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The Shinzo Abe government sends the new created Japan-Vietnam Special Ambassador Sugi Ryotaro to Hanoi for talks. Interesting, never heard before of such a role exists. I wonder what JP-VN special ambassador does.
I believe Ryotaro should not be worried. Vietnam has no objection to Japanese warships operating in the South China Sea. Even not to the Izumo.
I believe Ryotaro should not be worried. Vietnam has no objection to Japanese warships operating in the South China Sea. Even not to the Izumo.
Viet
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Members of Vietnam and Cambodia General Staffs opened a new office building for Cambodia armed forces, sponsored by Vietnam, in Phnom Penh on March 18.
A new anti tank missile TLCT is under development that is capable to pierce through 800mm armor steel.
According to Nikkei Asian Review, the Japanese government intends to donate military hardware surplus to friends and allies in south east Asia including Vietnam. Good stuff.
A new anti tank missile TLCT is under development that is capable to pierce through 800mm armor steel.
According to Nikkei Asian Review, the Japanese government intends to donate military hardware surplus to friends and allies in south east Asia including Vietnam. Good stuff.
Viet
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A delegation led by Mishel Baruch (left), the head of Israeli military industrial complex, on a visit to Vietnam.
No longer Ak-47, a Special Force unit with Israeli Tar-21 rifle
Regular army unit with Galil-31 assault rifle
No longer Ak-47, a Special Force unit with Israeli Tar-21 rifle
Regular army unit with Galil-31 assault rifle
Carlosa
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Strengthening Ties with Vietnam as a ‘South China Sea Ally’
by Daniel Ward
March 19, 2017 - 9:17am
Strengthening Ties with Vietnam as a ‘South China Sea Ally’
Daniel Ward
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/strengthening-ties-with-vietnam-as-a-‘south-china-sea-ally’
Introduction
Current tensions in the South China Sea, and their direct effect on U.S. vital interests, need to be addressed through strong relationships and alliances. The U.S. cannot be content to rely on past goodwill and must actively build and nurture its ties within the region. Current events demonstrate that even once-solid connections, such as those with the Philippines, can be threatened with regime changes. The U.S. can leverage Vietnam’s conflicts with China and our own growing ties with this former enemy to build a mainstay in the bulwark against Chinese expansion, and have another ally to counter any future Chinese aggression. Within the overall construct of such a relationship, the maritime domain is at the forefront of priorities.
This domain is critical as the U.S. may arguably be losing its ‘traditional’ cohort, the Philippines, based on recent developments which indicate their new leadership. While the U.S. could be said to have strong alliances in the Pacific region with Japan and Australia, neither has a direct presence in the South China Sea as compared to the Philippines, and with the potential loss of their support, the U.S. would be wise to invest in another nation with ‘local’ ties to bolster U.S. interests. Even with a volatile history between them, Vietnam makes sense as a partner for the U.S. Historical and current tensions between China and Vietnam are heightened in certain aspects of disagreement, particularly with regards to maritime resources. The U.S. can work to support Vietnamese claims to strengthen relationships and counter Chinese movements. The U.S. can build upon current efforts underway with Vietnam, such as ties between the U.S. Coast Guard and Vietnam Marine Police.
The U.S. needs local support in the South China Sea if we are truly committed to countering extensive development of China’s military footprint, which could effectively make the South China Sea a non-permissive area based on their control of several islands. Diplomacy and negotiation are bolstered by actual ability; and without a strong presence in the region the U.S. does not have a formidable position from which to engage China in diplomacy. Another regional ally would greatly help this cause, and Vietnam is the best candidate.
South China Sea ‘Construct’
The South China Sea is a current backdrop for China’s increasing global ambitions and desire to cement itself as the preeminent power in Asia. China is working towards “a grand strategy for itself that is meant…to pacify its periphery…and replace the United States as the most important power in Asia” [1]. To counter this movement, “forward-stationed U.S. forces…signal U.S. political commitment to the region” [2]. However, the U.S. cannot realistically maintain a solo posture in the region; allies are needed whom also have needs to balance Chinese ambition. In one such example, “Vietnam’s government, pressed by an ever more powerful China, knows it cannot stand up to Beijing alone and is cautiously moving toward increased ties with the United States” [3]. Numerous factors in the China-Vietnam rivalry have increasingly come to the forefront over the last several years to include: disputes over South China Sea territory; conflicting energy related exploration; disagreement on fishing rights and clashes between fishermen and patrol forces; and alliances against one another across the Diplomatic-Information-Military-Economic (DIME) spectrum. Added to this mix, “rising nationalism in both Vietnam and China fuels this race for regional influence and makes it harder for leaders in each country to back down from any confrontation, whatever the initial genesis” [4]. This set of factors allows the U.S. to engender itself towards Vietnam as both nations have common purpose in working to curb the extent of China’s South China Sea control.
The South China Sea is important regionally and globally as a source of energy resources, fisheries, and trade. Control of these sea lanes through various aspects of DIME, particularly military control, give nations leverage upon one another. As Julian Corbett might argue, control of the sea and its lines of communication effectively gives one control of all aspects of that region and its coastal environs. This is the goal of both China and the U.S. However, China enjoys a proximity advantage. China’s “pursuit of power in all its dimensions…is driven by the conviction that China…could never attain its destiny unless it amassed the power necessary to ward off the hostility of those opposed to this quest” [5]. Smaller, regional powers are at odds with this prospect. Both “China and Vietnam claim the entire area of the South China Sea and the islands within it while Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Brunei have laid claims to contiguous areas” [6]. Compared to China, there are two sets of principles which favor Vietnam’s claims, both that of ‘effective occupation’ and the rules of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which sets down internationally accepted norms for claims on exclusive economic zones. Perhaps amassed as one, a group resolve can best be applied to at least balance China’s stance of occupation. But simple diplomacy will not be effective, as “Beijing is rapidly dredging and militarizing disputed maritime areas” [7].
The U.S. cannot assume historical alliances will hold up under such conditions, and the U.S. cannot idly count upon international dynamics to be stable. With the recent election in the Philippines of President Rodrigo Duterte, the U.S. may see a trusted ally move to the sidelines or even towards the other side of the coin. As reported in The Wall Street Journal, “a top U.S. diplomat said that Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte was stoking “consternation” among governments and investors by repeatedly raising doubts about the future of the alliance between their two countries” [8]. This rhetoric is enhanced by statements from Duterte that “the Philippines would begin buying weapons from China and Russia (the US is the traditional main supplier), and that it would cease joint patrols of the South China Sea with the US” [9]. China is strategically working to control the lanes of the South China Sea through a “’strategic triangle’…that would allow it to monitor and police the waterway for decades to come…with bunkers, landing strips, and surveillance equipment” and which includes its current control of the Spratly and Paracel chains and its ambitions on the “Scarborough Shoal in the northeast” [10]. While the Philippines has served as a buttress against Chinese control of this important area, under the new president the Philippines are seemingly “set to essentially reverse course and give China Scarborough Shoal after all” [11].
Where can the U.S. find basing and naval allies in the region to support its cause? The Philippines support may be assessed as diminished, and other traditional support is not logistically robust, noting that “Australia lacks the maintenance facilities required by a carrier strike group” and “Guam's infrastructure is outdated and would require massive investment to accommodate a carrier” [12]. Hence more closely linked support is required. And China has taken notice. In response to recent ASEAN meetings, in which regional members have tried to organize against Chinese aggression, “Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin warned ASEAN against being influenced by outside powers, a clear rebuke to Washington” [13]. Among nations who may disregard Chinese threats and be willing to bolster an alliance against the regional powerhouse, is a former U.S. enemy, Vietnam. Why? Past tensions are increasing between this coastal nation and China, and the U.S. should be ready to mesh with Vietnam in pursuit of common goals.
China and Vietnam
China’s largest regional rival in the maritime realm is Vietnam. As discussed by Leszek Buszynski, “Vietnam is the major oil producer in the area” and as it “attempts to exploit new fields, there is the possibility of renewed clashes with China, which has consistently opposed Vietnam’s attempts to conclude exploration agreements with international oil companies in the South China Sea” [14]. In addition to energy, fishing grounds are a point of contention, and “the Vietnamese claim that 63 fishing boats with 725 crew members have been seized by the Chinese since 2005 in the South China Sea” [15]. An overall analysis concludes that “China has interfered massively in Vietnam’s economic development — not only against its fishing, but against its offshore oil and gas exploration and extraction” [16]. One wonders, can Vietnam compete? Vietnam has been moved upon aggressively by China in both the energy resource and fisheries arenas. But Vietnam is not poised to stand toe-to-toe with China if or when tensions escalate, and “analysts believe that Vietnam’s deterrence strategy is not designed to confront China in a conflict, but rather intended to create some risks for the Chinese navy if it decided to resort to force” [17].
