US suspends military aid to Pakistan. Military says it doesn't need it.

[VCheng]

...And the shameless begging by the unscrupulous politicians begins again:


from: PM Gilani

ISLAMABAD: Pakistan’s prime minister expressed concern Wednesday over US plans to suspend around $800 million in military aid to his country, saying it could damage Pakistan’s fight against militants and further endanger the world.

Yousuf Raza Gilani’s comments suggest Pakistan’s civilian leaders are, at least publicly, more wary of the cuts than the Pakistani army, which operates largely beyond civilian control and has downplayed the aid issue.

They also came as Pakistan’s spy chief headed to Washington for meetings Wednesday.

The US-Pakistan relationship has been on a downward spiral since the May 2 US raid that killed al-Qaida chief Osama bin Laden in a Pakistani garrison town.

Pakistani leaders have protested the unilateral raid by kicking out many American military trainers and asking the US to reduce its footprint in the country.

On Sunday, President Barack Obama’s chief of staff, William Daley, said the US was suspending more than one-third _ or $800 million _ of its military aid to Pakistan until the two countries can resolve their differences enough to work together.

The Pakistani army has said it has no intention of stopping its fight against insurgents who have attacked the Pakistani state, and that it will continue to do so with its own resources. The statements have appeared designed to deflect notions that the Pakistani military is too reliant on American aid.

Gilani, however, said he was worried about the US decision.

“We are concerned over this issue of aid because we are in the middle of the war against terrorism and extremism,” the premier said during a televised news conference in the southwestern city of Quetta.

“Though this is our own war, we are fighting the war for the entire world, for the peace and prosperity and progress of the whole world.”

Earlier Wednesday, Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the head of Pakistan’s powerful Inter-Services Intelligence agency, headed for talks in Washington, army spokesman Maj. Gen. Athar Abbas confirmed.

Although he was reportedly angry at being left out of the loop on the US raid, Pasha’s trip could be an opportunity for both sides to improve ties.

Pakistani leaders insist they had no idea that bin Laden was hiding in the northwest town of Abbottabad, and US leaders have said that to date they’ve seen no evidence that the top echelon of Pakistan’s civilian and military leadership knew the terror chief’s whereabouts.

But suspicions have lingered that rogue elements of Pakistan’s security establishment, which historically has had connections with various militant groups, helped hide bin Laden.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Where else were you gonna keep them? A soldier in the US cost the same east or west. If we didn't pay, you would have no soldiers there? Makes no sense.

The problems arise from budgeting issues - the US and Pakistan have had an agreement that the US will reimburse Pakistan for certain deployments in FATA. Pakistan, GoP primarily, comes up with a budget that takes into account all revenue sources, including US reimbursements. When the US reneges on its agreement to provide funds for those operations/deployments in FATA, that have already taken place, and the money has already been spent, then the GoP has a problem.

The US could have also indicated that it would not reimburse any more funds starting July 2011, if Pakistan did not do XYZ, in which case the GoP would then have the opportunity to put together a budget without the expected reimbursement revenues from the US.

 

[VCheng]

The problems arise from budgeting issues - the US and Pakistan have had an agreement that the US will reimburse Pakistan for certain deployments in FATA. ...................

Please clarify for my benefit how is this any different than hiring a mercenary army? He who pays the piper calls the tune, right?

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Please clarify for my benefit how is this any different than hiring a mercenary army? He who pays the piper calls the tune, right?

Depends on if the Army is actually doing things it does not want to do.

If you remember, the PA has always been criticized for, and the current refusal to reimburse is using the same argument, not 'cooperating with the US completely'. In essence the canard of 'Hunting with the hounds and running with the hares' points to a military that will only go so far, and will not compromise on what it believes are Pakistan's national interests and security concerns.

A mercenary Army would have no qualms about fulfilling the conditions and demands of the US 150%.

 

[VCheng]

Depends on if the Army is actually doing things it does not want to do.

If you remember, the PA has always been criticized for, and the current refusal to reimburse is using the same argument, not 'cooperating with the US completely'. In essence the canard of 'Hunting with the hounds and running with the hares' points to a military that will only go so far, and will not compromise on what it believes are Pakistan's national interests and security concerns.

A mercenary Army would have no qualms about fulfilling the conditions and demands of the US 150%.

I see. Thanks.

And before you accuse me again of twisting your arguments, did you mean that the situation is more like an army that wants to be paid full rent (and then some), but then to pick and choose what it does in return? To my feeble mind, that sounds quite like paying a big local thug who will beat up only some of the smaller local thugs, but not the ones he is already cozy with, while his own house burns down.

I don't think it works that way, does it?

