Flash_Ninja
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Right so all those connections through Central Asia, Russia and Europe are "backups"
US Aims to Revive Projects in Central Asia, Asia-Pacific to Counter OBOR
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Right so all those connections through Central Asia, Russia and Europe are "backups"
StraightShooter
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Right so all those connections through Central Asia, Russia and Europe are "backups"
Look at the routes on the map that you posted.
Gwadar may only help the trade with GCC which itself would be debatable as GCC is close to West.
Any trade with Africa is much efficient through Myanmar.
EU route goes through Central Asia and Iran and not through CPEC.
Flash_Ninja
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Im talking about OBOR not CPEC though
StraightShooter
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CPEC a vital part of OBOR initiative: CM
http://dailytimes.com.pk/punjab/17-May-17/cpec-a-vital-part-of-obor-initiative-cm
Why do you think India is withdrawing from BCIM (Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar) corridor citing concerns on CPEC?
Both BCIM and CPEC are part of OBOR.
CPEC is the link for China to trade with GCC. Iranian ports cannot be used as Iran and Saudis don't go hand in hand.
For trading with Africa, China would be using the Myanmar route.
Flash_Ninja
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I think you are confused, I was speaking about how your IPEC wont match the scale of OBOR after you claimed that it would be a counter to China.
You also still haven't shown me the proof that South Korea, Japan, or the USA actually plan to heavily invest in the project, so everything you are saying is hypothetical anyway.
StraightShooter
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There are major differences in philosophies and strategies being adopted by China (OBOR) and its rivals (non-OBOR).
1) China is the primary investor/lender in case of OBOR while in case of non-OBOR we have multiple investors/lenders
2) China has great amount of cash/liquidity at its disposal hence needs to and can invest in greater amounts in short span of time irrespective of ROI as from China's point of view, something is better than nothing. On the other hand Rivals need to pool up resources and invest where they could substantiate those investments/Loans.
3) OBOR is not just limited to ports, rail and roads but includes ecosystem of all infrastructure projects from dams to power plants while Rivals have different programs and projects for different types of infrastructure hence comparing the numbers would be like comparing apples and oranges.
Both OBOR and Rivals would claim huge participation and in many cases we would have countries participating in both but what matters is who would actively use which infrastructure.
NoOne'sBoy
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I would choose US over China and India any day of the week.
Flash_Ninja
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Who else is investing in IPEC? Theres been no guarantee's from the US, South Korea, or Japan that they plan to invest or loan large sums of money.
So really, China has already won if its rivals are forced to pool their resources just to try and match them.
So then why would you say that IPEC is countering OBOR then? You said it yourself that OBOR is a diverse portfolio, which gives the Chinese influence over critical supplies like electricity, a resource which is far more important than some highways or a port.
StraightShooter
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US,Japan and India are confirmed.
Let us see. Jury is still out on this.
It is not that simple. Not putting everything under the same program does not mean that there would not be any ecosystem.
Even if we assume that China builds huge infrastructure than the Rivals the ROI is based on the usage.
Let's say US-Japan-India develops an alternate port in Sri Lanka to Chinese developed port of Hambantota, would US, Japan & India use Hambantota or the one developed by them?
Flash_Ninja
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source
So whats your point? that nobody will use Chinese Railways or highways? Electrical plants are guaranteed ROI because they will be used no matter what.
By US, India, Japan, who are you referring to? State owned enterprises? military? because unless those countries decide to put sanctions on China or otherwise punish companies dealing with them, private companies would use whichever is the most efficient, regardless of who built it. The Chinese have already built their port and are therefore established, which gives them a significant advantage.
StraightShooter
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The first page of this thread has various articles posted by me. I am not sure what you are looking for.
Of course China and the country in question (for example, Pakistan in case of CPEC and Sri Lanka in case of Hambantota) would surely use but would that be sufficient is the question. For example, India and Japan would use Chabahar while US may use Karachi instead of Chinese built and controlled Gwadar to reach central Asia. Russia would use INSTC to reach its recently bought refinery in India instead of Gwadar or Karachi.
You are mistaken if think the governments don't influence the behavior of the their private entities. Governments provide Import-Export loans, provide security, Insure goods etc. Private entities do not enter markets which are not supported by their government policies.