Certain measures on the international stage of diplomacy have proved less than fruitful, such as “when Vietnam threatened to file a U.N. arbitration claim against China in mid-2014 as maritime tensions flared” and “China responded by freezing credit lines for ongoing Vietnamese energy and infrastructure projects, forcing some projects into restructuring and leaving others stranded” [18]. In conjunction, the “two countries have never adopted a memorandum of understanding (MOU) about how to resolve maritime disputes; in 2011, Hanoi and Beijing signed an agreement on general guidelines for addressing maritime conflicts, but have not progressed beyond generalities” [19]. Escalation is the order of the day. Fishing fleets are accompanied on both sides by coastal and naval patrol vessels, and interdictions often place armed assets of both nations in close proximity to one another. And both China and Vietnam have both “used state-owned petroleum companies as tools to claim disputed areas” and each has “responded rapidly to the other side’s new oil and gas explorations by increasing patrols in disputed areas or cutting the cables of survey ships” [20]. Essentially, the South China Sea has been regionally militarized, but China holds the upper hand in vessels, aircraft, and capabilities. Vietnam needs a backdrop to even the tables.
Vietnam: A Maritime Ally
There are numerous important elements reference a U.S. strategy towards China, which include measures such as “concertedly building up the power-political capacities of U.S. friends and allies on China’s periphery” as well as “improving the capability of U.S. military forces to effectively project power along the Asian rimlands despite any Chinese opposition” [21]. This focus is a major reason why Vietnam can serve as a lynchpin in the U.S. strategy towards containment of China and furtherance of a stable footing in the Pacific theater. The U.S. must concern itself with the continued support and development of ASEAN allies, and with regards to Vietnam, the U.S. should “seek to expand the scope of activities during the annual U.S.-Vietnam naval exercises to include joint humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and/or search and rescue exercises, and make more frequent stops at the port at Cam Ranh Bay in the short term” [22]. And while “the Vietnamese regard the United States as an important check upon China…their country’s proximity to their northern giant dictates that they be cautious” [23]. This means Vietnam needs substantial support which is steady and focused.
The “maritime domain…is one of the biggest challenges Vietnam faces today in the South China Sea” and to improve this posture the U.S. can and should help Vietnam enhance its capabilities “through training of military personnel” and pursuing “opportunities for joint naval exercises” [24]. In this effort, Vietnam tends “to be led by the coast guard” as “Hanoi views the coast guard as less escalatory than the navy, which is seen more as a reserve force” [25]. Such measures indicate Vietnam’s need to confront China, but also a reluctance to overtly push back due to potential repercussions of retaliation. Having an ally who can match China provides Vietnam with resolve to not necessarily be the aggressor, but to also not feel pressure to sway under Chinese oppression. Le Hong Hiep argues that “Vietnam is China’s biggest rival in the South China Sea so targeting it can provide Beijing with an opportunity to test Vietnam’s genuine capabilities and resolve” and “Vietnam has recently invested considerably in upgrading its navy as well as paramilitary forces, such as the Vietnam Coast Guard and the newly-established Vietnam Fisheries Resources Surveillance” [26]. Faced with a more powerful opponent, “Vietnam’s restraint in using force is therefore understandable, although it might raise doubts regarding Vietnam’s deterrence capabilities against China” [27]. The U.S. does not benefit from a military clash between China and Vietnam, and measures to counter this possibility include working with “Vietnam and other Southeast Asian nations to create a united position on a code of conduct” or promotion of “ASEAN-China joint economic and scientific projects in the South China Sea, such as programs to codify the marine biodiversity” which may serve as a platform for a reduction in tensions [28]. But these measures must be made from a position of strength to realistically have any measure of regard within China. Improvement of Vietnamese military and patrol capabilities, in concert with U.S. exercises “could be effective in stopping China from projecting power in ways that could provoke a confrontation with its neighbors” [29].
Analysis by The New York Times indicates “Vietnam’s needs dovetail with those of the United States, which has been encouraging maritime states in Southeast Asia to better defend themselves, an effort partly aimed at keeping the United States from being dragged into a direct naval conflict with China” [30]. Such recent measures are highlighted by actions between the U.S. Coast Guard and Vietnam Marine Police, with “training…focused on maritime law enforcement, search and rescue and operational planning” [31]. This ties directly to governance of areas in dispute such as exploration of natural resources and harvesting of fisheries. This “capacity building has been a significant part of overall U.S. engagement in Vietnam over the past three years” and “each outreach activity has succeeded in further strengthening trust and opening the door to a broader range of activities between our two countries” [32].
Conclusion
The U.S. will continue to be concerned with developments in the South China Sea, and will actively seek to check China’s maneuvers to solidify itself as the central regional power through its acquisition of island territories. Simply stated, “what was once a maritime territorial dispute involving China, Vietnam, and the other littoral ASEAN states has become something more disturbing for the peace and stability of the Western Pacific” [33]. The U.S. must have regional partners, and one which also is actively seeking to check China could serve as a strong counterpart. At sea, “since 2009, when China submitted a nine-dash map to the United Nations and asserted its control over much of the South China Sea, Vietnam has begun to see the maritime domain as its most important security challenge” [34]. This serves as an opportunity for both Vietnam and the U.S. to improve relations focused upon common cause. Joshua Kurlantzick writes “…a maritime crisis between Vietnam and China could theoretically serve U.S. interests in Asia” in that “a crisis that stemmed primarily from aggressive Chinese action, and that was met with a U.S. response that prompted China to back down but averted conflict, could lead Asian nations to strengthen military relationships with the United States” [35]. The converse is true in that “if a maritime crisis erupted and a U.S. response was ineffective, prolonging the conflict and failing to prevent China from retreating, even close U.S. partners could seek to bolster ties with China at the expense of military relations with Washington” [36]. The objective is to avoid military action. This is done through diplomacy and application of the full spectrum of DIME elements. However, far from home, the U.S. needs local support upon which joint action can be based and linked to leverage alliances in coordinated efforts to balance power, and discourage Chinese aggression against its neighbors. In the past, a nation such as the Philippines would have been the ‘go-to’ choice. In the current construct, the U.S. could truly do no better than working with Vietnam.
End Notes
[1] Blackwill, Robert D. and Ashley J. Tellis. “Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China”. Council Special Report, No. 72, March 2015. Council of Foreign Relations, 2015, p. vii.
[2] Green, Michael, Kathleen Hicks, Mark Cancian, Zack Cooper, and John Schaus. Asia-Pacific Rebalance 2025: Capabilities, Presence, and Partnerships. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2016, p. 201.
[3] Perlez, Jane. “Why Might Vietnam Let U.S. Military Return? China”. The New York Times, May 19, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/20/w...s-us-weighs-lifting-vietnam-embargo.html?_r=0, p. 1.
[4] Kurlantzick, Joshua. “A China-Vietnam Military Clash” Contingency Planning Memorandum No. 26. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2015, p. 1.
[5] Blackwill and Tellis, p. 7.
[6] Buszynski, Leszek. "The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and U.S.-China Strategic Rivalry." The Washington Quarterly 35 (2), p. 139-156. 2012, p. 140.
[7] Kurlantzick, p. 6.
[8] Larano, Cris. “U.S. Diplomat Calls Duterte ‘Separation’ Comment ‘Bad for Business’”. The Wall Street Journal, October 24, 2016. Dow Jones & Company, Inc. 2016. http://www.wsj.com/articles/duterte...om-u-s-stoke-worries-in-washington-1477289185, p. 1.
[9] Mollman, Steve. “The Philippines is About to Give Up the South China Sea to China”. Defense One, October 13, 2016. National Journal Group, Inc. 2016. http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2...na-sea-china/132319/?oref=defenseone_today_nl, p. 1.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Robson, Seth. “Analysts Recommend Second US Aircraft Carrier for Far East”. Stars and Stripes, July 29, 2016. http://www.military.com/daily-news/...-second-us-aircraft-carrier-for-far-east.html, p. 1.
[13] Symington, Annabel and Martin Abbugao. SE Asia Deadlocked as South China Sea Split Deepens. Agence France Presse. July 24, 2016. http://www.military.com/daily-news/2016/07/24/se-asia-deadlocked-south-china-sea-split-deepens.html, p. 1.
[14] Buszynski, p. 141.
[15] Ibid, p. 143.
