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Vietnam Shipbuilding Capabilities in the Headlines With Patrol Vessel Deliveries to Nigeria

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A picture of the Le Quy Don, a Vietnam Navy sailing ship.
Credit: Wikimedia Commons


By Prashanth Parameswaran
January 09, 2020

Earlier this month, reports surfaced regarding Vietnam’s building of patrol vessels for Nigeria. The development spotlighted Hanoi’s ongoing ambitions to increase the global reach of its shipbuilding capabilities amid the opportunities and challenges that this objective continues to present for the country.

Vietnam’s maritime industry continues has continued to experience notable growth over the years, and its shipbuilding sector includes a series of shipyards in the south, central, and northern areas of the country including state-owned and foreign-linked firms. Despite ongoing challenges like capacity and cases of corruption, Vietnam continues to eye opportunities to expand its shipbuilding capabilities through various means — including constructing and delivering boats to foreign countries.

Last week, we saw another round of headlines about Vietnam’s shipbuilding capabilities. Local media reports spotlighted the fact that Vietnamese shipyards were in the process of delivering dozens of patrol boats to Nigeria as part of existing commitments that had been made.

The report by Vietnam’s Tuoi Trenewspaper, last updated January 5, focused on two separate deliveries by Vietnamese shipyards. The first was the delivery of 50 patrol boats by Hanoi-based James Boat Technology Company, which had been transported from Doan Xa Port in the northern Vietnamese city of Hai Phong to Harcourt Port in Nigeria in mid-December. Those boats will reportedly be used for patrol, search and rescue missions, and protection of oil rigs. The second was the expected delivery by Vietnamese firm Hong Ha of 10 steel-armored patrol boats now being kept at a port in Hai Phong City, following a deal signed with what was described as “a Nigerian billionaire.”

Few additional specifics were offered by the report, including the exact identification of the type of vessels. Based on photos and videos that accompanied the report, IHS Jane’s noted that the armored patrol boats to be delivered looked similar to the 17 m Manta fast patrol/interceptor craft that had been made by Malaysian company Suncraft and also advertised by Vietnam’s Haiphong-based 189 Shipbuilding Company (Z189).

The deliveries themselves are in line with Vietnam’s ambitions to increase the global outreach of its shipbuilding capabilities. They are also consistent with Nigeria’s efforts to build up its naval capabilities, with Nigerian officials indicating late last year that new vessels were expected from countries such as France, Malaysia, and Vietnam.

To be sure, this is just one in a series of developments spotlighting Vietnam’s global shipbuilding ambitions and the expansion of its maritime sector more generally. But with these trends expected to continue on into the future, specific manifestations of this such as the one we saw surfacing int his case will continue to be important to monitor to assess how Hanoi is managing the opportunities and challenges therein.
 
A docu (in German language sorry) over Germany‘s involvement. After the WW II, colonial French made a brutal attempt to retake the control over Vietnam (along with Laos and Cambodia). The indochina war that would last for 9 years broke out. Fighting on the foremost front lines were the soldiers of the Fremdenlegion or Légion étrangère.

70 pct of Légion étrangère members were former Deutsche Wehrmacht. Some were recruited from the former Waffen SS - a racistic ideological military arm of the Deutsche Wehrmacht. At of the day, the Germans were the ones that fought until the bitter end.


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Unter der Doppelrune "wirst du siegen": Werbeplakat für Franzosen, die freiwillig in die Waffen-SS eintreten sollten

Quelle: picture alliance / akg-images



 
China Would Rather You Forget Their Losing a War Against Vietnam

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January 9, 2020 Topic: Security Blog Brand: The Buzz Tags: ChinaVietnamMilitaryTechnologyWar

In 1979 the PLA didn't live up to expectations.

by Charlie Gao

Key Point: The PLA was able to use 1979 as a testing ground for military reforms.


Chinese operations against Vietnam in the 1980s are often divided into four phases. In the first, the Chinese and Vietnamese further entrenched their positions along the border. This lasted until 1981. The second and third phase consisted of escalating offensive operations across the border from 1981 to 1987, gradually increasing in intensity. The last phase involved the PLA’s withdrawal from the border region. The political objectives of the Chinese incursions were to “punish” Vietnam for its continued belligerence towards Thailand and Cambodia. Since Vietnamese troops were going into Cambodia, Chinese troops would continue to do the same. Militarily, China saw the border conflict as a way to evolve the PLA from an antiquated fighting force to a modern one, by testing new doctrines and equipment on the border.

The PLA’s performance in the 1979 war was so bad, even Vietnamese commanders were surprised, according to some sources. This was a result of its reliance on Korean War–style infantry assault tactics, due to the operational inflexibility and stagnation of military thought in the PLA. The layout of the command structure, and the infrastructure that supported it, could not support maneuver warfare by smaller units of higher-quality forces.