Flash_Ninja
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Something more credible, the only source that the US has interest is from the Indian embassy and not the US State Department like it says in the article. Japans involvement is in another project and not this so called IPEC.
Can you cite an example of this happening.
Yeah against "rogue states" maybe, but the Americans would never try that against the Chinese.
StraightShooter
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The below document is from US government website
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00KZQ1.pdf
Japan is fully engaged.
Toward Strategic Economic Cooperation Between India and Japan
Source: Getty
DARSHANA BARUAH
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- December 01, 2016
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Under the leadership of Prime Ministers Narendra Modi and Shinzo Abe, India and Japan are increasingly using infrastructure and connectivity projects, particularly in regions bordering India, to further converge their interests. While such economic cooperation between New Delhi and Tokyo is not new, the clarity of strategic purpose driving it is. The two countries are pursuing greater cooperation to further their own regional interests and strengthen their collective capacity to counterbalance China’s ambitions and its own connectivity initiatives in Asia and beyond.
A DEEPENING ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP
Darshana Baruah
Research Analyst
Carnegie India
More from this author...- Nepal Joined the Belt and Road. What Does That Mean for India?
- Global Governance, Security, and Strategy in the EU-India Partnership
- Brussels and Delhi’s Shared Interests in the Indian Ocean
- Brussels and Delhi: Converging Interests in the Indian Ocean
Japan has a long and impressive history of foreign development assistance, and India has been a major South Asian recipient for decades. Beginning with technical cooperation programs in 1954, Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) emerged as a crucial source for infrastructure funding for emerging economies. India and Japan began their economic relationship soon after they established diplomatic ties in the early 1950s. Japan extended a yen-denominated loan, the first of its kind, to India in 1958 under the leadership of then prime minister Nobusuke Kishi, the grandfather of Shinzo Abe. The loan was extended shortly after then Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru hosted Kishi in 1957, as both looked to establish bilateral relationships and engage with the international community. From its first ODA loan in 1958 to investing in the construction of the Delhi Metro, which began around the turn of the century, Japan has emerged as a trusted partner for infrastructure development in India.1 Given its size, India has historically received the lion’s share of Japanese ODA in South Asia—New Delhi has been the largest recipient of Japanese ODA in South Asia since 2003. In 2014, for instance, India received 57 percent of Japan’s South Asia ODA budget.2
Over time, Japan has integrated ODA more deeply into its broader foreign policy agenda. Japan’s ODA budget expanded from $100 million in 1960 to $4.3 billion in 1984, making the country the second-largest aid donor in the world by the mid-1980s. Japan’s ODA budget in 2015 stood at approximately $10 billion.3 Until 2003, Japan’s ODA lacked a clear strategic rationale. That year, Japan revised its ODA charter for the first time in a decade, explicitly linking its aid and security policy in an effort to “maintain and strengthen international peace and stability;” this charter is an official guiding document that lays out the key principles and goals of Japan’s aid policy. In 2015, Abe’s cabinet replaced the ODA charter with the Development Cooperation Charter, highlighting the strategic dimension of Japan’s ODA. In moving from development assistance to development cooperation, Japan is seen as a development partner in the region. The India-Japan relationship is a good example of this shift.
At least in part, India and Japan’s deepening economic partnership has been prompted by a recognition of China’s efforts to enhance its influence by funding development projects in its neighborhood. China plans to build a corridor of infrastructure projects across both land and sea routes connecting Southeast Asia to Europe, popularly known as the Belt and Road Initiative (B&R). The project is divided into two parts: a continental road (the Belt) and a sea route known as the Maritime Silk Road. As China extends its influence and reach throughout Asia, Japan and India naturally are seeking to do the same. The recent upturn in economic engagement between India and Japan is founded on the twin pillars of development assistance and infrastructure development to enhance domestic and regional connectivity. Both countries are employing economic instruments for purposes that include advancing their respective strategic interests as well as strengthening their bilateral relationship and fulfilling other national objectives.