[16] Corr, Anders. “China vs. Vietnam: Next Up at the International Court on the South China Sea”. Forbes, July 13, 2016. http://www.forbes.com/sites/andersc...al-court-on-the-south-china-sea/#2b2e9a142887, p. 1.
[17] Green et al, p. 106.
[18] Harris, Jennifer M. “U.S. Needs New South China Sea Strategy to Restrain Beijing”. Newsweek, July 17, 2016. http://www.newsweek.com/us-readies-beijings-new-strategy-south-china-sea-480744, p. 1.
[19] Kurlantzick, p. 2.
[20] Ibid, p. 3.
[21] Blackwill and Tellis, p. 5.
[22] Ibid, p. 30.
[23] Buszynski, p. 149.
[24] Green et al, p. 106.
[25] Ibid, p .108.
[26] Hiep, Le Hong. “Chinese Assertiveness in the South China Sea: What Should Vietnam Do?”. The National Interest, May 15, 2014. http://nationalinterest.org/blog/th...iveness-the-south-china-sea-what-should-10468, p. 1.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Kurlantzick, p. 5.
[29] Ibid, p. 6.
[30] Perlez, p. 1.
[31] Webster, Rick. “Coast Guard Strengthens Relationship with Vietnam Marine Police”. Coast Guard Compass, September 13, 2013. http://coastguard.dodlive.mil/2013/...hens-relationship-with-vietnam-marine-police/, p. 1.
[32] Ibid, p. 1.
[33] Buszynski, p. 151.
[34] Green et al, p. 106.
[35] Kurlantzick, p. 4.
[36] Ibid.
by Daniel Ward
March 19, 2017 - 9:17am
Strengthening Ties with Vietnam as a ‘South China Sea Ally’
Daniel Ward
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/strengthening-ties-with-vietnam-as-a-‘south-china-sea-ally’
Introduction
Current tensions in the South China Sea, and their direct effect on U.S. vital interests, need to be addressed through strong relationships and alliances. The U.S. cannot be content to rely on past goodwill and must actively build and nurture its ties within the region. Current events demonstrate that even once-solid connections, such as those with the Philippines, can be threatened with regime changes. The U.S. can leverage Vietnam’s conflicts with China and our own growing ties with this former enemy to build a mainstay in the bulwark against Chinese expansion, and have another ally to counter any future Chinese aggression. Within the overall construct of such a relationship, the maritime domain is at the forefront of priorities.
This domain is critical as the U.S. may arguably be losing its ‘traditional’ cohort, the Philippines, based on recent developments which indicate their new leadership. While the U.S. could be said to have strong alliances in the Pacific region with Japan and Australia, neither has a direct presence in the South China Sea as compared to the Philippines, and with the potential loss of their support, the U.S. would be wise to invest in another nation with ‘local’ ties to bolster U.S. interests. Even with a volatile history between them, Vietnam makes sense as a partner for the U.S. Historical and current tensions between China and Vietnam are heightened in certain aspects of disagreement, particularly with regards to maritime resources. The U.S. can work to support Vietnamese claims to strengthen relationships and counter Chinese movements. The U.S. can build upon current efforts underway with Vietnam, such as ties between the U.S. Coast Guard and Vietnam Marine Police.
The U.S. needs local support in the South China Sea if we are truly committed to countering extensive development of China’s military footprint, which could effectively make the South China Sea a non-permissive area based on their control of several islands. Diplomacy and negotiation are bolstered by actual ability; and without a strong presence in the region the U.S. does not have a formidable position from which to engage China in diplomacy. Another regional ally would greatly help this cause, and Vietnam is the best candidate.
South China Sea ‘Construct’
The South China Sea is a current backdrop for China’s increasing global ambitions and desire to cement itself as the preeminent power in Asia. China is working towards “a grand strategy for itself that is meant…to pacify its periphery…and replace the United States as the most important power in Asia” [1]. To counter this movement, “forward-stationed U.S. forces…signal U.S. political commitment to the region” [2]. However, the U.S. cannot realistically maintain a solo posture in the region; allies are needed whom also have needs to balance Chinese ambition. In one such example, “Vietnam’s government, pressed by an ever more powerful China, knows it cannot stand up to Beijing alone and is cautiously moving toward increased ties with the United States” [3]. Numerous factors in the China-Vietnam rivalry have increasingly come to the forefront over the last several years to include: disputes over South China Sea territory; conflicting energy related exploration; disagreement on fishing rights and clashes between fishermen and patrol forces; and alliances against one another across the Diplomatic-Information-Military-Economic (DIME) spectrum. Added to this mix, “rising nationalism in both Vietnam and China fuels this race for regional influence and makes it harder for leaders in each country to back down from any confrontation, whatever the initial genesis” [4]. This set of factors allows the U.S. to engender itself towards Vietnam as both nations have common purpose in working to curb the extent of China’s South China Sea control.
The South China Sea is important regionally and globally as a source of energy resources, fisheries, and trade. Control of these sea lanes through various aspects of DIME, particularly military control, give nations leverage upon one another. As Julian Corbett might argue, control of the sea and its lines of communication effectively gives one control of all aspects of that region and its coastal environs. This is the goal of both China and the U.S. However, China enjoys a proximity advantage. China’s “pursuit of power in all its dimensions…is driven by the conviction that China…could never attain its destiny unless it amassed the power necessary to ward off the hostility of those opposed to this quest” [5]. Smaller, regional powers are at odds with this prospect. Both “China and Vietnam claim the entire area of the South China Sea and the islands within it while Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Brunei have laid claims to contiguous areas” [6]. Compared to China, there are two sets of principles which favor Vietnam’s claims, both that of ‘effective occupation’ and the rules of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which sets down internationally accepted norms for claims on exclusive economic zones. Perhaps amassed as one, a group resolve can best be applied to at least balance China’s stance of occupation. But simple diplomacy will not be effective, as “Beijing is rapidly dredging and militarizing disputed maritime areas” [7].
The U.S. cannot assume historical alliances will hold up under such conditions, and the U.S. cannot idly count upon international dynamics to be stable. With the recent election in the Philippines of President Rodrigo Duterte, the U.S. may see a trusted ally move to the sidelines or even towards the other side of the coin. As reported in The Wall Street Journal, “a top U.S. diplomat said that Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte was stoking “consternation” among governments and investors by repeatedly raising doubts about the future of the alliance between their two countries” [8]. This rhetoric is enhanced by statements from Duterte that “the Philippines would begin buying weapons from China and Russia (the US is the traditional main supplier), and that it would cease joint patrols of the South China Sea with the US” [9]. China is strategically working to control the lanes of the South China Sea through a “’strategic triangle’…that would allow it to monitor and police the waterway for decades to come…with bunkers, landing strips, and surveillance equipment” and which includes its current control of the Spratly and Paracel chains and its ambitions on the “Scarborough Shoal in the northeast” [10]. While the Philippines has served as a buttress against Chinese control of this important area, under the new president the Philippines are seemingly “set to essentially reverse course and give China Scarborough Shoal after all” [11].
Where can the U.S. find basing and naval allies in the region to support its cause? The Philippines support may be assessed as diminished, and other traditional support is not logistically robust, noting that “Australia lacks the maintenance facilities required by a carrier strike group” and “Guam's infrastructure is outdated and would require massive investment to accommodate a carrier” [12]. Hence more closely linked support is required. And China has taken notice. In response to recent ASEAN meetings, in which regional members have tried to organize against Chinese aggression, “Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin warned ASEAN against being influenced by outside powers, a clear rebuke to Washington” [13]. Among nations who may disregard Chinese threats and be willing to bolster an alliance against the regional powerhouse, is a former U.S. enemy, Vietnam. Why? Past tensions are increasing between this coastal nation and China, and the U.S. should be ready to mesh with Vietnam in pursuit of common goals.
China and Vietnam
China’s largest regional rival in the maritime realm is Vietnam. As discussed by Leszek Buszynski, “Vietnam is the major oil producer in the area” and as it “attempts to exploit new fields, there is the possibility of renewed clashes with China, which has consistently opposed Vietnam’s attempts to conclude exploration agreements with international oil companies in the South China Sea” [14]. In addition to energy, fishing grounds are a point of contention, and “the Vietnamese claim that 63 fishing boats with 725 crew members have been seized by the Chinese since 2005 in the South China Sea” [15]. An overall analysis concludes that “China has interfered massively in Vietnam’s economic development — not only against its fishing, but against its offshore oil and gas exploration and extraction” [16]. One wonders, can Vietnam compete? Vietnam has been moved upon aggressively by China in both the energy resource and fisheries arenas. But Vietnam is not poised to stand toe-to-toe with China if or when tensions escalate, and “analysts believe that Vietnam’s deterrence strategy is not designed to confront China in a conflict, but rather intended to create some risks for the Chinese navy if it decided to resort to force” [17].