I am asking this with the clearest of intentions, mind you, and I can only hope that you can see that.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

I see. Thanks.

And before you accuse me again of twisting your arguments, did you mean that the situation is more like an army that wants to be paid full rent (and then some), but then to pick and choose what it does in return? To my feeble mind, that sounds quite like paying a big local thug who will beat up only some of the smaller local thugs, but not the ones he is already cozy with, while his own house burns down.

I don't think it works that way, does it?

I am asking this with the clearest of intentions, mind you, and I can only hope that you can see that.

The situation is of an Army that is willing to cooperate with the US on mutual interests such as combating Al Qaeda and other terrorists/organizations that pose a terrorist threat to the Western world, but is unwilling to extend itself to the point that it denudes its defences against India or makes enemies out of every single 'player' in a 'Post US Afghanistan', and has to then pay a very large price in terms of national security.

The situation is of an Army that is willing to accept a degree of aid and support from the US in pursuing common objectives, given the recognition that Pakistan is severely under-resourced in every area, and has an incompetent government that simply cannot do what is needed to cover the resource shortfall.

 

[VCheng]

The situation is of an Army that is willing to cooperate with the US on mutual interests such as combating Al Qaeda and other terrorists/organizations that pose a terrorist threat to the Western world, but is unwilling to extend itself to the point that it denudes its defences against India or makes enemies out of every single 'player' in a 'Post US Afghanistan', and has to then pay a very large price in terms of national security.

The situation is of an Army that is willing to accept a degree of aid and support from the US in pursuing common objectives, given the recognition that Pakistan is severely under-resourced in every area, and has an incompetent government that simply cannot do what is needed to cover the resource shortfall.

Thank you for the very well-worded response, which I appreciate.

I find it interesting that you used the phrase highlighted above, so does that imply that the same terrorist/organizations do not pose an existential threat to Pakistan itself? The implications of such a mind set in view of the multiple and persistent terrorist attacks in Pakistan are quite important I would think.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Thank you for the very well-worded response, which I appreciate.

I find it interesting that you used the phrase highlighted above, so does that imply that the same terrorist/organizations do not pose an existential threat to Pakistan itself? The implications of such a mind set in view of the multiple and persistent terrorist attacks in Pakistan are quite important I would think.

I am multi- tasking at work, that was an omission due to a hurried reply. It should have included 'threat to Pakistan' as well.

 

[VCheng]

I am multi- tasking at work, that was an omission due to a hurried reply. It should have included 'threat to Pakistan' as well.

I am horrible at multi-tasking, so I do understand.

So if I now read your sentence as:

"terrorists/organizations that pose a terrorist threat to the Western world AND PAKISTAN..."

then why would the Pakistani Army wanted to be paid for fighting that adversary that poses an EXISTENTIAL threat to its OWN state?

In all fairness, I think that recent steps by the COAS mean the the top brass may have realized that the monies that they accepted put them in an untenable situation. However, the damage to the reputation of both the State of Pakistan and the Pakistan Army as a result of that, both domestically and internationally, is deep and long-lasting.

However, I am hopeful the damage will be overcome and the reputations restored, but it needs immediate and corrective actions for sure.

 

[Juice]

1.That is an interesting point you bring out - but we should discuss it in a separate thread. What has changed for us soldiers in SA post-47? The wars and battles pre-47 including the slaughter we suffered in every part of the globe fighting for somebody else duped by injected values of "nimak halal' and loyalty and 'kasam', etc to an alien - do these not continue? Don't they continue in other colors?
a.For instance, together we from SA have been providing almost the entire force to protect somebody else's diamond mines/trade and other interests.
b. We have been protecting oil regimes compliant to major powers.
c. Genocides, HR issues, WMD issues, etc covertly created by these powers see our soldiers guarding interests of others we have never known before.
c. We nave been fighting among ourselves, and cannot solve our differences because of interference from the powers that, in the first place, had intentionally left these problems to make us fight for ever. Therefore, we need to go back to these colonial thugs, who should in fact be our enemy #1, everyday seeking diplomatic assistance and arms.
2. We did not sign for most of these ops in the first place. But our political leaders send us anyway to please somebody or to keep us engaged. And we are paid beyond imagination.ARE WE ARE REALLY NOT MERCENARIES - all of us?
3. Supposing tomorrow at a SAARC Summit they announce to pull out all Mission troops. The White Man will collapse in no time.

As you live in Canada, you can look out your window and inform us when the white man "collapses".

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

So if I now read your sentence as:

then why would the Pakistani Army wanted to be paid for fighting that adversary that poses an EXISTENTIAL threat to its OWN state?

