1965 analysed.

[Joe Shearer]

Excellent thread. Really enjoyed reading it. It's threads like these that make me want to stay on this forum.

Why do you think some of us cling on here, in spite of suffering multiple humiliations at the hands of toads and sycophants?

I don't really have anything else to add, except maybe it would be relevant to post General Akhter Hussain Malik’s letter to his brother General Abdul Ali Malik, regarding the whole change of command fiasco that we are all well aware of. I apologise if this has been posted on this forum already:

"My Dear brother, I hope you and the family are very well. Thank you for your letter of 14 Oct. 67. The answers to your questions are as follows:

a. The de facto command changed the very first day of the ops [operations] after the fall of Chamb when Azmat Hayat broke off wireless communications with me. I personally tried to find his HQ [headquarters] by chopper and failed. In late afternoon I sent Gulzar and Vahid, my MP [military police] officers, to try and locate him, but they too failed. The next day I tore into him and he sheepishly and nervously informed me that he was ‘Yahya’s brigadier’. I had no doubt left that Yahya had reached him the previous day and instructed him not to take further orders from me, while the formal change in command had yet to take place. This was a betrayal of many dimensions.

b. I reasoned and then pleaded with Yahya that if it was credit he was looking for, he should take the overall command but let me go up to Akhnur as his subordinate, but he refused. He went a step further and even changed the plan. He kept banging his head against Troti, letting the Indian fall back to Akhnur. We lost the initiative on the very first day of the war and never recovered it. Eventually it was the desperate stand at Chawinda that prevented the Indians from cutting through.

c. At no time was I assigned any reason for being removed from command by Ayub, Musa or Yahya. They were all sheepish at best. I think the reasons will be given when I am no more.

d. Not informing pro-Pak Kashmiri elements before launching Gibraltar was a command decision and it was mine. The aim of the op was to de freeze the Kashmir issue, raise it from its moribund state, and bring it to the notice of the world. To achieve this aim the first phase of the op was vital, that is, to effect undetected infiltration of thousands across the CFL [cease-fire line]. I was not willing to compromise this in any event. And the whole op could be made stillborn by just one double agent.

e. Haji Pir [Pass] did not cause me much anxiety. Because [the] impending Grand Slam Indian concentration in Haji Pir could only help us after Akhnur, and they would have to pull out troops from there to counter the new threats and surrender their gains, and maybe more, in the process. Actually it was only after the fall of Akhnur that we would have encashed the full value of Gibraltar, but that was not to be!

f. Bhutto kept insisting that his sources had assured him that India would not attack if we did not violate the international border. I however was certain that Gibraltar would lead to war and told GHQ so. I needed no op intelligence to come to this conclusion. It was simple common sense. If I got you by the throat, it would be silly for me to expect that you will kiss me for it. Because I was certain that war would follow, my first choice as objective for Grand Slam was Jammu. From there we could have exploited our success either toward Samba or Kashmir proper as the situation demanded. In any case whether it was Jammu or Akhnur, if we had taken the objective, I do not see how the Indians could have attacked Sialkot before clearing out either of these towns.

g. I have given serious consideration to writing a book, but given up the idea. The book would be the truth. And truth and the popular reaction to it would be good for my ego. But in the long run it would be an unpatriotic act. It will destroy the morale of the army, lower its prestige among the people, be banned in Pakistan, and become a textbook for the Indians. I have little doubt that the Indians will never forgive us the slight of 65 and will avenge it at the first opportunity. I am certain they will hit us in E. Pak [East Pakistan] and we will need all we have to save the situation. The first day of Grand Slam will be fateful in many ways. The worst has still to come and we have to prepare for it. The book is therefore out.

I hope this gives you the gist of what you needed to know. And yes, Ayub was fully involved in the enterprise. As a matter of fact it was his idea. And it was he who ordered me to by-pass Musa while Gibraltar etc. was being planned. I was dealing more with him and Sher Bahadur than with the C-in-C. It is tragic that despite having a good military mind, the FM’s [Foreign Minister Z.A. Bhutto’s] heart was prone to give way. The biggest tragedy is that in this instance it gave way before the eruption of a crisis. Or were they already celebrating a final victory!!
In case you need a more exact description of events, I will need war diaries and maps, which you could send me through the diplomatic bag.

Please remember me to all the family.
Yours,
Akhtar Hussain Malik"

Most apt. Yes, it has been posted earlier, but it does us all no harm to be reminded of it. I benefited from the reproduction once again, if for no other reason than these two, first, to be reminded that, while in general, Major Amin's praise for Yahya was justified, in this instance, in his collusion with Ayub and Musa, his conduct was quite conspiratorial, quite clandestine. To inform a commanding officer's subordinates not to cooperate with him, even before taking over command, was quite underhand. The second reason is to remind us that his injection did not lead to command paralysis in simplistic terms, but to a certain amount of churn in decision-making; General Malik speaks with regret about Yahya's obsession with Troti. As he points out, that allowed the surprised, beleaguered temporary Indian brigade defending the Chicken's Neck time to fall back towards Jammu; it also allowed Harbaksh, GOC-in-C Western Command, time to rush in reinforcements, and time to plan his riposte.

A third important consequential situation: the delay in Pakistan's capture of Jammu allowed us time to build pressure both on Pakistan administered Kashmir opposite the Haji Pir Pass, and to put pressure on Sialkot, later on Lahore, in two separate counter-strokes. This was the extension of hostilities across the international border, that Bhutto repeatedly insisted was never going to happen, and that General Malik had already anticipated, and that he mourned in the letter above.

Apart from which General Malik, in his letter quoted above, warned his brother, warned posterity through his brother, in a sense, that an Indian repayment of the compliment would become imminent and would be concentrated on East Pakistan. In the event, it became due two years after General Malik's unfortunate demise in Turkey in a road accident, ironically due to Yahya being unable to cope with the tide of events that he himself had unleashed, ironically, through doing the decent thing and holding elections with universal suffrage and with parity for all voters, giving the Awami League the opportunity to sweep the polls in East Pakistan, while Bhutto and the People's Party did the same in West Pakistan. So Yahya in his decent avatar reaped the revenge in 1971 for the situation created by his command errors in his less decent avatar in 1965. Karma, karma....

One person in India not given enough credit for 65 is Shastri. He had just taken over after not only the Chinese fiasco of 62 but after the death of someone who was seen as a pretty huge international figure - Nehru. Faced with a better equipped and more prepared foe, he rallied a nation and fought tooth and nail to secure India's borders. Indira Gandhi is feted for 71 and rightly so but the odds were heavily in India's favor then. In 65, odds were stacked against India. To recoup from that position against a SEATO and CENTO ally was no mean feat.

To be honest, while I agree with you in general, there is a lasting feeling of regret within military circles in India about Shastri's guileless reversion of the Haji Pir Pass to Pakistan in the settlement at Tashkent. We are still suffering the consequences.

 

[Jackdaws]

Why do you think some of us cling on here, in spite of suffering multiple humiliations at the hands of toads and sycophants?



Most apt. Yes, it has been posted earlier, but it does us all no harm to be reminded of it. I benefited from the reproduction once again, if for no other reason than these two, first, to be reminded that, while in general, Major Amin's praise for Yahya was justified, in this instance, in his collusion with Ayub and Musa, his conduct was quite conspiratorial, quite clandestine. To inform a commanding officer's subordinates not to cooperate with him, even before taking over command, was quite underhand. The second reason is to remind us that his injection did not lead to command paralysis in simplistic terms, but to a certain amount of churn in decision-making; General Malik speaks with regret about Yahya's obsession with Troti. As he points out, that allowed the surprised, beleaguered temporary Indian brigade defending the Chicken's Neck time to fall back towards Jammu; it also allowed Harbaksh, GOC-in-C Western Command, time to rush in reinforcements, and time to plan his riposte.

A third important consequential situation: the delay in Pakistan's capture of Jammu allowed us time to build pressure both on Pakistan administered Kashmir opposite the Haji Pir Pass, and to put pressure on Sialkot, later on Lahore, in two separate counter-strokes. This was the extension of hostilities across the international border, that Bhutto repeatedly insisted was never going to happen, and that General Malik had already anticipated, and that he mourned in the letter above.

Apart from which General Malik, in his letter quoted above, warned his brother, warned posterity through his brother, in a sense, that an Indian repayment of the compliment would become imminent and would be concentrated on East Pakistan. In the event, it became due two years after General Malik's unfortunate demise in Turkey in a road accident, ironically due to Yahya being unable to cope with the tide of events that he himself had unleashed, ironically, through doing the decent thing and holding elections with universal suffrage and with parity for all voters, giving the Awami League the opportunity to sweep the polls in East Pakistan, while Bhutto and the People's Party did the same in West Pakistan. So Yahya in his decent avatar reaped the revenge in 1971 for the situation created by his command errors in his less decent avatar in 1965. Karma, karma....



To be honest, while I agree with you in general, there is a lasting feeling of regret within military circles in India about Shastri's guileless reversion of the Haji Pir Pass to Pakistan in the settlement at Tashkent. We are still suffering the consequences.