Certain measures on the international stage of diplomacy have proved less than fruitful, such as “when Vietnam threatened to file a U.N. arbitration claim against China in mid-2014 as maritime tensions flared” and “China responded by freezing credit lines for ongoing Vietnamese energy and infrastructure projects, forcing some projects into restructuring and leaving others stranded” [18]. In conjunction, the “two countries have never adopted a memorandum of understanding (MOU) about how to resolve maritime disputes; in 2011, Hanoi and Beijing signed an agreement on general guidelines for addressing maritime conflicts, but have not progressed beyond generalities” [19]. Escalation is the order of the day. Fishing fleets are accompanied on both sides by coastal and naval patrol vessels, and interdictions often place armed assets of both nations in close proximity to one another. And both China and Vietnam have both “used state-owned petroleum companies as tools to claim disputed areas” and each has “responded rapidly to the other side’s new oil and gas explorations by increasing patrols in disputed areas or cutting the cables of survey ships” [20]. Essentially, the South China Sea has been regionally militarized, but China holds the upper hand in vessels, aircraft, and capabilities. Vietnam needs a backdrop to even the tables.
Vietnam: A Maritime Ally
There are numerous important elements reference a U.S. strategy towards China, which include measures such as “concertedly building up the power-political capacities of U.S. friends and allies on China’s periphery” as well as “improving the capability of U.S. military forces to effectively project power along the Asian rimlands despite any Chinese opposition” [21]. This focus is a major reason why Vietnam can serve as a lynchpin in the U.S. strategy towards containment of China and furtherance of a stable footing in the Pacific theater. The U.S. must concern itself with the continued support and development of ASEAN allies, and with regards to Vietnam, the U.S. should “seek to expand the scope of activities during the annual U.S.-Vietnam naval exercises to include joint humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and/or search and rescue exercises, and make more frequent stops at the port at Cam Ranh Bay in the short term” [22]. And while “the Vietnamese regard the United States as an important check upon China…their country’s proximity to their northern giant dictates that they be cautious” [23]. This means Vietnam needs substantial support which is steady and focused.
The “maritime domain…is one of the biggest challenges Vietnam faces today in the South China Sea” and to improve this posture the U.S. can and should help Vietnam enhance its capabilities “through training of military personnel” and pursuing “opportunities for joint naval exercises” [24]. In this effort, Vietnam tends “to be led by the coast guard” as “Hanoi views the coast guard as less escalatory than the navy, which is seen more as a reserve force” [25]. Such measures indicate Vietnam’s need to confront China, but also a reluctance to overtly push back due to potential repercussions of retaliation. Having an ally who can match China provides Vietnam with resolve to not necessarily be the aggressor, but to also not feel pressure to sway under Chinese oppression. Le Hong Hiep argues that “Vietnam is China’s biggest rival in the South China Sea so targeting it can provide Beijing with an opportunity to test Vietnam’s genuine capabilities and resolve” and “Vietnam has recently invested considerably in upgrading its navy as well as paramilitary forces, such as the Vietnam Coast Guard and the newly-established Vietnam Fisheries Resources Surveillance” [26]. Faced with a more powerful opponent, “Vietnam’s restraint in using force is therefore understandable, although it might raise doubts regarding Vietnam’s deterrence capabilities against China” [27]. The U.S. does not benefit from a military clash between China and Vietnam, and measures to counter this possibility include working with “Vietnam and other Southeast Asian nations to create a united position on a code of conduct” or promotion of “ASEAN-China joint economic and scientific projects in the South China Sea, such as programs to codify the marine biodiversity” which may serve as a platform for a reduction in tensions [28]. But these measures must be made from a position of strength to realistically have any measure of regard within China. Improvement of Vietnamese military and patrol capabilities, in concert with U.S. exercises “could be effective in stopping China from projecting power in ways that could provoke a confrontation with its neighbors” [29].
Analysis by The New York Times indicates “Vietnam’s needs dovetail with those of the United States, which has been encouraging maritime states in Southeast Asia to better defend themselves, an effort partly aimed at keeping the United States from being dragged into a direct naval conflict with China” [30]. Such recent measures are highlighted by actions between the U.S. Coast Guard and Vietnam Marine Police, with “training…focused on maritime law enforcement, search and rescue and operational planning” [31]. This ties directly to governance of areas in dispute such as exploration of natural resources and harvesting of fisheries. This “capacity building has been a significant part of overall U.S. engagement in Vietnam over the past three years” and “each outreach activity has succeeded in further strengthening trust and opening the door to a broader range of activities between our two countries” [32].
Conclusion
The U.S. will continue to be concerned with developments in the South China Sea, and will actively seek to check China’s maneuvers to solidify itself as the central regional power through its acquisition of island territories. Simply stated, “what was once a maritime territorial dispute involving China, Vietnam, and the other littoral ASEAN states has become something more disturbing for the peace and stability of the Western Pacific” [33]. The U.S. must have regional partners, and one which also is actively seeking to check China could serve as a strong counterpart. At sea, “since 2009, when China submitted a nine-dash map to the United Nations and asserted its control over much of the South China Sea, Vietnam has begun to see the maritime domain as its most important security challenge” [34]. This serves as an opportunity for both Vietnam and the U.S. to improve relations focused upon common cause. Joshua Kurlantzick writes “…a maritime crisis between Vietnam and China could theoretically serve U.S. interests in Asia” in that “a crisis that stemmed primarily from aggressive Chinese action, and that was met with a U.S. response that prompted China to back down but averted conflict, could lead Asian nations to strengthen military relationships with the United States” [35]. The converse is true in that “if a maritime crisis erupted and a U.S. response was ineffective, prolonging the conflict and failing to prevent China from retreating, even close U.S. partners could seek to bolster ties with China at the expense of military relations with Washington” [36]. The objective is to avoid military action. This is done through diplomacy and application of the full spectrum of DIME elements. However, far from home, the U.S. needs local support upon which joint action can be based and linked to leverage alliances in coordinated efforts to balance power, and discourage Chinese aggression against its neighbors. In the past, a nation such as the Philippines would have been the ‘go-to’ choice. In the current construct, the U.S. could truly do no better than working with Vietnam.
End Notes
[1] Blackwill, Robert D. and Ashley J. Tellis. “Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China”. Council Special Report, No. 72, March 2015. Council of Foreign Relations, 2015, p. vii.
[2] Green, Michael, Kathleen Hicks, Mark Cancian, Zack Cooper, and John Schaus. Asia-Pacific Rebalance 2025: Capabilities, Presence, and Partnerships. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2016, p. 201.
[3] Perlez, Jane. “Why Might Vietnam Let U.S. Military Return? China”. The New York Times, May 19, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/20/w...s-us-weighs-lifting-vietnam-embargo.html?_r=0, p. 1.
[4] Kurlantzick, Joshua. “A China-Vietnam Military Clash” Contingency Planning Memorandum No. 26. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2015, p. 1.
[5] Blackwill and Tellis, p. 7.
[6] Buszynski, Leszek. "The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and U.S.-China Strategic Rivalry." The Washington Quarterly 35 (2), p. 139-156. 2012, p. 140.
[7] Kurlantzick, p. 6.
[8] Larano, Cris. “U.S. Diplomat Calls Duterte ‘Separation’ Comment ‘Bad for Business’”. The Wall Street Journal, October 24, 2016. Dow Jones & Company, Inc. 2016. http://www.wsj.com/articles/duterte...om-u-s-stoke-worries-in-washington-1477289185, p. 1.
[9] Mollman, Steve. “The Philippines is About to Give Up the South China Sea to China”. Defense One, October 13, 2016. National Journal Group, Inc. 2016. http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2...na-sea-china/132319/?oref=defenseone_today_nl, p. 1.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Robson, Seth. “Analysts Recommend Second US Aircraft Carrier for Far East”. Stars and Stripes, July 29, 2016. http://www.military.com/daily-news/...-second-us-aircraft-carrier-for-far-east.html, p. 1.
[13] Symington, Annabel and Martin Abbugao. SE Asia Deadlocked as South China Sea Split Deepens. Agence France Presse. July 24, 2016. http://www.military.com/daily-news/2016/07/24/se-asia-deadlocked-south-china-sea-split-deepens.html, p. 1.
[14] Buszynski, p. 141.
[15] Ibid, p. 143.
[16] Corr, Anders. “China vs. Vietnam: Next Up at the International Court on the South China Sea”. Forbes, July 13, 2016. http://www.forbes.com/sites/andersc...al-court-on-the-south-china-sea/#2b2e9a142887, p. 1.