There are several security-related reasons for New Delhi to pursue closer cooperation with Tokyo in response to Beijing. For India, both the continental and maritime routes of China’s B&R initiative are of strategic concern. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, a flagship B&R project, runs through Azad Kashmir, a disputed territory between India and Pakistan. On the maritime front as well, New Delhi has been wary of the growing number of Chinese infrastructure projects in its neighborhood especially in the Maldives, Mauritius, and Sri Lanka. To be sure, governments in the region are hardly passive actors in this space. Chinese, Indian, and Japanese investments are stimulating significant internal debate in these countries. Meanwhile, China’s development of the Gwadar Port in Pakistan and an increase in Chinese submarine dockings in the Karachi Port in Pakistan are irritants in the Indo-China relationship.
Underlining the fine balance between infrastructure development and its accompanied strategic aims, India’s Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar remarked in a March 2015 speech: “The interactive dynamic between strategic interests and connectivity initiatives—a universal proposition—is on particular display in our continent. . . . We cannot be impervious to the reality that others may see connectivity as an exercise in hard-wiring that influences choices.” In all these cases, the underlying concern is that Chinese economic influence will give way to larger strategic gains for Beijing in India’s immediate neighborhood.
India also has important economic interests to consider. New Delhi has to craft a balanced policy on Chinese-led initiatives given India’s large and growing appetite for infrastructure investment. For example, India was one of the first nations to sign on to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, of which China is a majority stakeholder, with an authorized capital of $100 billion earmarked for development finance. Despite this, India is yet to respond to China’s invitation to join the B&R given its suspicions regarding the project.
At the same time, the Modi administration has made infrastructure development a key priority, with a stated commitment to revitalize India’s moribund rural, power, and transportation sectors and to enhance domestic connectivity. India signed an agreement with Japan in December 2015 to build a high-speed rail in the Mumbai-Ahmedabad corridor using Japanese technology, financing, and technical assistance. Japan pledged a loan of $12 billion for the Mumbai-Ahmedabad high-speed rail (with a total cost of approximately $15 billion) at highly favorable terms for India. During the same visit, Abe committed $12 billion to Modi’s Make in India initiative, which aims to transform India into a global design, manufacturing, and export hub. Japan is a particularly attractive source of investment for India because of its technological expertise, long experience in implementing development projects, and commitment to timely delivery. The first phase of the Delhi Metro, for instance, was completed two years and nine months ahead of schedule.4
Additionally, India’s and Japan’s strategic interests converge in this area. By cooperating with India to develop connectivity projects in South and Southeast Asia, Japan has an opportunity to accomplish its objective of countering Chinese economic and strategic expansion in the region. Japan’s use of official development assistance as a tool of economic statecraft seems to be directed toward reinforcing its dominance as an aid donor while counterbalancing China’s expansion. China’s increasing military and political assertiveness in Japan’s immediate security environment is a key driver of this change. This convergence in strategic interests has provided a strong foundation for Modi and Abe to carry their countries’ bilateral relationship to new heights.
TOWARD GREATER ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT
Consequently, to balance China’s influence in the region, both India and Japan have launched their own infrastructure development projects. The central features of this pushback are Japan’s Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (PQI) and collaborations in northeast India and on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands located off the Indian coast.
The PQI is an initiative for advancing Japan’s expertise in infrastructure development especially against the backdrop of an increasing competition to build economic corridors. The initiative was launched by Abe in May 2015. The Japanese government and the Asian Development Bank have committed $110 billion of infrastructure funding over the next five years. B&R, on the other hand, has multiple sources of funding that may total around $1 trillion, including the Silk Road Fund and potentially the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. While the PQI cannot directly compete with the scale and scope of the B&R, its comparative advantage lies in highlighting Japan’s extensive experience and expertise in building infrastructure. When announcing the project, Abe emphasized that “in order to make innovations extend to every corner of Asia, we no longer want a ‘cheap, but shoddy’ approach”—a statement widely read as a critique of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.
Underlining the convergence of interests in the India-Japan relationship, a joint statement released in 2015 by the two countries read: “Seeking the synergy between India’s ‘Act East’ policy and Japan’s ‘Partnership for Quality Infrastructure,’ the two Prime Ministers decided to develop and strengthen reliable, sustainable and resilient infrastructures that augment connectivity within India and between India and other countries in the region.”