Yes, I've read the accounts about even his reluctance and the backlash at returning Haji Pir

 

[fatman17]

1965 War Area

 

[Joe Shearer]

A point of view (he speaks about 1965 within this presentation):

 

[niaz]

In my view, the real tragedy of 165 wars was the sad side-lining of the officers who really saved Pakistan from disaster. Major(Rtd) Agha Humayun Amin wrote in the Defence Journal:

“The real heroes of Chawinda were Colonel Nisar and his unit ∏ whatever their perception or misperception, not knowing what was in front of them, and thankfully so, for this may have reduced their resolution to make a resolute stand, saved Pakistan on 8th September by their most heroic resistance in Gadgor area. General Ibrar who entered the scene albeit after the really decisive engagement of Gadgor had been fought played a decisive role in keeping the Pakistani position intact after fiascos like Phillora and by prodding Brigadier Abdul Ali Malik not to panic on the fateful 16th of September.

and

Abrar later played a decisive role in saving Pakistan by his most resolute leadership during the highly critical period from 11th to 19th September when the Indians came close to victory on at least three different occasions. During one of the most critical moments of the Battle of Chawinda, on 16th September, Abrar, as we discussed earlier, dismissed the request of 24 Brigade Commander to abandon Chawinda. This, if done, would have seriously jeopardized the Pakistani position ! And yet after the war Abrar was superseded and 24 Brigade Commander promoted to general rank finally retiring as a three-star general! The third factor in the Pakistani success was 4 Corps Artillery Brigade under the indomitable as well as extremely able leadership of Brigadier Amjad Chaudhry. All three were sidelined. Abrar never went beyond Major General’s rank since Yahya Khan did not like his face, and Abrar was not from Ayub’s unit! Chaudhry also suffered on the same count and retired as a brigadier while the much more mediocre gunner Tikka rose to the highest rank! Nisar did become a brigadier but was sidelined even before the 1971 war broke out since he was not from the infantry, and did not have the right push and pull or patrons in higher positions after 1971! It was an irony of Pakistani history that Abrar since he
was on the wrong side of the army chief, was placed on a much lower rung in the heroes of the 1965 war than men like Tikka Khan (in whose area of responsibility no major fighting took place), etc. On the other hand many like Niazi (14 Para Brigade Commander) etc rose to the rank of Lieutenant General by virtue of push and pull based on parochial and personal relations with Ayub being from his unit, while the real heroes were sidelined.”

http://www.defencejournal.com/2001/mar/chawinda.htm


Compare this to the President Lincoln’ remarks about General Grant.

“After the failure of his first experimental explorations around Vicksburg, a committee of abolition war managers waited upon the President and demanded the General’s removal, on the false charge that he was a whiskey drinker, and little better than a common drunkard. “Ah!” exclaimed Honest Old Abe, “you surprise me, gentlemen. But can you tell me where he gets his whiskey?” “We cannot, Mr. President. But why do you desire to know?” “Because, if I can only find out, I will send a barrel of this wonderful whiskey to every general in the army.”


On October 30, 1863 a compact version of the story was printed in the New York Time.

https://quoteinvestigator.com/2013/02/18/barrel-of-whiskey/

Any nation that does not recognize merit does so at her peril as evident from the humiliation caused by the disastrous surrender by Gen Niazi in 1971 war. I sincerely hope that the new crop of the top brass in the Pak Army has been promoted on merit.

 

[Joe Shearer]

1965 War Area

One of the major differences between Major Amin's style of narration and that of others was the Major's excellent practice of illustrating his accounts with very clear maps, many of which he seems to have drawn up on his own. This is, of course, one of the compelling ways in which he draws attention to the point that he is making. In this case, that interrupting Akhtar Hussain Malik in the course of his launch of his offensive, and isolating him even before formally relieving him of his command, were both to have terrible consequences on the fortunes of Pakistan in the conflict. A point very well made, that might seem to be carefully crafted to forestall any attempt at defending either Ayub's decision to move Malik out and Yahya in, or Yahya's behaviour in communicating the impending change to Malik's subordinates. Major Amin shows clearly that in war, timing is everything; the blow at Akhnur delivered on schedule as per the original schedule would have made a world of difference.

This illumination of events by a strategic perception is the reason for his ability to explain the most complex situations.

Leaving aside some paragraphs of his account quoted by @fatman17 that are self-evident, and that are better left to internal discussions among the members belonging to one nation involved, we have this invaluable account of the contrasting approach to the use of armour to inspect:

Indian and Pakistani armour failures compared

At the strategic level both India and Pakistan got an opportunity to knock out the other side. Pakistan got it twice, first at Akhnur and then at Khem Karan. India got it once at Gadgor on 8th September. Both the sides failed. On the Pakistani side the failure had more to do with lack of strategic insight at Akhnur, ordering a change of horses in the middle of a crucial operation.

After making allowances for Major Amin's exquisite courtesy, that leads him to represent failure in the abstract rather than personalising those, we find that there are several command failures.

At Akhnur, Ayub Khan and Musa Khan failed, as commanders, by failing to support a divisional commander who had thought out a good plan and was carrying it out well; Yahya Khan failed, as successor to command in place of General Malik, by first alienating the loyalties of the subordinate brigade level chiefs, even before taking command, then by failing to remember the core concept of a mobile armoured attack, the concept of the 'expanding torrent', where a column made a breakthrough at one point, and then manoeuvred with complete freedom through the enemy hinterland. Instead of hitting hard at Akhnur, carrying the position, and then turning to strike behind our Indian front line, the Pakistani attack got bogged down at trying to capture a point before Akhnur, thereby weakening and slowing down the attack at Akhnur, and allowing us to re-group and rush in reinforcements.

It is educative to see what happened a bare six years later, where the PA struck once again at the same point; both the essential plan and the subsequent development showed that six years earlier, General Malik might have achieved the same results as General Eftekhar Janjua did in 71.

Then at Khem Karan the Pakistani failure was at divisional level i.e failure to pump in all five armoured regiments on the 8th or 9th September thus achieving a decisive breakthrough.The situation was made worse by absence of Corps Headquarter.

The dates are all-important. The setback at Khem Karan alerted Major General Gurbaksh Singh to the strength in which the PA might advance, and he lost no time in pulling his troops into a U-shaped formation, with the middle ground containing sugar-cane fields. In addition to the existing slush and mud, orders were given to let out the water from the feeder canals; the ground became extremely difficult to pass. This is where Major Amin's notes on terrain favourable for tank operations rings an ominous note; although this area was considered one of the better ones, the flooding that was used to soften the ground made a serious difference, and, in the event, slowed down the under-strength Pakistani thrust where recoil-less rifles were able to pick off the PA tanks.

As for under-strength, see the comment above: "...the Pakistani failure was at divisional level i.e. failure to pump in all five armoured regiments on the 8th or 9th September thus achieving a decisive breakthrough...."

The Indian failure at Gadgor had more to do with failure at brigade and divisional level in actual execution despite the fact that the Indians had the mains “available” as well as “physically available” to achieve a breakthrough. The failure was Brigadier K.K Singh Commander Indian 1st Armoured Division who saw a threat to his flanks which in reality was a tank squadron of 62 Cavalry which had lost its way and blundered into the Indian artillery echelons opposite Rangre. The Indians had the means to achieve a breakthrough but failed primarily because lack of coup d oeil and resolution at brigade level. This was a command and execution failure. *

Going by the principle De mortuis nil nisi bonum, it is improper to take any names. But this excerpt relieves one of that moral constraint: it names one of the major culprits (there were so many others!). Brigadier K. K. Singh survived this debacle, got two promotions in the six years intervening (not bad going), and mucked things up again in 1971. They said at the time that McArthur left active service that "...old soldiers never die, they just fade away..." If only some of ours had faded faster!

In Khem Karan on the other hand Pakistan had the resources but failed to bring them into the battle area because of poor staff work and planning at divisional level. Thus on the decisive 8th September Pakistan did not have the means to achieve a breakthrough and this had more to do with poor initial planning and staff work at div and brigade level rather than at the command or execution level. Thus the Pakistani failure was a staff and planning failure in which all from brigade till GHQ were included while the Indian failure was a command failure in which the prime culprits were the armoured brigade and divisional commander.

On the Pakistani side the success at Gadgor had more to do with outstanding leadership at squadron and unit level rather than any operational brilliance at brigade or divisional level. In the Indian success at Khem Karan, however, an important role was played by Indian higher headquarters at divisional corps and army command level.