[17] Green et al, p. 106.
[18] Harris, Jennifer M. “U.S. Needs New South China Sea Strategy to Restrain Beijing”. Newsweek, July 17, 2016. http://www.newsweek.com/us-readies-beijings-new-strategy-south-china-sea-480744, p. 1.
[19] Kurlantzick, p. 2.
[20] Ibid, p. 3.
[21] Blackwill and Tellis, p. 5.
[22] Ibid, p. 30.
[23] Buszynski, p. 149.
[24] Green et al, p. 106.
[25] Ibid, p .108.
[26] Hiep, Le Hong. “Chinese Assertiveness in the South China Sea: What Should Vietnam Do?”. The National Interest, May 15, 2014. http://nationalinterest.org/blog/th...iveness-the-south-china-sea-what-should-10468, p. 1.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Kurlantzick, p. 5.
[29] Ibid, p. 6.
[30] Perlez, p. 1.
[31] Webster, Rick. “Coast Guard Strengthens Relationship with Vietnam Marine Police”. Coast Guard Compass, September 13, 2013. http://coastguard.dodlive.mil/2013/...hens-relationship-with-vietnam-marine-police/, p. 1.
[32] Ibid, p. 1.
[33] Buszynski, p. 151.
[34] Green et al, p. 106.
[35] Kurlantzick, p. 4.
[36] Ibid.
Aqsuperman
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50th Anniversay of Đặc Công aka "Special Attack" unit. Born as a light infantry force to overcome fortifications, Đặc công has become an important component of the VPA. Here are guns that are used by the force.
PM-63
Uzi
Galatz sniper rifle
SVD sniper rifle
Collapsible stock AK
M18 ( Never seen outside parade )
Gali + M203 ( Never seen outside parade )
PM-63
Uzi
Galatz sniper rifle
SVD sniper rifle
Collapsible stock AK
M18 ( Never seen outside parade )
Gali + M203 ( Never seen outside parade )
Carlosa
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Vietnam asks South Korea for support with South China Sea issue
Gabriel Dominguez, London - IHS Jane's Defence Weekly
21 March 2017
http://www.janes.com/article/68879/vietnam-asks-south-korea-for-support-with-south-china-sea-issue
Vietnam's prime minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc has asked South Korea to support his country's stance on "the South China Sea issue", the Vietnamese government said in a 20 March statement.
"The prime minister proposed that South Korea continue to support the position of Vietnam and ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] on the South China Sea issue and help Vietnam strengthen its law enforcement capacity at sea," Hanoi said in a statement on its website following a meeting between Nguyen Xuan Phuc and South Korean foreign minister Yun Byung-se.
The statement did not provide further details in this regard. South Korea is Vietnam's biggest foreign investor and one of the Southeast Asian nation's largest trading partners.
Want to read more? For analysis on this article and access to all our insight content, please enquire about our subscription options: ihs.com/contact
Gabriel Dominguez, London - IHS Jane's Defence Weekly
21 March 2017
http://www.janes.com/article/68879/vietnam-asks-south-korea-for-support-with-south-china-sea-issue
Vietnam's prime minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc has asked South Korea to support his country's stance on "the South China Sea issue", the Vietnamese government said in a 20 March statement.
"The prime minister proposed that South Korea continue to support the position of Vietnam and ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] on the South China Sea issue and help Vietnam strengthen its law enforcement capacity at sea," Hanoi said in a statement on its website following a meeting between Nguyen Xuan Phuc and South Korean foreign minister Yun Byung-se.
The statement did not provide further details in this regard. South Korea is Vietnam's biggest foreign investor and one of the Southeast Asian nation's largest trading partners.
Want to read more? For analysis on this article and access to all our insight content, please enquire about our subscription options: ihs.com/contact
Carlosa
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My Lai Massacre, 49 Years Later
by MIKE HASTIE
http://www.counterpunch.org/2017/03/21/my-lai-massacre-49-years-later/
My Lai mural
March 16, 2017, was the 49th anniversary of the My Lai Massacre, located in Quang Ngai Province, Vietnam. It was Saturday morning, March 16, 1968, when approximately 115 U.S. Army soldiers of the Americal Division’s Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry, landed in helicopters just outside the village of My Lai 4. Over the course of the next four hours, these American soldiers, and their Military High Command, who were flying overhead in helicopters observing the massacre, took part in a horror show far beyond the human imagination. They took the term, “War Crimes,” and added a butcher shop to the equation of morbid extermination. In essence, they became a U.S. version of the final solution. They committed an act of barbarity that would redefine the war in Vietnam. It would take years to decipher what happened that day, as denial is the elixir that protects us from experiencing national shame. It is these two words, “National Shame,” that continues to hide the truth of what really happened in Southeast Asia.
This is what the U.S. Military did on that day on March 16, 1968. I use the word “We,” because our taxes paid for the massacre, and our ignorance about the war wrote the check. Among the dead were a hundred and eighty-two women, seventeen of them pregnant. A hundred and seventy-three children were executed, including fifty-six infants. Sixty older men were also murdered. The museum at My Lai includes the accounting of another important fact: there was another village located about a mile away from My Lai 4, called My Khe 4, that U.S. soldiers from Bravo Company on the same day, also committed atrocities. So, 407 were murdered at My Lai 4, and 97 were murdered at My Khe 4, for a total of 504 Vietnamese civilians. It also must be noted, that there were twenty rapes committed, not to include attempted rapes. I have chosen not to go into detail about how those executions were committed, or the torture and extreme suffering that was committed by American soldiers under Pentagon command. This butcher shop mentality would be extremely difficult to read and comprehend by most people. I will say this, and it is a quote from Larry Colburn, who was a door gunner on Hugh Thompson’s helicopter that landed on the ground during the massacre, and attempted to stop the killing. These are Larry Colburn’s words: ” The only thing the U.S. soldiers did not do was cook them and eat them.”
In order to understand WHY these two massacres were committed on March 16, 1968, a synopsis and history of what happened in Quang Ngai Province during the war would be helpful for the reader. I came across an article written on October 2, 1994, by award winning author, and Vietnam veteran, Tim O’Brien. The title of the article is: “The Vietnam in Me.” These are his words:
In the years preceding the murders at My Lai, more than 70 percent of the villages in Quang Ngai Province had been destroyed by air strikes, artillery fire, Zippo lighters, napalm, white phosphorus, bulldozers, gunships and other such means. Roughly 40 percent of the population had lived in refugee camps, while civilian casualties in the area were approaching 50,000 a year. These numbers, reported by the journalist Jonathan Schell in 1967, were later confirmed as substantially correct by Government investigators. Not that I needed confirmation. Back in 1969, the wreckage was all around us, so common it seemed part of the geography, as natural as any mountain or river. Wreckage was the rule. Brutality was S.O.P. Scalded children, pistol-whipped women, burning hootches, free-fire zones, body counts, indiscriminate bombing and harassment fire, villages in ash, M-60 machine guns hosing down dark green tree lines and human life behind them.
In a war without aim, you tend not to aim. You close your eyes, close your heart. The consequences become hit or miss in the most literal sense. With so few military targets, with an enemy that was both of and among the population, Alpha Company began to regard Quang Ngai itself as the true enemy–the physical place, the soil and paddies. What had started for us as a weird, vicious little war soon evolved into something far beyond vicious, a hopped-up killer strain of nihilism, waste without want, aimlessness of spirit. As Schell wrote after the events at My Lai, There can be no doubt that such an atrocity was possible only because a number of other methods of killing civilians and destroying their villages had come to be the rule, and not the exception, in our conduct of the war.”
In his book, Kill Anything That Moves, by Nick Turse, he states on page 11, ” The war’s casualty figures are staggering indeed. From 1955 to 1975, the United States lost more than 58,000 military personnel in Southeast Asia. Its troops were wounded around 304,000 times, with 153,000 cases serious enough to require hospitalization, and 75,000 veterans left severely disabled. While Americans who served in Vietnam paid a grave price, an extremely conservative estimate of Vietnamese deaths found them to be proportionally 100 times greater than those suffered by the United States.”
Also, on page 61 of Nick Turse’s book, he states: According to Westmoreland’s memoir, MacArthur “urged me to make sure I always had plenty of artillery, for the Oriental, he said, ‘ greatly fears artillery,'” and suggested that Westmoreland might have to employ a ” scorched earth policy ” in Vietnam.