Keeping its strategic interests in mind, India is seeking investment in its historically underdeveloped northeast region, particularly in key highways connecting India to Bangladesh and Myanmar that are crucial for boosting India’s road links to these countries and beyond. Following Modi’s visit to Japan in September 2014, both leaders affirmed their commitment to infrastructure and connectivity projects with a special emphasis on the development of India’s northeast region and increased connectivity between India and Southeast Asia.
Likewise, many of Japan’s upcoming infrastructure projects in India are focused on developing and connecting northeast India with Southeast Asia. The Japan International Cooperation Agency, the official body that coordinates ODA, is currently conducting feasibility studies on a series of joint projects with its Indian counterparts. India has requested Japanese support to build approximately 1,200 kilometers of roads in the hilly terrains of six northeastern Indian states.5 Among the projects selected, two highways have priority status: the Aizawl-Tuipang road on National Highway 54 in Mizoram and the Tura-Dalu road on National Highway 51 in Meghalaya.6 Japan has pledged an ODA loan of more than 96 billion yen (about $845 million) for both highways at minimal interest rates.
Beyond infrastructure development in northeast India, Japan has also invested in improving energy infrastructure on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The islands provide the Indian Navy with significant access to the Malacca Strait, a key and strategic commercial route. Popularly referred to as India’s unsinkable aircraft carrier, these islands allow New Delhi to expand its maritime influence in the region. This is particularly important as India has watched China’s presence in the Indian Ocean grow with some concern, especially the recent docking of Chinese submarines in Colombo and Karachi.7 Given their distance from the mainland and environmental concerns, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands have remained underdeveloped. As strategic competition in the Indian Ocean increases, however, it is likely that calls for building infrastructure on the islands will only grow louder.
India and Japan are also keen to extend their economic strategic partnership to areas beyond South Asia. Modi’s November 2016 visit to Japan underlined the need for improved connectivity between Asia and Africa for a stable Indo-Pacific region. Apart from collaborations in South Asia, both leaders mentioned Afghanistan and Iran as likely sites of future cooperation, specifically citing infrastructure development for the Chabahar Port in Iran as an example. Joint collaboration in developing this port is a key endeavor given Chinese investments in developing the Gwadar Port in neighboring Pakistan. An increasing Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean is of particular concern to New Delhi. Abe also talked about “the confluence of two seas” (the Pacific and the Indian Oceans) during his speech to the Indian Parliament in 2007.
Looking further abroad, Abe and Modi also “underscored the importance of India-Japan dialogue to promote cooperation and collaboration in Africa . . . [and] promote the development of industrial corridors and industrial network in Asia and Africa.” Both nations are discussing funding mechanisms and development projects for a Pacific-Indian Ocean corridor, with a particular emphasis on investments in African nations. While the specifics of the corridor are still under consideration, this network could also be a strategic counter to China’s maritime B&R route connecting Southeast Asia to Europe through Middle Eastern and East African countries. By expanding their bilateral relationship to include joint infrastructure development across Asia and Africa, Abe and Modi are looking to leverage Japan’s economic and India’s strategic outreach beyond South Asia and in the broader Indo-Pacific Ocean region.
THE ROAD AHEAD
Going forward, India and Japan should develop a long-term strategy to identify specific geographical areas for further engagement. One additional area in which the two countries can work together could be Bangladesh’s Matarbari Island, where Japan is investing in the Bay of Bengal Industrial Growth Belt. Further, New Delhi and Tokyo could also initiate a dialogue with Sri Lanka on facilitating government-to-government assistance for critical maritime infrastructure like the Trincomalee Port. India could also provide investment to complement Japanese funding for a highway running between India, Myanmar, and Thailand that is now extending to Vietnam. Yet another focus could be boosting infrastructure in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, such as better port facilities and enhanced connectivity both on the islands as well as between the islands and the mainland. These improvements could eventually facilitate better military infrastructure on the strategically located islands.