 

[fatman17]

Agha Humayun Amin Major (r) Tank Corps: 13 Years service in Pakistan Army (PAVO 11 Cavalry,29 Cavalry,58 Cavalry,15 Lancers,5 Independent Tank Squadron,14 Lancers,15 SP) and 31 years research . Ex Editor Globe , Ex Assistant Editor Defence Journal , Ex Editor Journal of Afghanistan Studies. Publications: More than 200 articles in News, Nation , PRAVDA,Pakistan Army Journal , Citadel Magazine of Command and Staff College,Journal of Afghanistan Studies,Indian Strategic Review,Dawn ,Friday Times,Outlook Afghanistan ,Afghanistan Times,Frontier Post,Globe,Defence Journal,Media Monitors Network,Pakistan Army till 1965 held at US Army War College Library,US Army Command and Staff College Library,Indo Pak Wars a Strategic and Operational Analysis,Sepoy Rebellion of 1857-59 Reinterpreted, The Essential Clausewitz,Man's Role in History: Education/Credentials : Masters (History). Past/Present Clients: Various Think Tanks , Afghanistan Research Associates,Centre for Study of Non State Militant Actors in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

DEFENCE NOTES
1965 War
Operation Gibraltar
Role of SSG Para Commandos

Col SG MEHDI, MC who commanded the SSG till just before the 1965 war, gives a fascinating account of SSG operations during the conflict

Mian Arshad Hussain, a former Foreign Minister of Pakistan had demanded a judicial probe in the events leading to the 1965 war. On Oct. 23, 1977, Mian Sahib addressed the nation through a statement released to the Pakistan Times, Lahore. I quote;
Following Col. Mehdi's articles on the 1965 war, there has been an expression of interest in this momentous event as can be seen from the letters which appeared in this columns. In my opinion, the 1965 war bred the 1971 war and is thus an important contributory cause of the latter and the tragic events that have followed the conflict. Is it not time that a full-fledged inquiry was held into the causes, the conduct and the consequences of 1965 war?

Mian Arshad Hussain had excellent reasons to demand a probe into the concept, conduct and consequences of 1965 war' as he was Pakistan's High Commissioner at Delhi during that fateful period. He sent a warning on 4th September 1965 to the foreign office of Pakistan through Turkish Embassy that the Indians were planning to attack Pakistan, on 6th September. Mr. Aziz Ahmed, Pakistan's Foreign Secretary through a press statement acknowledged that such a warning was indeed received by the Foreign Office. But the debate on this warning issue' remained inconclusive, in that Aziz Ahmed maintained that the warning was received two days after war had already started! Only probe by a high powered judicial commission can separate shadows from the substance.

1965 war
'Without deliberate intent'

In 1965, the Pakistan Army found itself at war with India without deliberate intent which achieved a measure of surprise....'This is the opening sentence of the foreword by General Zia-ul-Haq, written for The Pakistan Army, War 1965' compiled by Major General Shauket Riza from hundreds of interviews and documents.

General Mohammed Musa who commanded the Army in the 65 War, gives a graphic account of how the Indians surprised the GHQ, the C-in-C and the Supreme Commander Field Marshal Ayub Khan on September 6, 1965. Narrates Musa Khan on page 48 of his book My Version'.

India launched her ignominious, undeclared and blatant aggression on our homeland at about 0330 hours on 6 September. The Supreme Commander was informed about the invasion by Air Commander Akhtar of the Pakistan Air Force, who was on duty at the Air Defence Headquarters at Rawalpindi on night of 5/6 September. Indian troop movements across the frontier had been reported to him by the border posts of the PAF Wireless Observer wing. The President then rang me up to ascertain whether or not GHQ had received any information about the Indian attack and the whereabouts of the field army that morning'.

How did the GHQ
allow Indians to Achieve Surprise?

Let General Musa describe the genesis of the surprise' Indian attack on 6th September in his own words.

The then Foreign Minister Mr Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, and the Foreign Secretary, Aziz Ahmed spurred on by Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik, who was commander of our troops in Azad Kashmir, pressed the Government to take advantage of the disturbed situation in the valley and direct the Army to send raiders into Indian held Kashmir for conducting guerrilla activities there and to help, on a long term basis, the locals in organising a movement with a view to eventually starting an uprising against the occupying power.

Continues the former C-in-C on page 6 of his book, the sponsors and supporters of the raids had at last succeeded in persuading the President to take the plunge that led to an all-out armed conflict with India' ....... To the extent that the concept of sending infiltrators in the Indian held Kashmir, code named Gibraltar' was the brain-child of the ministry of Foreign Affairs, is the simple truth and nothing but the truth. But General Musa, the C-in-C, assumed full responsibility for the development of the concept, its planning and coordination of the entire operation. This is graphically stated by him on page 35 of his book: After the Government finally decided that deep raids should be launched in Indian-held Kashmir, I directed Commander 12 Division, Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik, to prepare a draft plan for the operation, code-named Gibraltar' in consultation with GHQ and within the broad concept we had specified. GHQ approved it after making certain changes in it. With the help of sand model, he went over the final plan in Murree before it was put into effect on 7 August, 1965 under our overall control. The Supreme Commander and his Military Secretary were present. He also agreed with it. I was accompanied by the CGS (Major General Sher Bahadur) and the Directors of Military Operations and Intelligence (Brigadiers Gul Hasan and Irshad Ahmed Khan respectively). No civil official attended this briefing.

Broadly the plan envisaged, on a short-term basis, sabotage of military targets, disruptions of communications, etc. and, as a long-term measure, distribution of arms to the people of occupied Kashmir and initiation of a guerrilla movement there with a view to starting an uprising in the valley eventually. The push towards Akhnur was not part of it. However, it was considered as one of the likely operations that we might have to undertake, as we felt our activities would have an escalating effect.

When Akhtar Malik was pointing out on the sand model the various targets of the raiding parties of Gibraltar, the President did say why don't you go for Akhnur also? Akhtar Malik replied that, too, could be considered, but it was not raided because no Gibraltar force had been organised for that purpose.

Nevertheless, when the Indians started attacking and capturing Azad Kashmir territory in Tithwal and Haji Pir Pass areas, we decided to hold them in these places and retaliate by threatening Akhnur through the Chamb valley in order to release the pressure in the north.

The simple truth emerging from the preceeding statement of General Musa is clear cut, in that, while the concept of Gibraltar' did originate from the ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Musa, whatever he might say after the event, went along with it in a half heartedly and non serious manner.

Operation Gibraltar and the SSG Involvement

This writer is a personal witness to the unfolding of this tragedy as I had the honour to command our Army's Corps de elite, the Special Service Group (SSG) at this critical juncture.

In late May 1965, I was directed by the Vice Chief of General Staff, (late Major General Abid Bilgrami) to go to Murree and see GOC 12 Division, Akhtar Hussian Malik. The GOC's briefing of the outline plan of Gibraltar operation left me stunned. The plan was so childish, so bizarre as to be unacceptable to logical, competent, professionally sound military persons anywhere in the world.

I frankly told General Akhtar Malik that the Operation was a non starter and that I would render the same advice to the Chief and Vice Chief of General Staff. At GHQ, the same day I briefed the CGS and VCGS, who listened to me patiently. The result of my presentation however was barren of the result. Major General Malik Sher Bahadur (The CGS), posed only one question. You (Mehdi) say that operation Gibraltar as planned stands no chance of succeeding, but Akhtar Malik (COG 12 Division) feels confident of its success. My reply to the Chief of the General Staff was that, the conflicting view point of Mehdi and Akhtar Malik not withstanding, as Chief of General Staff of Pakistan Army, he should also have an opinion on this important matter as we were not playing a peace time war game, but with the destiny of Pakistan itself. To this date I remember the reaction of the CGS. He went red right up to his ears, and after a painful pause got up, extended his hand to shake and brought the interview to an end with the remarks that it is always interesting to listen to you!!

Undaunted by the rebuff at Murree and later at the GHQ, I decided to reduce my arguments in writing, as to the reasons why Gibraltar shall fail. These, in brief, were:

1. No ground had been prepared before launching of the operation, in concert with people of the valley.

2. The raids were to be launched in total logistical vacuum relying exclusively of what the troops would carry in their packs or living off the countryside. Without any covert support across the Ceasefire Line, this living off the land proved fatal to the security of the guerrillas. Most of them were betrayed.

3. GHQ had mixed up classic guerrilla operations with Commandos raids.

4. All SSG and other officers, responsible for training and later leading groups across the ceasefire line were critical of the soundness of the plan, unsure of the means and uncertain of the end.

SSG records at Cherat shall substantiate the points made above

The simple truth emerging from the narrative is, that neither the C-in-C Army nor General Staff had the guts to stand up to the President, Field Marshal Ayub Khan, and tell him that his advisers in the ministry of Foreign Affairs supported by GOC 12 Division, Akhtar Malik were taking him on a long ride commencing with Gibraltar, leading to his downfall via Tashkent, as it eventually proved! The loser in the final analysis was Pakistan, described so feelingly by General K.M. Arif in an analysis carried by daily Dawn', 6th September 1990. How and why Pakistan blundered into war .......... At that time, the policy making in the country was highly personalised. The institutions were weak and by-passed. Pakistan's Foreign Office with Mr. Aziz Ahmed as the Foreign Secretary and Mr. Z.A. Bhutto as the Foreign Minister called the martial tunes. It had miscalculated that despite operation Gibraltar, the fighting was likely to remain confined inside the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir. The Foreign Office is on record to have assessed that India was not in a position to risk a general war with Pakistan......for inexplicable reasons the General Headquarters based its operational plan in Kashmir on a wishful logic. The misplaced ego, the high ambition and the naive approach of a selected few plunged the country into an armed conflict. The outcome of the war, or the lack of it, eclipsed Ayub's position.

