956-1981 - Army Education Press-GHQ-Rawalpindi-1981.

61 See Page-42-Brig A.R Siddiqi-Op Cit. Brig Siddiqi states in his excellent and thought provoking book , that General Azam “carried with him a copy of the newly published ‘Rommel Papers’ and was full of it”.

62 Page-26-Brig Z.A Khan-Op Cit.Brig Z.A Khan states that Liddell Hart’s book was given to all cadets in the military academy. I hold Liddell Hart in very high esteem and as a matter of fact started my study of military history with this book and Palit’s essentials of miltary knowledge .However it is not clear what purpose Liddell Hart could serve for cadets in a military academy learning the basics of infantry tactics. I may add that I met very few officers during my entire military service who had read this particular book of Liddell Hart from first to last page.

63 Page-209-Gul Hassan Khan-Op Cit

64 Based on orders of battle of various divisions given in - The Pakistan Army-War-1965-Major General Shaukat Riza (Retired) - Army Education Press-GHQ-Rawalpindi -1984.

65 Page-126-Behind the Scene-An Analysis of India’s Military Operations-1947-1971-Major General Joginder Singh (Retired) - Lancer International-New Delhi-11993.

66 Page -126-Ibid.

67 Page-343-Gurcharan Singh Sandhu -Op Cit.

68 Page-344-Ibid.

69 Ibid.

70 Page-123-Shauakat Riza-Op Cit.

71 According to the 11 Cavalry history it was 0855 hours while according to Brigadier A.A.K Chaudhry it was 0830 hours .See Page-49-September 1965-Before and After-Brig Amjad Ali Khan Chaudhry-Ferozesons Limited-Lahore-1977.Page -Page-43-Short History of 11 Cavalry (FF)-Lieutenant Colonel Mohammad Khalid -Quetta Cantonment-1999.Published by the unit and distributed only to selected list of serving and retired officers. The readers may note that 11 Cavalry’s history was compiled only 42 years after independence through sole voluntary efforts of Lieutenant Colonel Khalid , despite the fact that the unit produced many two three and four star generals from 1947 to date. Brigadier Amjad Ali Khan Chaudhry’s book soon went out of stock after its publication in 1977-78 .Interestingly this scribe found it at a outwardly most hopeless looking bookshop at Kohat some “Aziz News Agency” on Monday 30th March 1981 on the evening of the fourth day of the ISSB at Kohat . At that time the ISSB used to last for five days.