I'll have to repeat my last comment on this:

"an Army that is willing to accept a degree of aid and support from the US in pursuing common objectives, given the recognition that Pakistan is severely under-resourced in every area, and has an incompetent government that simply cannot do what is needed to cover the resource shortfall."

As I have stated already, the military's statements after the news of the US Aid cuts do not indicate a 'withdrawal' from the areas they are combating terrorists. I would therefore argue that the Pakistani military will remain committed to combating terrorists that pose a threat to Pakistan (first and foremost, as it should be) and to other nations.

In all fairness, I think that recent steps by the COAS mean the the top brass may have realized that the monies that they accepted put them in an untenable situation. However, the damage to the reputation of both the State of Pakistan and the Pakistan Army as a result of that, both domestically and internationally, is deep and long-lasting.

However, I am hopeful the damage will be overcome and the reputations restored, but it needs immediate and corrective actions for sure.

The Army has the advantage of 'rotating/new leadership', new leadership provides the opportunity for the Army, which has strong emotional and patriotic support from an overwhelming majority of Pakistani, to solidify that support by at least projecting 'change'. That is exactly what kayani did when he became COAS (through implementing tangible and popular changes in how the Army operated - removing Army personnel from most civilian institutions, stating outright no desire to intervene in domestic politics etc.) - and Kayani managed to completely turn around support for the Army from the lows of Musharraf's last days in office, to approval ratings in the high eighties\, higher than any other institution or personality in Pakistan.

Even now the Military enjoys support from 78%+ of Pakistan, despite everything that has happened in the last few months.

As far as 'International damage', international support for many of the strategic programs Pakistan wanted to pursue or would like to pursue, such as Military hardware, NSG support etc. will not be forthcoming regardless of Pakistan's actions on the WoT and in support of the US. That kind of support is only going to come when Pakistan can turn around its economy, and show the ability to buy the high-tech goods produced by the West.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

U.S. Funding Cut May Do More for Pakistan's Generals than for Washington's Goals​

By Omar Waraich / Islamabad Wednesday, July 13, 2011

This week's news that the Obama Administration has withheld just over a third of the military aid earmarked for Pakistan's military aroused little surprise in the Pakistani capital. Since the May 2 humiliation of the U.S. raid that killed Osama bin Laden, the Pakistani military has pushed back against the U.S., embracing defiant nationalist rhetoric that mirrors the distrustful mood in Washington. The U.S. funding move may, ironically, actually create an impression that helps Pakistan's military satisfy its citizenry's clamor for it to stand up to Washington. Still, even if a backlash from the U.S. were expected, cutting funding will make it more difficult to repair relations, exert influence over Pakistan and press it to move against those militants against whom it has been reluctant to act.

The aid has not been cut, U.S. and Pakistani officials insist. What has taken place is a "delay" in the delivery of $800 million from two separate funds. The largest chunk, $500 million, comes from the Coalition Support Fund — used to reimburse Pakistani troops for combat operations against Taliban militants. The U.S. is invoiced for these costs and, after determining whether the claims are justified, the sums are paid to the Pakistani government before being transferred to the military. In the past, U.S. officials have complained about these expenses being either poorly documented or inflated.
(See photos of the Taliban's war in Pakistan.)

The delay of payment is hardly sudden, either. In contrast to the impression created by recent media reports, Pakistan's military has been waiting for payments for at least six months. Coalition Support Fund payments are disbursed quarterly, and the half-billion dollars being withheld are the payments from the last two quarters of 2010. And it is this sum that will most anger Pakistan's generals, who see Washington responding to events after May 2 by further delaying money already spent by the Pakistani military the previous year. Still, in public, the military has affected an insouciant shrug in response to the announcement.

The reimbursement process via the Coalition Support Fund has long been a source of frustration for Pakistan's generals. Back in January 2009, army chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani complained to General David Petraeus about slow payment. According to a 2009 State Department cable released by WikiLeaks, Kayani also told Petraeus that the bulk of the funds never reached the military's coffers — he claimed that as much as 60% had remained with the civilian government. That claim was reinforced in a press release after the last meeting of Pakistan's top army generals, the powerful corps commanders.
The corps commanders' statement claimed that the army had only received $1.4 billion out of the $8.4 billion in Coalition Support Funds paid to Pakistan since 2001. Some $6 billion, the statement asserted, had remained with the government for "budgetary support." Until 2008, of course, the government had been run by the military under General turned President Pervez Musharraf, a fact artfully elided by the statement. The commanders added that since March 2010, the military hard argued that U.S. military assistance should "be diverted toward economic aid to Pakistan."
(See why the U.S. is cutting aid to Pakistan.)