S.S.G. COMMANDO PARA DROPS

The 1965 War cannot be worthy of study unless the story of Pakistani commando drops on Adampur, Helwara and Pathankot air bases are briefly recounted. John Fricker calls this operation as an unmitigated disaster'. This operation conceived initially by PAF Chief who obtained the nod' of Ayub Khan in May/June 1965 while planning for operational contingencies in the event of an Indian aggression. Such advance operational planning is normal to all service HQ in peace time. GHQ passed the buck on to the commander of SSG- this writer. On being told by Vice Chief of General Staff Brigadier Bilgrami who had these instructions conveyed to him from Musa and Sher Bahadur the Chief of General Staff, I emphatically pointed out that the concept of operation was faulty as no raids of this nature, after the breakout of war, could have even a remote chance of success against fully alerted targets.

On my persistent refusal, GHQ told me that I should give my reasons for not undertaking the envisaged operation direct to the HQ, PAF. At a briefing arranged at SSG Parachute Training School at Peshawar in the presence of two senior officers of my command, Lt. Col. Abdul Matin, the Commander of No. 1 Commando Battalion, now retired and the brilliant Operations Staff Officer Maj. E. H. Dar, (Late Major General E. H. Dar) Air Force Chief were told that only a pre-emptive operation like the Israeli crippling raids against the front line Arab State's air bases as in 1956 Arab Israel War, could have probability of success. To this, the Air Chief observed that a decision to carry out pre-emptive operation as suggested could only be taken by the Government-meaning the President. Technically the observation made was correct but in that case the operation should have been based on the hypothesis of pre-emptive' alone. I had also objected to the para-commandos after being dropped, just left there in the void, in the heart of 100% hostile population with no equivalent of French Maquis to hide, feed and organise the escape of commandos.

That this was an unmitigated disaster from beginning to end is correct but for no fault of the brave band of commandos or their officers. I have already rendered a full account of this in my testimony to Hamood-ur-Rehman Commission, besides submission of a report to the Chief of General Staff and C-in-C in 1967.

Tribute

No objective study of this war would be complete without paying tribute to the great fighting spirit and unparalleled heroism of all ranks of the Pakistan Army, Navy and Air Force and notably of the SSG. The war of 1965 into which the country stumbled, with GHQ Surprised' and the army, its 25% of its strength still on leave, thus became a series of stray and isolated battles without any strategic concept and perspective. The Ghazis of the army, janbaz of the SSG, Shaheens of our Air force and Barbaroosas' of Pak Navy fought against the betrayal within and India's regimented hordes to an honourable draw. They also fought against international conspiracy of Anglo Saxon powers.

Conclusion

Had our Government initiated a probe into concept, conduct and consequences of 1965 War', and raised the curtain from the acts of gross omission or that of the criminal commission, the ignominy of 1971 could have been avoided.

 

[Xestan]

Agha Humayun Amin Major (r) Tank Corps: 13 Years service in Pakistan Army (PAVO 11 Cavalry,29 Cavalry,58 Cavalry,15 Lancers,5 Independent Tank Squadron,14 Lancers,15 SP) and 31 years research . Ex Editor Globe , Ex Assistant Editor Defence Journal , Ex Editor Journal of Afghanistan Studies. Publications: More than 200 articles in News, Nation , PRAVDA,Pakistan Army Journal , Citadel Magazine of Command and Staff College,Journal of Afghanistan Studies,Indian Strategic Review,Dawn ,Friday Times,Outlook Afghanistan ,Afghanistan Times,Frontier Post,Globe,Defence Journal,Media Monitors Network,Pakistan Army till 1965 held at US Army War College Library,US Army Command and Staff College Library,Indo Pak Wars a Strategic and Operational Analysis,Sepoy Rebellion of 1857-59 Reinterpreted, The Essential Clausewitz,Man's Role in History: Education/Credentials : Masters (History). Past/Present Clients: Various Think Tanks , Afghanistan Research Associates,Centre for Study of Non State Militant Actors in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
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DEFENCE NOTES
1965 War
Operation Gibraltar
Role of SSG Para Commandos

Col SG MEHDI, MC who commanded the SSG till just before the 1965 war, gives a fascinating account of SSG operations during the conflict

Mian Arshad Hussain, a former Foreign Minister of Pakistan had demanded a judicial probe in the events leading to the 1965 war. On Oct. 23, 1977, Mian Sahib addressed the nation through a statement released to the Pakistan Times, Lahore. I quote;
Following Col. Mehdi's articles on the 1965 war, there has been an expression of interest in this momentous event as can be seen from the letters which appeared in this columns. In my opinion, the 1965 war bred the 1971 war and is thus an important contributory cause of the latter and the tragic events that have followed the conflict. Is it not time that a full-fledged inquiry was held into the causes, the conduct and the consequences of 1965 war?

Mian Arshad Hussain had excellent reasons to demand a probe into the concept, conduct and consequences of 1965 war' as he was Pakistan's High Commissioner at Delhi during that fateful period. He sent a warning on 4th September 1965 to the foreign office of Pakistan through Turkish Embassy that the Indians were planning to attack Pakistan, on 6th September. Mr. Aziz Ahmed, Pakistan's Foreign Secretary through a press statement acknowledged that such a warning was indeed received by the Foreign Office. But the debate on this warning issue' remained inconclusive, in that Aziz Ahmed maintained that the warning was received two days after war had already started! Only probe by a high powered judicial commission can separate shadows from the substance.

1965 war
'Without deliberate intent'

In 1965, the Pakistan Army found itself at war with India without deliberate intent which achieved a measure of surprise....'This is the opening sentence of the foreword by General Zia-ul-Haq, written for The Pakistan Army, War 1965' compiled by Major General Shauket Riza from hundreds of interviews and documents.

General Mohammed Musa who commanded the Army in the 65 War, gives a graphic account of how the Indians surprised the GHQ, the C-in-C and the Supreme Commander Field Marshal Ayub Khan on September 6, 1965. Narrates Musa Khan on page 48 of his book My Version'.

India launched her ignominious, undeclared and blatant aggression on our homeland at about 0330 hours on 6 September. The Supreme Commander was informed about the invasion by Air Commander Akhtar of the Pakistan Air Force, who was on duty at the Air Defence Headquarters at Rawalpindi on night of 5/6 September. Indian troop movements across the frontier had been reported to him by the border posts of the PAF Wireless Observer wing. The President then rang me up to ascertain whether or not GHQ had received any information about the Indian attack and the whereabouts of the field army that morning'.

How did the GHQ
allow Indians to Achieve Surprise?

Let General Musa describe the genesis of the surprise' Indian attack on 6th September in his own words.

The then Foreign Minister Mr Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, and the Foreign Secretary, Aziz Ahmed spurred on by Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik, who was commander of our troops in Azad Kashmir, pressed the Government to take advantage of the disturbed situation in the valley and direct the Army to send raiders into Indian held Kashmir for conducting guerrilla activities there and to help, on a long term basis, the locals in organising a movement with a view to eventually starting an uprising against the occupying power.

Continues the former C-in-C on page 6 of his book, the sponsors and supporters of the raids had at last succeeded in persuading the President to take the plunge that led to an all-out armed conflict with India' ....... To the extent that the concept of sending infiltrators in the Indian held Kashmir, code named Gibraltar' was the brain-child of the ministry of Foreign Affairs, is the simple truth and nothing but the truth. But General Musa, the C-in-C, assumed full responsibility for the development of the concept, its planning and coordination of the entire operation. This is graphically stated by him on page 35 of his book: After the Government finally decided that deep raids should be launched in Indian-held Kashmir, I directed Commander 12 Division, Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik, to prepare a draft plan for the operation, code-named Gibraltar' in consultation with GHQ and within the broad concept we had specified. GHQ approved it after making certain changes in it. With the help of sand model, he went over the final plan in Murree before it was put into effect on 7 August, 1965 under our overall control. The Supreme Commander and his Military Secretary were present. He also agreed with it. I was accompanied by the CGS (Major General Sher Bahadur) and the Directors of Military Operations and Intelligence (Brigadiers Gul Hasan and Irshad Ahmed Khan respectively). No civil official attended this briefing.

Broadly the plan envisaged, on a short-term basis, sabotage of military targets, disruptions of communications, etc. and, as a long-term measure, distribution of arms to the people of occupied Kashmir and initiation of a guerrilla movement there with a view to starting an uprising in the valley eventually. The push towards Akhnur was not part of it. However, it was considered as one of the likely operations that we might have to undertake, as we felt our activities would have an escalating effect.

When Akhtar Malik was pointing out on the sand model the various targets of the raiding parties of Gibraltar, the President did say why don't you go for Akhnur also? Akhtar Malik replied that, too, could be considered, but it was not raided because no Gibraltar force had been organised for that purpose.

Nevertheless, when the Indians started attacking and capturing Azad Kashmir territory in Tithwal and Haji Pir Pass areas, we decided to hold them in these places and retaliate by threatening Akhnur through the Chamb valley in order to release the pressure in the north.