72 Page-49-Brig Amjad Chaudhry-Op Cit.

73 Page-394-Gurcharan Singh-Op Cit.

74 Page-101- War Despatches- Lieutenant General Harbaksh Singh-Lancer International-New Delhi-1992.

75 Page-10 and 11-Brigadier Riaz ul Karim-Op Cit. Mishandling of the 5 Armoured Brigade is a well confirmed fact and there is a consensus in Pakistani military analysts and direct participants that it was mishandled on 7th, 8th and 9th September 1965. Refers:— Page-56-Musa Khan-Op Cit. Musa thus observed “Twice in two days,5 Armoured Brigade reached Valtoha railway station and Assal Uttar,approximately 12 and 6 miles respectively beyond Khem Karan,but for inexplicable reasons,the brigade commander issued confusing orders on it on both occasions to return to Khem Karan and leaguer there at night,instead of arranging to send up motorised infantry to hold the ground his armour had captured”. Also see Page- 200-Gul Hassan Khan-Op Cit. Also pages-238 & 239-Pakistan Meets Indian Challenge-Brigadier Gulzar Ahmad-Al Mukhtar Publishers-1967 and Reprinted by-Islamic Book Foundation-Lahore-1986 The Leaguer is a formation adopted by an armoured regiment or squadron after the battle. Leaguer was a conservative British countermeasure adopted after last light to secure tanks against night raids by tank hunting parties.The Germans noted this serious British failing in North Africa (See Pages-109-The North African Campaign -Captain B.H Liddell Hart-Reprinted by Natraj Publishers-Dera Dun-1983) which led to loss of initiative as well as time and space.The Germans on the contrary did not adhere to this ridiculously cautious drill or battle procedure but occupied the same area that they had occupied in the days fight at night.But Bashir following the typical British tradition was concerned more with safety than with rapid progress of operations. After all “Mission Oriented Approach” had no chance in the “Orders Oriented “ army of that time and with my thirteen years service from 1981-1994 even of this time ! In all fairness to Bashir it may be said that he was at least on papers among the best and he did what was taught or interpreted at schools of instruction as such . He was a product of that age and must be viewed with this perspective. Innovation , dynamic thinking and serious professional study had limited room in the old polo playing ceremonial British Indian Army. Even Gul who so vehemently criticised Bashir, had no tank experience in WW II having been from infantry and an aide de camp throughout the war . So no one can never know how Gul or any other armour brigade commander may have behaved in that situation. There was one man who may have behaved differently , but he was from infantry i.e the indomitable Brigadier Eftikhar Khan , a half Pakistani/Janjua who was at least technically a non Muslim ,had he lived in Mr Bhutto’s time being from the Ahmadiya community!Later around 1950s emphasis on ceremonial and polo playing was largely substituted by sycophancy once all patronage was concentrated in the hands of one man from 1958 to 1988 whether a civilian or an army man . The situation today is that the army is composed of more educated ( professionally) but more ambitious, far more calculating and careerist type men. Men who would make good bankers and excellent peace time decision makers when all is well , but certainly not men of crisis, which unfortunately occur rarely .These are the typical hole punching men well described in “Crisis in Command by Gabriel and Savage. Of all the people above cited Brigadier Riaz ul Karim, MC , who never became a general is definitely the most competent in his criticism since he was the only one from armoured corps who commanded a tank squadron in Burma and also won an MC . All praise to the Ayubian selection boards that this most professional man was not promoted while men like Bashir and Nasir became Major Generals . After all Riazul Karim was neither from those indomitable martial races north of Chenab,nor did he have that pleasing sycophantic personality that gave the south of Chenab races a waiver to enter general rank ! I had the opportunity of meeting this very fine gentleman and officer on various evenings in Lahore’s Polo Ground where he used to come to refresh himself with an evening walk in the 1990s. The jogging track of that Polo Ground on Sarwar Road apart from the other more sensually refreshing spectacles is a military historians paradise since one gets the opportunity to meet many retired officers of all ranks and types. Alas that old breed is fast vanishing and many historical records will be lost since Pakistani officers are not interested in writing.

76 Page -94-Harbaksh Singh-Op Cit.

77 Page-357-Gurcharan Singh-Op Cit.

78 Page-206 & 207-Shaukat Riza-1965-Op Cit and Page-180-Brigadier Z.A Khan-Op Cit

(To be continued)

 

[PanzerKiel]

My unit was part of 4 Armd Bde in Khem Karan op. It was a mix i should say, there were tac brilliances which were ack by even our Indian counter parts but then there were several basic mistakes committed as well, roots of which lay in the time before the war, keeping in view how 1 Armd Div had been trained.
And there there were some limitations posed on 1 Armd Div which played their due role, effect being that it could not be really emp as a Mailed Fist.

 

[niaz]

I have come across the mention of the observation made by Major Agha Human Amin posted by @fatman17 (post 52), before. This basically says that the subcontinent commanders did not utilize the large concentrations of armor to the maximum effect.

Quite a few years back, a retired British Army Brigadier, who used to be in the group that I played ‘Bridge’ with; asserted that expertise of the Indian/Pakistani commanders stopped at the Battalion or at best at the Brigade level and that they did not have the military leaders who knew how to command large military formations to the best advantage.

 

[PanzerKiel]

I have come across the mention of the observation made by Major Agha Human Amin by posted @fatman17 (post 52), before. This basically says that the subcontinent commanders did not utilize the large concentrations of armor to the maximum effect.