As I did more research in writing this article, I had to put my mind in a place that required the attention of bearing witness. So much of the research is heart breaking, especially when you watch video of Vietnamese grieving the loss of loved ones. The shame you feel is gut wrenching. As an Army medic in Vietnam in 1970-71, the Vietnam War completely redefined my life. I was raised in a military family, as my father was a career Army officer, and combat veteran in North Africa during World War II. I spent my early life on U.S. military bases in Japan, and Germany, to include bases on the East Coast and West Coast of the United States.
My core belief system was a direct result of that upbringing. As far as I was concerned, the United States was the greatest country in the world. I wholeheartedly believed that until I went into the Army in March 1969. By the time I got to An Khe, Vietnam in September 1970, I was experiencing the rapid deterioration of American involvement in Vietnam. I was seeing periodic casualties coming in by medevac helicopters from the field, occasional attacks from mortars and rockets, but mostly internal violence in my own unit. Heroin addiction was rampant, suicides and shoot-outs between U.S. soldiers could happen at anytime. I spent most of my time on a reconnaissance support base that included three other heavily armed fire bases. The 155mm howitzers on those bases occasionally fired into free-fire zones just like most bases throughout Vietnam. Our assault helicopters and gunships went out often on hunting missions. To this day, I have no idea the damage they inflicted on the Vietnamese people.
In early April 1971, I was working in our aid station, when a Armored Personnel Carrier ( APC ) pulled up to our aid station, because one of the crew members had a minor injury. On the front of that APC, the crew had painted in large white letters: KILL A GOOK FOR CALLEY. Lt. William Calley, was of course the only one who was found guilty of the My Lai Massacre. He was found guilty of war crimes on March 29, 1971, and was sentenced to life in prison. However, President Nixon pardoned him, and he eventually returned to Atlanta, Georgia to work in his father-in-law’s jewelry store.
During his trial, millions of Americans believed he was not guilty, and sent thousands of letters to the White House asking for his release. Even though Calley was guilty, the one thing most people do not realize, is that you always protect the upper echelon of military command. It is an unwritten rule in the military. The military almost always blames it on a bad apple in the lower ranks. The important thing to remember, is that the My Lai Massacre was a military operation that had a predictable outcome. You do not bring the enemy to the peace table by just killing military combatants. You ultimately bring the enemy to the peace table by killing innocent civilians. They are military targets. The primary goal of the aggressor nation is to break the will of the people, and its ability to defend its homeland. This strategy is as old as warfare itself.
It is now March 16, 2017, forty-nine years after the My Lai Massacre. Since the end of World War II, my lifetime, as I am now 72, the United States has bombed 30 countries. The atrocities have never stopped. What happened at My Lai is extremely important to understand, because atrocities during the war were U.S. Policies! My Lai is a metaphor for the entire Vietnam War. My Lai was NEVER an aberration. The most important realization that has come out of writing this article, is that it always comes back to me, because My country did this. I cannot divorce myself from this reality. When I came back from Vietnam I finally had to face the truth, that I was the enemy in Vietnam. That realization was to eventually put me in two psychiatric hospitals. My core belief system was completely dismantled. I felt like a stranger in a strange land. And, whenever I tried to convince people that We were the barbarians in Vietnam, the more people avoided me.
The “Why” medivac helicopter, 1970, in An Khe, Vietnam. Photo by author.
People don’t want to hear that toxic truth, because I was violating the existing beliefs of society. I was like the 16-year-old girl who blurted out that her father raped her. This kind of information is taboo, and the only course was to blame the victim. I have met many Vietnam veterans who were involved in atrocities, and that pain was very excruciating. Some of them have worked through what happened, but the trail of suffering they went through had to be done behind closed doors with counselors. Our society is never part of that healing, because they don’t want to hear the truth. And, of course, you have to ask why? They do not want to feel the shame, the National Shame, because it is so frightening. If they were to feel that shame, they would have to redefine their entire lives. In the end, I came to realize, that whenever the truth threatens one’s core belief system, there is an urgent need to deny its reality. That is why denial becomes a sacred cow.
I have personally known many Vietnam veterans who were destroyed by their experiences in Vietnam. At least four of my friends died from Agent Orange exposure, to include my brother-in-law. One died from a head on car collision, one died homeless on the streets, and two hung themselves. It does not surprise me that more Vietnam veterans have committed suicide than were killed in Vietnam. According to the Veterans Administration, one veteran commits suicide every hour in this country.
The survivor, then, is a disturber of the peace. He is a runner of the blockade men erect against knowledge of ” unspeakable ” things. About these he aims to speak, and in so doing he undermines, without intending to, the validity of existing norms. He is a genuine transgressor, and here he is made to feel real guilt. The world to which he appeals does not admit him, and since he has looked to this world as the source of moral order, he begins to doubt himself. And that is not the end, for now his guilt is doubled by betrayal– of himself, of his task, of his vow to the dead. The final guilt is not to bear witness. The survivor’s worst torment is not to be able to speak. Terrence Des Pres, The Survivor
In closing, I have to remind myself that Lying Is The Most Powerful Weapon In War. I am reminded of what Dalton Trumbo wrote in his famous novel, ” Johnny Got His Gun.” These are his words: ” If the thing they were fighting for was important enough to die for then it was also important enough for them to be thinking about it in the last minutes of their lives. That stood to reason. Life is awfully important so if you’ve given it away you’d ought to think with all your mind in the last moments of your life about the thing you traded it for. So, did all those kids die thinking of democracy and freedom and liberty and honor and the safety of the home and the stars and strips forever? You’re goddamn right they didn’t.”
Viktor E. Frankl, who wrote, “Mans Search For Meaning, ” was very instrumental in my healing, when he wrote, ” Suffering ceases to be suffering when it has meaning.” In 1994, and 2016, I made trips back to Vietnam, with special emphasis on spending time at the My Lai Massacre site. This past year, I helped raise $8,600.00 with the help of Veterans For Peace, to restore a very large mosaic tile mural, that depicts the massacre of those civilians in the last moments of their lives. It is a very powerful piece of art.
While I was there, I met a Vietnamese woman who is the co-director of the My Lai Museum. She has worked there for 17 years, and has met countless tourists who make the journey to this place. I told her I was a veteran, and that millions of Americans who were adamantly against the war, see this memorial as being very important. I also said to her, that as far as I was concerned, the My Lai Massacre site was sacred ground. In an instant, she broke down and cried. The emotional connection I felt was beyond understanding. I think it was the closest thing to love I had felt since I came back from Vietnam in 1971.
Shortly after I met her, she asked me if I wanted to meet one of the lone survivors of the massacre. His name is Pham Thanh Cong, who was eleven-years-old when U.S. troops came into his village that early morning on March 16, 1968. An American soldier threw a hand grenade into his family hut, and killed his mother, three sisters and a six-year-old brother. He was protected by their bodies during the explosion. He himself was wounded in three places. It was a privilege to meet him, but I have to admit, I was somewhat apprehensive, because I had been an American soldier in HIS country.
Shortly after we met, he asked me if I had been at My Lai during the massacre. I assured him that I had not, and that I was in the Central Highlands two years after the massacre. I could tell he was relieved. We talked for about ten minutes through an interpreter. There was a brief recording of that conversation made. When I began to see his eyes turn red, with tears welling up, I switched the conversation to having a picture made with him and me, and another American veteran who was with me by the name of Sandy Kelson. In the back of my mind, I didn’t really know what I would say to him as we parted. In the end, I kissed him on the cheek, and told him I loved him.
Mike Hastie served as an Army Medic in Vietnam.
by MIKE HASTIE
http://www.counterpunch.org/2017/03/21/my-lai-massacre-49-years-later/
My Lai mural
March 16, 2017, was the 49th anniversary of the My Lai Massacre, located in Quang Ngai Province, Vietnam. It was Saturday morning, March 16, 1968, when approximately 115 U.S. Army soldiers of the Americal Division’s Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry, landed in helicopters just outside the village of My Lai 4. Over the course of the next four hours, these American soldiers, and their Military High Command, who were flying overhead in helicopters observing the massacre, took part in a horror show far beyond the human imagination. They took the term, “War Crimes,” and added a butcher shop to the equation of morbid extermination. In essence, they became a U.S. version of the final solution. They committed an act of barbarity that would redefine the war in Vietnam. It would take years to decipher what happened that day, as denial is the elixir that protects us from experiencing national shame. It is these two words, “National Shame,” that continues to hide the truth of what really happened in Southeast Asia.