The simple truth emerging from the preceeding statement of General Musa is clear cut, in that, while the concept of Gibraltar' did originate from the ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Musa, whatever he might say after the event, went along with it in a half heartedly and non serious manner.

Operation Gibraltar and the SSG Involvement

This writer is a personal witness to the unfolding of this tragedy as I had the honour to command our Army's Corps de elite, the Special Service Group (SSG) at this critical juncture.

In late May 1965, I was directed by the Vice Chief of General Staff, (late Major General Abid Bilgrami) to go to Murree and see GOC 12 Division, Akhtar Hussian Malik. The GOC's briefing of the outline plan of Gibraltar operation left me stunned. The plan was so childish, so bizarre as to be unacceptable to logical, competent, professionally sound military persons anywhere in the world.

I frankly told General Akhtar Malik that the Operation was a non starter and that I would render the same advice to the Chief and Vice Chief of General Staff. At GHQ, the same day I briefed the CGS and VCGS, who listened to me patiently. The result of my presentation however was barren of the result. Major General Malik Sher Bahadur (The CGS), posed only one question. You (Mehdi) say that operation Gibraltar as planned stands no chance of succeeding, but Akhtar Malik (COG 12 Division) feels confident of its success. My reply to the Chief of the General Staff was that, the conflicting view point of Mehdi and Akhtar Malik not withstanding, as Chief of General Staff of Pakistan Army, he should also have an opinion on this important matter as we were not playing a peace time war game, but with the destiny of Pakistan itself. To this date I remember the reaction of the CGS. He went red right up to his ears, and after a painful pause got up, extended his hand to shake and brought the interview to an end with the remarks that it is always interesting to listen to you!!

Undaunted by the rebuff at Murree and later at the GHQ, I decided to reduce my arguments in writing, as to the reasons why Gibraltar shall fail. These, in brief, were:

1. No ground had been prepared before launching of the operation, in concert with people of the valley.

2. The raids were to be launched in total logistical vacuum relying exclusively of what the troops would carry in their packs or living off the countryside. Without any covert support across the Ceasefire Line, this living off the land proved fatal to the security of the guerrillas. Most of them were betrayed.

3. GHQ had mixed up classic guerrilla operations with Commandos raids.

4. All SSG and other officers, responsible for training and later leading groups across the ceasefire line were critical of the soundness of the plan, unsure of the means and uncertain of the end.

SSG records at Cherat shall substantiate the points made above

The simple truth emerging from the narrative is, that neither the C-in-C Army nor General Staff had the guts to stand up to the President, Field Marshal Ayub Khan, and tell him that his advisers in the ministry of Foreign Affairs supported by GOC 12 Division, Akhtar Malik were taking him on a long ride commencing with Gibraltar, leading to his downfall via Tashkent, as it eventually proved! The loser in the final analysis was Pakistan, described so feelingly by General K.M. Arif in an analysis carried by daily Dawn', 6th September 1990. How and why Pakistan blundered into war .......... At that time, the policy making in the country was highly personalised. The institutions were weak and by-passed. Pakistan's Foreign Office with Mr. Aziz Ahmed as the Foreign Secretary and Mr. Z.A. Bhutto as the Foreign Minister called the martial tunes. It had miscalculated that despite operation Gibraltar, the fighting was likely to remain confined inside the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir. The Foreign Office is on record to have assessed that India was not in a position to risk a general war with Pakistan......for inexplicable reasons the General Headquarters based its operational plan in Kashmir on a wishful logic. The misplaced ego, the high ambition and the naive approach of a selected few plunged the country into an armed conflict. The outcome of the war, or the lack of it, eclipsed Ayub's position.

S.S.G. COMMANDO PARA DROPS

The 1965 War cannot be worthy of study unless the story of Pakistani commando drops on Adampur, Helwara and Pathankot air bases are briefly recounted. John Fricker calls this operation as an unmitigated disaster'. This operation conceived initially by PAF Chief who obtained the nod' of Ayub Khan in May/June 1965 while planning for operational contingencies in the event of an Indian aggression. Such advance operational planning is normal to all service HQ in peace time. GHQ passed the buck on to the commander of SSG- this writer. On being told by Vice Chief of General Staff Brigadier Bilgrami who had these instructions conveyed to him from Musa and Sher Bahadur the Chief of General Staff, I emphatically pointed out that the concept of operation was faulty as no raids of this nature, after the breakout of war, could have even a remote chance of success against fully alerted targets.

On my persistent refusal, GHQ told me that I should give my reasons for not undertaking the envisaged operation direct to the HQ, PAF. At a briefing arranged at SSG Parachute Training School at Peshawar in the presence of two senior officers of my command, Lt. Col. Abdul Matin, the Commander of No. 1 Commando Battalion, now retired and the brilliant Operations Staff Officer Maj. E. H. Dar, (Late Major General E. H. Dar) Air Force Chief were told that only a pre-emptive operation like the Israeli crippling raids against the front line Arab State's air bases as in 1956 Arab Israel War, could have probability of success. To this, the Air Chief observed that a decision to carry out pre-emptive operation as suggested could only be taken by the Government-meaning the President. Technically the observation made was correct but in that case the operation should have been based on the hypothesis of pre-emptive' alone. I had also objected to the para-commandos after being dropped, just left there in the void, in the heart of 100% hostile population with no equivalent of French Maquis to hide, feed and organise the escape of commandos.

That this was an unmitigated disaster from beginning to end is correct but for no fault of the brave band of commandos or their officers. I have already rendered a full account of this in my testimony to Hamood-ur-Rehman Commission, besides submission of a report to the Chief of General Staff and C-in-C in 1967.

Tribute

No objective study of this war would be complete without paying tribute to the great fighting spirit and unparalleled heroism of all ranks of the Pakistan Army, Navy and Air Force and notably of the SSG. The war of 1965 into which the country stumbled, with GHQ Surprised' and the army, its 25% of its strength still on leave, thus became a series of stray and isolated battles without any strategic concept and perspective. The Ghazis of the army, janbaz of the SSG, Shaheens of our Air force and Barbaroosas' of Pak Navy fought against the betrayal within and India's regimented hordes to an honourable draw. They also fought against international conspiracy of Anglo Saxon powers.

Conclusion

Had our Government initiated a probe into concept, conduct and consequences of 1965 War', and raised the curtain from the acts of gross omission or that of the criminal commission, the ignominy of 1971 could have been avoided.

This reminds me of piece AC (R) Kaiser Tufail wrote a while ago explaining the operation details from PAF's pov.

The Fateful Para-Commando Assault - 1965 War


In the wake of hostilities in Rann of Kutch, the PAF Air Headquarters decided to review its war plans, as the threat of a wider conflagration loomed. Though the PAF and the IAF C-in-Cs had tacitly agreed not to use their air forces in Kutch – which was a bizarre arrangement worked out over a phone call between the two pre-Partition squadron mates – the possibility of air operations in a future war was real.

The PAF C-in-C, Air Marshal Asghar Khan, toyed with the idea of launching a para-commando assault on some of the forward IAF airfields, in case war broke out. This desire was conveyed to GHQ in May 1965, and a series of meetings were held between representatives of the two services. Gp Capt Mukhtar Dogar, a former transport pilot posted as Director of Air Intelligence in AHQ, was tasked to liaise with Col Seyyed Ghaffar Mehdi, Commander Special Service Group (SSG). According to Col Mehdi, “nothing appreciable was achieved as the demands made by the PAF were clearly beyond the operational capability of our troops.”[1] A formal presentation was made to the PAF C-in-C by Col Mehdi (alongside his GSO-2 Ops, Major Ehsan-ul-Haq Dar) in July at the Para Training School (PTS) in Peshawar, and the SSG’s point of view was explained. Two important points were highlighted[2]:

a) A daring operation of this nature could only succeed if both the strategic and tactical surprise was with the attacker. The blow against the Indian bases, therefore, had to be struck as a first ever signal of war, the implication being that if the war had been going on for some time and enemy air base defences were in a state of alert, the chances of success of such commando operations using Second World War methods were remote.

b) An accurate and up-to-date analysis of the target, its characteristics, size, shape and dimensions of its defences, and peculiarities of the general environments in which the target existed, had to be provided to the SSG by PAF/GHQ.
Assuming that these two basic pre-requisites were met, the operational considerations for SSG’s employment were then spelt out by Col Mehdi:

a) The operations would be mounted in the early hours of the night.
b) Air missions (para-commandos) would be dropped on the target.
c) Exfiltration would be either by landing an aircraft on the captured airfield, or by rendezvous with a helicopter, in view of the vast distances separating the targets from friendly forces.

The requirements for the operation were largely reasonable and well thought out, except for the matter of exfiltration of the para-commandos after the mission. Landing transport aircraft on an airfield that was expected to be on full alert after the attack was, in the least, a fanciful idea. As for helicopters, neither Pak Army, nor the PAF had troop transport versions that could evacuate a large number of commandos from enemy territory.