Following the 1979 war, many reforms and reorganizations occurred within the PLA. Old leadership was removed, and a fresh set of new officers was brought in. Finally, in 1984 the situation presented itself for a test of these reforms. Late in 1983, Deng Xiaoping met with Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia. The prince wanted help, as Vietnamese soldiers were making significant gains inside of Cambodia. As a result, Deng decided to mobilize the PLA for a significant offensive operation in 1984. The offensive’s objectives were to capture the areas of Laoshan and Zheyinshan.

After preparatory barrages throughout most of April 1984, the ground offensive was finally launched on April 28. Five infantry regiments assaulted hilltop positions around Laoshan, taking them one by one. This was not a total success story, as these regiments took heavy casualties and used inflexible tactics similar to 1979. The two regiments assigned to assault Zheyinshan fared better. Flexible command allowed the attacks to be postponed until the opportune time, and the attack was a great success, with all Vietnamese positions being captured. The divisional commander in charge of those regiments was soon promoted to command the Eleventh Army, and the attack was cited as a textbook example of what the PLA could now accomplish.

The Vietnamese launched counterattacks in the MD-84 Campaign in an attempt to reclaim the positions they lost in the Laoshan offensive. Counterattacks occurred against the Chinese positions at Laoshan throughout June and July. After-action reports from these offensives suggest that Chinese military modernization proved to be a possible reason for success. Vietnamese veterans recalled being shelled by Chinese artillery even at nighttime, due to the deployment of new Chinese night-vision devices to the frontline. In addition, Chinese logistics achieved new levels of efficiency. One Chinese artillery commander remarked that in repelling the counterattacks, he could execute as many fire missions as he wished without worrying about ammunition supply for the first time in his career.

Operations in the Laoshan sector also were the catalyst for the development of greater direct-action capability among the PLA’s reconnaissance units. After a Vietnamese Dac Cong commando unit destroyed a PLA counterbattery radar in 1984, Deng Xiaoping asked the PLA General Staff to create similar capabilities. All Chinese military regions were ordered to organize reconnaissance brigades, which were then rotated throughout the Laoshan sector. Fifteen reconnaissance brigades were created, three to five of which were deployed to the sector at any given time. These brigades were very active in raiding rear areas, and experience gained by them was later used by the PLA to help create their own special-operations forces.

Overall, while the Sino-Vietnamese border wars might have seemed insignificant, they proved to be an effective testing ground for the PLA’s reforms. Trials by fire in the Laoshan sector allowed the PLA to grow a new cadre of forward-thinking leadership. New technologies and organizational structures were also trialed and reformed, and combat experience was gained that lead to the creation of Chinese SOF. In one Chinese general’s words, the border conflict “allowed him to achieve his dream of waging modern war by modern methods.” The Sino-Vietnamese border conflict of 1979 to 1990 can be seen as the crucible in which the modern PLA was born, reformed from the lumbering army that attacked Vietnam in 1979.


The author was informed by Chinese Military Strategy in the Third Indochina War by Edward C. Dowd and Deng Xiaoping’s Long War: The Military Conflict between China and Vietnam 1979–1991 by Xiaoming Zhang.

Charlie Gao studied political and computer science at Grinnell College and is a frequent commentator on defense and national-security issues. This piece was originally featured in September 2019 and is being republished due to reader's interest.
 
a model of similar 60 highspeed patrol boats that are sold to Nigeria.


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30y fighter pilot
Cpt Nguyễn Quang Sáng
coming from a farmer family, his father a war veteran









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No money, no education, no job, no citizenship, no future?

Why joining the US army is a very good alternative!

Plus, unlike Vietnam, US soldiers are very highly respected in daily life.




- good salary ranging from $20k to $100k per year

- generous healthcare

- free college education

- fast lane to US citizenship

- tax free when buying at US army shops

- personal development program
 
Unmanned copter made by Vietnam’s Academy of Science and Technology

name dragonfly-df26

operating radius 50 km

fuel for 180 minutes

load 4 kg


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a donation by Donald Trump

a US coast guard cutter


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© ẢNH : FACEBOOK
John Midgett (WHEC 726) thuộc lớp Hamilton của Hải quân Mỹ

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© Ảnh : VGP
 
I have never seen warriors like Vietnam.... This nation brought two super powers to its knees.... USA and China.... Still in spite of having such a huge navy and budget China can't even dream of touching Vietnam.... I'm really proud that India has Vietnam as a friend.... Wish our borders were sharing each others and we would have both be like Jai and veeru
 

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