This is what the U.S. Military did on that day on March 16, 1968. I use the word “We,” because our taxes paid for the massacre, and our ignorance about the war wrote the check. Among the dead were a hundred and eighty-two women, seventeen of them pregnant. A hundred and seventy-three children were executed, including fifty-six infants. Sixty older men were also murdered. The museum at My Lai includes the accounting of another important fact: there was another village located about a mile away from My Lai 4, called My Khe 4, that U.S. soldiers from Bravo Company on the same day, also committed atrocities. So, 407 were murdered at My Lai 4, and 97 were murdered at My Khe 4, for a total of 504 Vietnamese civilians. It also must be noted, that there were twenty rapes committed, not to include attempted rapes. I have chosen not to go into detail about how those executions were committed, or the torture and extreme suffering that was committed by American soldiers under Pentagon command. This butcher shop mentality would be extremely difficult to read and comprehend by most people. I will say this, and it is a quote from Larry Colburn, who was a door gunner on Hugh Thompson’s helicopter that landed on the ground during the massacre, and attempted to stop the killing. These are Larry Colburn’s words: ” The only thing the U.S. soldiers did not do was cook them and eat them.”
In order to understand WHY these two massacres were committed on March 16, 1968, a synopsis and history of what happened in Quang Ngai Province during the war would be helpful for the reader. I came across an article written on October 2, 1994, by award winning author, and Vietnam veteran, Tim O’Brien. The title of the article is: “The Vietnam in Me.” These are his words:
In the years preceding the murders at My Lai, more than 70 percent of the villages in Quang Ngai Province had been destroyed by air strikes, artillery fire, Zippo lighters, napalm, white phosphorus, bulldozers, gunships and other such means. Roughly 40 percent of the population had lived in refugee camps, while civilian casualties in the area were approaching 50,000 a year. These numbers, reported by the journalist Jonathan Schell in 1967, were later confirmed as substantially correct by Government investigators. Not that I needed confirmation. Back in 1969, the wreckage was all around us, so common it seemed part of the geography, as natural as any mountain or river. Wreckage was the rule. Brutality was S.O.P. Scalded children, pistol-whipped women, burning hootches, free-fire zones, body counts, indiscriminate bombing and harassment fire, villages in ash, M-60 machine guns hosing down dark green tree lines and human life behind them.
In a war without aim, you tend not to aim. You close your eyes, close your heart. The consequences become hit or miss in the most literal sense. With so few military targets, with an enemy that was both of and among the population, Alpha Company began to regard Quang Ngai itself as the true enemy–the physical place, the soil and paddies. What had started for us as a weird, vicious little war soon evolved into something far beyond vicious, a hopped-up killer strain of nihilism, waste without want, aimlessness of spirit. As Schell wrote after the events at My Lai, There can be no doubt that such an atrocity was possible only because a number of other methods of killing civilians and destroying their villages had come to be the rule, and not the exception, in our conduct of the war.”
In his book, Kill Anything That Moves, by Nick Turse, he states on page 11, ” The war’s casualty figures are staggering indeed. From 1955 to 1975, the United States lost more than 58,000 military personnel in Southeast Asia. Its troops were wounded around 304,000 times, with 153,000 cases serious enough to require hospitalization, and 75,000 veterans left severely disabled. While Americans who served in Vietnam paid a grave price, an extremely conservative estimate of Vietnamese deaths found them to be proportionally 100 times greater than those suffered by the United States.”
Also, on page 61 of Nick Turse’s book, he states: According to Westmoreland’s memoir, MacArthur “urged me to make sure I always had plenty of artillery, for the Oriental, he said, ‘ greatly fears artillery,'” and suggested that Westmoreland might have to employ a ” scorched earth policy ” in Vietnam.
As I did more research in writing this article, I had to put my mind in a place that required the attention of bearing witness. So much of the research is heart breaking, especially when you watch video of Vietnamese grieving the loss of loved ones. The shame you feel is gut wrenching. As an Army medic in Vietnam in 1970-71, the Vietnam War completely redefined my life. I was raised in a military family, as my father was a career Army officer, and combat veteran in North Africa during World War II. I spent my early life on U.S. military bases in Japan, and Germany, to include bases on the East Coast and West Coast of the United States.
My core belief system was a direct result of that upbringing. As far as I was concerned, the United States was the greatest country in the world. I wholeheartedly believed that until I went into the Army in March 1969. By the time I got to An Khe, Vietnam in September 1970, I was experiencing the rapid deterioration of American involvement in Vietnam. I was seeing periodic casualties coming in by medevac helicopters from the field, occasional attacks from mortars and rockets, but mostly internal violence in my own unit. Heroin addiction was rampant, suicides and shoot-outs between U.S. soldiers could happen at anytime. I spent most of my time on a reconnaissance support base that included three other heavily armed fire bases. The 155mm howitzers on those bases occasionally fired into free-fire zones just like most bases throughout Vietnam. Our assault helicopters and gunships went out often on hunting missions. To this day, I have no idea the damage they inflicted on the Vietnamese people.
In early April 1971, I was working in our aid station, when a Armored Personnel Carrier ( APC ) pulled up to our aid station, because one of the crew members had a minor injury. On the front of that APC, the crew had painted in large white letters: KILL A GOOK FOR CALLEY. Lt. William Calley, was of course the only one who was found guilty of the My Lai Massacre. He was found guilty of war crimes on March 29, 1971, and was sentenced to life in prison. However, President Nixon pardoned him, and he eventually returned to Atlanta, Georgia to work in his father-in-law’s jewelry store.
During his trial, millions of Americans believed he was not guilty, and sent thousands of letters to the White House asking for his release. Even though Calley was guilty, the one thing most people do not realize, is that you always protect the upper echelon of military command. It is an unwritten rule in the military. The military almost always blames it on a bad apple in the lower ranks. The important thing to remember, is that the My Lai Massacre was a military operation that had a predictable outcome. You do not bring the enemy to the peace table by just killing military combatants. You ultimately bring the enemy to the peace table by killing innocent civilians. They are military targets. The primary goal of the aggressor nation is to break the will of the people, and its ability to defend its homeland. This strategy is as old as warfare itself.
It is now March 16, 2017, forty-nine years after the My Lai Massacre. Since the end of World War II, my lifetime, as I am now 72, the United States has bombed 30 countries. The atrocities have never stopped. What happened at My Lai is extremely important to understand, because atrocities during the war were U.S. Policies! My Lai is a metaphor for the entire Vietnam War. My Lai was NEVER an aberration. The most important realization that has come out of writing this article, is that it always comes back to me, because My country did this. I cannot divorce myself from this reality. When I came back from Vietnam I finally had to face the truth, that I was the enemy in Vietnam. That realization was to eventually put me in two psychiatric hospitals. My core belief system was completely dismantled. I felt like a stranger in a strange land. And, whenever I tried to convince people that We were the barbarians in Vietnam, the more people avoided me.
The “Why” medivac helicopter, 1970, in An Khe, Vietnam. Photo by author.
People don’t want to hear that toxic truth, because I was violating the existing beliefs of society. I was like the 16-year-old girl who blurted out that her father raped her. This kind of information is taboo, and the only course was to blame the victim. I have met many Vietnam veterans who were involved in atrocities, and that pain was very excruciating. Some of them have worked through what happened, but the trail of suffering they went through had to be done behind closed doors with counselors. Our society is never part of that healing, because they don’t want to hear the truth. And, of course, you have to ask why? They do not want to feel the shame, the National Shame, because it is so frightening. If they were to feel that shame, they would have to redefine their entire lives. In the end, I came to realize, that whenever the truth threatens one’s core belief system, there is an urgent need to deny its reality. That is why denial becomes a sacred cow.
I have personally known many Vietnam veterans who were destroyed by their experiences in Vietnam. At least four of my friends died from Agent Orange exposure, to include my brother-in-law. One died from a head on car collision, one died homeless on the streets, and two hung themselves. It does not surprise me that more Vietnam veterans have committed suicide than were killed in Vietnam. According to the Veterans Administration, one veteran commits suicide every hour in this country.
The survivor, then, is a disturber of the peace. He is a runner of the blockade men erect against knowledge of ” unspeakable ” things. About these he aims to speak, and in so doing he undermines, without intending to, the validity of existing norms. He is a genuine transgressor, and here he is made to feel real guilt. The world to which he appeals does not admit him, and since he has looked to this world as the source of moral order, he begins to doubt himself. And that is not the end, for now his guilt is doubled by betrayal– of himself, of his task, of his vow to the dead. The final guilt is not to bear witness. The survivor’s worst torment is not to be able to speak. Terrence Des Pres, The Survivor
In closing, I have to remind myself that Lying Is The Most Powerful Weapon In War. I am reminded of what Dalton Trumbo wrote in his famous novel, ” Johnny Got His Gun.” These are his words: ” If the thing they were fighting for was important enough to die for then it was also important enough for them to be thinking about it in the last minutes of their lives. That stood to reason. Life is awfully important so if you’ve given it away you’d ought to think with all your mind in the last moments of your life about the thing you traded it for. So, did all those kids die thinking of democracy and freedom and liberty and honor and the safety of the home and the stars and strips forever? You’re goddamn right they didn’t.”