By 22 July, Air Marshal Asghar Khan had retired after completing two four-year terms. The new C-in-C, Air Vice Marshal Nur Khan (later Air Marshal), who had stayed out of the PAF for six years while on deputation as Managing Director PIA, had too many operational matters to catch up on. He, therefore, decided to go along with the para-commando assault mission as it shaped up. Not known for getting into minutiae, the C-in-C apparently left it to Gp Capt Dogar and Col Mehdi to sort out the nuts and bolts of the assault. It so happened that Col Mehdi fell out with the Army C-in-C, General Muhammad Musa, for opposing the utilisation of commandos in insurgency and prolonged guerrilla warfare roles that were central to the impending Operation ‘Gibraltar’[3]. On 31 August, he was replaced with one of the SSG battalion commanders, Lt Col Abdul Matin, as the officiating Commander of SSG.

During the meetings between Gp Capt Dogar and Lt Col Matin, a sticking point was the number of airfields to be attacked, with the Army pleading a shortage of commandos due to their commitment in Operation ‘Gibraltar’. Four airfields, viz Adampur, Ambala, Pathankot and Halwara were agreed upon, though a day before the attack, Ambala was cancelled.[4] Three teams, each of 60 commandos including three officers, were planned to be air-dropped by three C-130s. Each team was to have one wireless set so as to be able to keep the C-130s informed of their progress. Individual commandos were provided with two days’ rations (five meethi rotis each) and Rupees 400 in Indian currency, in addition to personal weapons, explosives, grenades, etc.

Retrieval of the commandos after the mission was a tricky and dangerous affair, and a final decision was callously deferred. The options discussed included landing C-130s on the recently-attacked airfields to pluck the teams, and also for the teams to wend their way back on foot across enemy territory, with the farthest target being 60 miles from the nearest border.

Cobbling Up the Teams

In response to Operation ‘Gibraltar’, the Indians had captured Haji Pir Pass which provided easy access to Muzaffarabad, capital of Azad Kashmir. On 1 September, Pakistan’s 12 Division frantically launched a riposte in Chamb Sector under the label of Operation ‘Grand Slam’. With the lifeline to Srinagar threatened by imminent capture of the vital Akhnur Bridge, the Indian Prime Minister warned Pakistan in no uncertain terms that India would respond 'at a time and place of her choosing'. After that stern message, the possibility of an Indian attack across the international border did not need any guessing. Pakistan armed forces, thus, ordered a belated general mobilisation, all leave was cancelled, and those already on leave were recalled.

Those amongst the SSG airfield assault teams who were on leave rushed back, but it was discovered that as late as 6 September, there was still a personnel shortfall of 40%. In a last-minute cobbling effort, men from Group HQ, Unit HQ and rear companies were mustered to complete the required numbers. The motley teams had not conducted joint training, and some of the members did not even know each other, or their officers. Many personnel had not done any refresher para drops during the last one year. One team leader had not even completed his fifth and final training jump, while four volunteer staff officers, including one on low medical category (‘B’), were taken in desperately.[5]

The Pathankot team consisted of 64 personnel including three officers, viz Major Khalid Gulrez Butt, Capt Bunyad Hussain Syed and Capt Muhammad Azad.

The Adampur team consisted of 55 personnel including three officers, viz Capt Said Afzal Durrani, Capt Ghulam Ahmed Kabir and Capt Muhammad Ashraf.

The Halwara team consisted of 63 personnel including three officers, viz Capt Hasan Iftikhar, Capt Ghulam Ahmed and Capt Syed Hazoor Hasnain.

Now or Never

On 6 September at 0830 hours, the GSO-2 (Coord) at GHQ informed the officiating SSG Commander, Lt Col Matin that the Indian Army had attacked across the international border at Wagah, therefore the SSG 'Ibrahim' and 'Kamal' Companies should be kept ready on short notice. At 1030 hours, another phone call from GHQ ordered the immediate move of the two companies to Peshawar, where they were to be briefed in detail by PAF’s Gp Capt Dogar. Almost as an afterthought, the Officer Commanding of PTS was tasked by GHQ to prepare necessary equipment for the para drops.

At mid-day, Gp Capt Eric Hall (Station Commander Chaklala, and senior supervisor of C-130 operations), Gp Capt Dogar and Lt Col Matin started a briefing session in Peshawar that lasted a full four hours. Gp Capt Dogar announced that the three IAF airfields of Adampur, Halwara and Pathankot were to be attacked by para-commandos, with a time-on-target (TOT) of 2300 hours. At this, Lt Col Matin objected to the very short notice for the complex and difficult mission, and suggested that the mission be delayed by one day for better preparation. Gp Capt Dogar answered Matin’s suggestion with a curt ‘now or never’ reply.[6] It is uncertain whether Gp Capt Dogar had the C-in-C’s consent on this decision.

Both companies, which were still fumbling for important equipment like wire cutters and explosive detonator switches in Cherat, were ordered to reach Peshawar by 1600 hours for another briefing by Gp Capt Dogar and the C-130 aircrews. The briefing started at 1645 hours and the assault teams were briefed about their targets for the first time. They were told to destroy aircraft, radars, bomb dumps and air traffic control towers on the designated airfields. Details of recovery of the assault teams after the mission was accomplished, were confused and cursory. The teams were told that on receipt of a ‘mission accomplished’ radio signal from the team leaders, the C-130s would land at the airfields, and the teams would be picked up. Outlandish as the idea was, the team leaders rejected it, and decided to trudge back on foot.

Each team was issued a set of two ¼” maps (scale: ¼” to a mile), and a picture of the respective airfield. The maps were surveyed as far back as 1909, so these obviously did not show the Indo-Pak boundary line, and the terrain features, irrigation networks and population centres were drastically outdated. The airfield pictures were also old dating to 1958, and had few worthwhile details. With just a few hours remaining for boarding the aircraft, the teams hopelessly tried to make sense of the ‘intelligence info’ just received. The team leaders needed more time to explain the mission details to their men. At the PTS, there was mayhem as the riggers tried to complete the checks on 182 main and 182 emergency sets of parachutes in blacked-out conditions. With mission preparations far from complete, the TOT was delayed by an hour to 0000 hours.

At 2330 hours, it was learnt that Pathankot had been attacked earlier in the evening by PAF Sabres, and all air and ground defences had been alerted.[7] Lt Col Matin, therefore, suggested that the Pathankot drop should be called off, but it was not agreed to by Gp Capt Dogar. Instead, it was summarily decided to carry out the air drops 3-4 miles away from the targets to avoid enemy AAA. Whether the PAF C-in-C was consulted on this matter remains moot.

Embarkation by the para-commando teams started at 0030 hours, and the three aircraft took off within the next fifteen minutes. After flying at low level for up to one-and-a-half hour, the C-130s were over their respective targets and by 0235 hours, all drops had been completed. At 0400 hours, Gp Capt Dogar informed Lt Col Matin that, “the para drops were complete, and that the team leaders had unanimously rejected the plan for retrieval by C-130s and would be exfiltrating on their own, Insha’Allah.”[8]

Pathankot Drop

On the morning of 7 September at 0235 hours, 64 commandos designated for Pathankot airfield were dropped from the two side doors of the C-130 in two ‘sticks’[9] of 32 each, at an altitude of 1,000 feet. On landing, the team leader, Major K G Butt, discovered that they had been dropped five miles south-west of the airfield, just next to a major canal which ran parallel to another one, 500 yards away. Apparently the major waterway was the Upper Bari Doab Canal, while the minor one was a later distributary not marked on the old map. The first casualty of the Pathankot assault was the team’s wireless operator who parachuted straight into a canal, and drowned along with his equipment. No contact could, thus, be established with Cherat, and the fate of the group members was known only after the POWs had been repatriated six months later.

Major Butt was able to regroup 25 of his men, and started heading east towards the airfield through boggy terrain. Immediately after crossing a bridge over the first canal, they encountered enemy troops. Company Havaldar Major Abbas Ali, along with two of his mates, engaged the enemy so that the rest of the party could continue its advance. In the ensuing firefight, Havaldar Major Abbas Ali and Lance Naik Muzaffar Khan were martyred, while Sepoy Shah Nawaz Khan was seriously wounded. (All three were awarded Tamgha-e-Jur’at). Butt’s party was able to cross the second canal, and carefully negotiated the crop fields which had started to fill up with farmers for the day’s work. The airfield was now a mere 1,000 yards away.

The enemy troops were in close pursuit, and seeing that no sanctuary was available for cover at the crack of dawn, Major Butt decided to throw the enemy off their scent. Skirting the airfield, the group scattered and headed north-east towards Kangra Hills. Assaulting the next night after a well-rested day in the safety of crags and ravines, was considered a more sensible option. While heading towards the hills not far from Chaki River, Capt Bunyad’s party encountered enemy fire. A firefight ensued, but when the party found itself out of ammunition and completely surrounded by enemy troops, it was left with no option but to surrender. Major Butt’s party was also encircled by enemy troops near Pathankot-Jalandhar Road, and after a courageous two-hour firefight, it also had to surrender. (Major Khalid Gulrez Butt was later awarded a Sitara-e-Jur’at.)