Such planning and cooperation opens opportunities for both India and Japan to advance their national and regional interests. In doing so, Abe is formulating a more proactive role for Japan in maintaining global peace and security.8 Meanwhile, under the Modi administration, India is seeking to realize its great power ambitions and increase its influence in its neighborhood and beyond. Greater coordination and a detailed policy blueprint could help the two countries build a strong foundation for a defining partnership that realizes the full potential of Japan’s economic diplomacy and India’s regional aspirations.
http://carnegieindia.org/2016/12/01...cooperation-between-india-and-japan-pub-66326
Japan to join Iran, India in Chabahar port development
http://www.joc.com/port-news/asian-...india-chabahar-port-development_20160511.html
Try what against China? No one talking about sanctioning China but US would look after its interests like any other country.
US would use the infrastructure that is funded by US or its institutions.
Flash_Ninja
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" The author’s views in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the
United States Agency for International Development or the United States
Government."
come on dude its like the second page in.
Toward Strategic Economic Cooperation Between India and Japan
Source: Getty
DARSHANA BARUAH
Summary: India and Japan are using economic cooperation to advance their strategic interests and counterbalance Chinese influence in their neighborhood.
- Article
- December 01, 2016
Related Topics
Related Media and Tools
- FULL TEXT
- ADD A COMMENT
Under the leadership of Prime Ministers Narendra Modi and Shinzo Abe, India and Japan are increasingly using infrastructure and connectivity projects, particularly in regions bordering India, to further converge their interests. While such economic cooperation between New Delhi and Tokyo is not new, the clarity of strategic purpose driving it is. The two countries are pursuing greater cooperation to further their own regional interests and strengthen their collective capacity to counterbalance China’s ambitions and its own connectivity initiatives in Asia and beyond.
A DEEPENING ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP
Darshana Baruah
Research Analyst
Carnegie India
More from this author...@DARSHANABARUAH
- Nepal Joined the Belt and Road. What Does That Mean for India?
- Global Governance, Security, and Strategy in the EU-India Partnership
- Brussels and Delhi’s Shared Interests in the Indian Ocean
- Brussels and Delhi: Converging Interests in the Indian Ocean
Japan has a long and impressive history of foreign development assistance, and India has been a major South Asian recipient for decades. Beginning with technical cooperation programs in 1954, Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) emerged as a crucial source for infrastructure funding for emerging economies. India and Japan began their economic relationship soon after they established diplomatic ties in the early 1950s. Japan extended a yen-denominated loan, the first of its kind, to India in 1958 under the leadership of then prime minister Nobusuke Kishi, the grandfather of Shinzo Abe. The loan was extended shortly after then Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru hosted Kishi in 1957, as both looked to establish bilateral relationships and engage with the international community. From its first ODA loan in 1958 to investing in the construction of the Delhi Metro, which began around the turn of the century, Japan has emerged as a trusted partner for infrastructure development in India.1 Given its size, India has historically received the lion’s share of Japanese ODA in South Asia—New Delhi has been the largest recipient of Japanese ODA in South Asia since 2003. In 2014, for instance, India received 57 percent of Japan’s South Asia ODA budget.2
Over time, Japan has integrated ODA more deeply into its broader foreign policy agenda. Japan’s ODA budget expanded from $100 million in 1960 to $4.3 billion in 1984, making the country the second-largest aid donor in the world by the mid-1980s. Japan’s ODA budget in 2015 stood at approximately $10 billion.3 Until 2003, Japan’s ODA lacked a clear strategic rationale. That year, Japan revised its ODA charter for the first time in a decade, explicitly linking its aid and security policy in an effort to “maintain and strengthen international peace and stability;” this charter is an official guiding document that lays out the key principles and goals of Japan’s aid policy. In 2015, Abe’s cabinet replaced the ODA charter with the Development Cooperation Charter, highlighting the strategic dimension of Japan’s ODA. In moving from development assistance to development cooperation, Japan is seen as a development partner in the region. The India-Japan relationship is a good example of this shift.