Quite a few years back, a retired British Army Brigadier, who used to be in the group that I played ‘Bridge’ with; asserted that expertise of the Indian/Pakistani commanders stopped at the Battalion or at best at the Brigade level and that they did not have the military leaders who knew how to command large military formations to the best advantage.

In my opinion it was quiete natural. IT basically had to deal with the command and staff experience in battle which our commanders had before 65 war, which was almost nil. Speedy promotions happened in the 50s (Gen Yahya became a Brigadier at 34 years of age). So whatever happened was something very natural in my opinion once theory was tested.

 

[Joe Shearer]

In my opinion it was quiete natural. IT basically had to deal with the command and staff experience in battle which our commanders had before 65 war, which was almost nil. Speedy promotions happened in the 50s (Gen Yahya became a Brigadier at 34 years of age). So whatever happened was something very natural in my opinion once theory was tested.

Another factor is that on the European continent, wars were so frequent, and the development of military doctrine reached such scholarly proportions, that the theory of military leadership, from age to age, keeping pace with technical and doctrinal developments, kept evolving. Fortunately for us, after the British consolidated their hold on South Asia, there was never really much by way of experience of warfare for our own military leadership to come to the fore. Europe was almost continually at war throughout the last two millennia; so, too, was South Asia, in some ways, but the difference lay in the creation of military doctrine on a systematic basis from the fifteenth and sixteenth century onwards. All these theories found ample scope for realisation in Europe's very frequent wars.

 

[PanzerKiel]

Just to add on to my previous reply in relation to lack of our performance....
- Pakistan's early military leaders were junior officers during WW2, with no formal exposure to operational strategy.
- Most of them were influenced by the great tank battles fought in the Western Desert. They viewed the situation through the lenses of a junior officer, with focus on local / tactical level.
- They then rose to higher ranks post partition, in a telescoped timeframe.
- Understanding of operational strategy was restricted to a few luminaries like Lt Gen Sahibzada Yaqub Khan, that too by virtue of personal interest, study and exposure to a few courses abroad like IDC, UK.
- There was no forum for operational strategy, till beginning of War Course, first at Staff College during late 60s, followed by NDC.
- Therefore, with a few exceptions, the tactical level remained the basis of planning and conduct of military operations from the earliest days of Pakistan till 70s. It may be remembered that our first conflict with India, Kashmir War of 1948, was restricted to a series of tactical actions, although they created strategic effects.
- lack of political will, vision and competence.
- Inadequate understanding of actual capabilities / limitations of formations and arms / services.
- Equipment limitations.
- Predominance of firepower over manoeuvre, and slogging matches.
- No worthwhile operations conducted in desert / semi-desert terrain, due to hesitation to venture into it, keeping in view poor communication, hostile weather and daunting logistic and movement requirements.

 

[Signalian]

- No worthwhile operations conducted in desert / semi-desert terrain, due to hesitation to venture into it, keeping in view poor communication, hostile weather and daunting logistic and movement requirements.

Desert warfare WW2, African Campaign against Rommel, any officer from Pak Army who served under British 8th Army ?

One name comes to mind, Colonel Muhammad Khan, Signal Corps and then AEC probably, who wrote a famous book (Bajang aamad ?) mentioning his service under British 8th Army against Rommel.

any more officers?

 

[PanzerKiel]

Desert warfare WW2, African Campaign against Rommel, any officer from Pak Army who served under British 8th Army ?

One name comes to mind, Colonel Muhammad Khan, Signal Corps and then AEC probably, who wrote a famous book (Bajang aamad ?) mentioning his service under British 8th Army against Rommel.

any more officers?

there are many, including Gen Iftikhar who was slated as our first C in C. Gens Yahya, Tikka.....in a nutshell.....many.

 

[ghazi52]

September 1965: Pak Army Captured Ghotaru Fort - Rajisthan and hoisted Pakistani Flag

Photos: ISPR Archives

Hur force members who are among with pak army are wearing turbon and shalwar qamees ..