Seeing the mission headed nowhere, Capt Azad’s party decided to abort, and turned west to escape. The party was able to evade the enemy for four days, but was apprehended while crossing River Ravi just a few miles from the border. Only a party of fifteen men, led by Naib Subedar Muhammad Azam, was able to make it back to Pakistan from amongst the Pathankot group. Of the remaining men, 45 were captured (including six seriously wounded), and four were martyred.

Adampur Drop

At 0230 hours, 55 commandos designated for Adampur airfield were dropped by the C-130 in two sticks of 27 and 28, at an altitude of 1,000 feet. After landing, most of the commandos discovered that they had landed in the midst of a village, in the vicinity of fields with tall crops. Barking of dogs gave away their presence immediately. While it took almost two hours to extract and regroup, the team leader Capt Durrani, managed to put together 49 men, and by 0415 hours they were ready to launch.

The airfield was about two miles away, but shortly after the group started to move, it was struck by the noise of jet engines, signalling that aircraft were starting up for the day’s missions. By then it was first light, and soon the aircraft formations started to get airborne. Everyone ruefully wished that the para drops had occurred two hours earlier, so they could get on with the assault before daybreak. Capt Durrani decided to put off the operation for the following night, and broke up the group into smaller parties to hunker down for the day.

With an infantry company searching for the commandos, it was not long before they were completely surrounded by regular troops, police, armed villagers, and dogs. Fierce fighting took place and there were many casualties. In view of the enemy becoming fully alert, it was decided to abort the mission and all survivors were told to escape in small teams. The three officers (Captains Durrani, Ashraf and Ghulam Ahmed) were able to evade search parties for the next four days, living on nothing more than raw corn cobs and sugar cane. After covering a distance of fifty miles their luck ran out, and they were apprehended just 14 miles short of the border while crossing River Sutlej. In all, 42 men were captured (including three seriously wounded), 12 were martyred, and only one managed to escape.

Halwara Drop

The drop of 63 commandos at Halwara was done in a single stick, due to the non-availability of a second jumpmaster on board the C-130. Just as at Adampur, the commandos landed in the midst of houses and fields with tall crops. Assembling the group was a problem, as no one was able to spot the signalman’s torchlight due to various high obstructions in the line of sight. Search parties of regular troops, and police in armoured cars and jeeps were all over the place; at dawn, light aircraft also joined in the search from the air. Most of commandos could not make it to the airfield, and got scattered while trying to evade the enemy. A few small parties were able to ambush the enemy’s troops from Punjab Armed Police, and muleteers from the animal transport company in Ludhiana, that had been hastily mustered. One commando party managed to blow up a bridge. Subedar Allah Ditta managed to lead his team almost to the boundary of the airfield, but was surrounded by the enemy and a tough firefight ensued before the group ran out of ammunition; he was later awarded the Sitara-e-Jur'at for his brave leadership. In another encounter, Lance Naik Mukhtar Ahmed fought till the end when surrounded by one of the hunting parties. He was posthumously awarded the Tamgha-e-Jur'at.

Capt Hazoor Hasnain was able to regroup a team of six men, and headed for the airfield from where jet noise could be heard. Reaching the fourteen feet high airfield perimeter fence, they discovered to their dismay that the tightly woven wires could not be cut, as none of them had been issued with wire-cutters. After a while, a PAF bomber flew overhead and discharged its bomb load on the runway. (It later transpired that this B-57 was flown by Flt Lt Yusuf H Alvi.) The enemy AAA opened up and the sky was lit all around. The air base was now fully alert, and it was daybreak. Hasnain decided to call off the mission, and the party of six prepared to escape.

Not long after they set course, Capt Hasnain’s party was surrounded by scores of highly charged villagers, but the audacious commandos managed to defy them after threatening to kill everyone and burn their village. Later, on several occasions they were spotted by search parties, but incredibly, they were able to give them the slip each time. After covering a circuitous route of 50 miles on foot – travelling at night and resting in the fields during day – they came upon an Army jeep which they were able to commandeer, and drove the remaining 50 miles to the Pakistani border, south of Kanganpur. Soon after they arrived at the Indian border check-post of Fattuwala for an ID check, their cover of ‘Indian commandos going on a mission to Pakistan’ was blown, but they were able to scamper away. The next thing they heard was a loud blast and saw their jeep blown to bits by the irate check-post guards, who thought it was still occupied. Once on the Pakistani side, they were accosted by a Pathan soldier at the check-post, “Olaka, tau sokay?” (Hey there, who are you?) Capt Hasnain declared that they were ‘Pakistani commandos coming back from a mission in India’. The guard commander, instantly ordered his men to hold fire, and welcomed the weary troops to their motherland. Capt Hasnain was later awarded a Sitara-e-Jur’at. Besides Hasnain’s party of six which escaped, 53 men were captured (including four seriously injured), and four were martyred.

Ambala Drop That Never Was

On 16 September, in the midst of a fierce war, HQ SSG received a flash message from GHQ ordering 'Ghazi' Company to undertake a para-commando assault against Ambala airfield, the same night. It was a baffling order, not only because the company had returned after operations in Kashmir just two days ago, but none of them had been trained for assault on an enemy airfield. Besides, the commandos had no experience of night jumps and had only done their basic para course; they were also in need of a refresher.

Pursuant to the GHQ order, Lt Col Ayub Afridi (Officer Commanding, 2 Commando Battalion), Major Naeem Shaikh (Company Commander, 'Ghazi' Company) and Major Ehsan-ul-Haq Dar (GSO-2 Ops), reached the Para Training School at 1100 hours for a coordination meeting with the PAF representative. Gp Capt Mukhtar Dogar arrived at 1500 hours, and straightaway went in for the briefing. He started by lauding the successful assault on the Indian airfields, “which had been completely destroyed by the SSG officers and men.”[10] A surprised Major Naeem questioned Gp Capt Dogar if the PAF had the means to differentiate between damage caused by aerial bombing and ground action. When Gp Capt Dogar was unable to give a satisfactory reply, he was informed that for the last nine days, not even a beep had been heard from any of the wireless sets that the commando teams carried with them. BBC and All India Radio had reported that most of the commandos had been captured, and were POWs. In short, the mission that Gp Capt Dogar was lauding had actually been a complete disaster.

Moving to the upcoming Ambala assault, Gp Capt Dogar showed his audience an old photograph of Ambala airfield. Major Naeem objected to the obsolete photograph and demanded latest ones, with aircraft shelters and airfield defences properly marked. He also demanded photographs of at least two nearby drop zones. He then reminded Gp Capt Dogar that his men had not done a refresher para course, and also needed to carry out night jumps and learn group assembly techniques in darkness. These, Naeem insisted, were the minimum requirements to undertake the assault.

Irritated, Gp Capt Dogar remarked if that was the case, the task would require three months to complete. An equally exasperated Naeem replied that the task should then be postponed for three months. “Are you telling me that the mission cannot be launched tonight?” Gp Capt Dogar questioned Naeem.[11] Naeem caustically replied that if the commandos were ordered to sit in the aircraft and launch, it would be done, but the mission success could not be guaranteed. With this, the briefing was called off and while departing, Gp Capt Dogar said that he would check with GHQ if the mission was on for the night.

The same evening, 'Ghazi' Company learnt that in view of Major Naeem’s reservations, the Pak Army C-in-C had agreed to call off the mission, much to the consternation of the PAF high command. It was no less embarrassing for the GHQ to have acceded to PAF’s request to start with, when the failure of the earlier missions was well known.

Some Professional Perspectives on the Operation

Brig Zahir Alam Khan, a former SSG battalion commander states in his book, The Way it Was, “The Headquarters SSG had carried out no preliminary planning for these operations, no intelligence had been gathered, no maps and air photos had been collected, and no troops had been earmarked and trained. Lt Col Matin, Punjab Regiment, who had not served in the SSG but had been selected as a SSG battalion commander by Col S G Mehdi, was the officiating commander of the SSG on 6 September. The orders came without any warning, and caught the SSG without any plans and troops earmarked for the operation. The officiating SSG commander, and the GSO-2 (Operations), Major Dar, Punjab Regiment, later Major General, who had also not served with the SSG but was made responsible for operational planning and supervision of the launching of operations.” In a scathing final comment, Brig Zahir Alam goes on to say, “The whole operation was a disaster due to bad planning, bad launching of operation, and above all, the lack of moral courage to refuse a badly organised operation.” [12]

Brig Shamim Yasin Manto, was a former GSO-2 (Ops) at SSG HQ, and President of the Court of Inquiry constituted for debriefing the repatriated para-commando POWs. He was of the opinion that GHQ must equally share the blame for the fiasco, alongside the SSG officers, viz Col Mehdi, Lt Col Matin and Major Dar. He also believed that despite a four-month prior notification, the mission details were provided only a few hours before the actual launch, hence the preparations were shoddy. Secrecy had been stretched to such an extent that instead of surprising the enemy, own troops stood stunned. As for Col Mehdi’s role, Brig Manto thought that he failed to properly liaise and coordinate with AHQ regarding the mission. Another observation of Brig Manto was that there was no oversight of the preparations and training of personnel by a higher authority (in case of the SSG, it was the Chief of General Staff); this was unlike other subordinate formations which were under constant scrutiny of Corps and Divisional Commanders. Brig Manto addressed another significant operational aspect that was found wanting. This was the need for ‘pathfinders’ who should have been para-dropped or infiltrated a night or two prior, to radio back suitable drop zones near the three airfields, and away from population centres. Finally, he felt that if there had been a bold SSG Commander, he would have refused to undertake a mission that was practically ordered at a twelve-hour notice, with no preparation and with perfunctory target details.[13]
The late Air Cdre M Zafar Masud, former Station Commander Sargodha, and the 'ghost' author of The Story of the Pakistan Air Force – A Saga of Courage and Honour, summed up the operation as follows: “Thus ended an operation which on the face of it was an unmitigated disaster. Certainly the cost in lives of the heroic para-commandos, who embarked on their perilous mission with a memorably cheerful calm was difficult to justify.”[14]

