Well, we can chose to differ on this, since in my opinion, every time a group relocates from a stronghold, it decreases its immidiate effectiveness and increases its chances of getting neutralized.. Its not Call of Duty that after you get bombed and killed, you reload a save game and start over..
Again, even if what you said was true, which it isn't since there is no credible evidence to support allegations of ISI support for the Haqqanis, the Haqqani network would merely move into other parts of FATA and Pakistan and continue to be 'supported by the Establishment' and therefore 'continue carrying out attacks in Afghanistan', and would in fact have even more recruits and volunteers from across Pakistan, who would be joining to fight a US invasion of Pakistan. Therefore the problem becomes of the same magnitude as the Afghan problem, and the spread of the group outside of NW allows the group to tap into even more resources and become even more entrenched and the problem becomes more intractable.
Not really as explained above.. Simply because its not an approach of attacking and defeating them with an aim of holding land.. Its coming in, destroying what ever is possible and getting out. Then coming back in later to destroy some more.. The one key difference from Afg is that here, it is the US forces that will be the guerrilla attackers and Taliban who will be trying to hold on to the land. So while this will not kill off the group, it will keep it busy enough to prevent it from being a large enough headache in Afg..
If the PA does not stay neutral, then it is essentially full fledged war and therefore essentially a requirement to invade, occupy and stabilize all of Pakistan - not sure how exactly that is an attractive proposition or how it does not exacerbate the terrorism and regional instability issue, instead of solving it.
You are assuming that the only way PA will go non neutral is by siding with the terrorists.. Thats not a good mind set in my view.. But even assuming that, still there is no real need to occupy and stabilize whole or any part of Pakistan.. The same stand off weapons (though at a different scale) can erode Paksitan's ability to wage a counter offensive pretty quickly. As a matter of fact, rendering PA ineffective will be a lot more easier than defeating the Haqquani group since PA is mostly a conventional force which can be easily overwhelmed by the technical superiority of American forces in the theater..
The operation is bound to fail, there is no question about that - the facts on the ground cannot be changed just because you shift from Afghanistan to North Waziristan. The TTP showed us that in South Waziristan, where they simply evacuated the agency and sheltered with other tribes. The Haqqanis are respected and have influence across the Tribal belt and links with groups across Pakistan - they will emerge even stronger, and the Pakistani state even weaker.
Again, the comparison between Afg and NW is not correct. The objectives are a mile apart. Afghanistan, NATO has to hold ground. In Pakistan, they just need to destroy as much of the infrastructure as they can to interdict the terrorist network. Also the operation in SW is more similar to the NATO ops in Afg as the objective there was also to expel the insurgents and hold ground..
And these 'fast moving forces' would likely inflict similar damage to the drone attacks, which is insignificant. Essentially all of this verbosity of 'fast moving ingress/egress' boils down to is the replication of an air strike with ground troops, unless the intent is to capture an HVT rather than kill him., and therefore the impact of all this 'fast moving ingress/egress' will be the same as the drone strikes - minimal.
Again, its a difference of opinion.. I would though lean towards the theory that the damage from an average of 2 missile hits in a week can not compared with a sustained round the clock offensive on the enemy by means of air and boots on the ground..
If the Haqqanis have been successful in hiding from the drones lurking high, they'll be just as successful in hiding from US assaults by air-borne troops, and if the strikes get too heavy, they'll relocate to other areas and continue their operations.
As I said before, every relocation brings its own perils along with it.. It takes time and effort to shift your base and be operational from a new one. And thats what keeps the enemy unbalanced and ineffective.. A pretty good objective to have. Obviously I am assuming that the Pakistan administration will not allow Haqquani and company establishing bases in areas like Lahore and Islamabad..
Worse for both - the US ends up with a region that is destabilized beyond repair and that no one will want to pour trillions and trillions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of troops into to stabilize, rather than working with Pakistan on Pakistan's time table to deal with the Haqqani threat.
US doesn't end up with anything.. Its not their home ground. As long as their home base is protected, why would they care whether the region is stable or not..
Pakistan's timetable is just an eye wash.. Since there is no time table in reality.. Its just an ever procrastination "NOT NOW".. Which further deepens the suspicion towards the suspected complicity of the Pakistani state...