Viktor E. Frankl, who wrote, “Mans Search For Meaning, ” was very instrumental in my healing, when he wrote, ” Suffering ceases to be suffering when it has meaning.” In 1994, and 2016, I made trips back to Vietnam, with special emphasis on spending time at the My Lai Massacre site. This past year, I helped raise $8,600.00 with the help of Veterans For Peace, to restore a very large mosaic tile mural, that depicts the massacre of those civilians in the last moments of their lives. It is a very powerful piece of art.
While I was there, I met a Vietnamese woman who is the co-director of the My Lai Museum. She has worked there for 17 years, and has met countless tourists who make the journey to this place. I told her I was a veteran, and that millions of Americans who were adamantly against the war, see this memorial as being very important. I also said to her, that as far as I was concerned, the My Lai Massacre site was sacred ground. In an instant, she broke down and cried. The emotional connection I felt was beyond understanding. I think it was the closest thing to love I had felt since I came back from Vietnam in 1971.
Shortly after I met her, she asked me if I wanted to meet one of the lone survivors of the massacre. His name is Pham Thanh Cong, who was eleven-years-old when U.S. troops came into his village that early morning on March 16, 1968. An American soldier threw a hand grenade into his family hut, and killed his mother, three sisters and a six-year-old brother. He was protected by their bodies during the explosion. He himself was wounded in three places. It was a privilege to meet him, but I have to admit, I was somewhat apprehensive, because I had been an American soldier in HIS country.
Shortly after we met, he asked me if I had been at My Lai during the massacre. I assured him that I had not, and that I was in the Central Highlands two years after the massacre. I could tell he was relieved. We talked for about ten minutes through an interpreter. There was a brief recording of that conversation made. When I began to see his eyes turn red, with tears welling up, I switched the conversation to having a picture made with him and me, and another American veteran who was with me by the name of Sandy Kelson. In the back of my mind, I didn’t really know what I would say to him as we parted. In the end, I kissed him on the cheek, and told him I loved him.
Mike Hastie served as an Army Medic in Vietnam.
Carlosa
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TEST-71 Most Powerful Torpedoes of the Vietnamese Kilo Submarine
07 March 2017
http://defense-studies.blogspot.com/search/label/VIETNAM
TEST-71 heavyweight torpedoes (photo : KienThuc)
(Kien Thuc) - Long range, deep strike capability and great destructive power,TEST-71 torpedoes are considered as powerful and most modern torpedoes of the Vietnamese Navy.
With 6 Kilo 636 diesel electric submarines equipped with equipped with modern weapons including TEST-71 torpedoes has the ability to kill both surface and underwater target, give multiplier effect for Vietnam troops.
For long time age torpedo is considered indispensable to any submarines. These are weapons designed to equip submarines to attack targets on water depth and seabed.
Torpedoes always darting nightmare for both submarines and warships accidentally attacked them.
Just a torpedo may tear the several thousand tonnes of battleship.
The submarines hidden in deep waters, bringing them with the deadly torpedo always unease of any enemy warship water would dare confront them.
TEST-71 heavyweight torpedoes (photo : milit)
And when not equipped with anti-submarine equipment, surface warships will have tragic outcomes like this. In illustrated graphics, torpedoes fired from submarines darting in vast waters towards the goal.
Vietnamese Navy is quite diverse kinds of torpedoes, from light to heavy, from the types of specialized combat surface ships, anti-submarine to all types of modern combat submarines and surface ships.
TEST-71 torpedoes has maximum range of 20 km (photo : alrosa)
The types of torpedoes in service may be mentioned as heavy anti-submarine and surface ship torpedoes SET-53M, is equipped for submarine hunter Petya class III warship.
Light anti-submarine torpedoes SET-40UE is also equipped for Petya III class submarine hunter of the Vietnamese Navy.
TEST-71 heavyweight torpedoes (image : weapons systems)
Anti surface ship torpedoes 53-65 are fitted for Vietnam Kilo 636 submarines which recently bought.
But most significant the killer is still heavy torpedo TEST-71, it is capable of destroying warships and submarines.
TEST-71 heavyweight torpedoes (photo : Military Russia)
This torpedo can be deployed both on the surface warships and submarines to attack the enemy.
TEST-71 torpedoe has 533mm in diameter, this is heavyweight torpedoes and is designed in the late 1970s, the improved version is still active in the several navy including Vietnamese Navy.
07 March 2017
http://defense-studies.blogspot.com/search/label/VIETNAM
TEST-71 heavyweight torpedoes (photo : KienThuc)
(Kien Thuc) - Long range, deep strike capability and great destructive power,TEST-71 torpedoes are considered as powerful and most modern torpedoes of the Vietnamese Navy.
With 6 Kilo 636 diesel electric submarines equipped with equipped with modern weapons including TEST-71 torpedoes has the ability to kill both surface and underwater target, give multiplier effect for Vietnam troops.
For long time age torpedo is considered indispensable to any submarines. These are weapons designed to equip submarines to attack targets on water depth and seabed.
Torpedoes always darting nightmare for both submarines and warships accidentally attacked them.
Just a torpedo may tear the several thousand tonnes of battleship.
The submarines hidden in deep waters, bringing them with the deadly torpedo always unease of any enemy warship water would dare confront them.
TEST-71 heavyweight torpedoes (photo : milit)
And when not equipped with anti-submarine equipment, surface warships will have tragic outcomes like this. In illustrated graphics, torpedoes fired from submarines darting in vast waters towards the goal.
Vietnamese Navy is quite diverse kinds of torpedoes, from light to heavy, from the types of specialized combat surface ships, anti-submarine to all types of modern combat submarines and surface ships.
TEST-71 torpedoes has maximum range of 20 km (photo : alrosa)
The types of torpedoes in service may be mentioned as heavy anti-submarine and surface ship torpedoes SET-53M, is equipped for submarine hunter Petya class III warship.
Light anti-submarine torpedoes SET-40UE is also equipped for Petya III class submarine hunter of the Vietnamese Navy.
TEST-71 heavyweight torpedoes (image : weapons systems)
Anti surface ship torpedoes 53-65 are fitted for Vietnam Kilo 636 submarines which recently bought.
But most significant the killer is still heavy torpedo TEST-71, it is capable of destroying warships and submarines.
TEST-71 heavyweight torpedoes (photo : Military Russia)
This torpedo can be deployed both on the surface warships and submarines to attack the enemy.
TEST-71 torpedoe has 533mm in diameter, this is heavyweight torpedoes and is designed in the late 1970s, the improved version is still active in the several navy including Vietnamese Navy.
Viet
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one of the first Vietnamese aviators: Do Huu Vi (1883-1916).
Born in Saigon, Do entered the Military Special School of Saint-Cyr in 1904, became Second lieutenant of infantry in 1906. After stations in Morocco and Vietnam, he returned to France in 1914, when the WW I broke out. He was flying reconnaissance flights. Do received the medal of Legion of Honor. Captain Do Huu Vi was killed on 9 July 1916 in the battle of the Somme. In 1921, his brother, also an officer, with the support of the colonial authorities, brought his body back to Vietnam. the final place to rest.
Born in Saigon, Do entered the Military Special School of Saint-Cyr in 1904, became Second lieutenant of infantry in 1906. After stations in Morocco and Vietnam, he returned to France in 1914, when the WW I broke out. He was flying reconnaissance flights. Do received the medal of Legion of Honor. Captain Do Huu Vi was killed on 9 July 1916 in the battle of the Somme. In 1921, his brother, also an officer, with the support of the colonial authorities, brought his body back to Vietnam. the final place to rest.
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Viet
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one of rarest events in the world: Vietnamese, Chinese celebrate Spring Greetings (Lunar New Year). Together.
the President of Vietnam will visit China in May to attend a OBOR conference, while Xi Jinping is expected to visit Hanoi in November to attend a APEC meeting. We will see whether the encounters will produce more fruitful outcomes than just an intention of cooperation between two countries Red Cross.
the President of Vietnam will visit China in May to attend a OBOR conference, while Xi Jinping is expected to visit Hanoi in November to attend a APEC meeting. We will see whether the encounters will produce more fruitful outcomes than just an intention of cooperation between two countries Red Cross.
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