Air Cdre Sajad Haider, mission leader of the famous Pathankot attack by Sabres, writes in his book, Flight of the Falcon, “The plan was somewhat utopian and proved to be a tragic failure, essentially because the premise and pre-requisites set forth for the mission’s success were totally missing.” Forthright as he is, Air Cdre Haider goes on to write: “There was clear reason to call it off. This was a horrific blunder by the PAF high command.”[15]

The late Maj Gen Faisal Alvi, a former GOC SSG, was more charitable towards his outfit regarding the failed para drop operation. “The airfield drop was PAF’s plan and the Army simply went along with it. It should be remembered that at that time the SSG was a nascent and inexperienced organisation. In such circumstances, it was not unusual for strong motivation and intense enthusiasm to have taken the better of good sense.”[16]

The late British military writer John Fricker, author of Battle for Pakistan – The Air War of 1965 writes, “It is difficult, in fact, to avoid the conclusion that the air assault raids were nothing less than suicide missions, but in the mood then prevailing in Pakistan, most fighting men considered their own lives of secondary importance to the need for national survival.” Fricker does not mince his words when he says that the operation was an unmitigated disaster. It was, “ill-conceived, ill-planned, badly executed and based on faulty intelligence.”[17]

Epilogue

The para-commando assault on airfields was, in all likelihood, originally conceived as a contingency operation. It was to be carried out in case the small PAF was constrained from attacking IAF airfields with combat aircraft, due to limited air effort at the outset of war. Apparently, as discussions between representatives of AHQ and GHQ progressed, the commando operation morphed into an opening gambit of major proportions, to be conducted soon after PAF’s pre-emptive air strikes. In this latter arrangement, the para-commando assault made no sense, since PAF’s air strikes promised to be far more effective, could deliver vastly more firepower, and were less risky in terms of human lives. When the PAF’s air strikes by Sabres did take place on the evening of 6 September, the element of surprise for the upcoming para assault had been snuffed, and its success was foreclosed there and then.

As far as the mission objectives are concerned, it seems that there was muddled thinking at the AHQ about utilization of the commandos, and it ended up employing them disastrously for mopping up PAF's air strikes earlier in the evening. If the para-assault was indeed meant to augment PAF's limited flying effort available for airfield strikes, a more profitable – and less risky – option would have been to earmark the nearby Pathankot for the commandos, while the PAF tackled the relatively distant Adampur and Halwara with its Sabres. In the event, the PAF ran out of air effort, and was able to put up just three aircraft each for these two airfields against the planned package of eight each, resulting in complete mission failures. It can be said, albeit in hindsight, that the shortfall of ten aircraft would not have existed, if those aircraft earmarked for Pathankot had been originally reserved for the other two airfields.

The AHQ had also left a number of issues unresolved during the planning stage. For instance, the idea of exfiltration of commandos by C-130s landing on the just assaulted airfields defied common sense, but either the PAF C-in-C remained unaware of this plan, or had rashly approved it. Similarly AHQ, which should have known better about air intelligence matters, failed to inform GHQ about its stock of outdated maps and airfield photographs in advance, so that the latter could have tapped its own resources, if any. Finally, AHQ should have notified GHQ at an early stage – at least by 1 September, when Operation ‘Grand Slam’ was launched and retaliation by India expected – that warning for the impending para-commando assault was not going to be more than 24 hours. That would have kept the SSG commanders on their toes, and would not have caught them by surprise, as it happened.

At GHQ, the Chief of General Staff (Maj Gen Malik Sher Bahadur), to whom the SSG reported in the chain of command, was too busy in preparations and supervision of Operations ‘Gibraltar’ and ‘Grand Slam’. It appears that the para-commando operation got relegated in importance and – for want of milder words – was subjected to gross negligence in the preparatory stage. It is particularly deplorable that least attention had been paid to the most critical phases of the operation, viz infiltration and exfiltration. It seems that nobody at GHQ thought that the mission would actually have to be executed one day.

Evidently, the matter regarding secrecy of the mission had been taken to ludicrous limits by both service headquarters, and it had harmfully impinged on the preparations for the very dangerous and demanding mission. The only saving grace of the fateful assault was that the fearless commandos, whose lives were at stake, took the orders in a do-or-die spirit that had infused this impossible undertaking on the first day of war.

[Consolidated losses from a total of 182 commandos were: 140 captured (including 13 seriously wounded), 20 martyred and 22 escaped.]


[1] Politics of Surrender and the Conspiracy of Silence; page 25.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Operation ‘Gibraltar’ was aimed at stoking an insurgency in Kashmir with the help of infiltrated irregular forces supported and directed by SSG personnel.
[4] SSG Tareekh ke Ainay Mein claims that initially Chandigarh airfield was also proposed to be attacked, but the PAF cancelled this target at an early stage of discussions; page 125.
[5] Ibid, pages 126, 127.
[6] Ibid, page 128.
[7] Halwara had also been attacked by PAF Sabres in the evening, but this was not disclosed for some reason.
[8] SSG Tareekh ke Ainay Mein; page 129.
[9] In para drop parlance, a ‘stick’ is a group of paratroopers dropped over a point on the ground in quick succession.
[10] SSG Tareekh ke Ainay Mein; page 142.
[11] Ibid, page 143.
[12] The Way it Was; pages 163, 164.
[13] Brig Manto’s views abridged from SSG Tareekh ke Ainay Mein, pages 137-141.
[14] The Story of Pakistan Air Force – A Saga of Courage and Honour; page 375.
[15] Flight of the Falcon; pages, 157, 158.
[16] Maj Gen Alvi’s views from SSG Tareekh ke Ainay Mein; page 332.
[17] Battle for Pakistan – The Air War of 1965; pages 107, 108.

Bibliography
1. Fricker, John; Battle for Pakistan – The Air War of 1965, Ian Allen Ltd, London, 1979.
2. Haider, S Sajad; Flight of the Falcon, Vanguard Books (Pvt) Ltd, Lahore, 2009.
3. Khan, Lt Col Ghulam Jilani; SSG Tareekh ke Ainay Mein, SSG HQ, 2004.
4. Khan, Brig Z A; The Way it Was, Dynavis (Pvt) Ltd, Karachi, 1998.
5. Mehdi, Seyyed Ghaffar; Politics of Surrender and the Conspiracy of Silence, Crescent International Newspapers Inc, Markham, OT, Canada, 2001
6. The Story of Pakistan Air Force – A Saga of Courage and Honour, Shaheen Foundation, Islamabad, 1998

© KAISER TUFAIL

 

[Zhukov]

Excellent Post. Why can't we have such solid discussion threads regularly on PDF instead of stupid hate mongering and random social media nonsense.

 

[niaz]

Another example of Lions led by the Donkeys.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Excellent Post. Why can't we have such solid discussion threads regularly on PDF instead of stupid hate mongering and random social media nonsense.

Because we have only one @fatman17 and one @niaz Sahib. Look what one brilliant opening post achieved.

 

[SQ8]

Another example of Lions led by the Donkeys.

A retrospective analysis always points to a succession of bad leadership selection by the people of the land leading back to roots in a historical lack of checks and balances being enforced the higher the class.

Meritorious selection has yet to take root today in Pakistan and sadly such Lambs will continue to lead lions to disasters upon disaster.
Our good hand lies in the other side also engaging in the same for now.

 

[Joe Shearer]

A retrospective analysis always points to a succession of bad leadership selection by the people of the land leading back to roots in a historical lack of checks and balances being enforced the higher the class.

Meritorious selection has yet to take root today in Pakistan and sadly such Lambs will continue to lead lions to disasters upon disaster.
Our good hand lies in the other side also engaging in the same for now.

Please don't rub it in. Major Amin has already done it, in pointing out that the side that made fewer mistakes won, in the course of these uniformed communal riots.

 

[SQ8]

Please don't rub it in. Major Amin has already done it, in pointing out that the side that made fewer mistakes won, in the course of these uniformed communal riots.

No plan ever survives contact with the enemy, but in the case of the subcontinent the plans were sickly from the start and never survived contact with their implementers.

 

[Joe Shearer]

No plan ever survives contact with the enemy, but in the case of the subcontinent the plans were sickly from the start and never survived contact with their implementers.

LOLOL!

If this was not such a painful reality, I would rate this the most quotable quote in these discussions!