The remaining $300 million of the amount being delayed stems from a separate counterinsurgency fund, and covers the total costs of maintaining the presence of U.S. special-operations troops in Pakistan and the value of the equipment they brought along. Those forces had been based in places like Warsak in the northwest to train Pakistani military trainers, who would in turn impart enhanced counterinsurgency skills to their own troops. From the start, Kayani had been wary of letting U.S. trainers engage directly with his soldiers. In June, when the Pakistani military demanded the departure of many of those U.S. special-operations troops in retaliation for the bin Laden raid in Abbottabad, it knew it would also lose the equipment they had brought with them.
For Kayani, Pakistan cutting back on U.S. military aid has not only been a longstanding reality, but may even be desirable. Nearly two-thirds of U.S. military aid will continue, of course, and the military will continue to gobble up at least a quarter of Pakistan's national budget. But it helps Kayani to appear less dependent on the U.S. In the 2009 meeting with Petraeus, Kayani said he wanted to dispel the impression that the Pakistan military was "for hire." Highly publicized cuts in U.S. aid will help him achieve that goal.

In recent weeks, Kayani has been under pressure from his top generals and his middle ranks to stand up to the U.S. Unwittingly, by responding to the domestic political mood in America, Washington may in fact be helping Kayani respond to the domestic mood in Pakistan.
(See why cuts in military aid to Pakistan are unlikely to change the country's behavior.)

But Washington also loses some clout in the process. Suspending military aid is highly unlikely to pressure Pakistan into taking more decisive action against militants fighting Western forces in Afghanistan; Kayani has already long refused to do so as a result of Pakistan's view of its own interests in the region. Now, the powerful army chief will not even have to proffer excuses. The loss of military equipment is a setback, but as the military's spokesman has argued, the country can look to China and other sources as an alternative.

Still, the suspension of military aid will not alter the Pakistani military's fundamental strategic calculations; it is unlikely to make it any more cooperative with the U.S. but also unlikely to bring on a complete break with Washington. Kayani is well aware that Beijing is in no position to take over the role of "top sugar daddy," and any military equipment it might supply will be of poorer quality than the American variety to which the Pakistanis have become accustomed. Nor has China shown much enthusiasm for making common cause with Pakistan against their common strategic rival, India.
Pakistan simply maintaining the status quo doesn't suit Washington, of course: the purpose of suspending military aid is to change the U.S.-Pakistan dynamic in Washington's favor. But if anything, the move has made that less likely. After weeks of very public mutual recriminations following the Abbottabad raid, it has become more difficult for either side to be seen as backing down.


Read more: U.S. Funding Cut May Help, Not Hurt, Pakistan's Generals - TIME

 

[VCheng]

............

As far as 'International damage', international support for many of the strategic programs Pakistan wanted to pursue or would like to pursue, such as Military hardware, NSG support etc. will not be forthcoming regardless of Pakistan's actions on the WoT and in support of the US. That kind of support is only going to come when Pakistan can turn around its economy, and show the ability to buy the high-tech goods produced by the West.

By far the BEST comment EVER from you in our discussions! BINGO!

 

[Meengla]

In all fairness, I think that recent steps by the COAS mean the the top brass may have realized that the monies that they accepted put them in an untenable situation. However, the damage to the reputation of both the State of Pakistan and the Pakistan Army as a result of that, both domestically and internationally, is deep and long-lasting.
However, I am hopeful the damage will be overcome and the reputations restored, but it needs immediate and corrective actions for sure.

VCheng,
From the late 1970's till now, the 'strategic depth' is actually denying India strategic reach in Afghanistan. Till 1990 or so, Pakistani and American interests merged; India was secondary to Americans then. But once the Soviets left Afghanistan and crumbled a new threat is being perceived in the West: China. The media noise against China is undeniably pointing to the official perceptions, if not policies.

Pakistan's bad position is that it will never dump China for Americans but can't alienate Americans too much because of, primarily, economic reasons. Put in the new found India-America love and Pakistan is most certainly in the wrong place, at the wrong time. Remove the India factor in Afghanistan and you will see that Pakistanis couldn't care less which tribe kills which in Afghanistan. But an Afghanistan which is militarily strong enough AND is firmly in Indian orbit means far worse military and terrorism situation than exists now.

The peace in Pakistan and its region runs through peace with India. That will make Pakistan stand up to any threats posed by both internal and external powers.

I am not sure about American intentions in the region: Pipelines? Terrorism? Contain China? Perhaps all. But one of them; but one is probably the most important one. Which one?

 

[VCheng]

Which one? China.