At least in part, India and Japan’s deepening economic partnership has been prompted by a recognition of China’s efforts to enhance its influence by funding development projects in its neighborhood. China plans to build a corridor of infrastructure projects across both land and sea routes connecting Southeast Asia to Europe, popularly known as the Belt and Road Initiative (B&R). The project is divided into two parts: a continental road (the Belt) and a sea route known as the Maritime Silk Road. As China extends its influence and reach throughout Asia, Japan and India naturally are seeking to do the same. The recent upturn in economic engagement between India and Japan is founded on the twin pillars of development assistance and infrastructure development to enhance domestic and regional connectivity. Both countries are employing economic instruments for purposes that include advancing their respective strategic interests as well as strengthening their bilateral relationship and fulfilling other national objectives.
There are several security-related reasons for New Delhi to pursue closer cooperation with Tokyo in response to Beijing. For India, both the continental and maritime routes of China’s B&R initiative are of strategic concern. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, a flagship B&R project, runs through Azad Kashmir, a disputed territory between India and Pakistan. On the maritime front as well, New Delhi has been wary of the growing number of Chinese infrastructure projects in its neighborhood especially in the Maldives, Mauritius, and Sri Lanka. To be sure, governments in the region are hardly passive actors in this space. Chinese, Indian, and Japanese investments are stimulating significant internal debate in these countries. Meanwhile, China’s development of the Gwadar Port in Pakistan and an increase in Chinese submarine dockings in the Karachi Port in Pakistan are irritants in the Indo-China relationship.
Underlining the fine balance between infrastructure development and its accompanied strategic aims, India’s Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar remarked in a March 2015 speech: “The interactive dynamic between strategic interests and connectivity initiatives—a universal proposition—is on particular display in our continent. . . . We cannot be impervious to the reality that others may see connectivity as an exercise in hard-wiring that influences choices.” In all these cases, the underlying concern is that Chinese economic influence will give way to larger strategic gains for Beijing in India’s immediate neighborhood.
India also has important economic interests to consider. New Delhi has to craft a balanced policy on Chinese-led initiatives given India’s large and growing appetite for infrastructure investment. For example, India was one of the first nations to sign on to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, of which China is a majority stakeholder, with an authorized capital of $100 billion earmarked for development finance. Despite this, India is yet to respond to China’s invitation to join the B&R given its suspicions regarding the project.
At the same time, the Modi administration has made infrastructure development a key priority, with a stated commitment to revitalize India’s moribund rural, power, and transportation sectors and to enhance domestic connectivity. India signed an agreement with Japan in December 2015 to build a high-speed rail in the Mumbai-Ahmedabad corridor using Japanese technology, financing, and technical assistance. Japan pledged a loan of $12 billion for the Mumbai-Ahmedabad high-speed rail (with a total cost of approximately $15 billion) at highly favorable terms for India. During the same visit, Abe committed $12 billion to Modi’s Make in India initiative, which aims to transform India into a global design, manufacturing, and export hub. Japan is a particularly attractive source of investment for India because of its technological expertise, long experience in implementing development projects, and commitment to timely delivery. The first phase of the Delhi Metro, for instance, was completed two years and nine months ahead of schedule.4
Additionally, India’s and Japan’s strategic interests converge in this area. By cooperating with India to develop connectivity projects in South and Southeast Asia, Japan has an opportunity to accomplish its objective of countering Chinese economic and strategic expansion in the region. Japan’s use of official development assistance as a tool of economic statecraft seems to be directed toward reinforcing its dominance as an aid donor while counterbalancing China’s expansion. China’s increasing military and political assertiveness in Japan’s immediate security environment is a key driver of this change. This convergence in strategic interests has provided a strong foundation for Modi and Abe to carry their countries’ bilateral relationship to new heights.
TOWARD GREATER ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT
Consequently, to balance China’s influence in the region, both India and Japan have launched their own infrastructure development projects. The central features of this pushback are Japan’s Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (PQI) and collaborations in northeast India and on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands located off the Indian coast.
The PQI is an initiative for advancing Japan’s expertise in infrastructure development especially against the backdrop of an increasing competition to build economic corridors. The initiative was launched by Abe in May 2015. The Japanese government and the Asian Development Bank have committed $110 billion of infrastructure funding over the next five years. B&R, on the other hand, has multiple sources of funding that may total around $1 trillion, including the Silk Road Fund and potentially the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. While the PQI cannot directly compete with the scale and scope of the B&R, its comparative advantage lies in highlighting Japan’s extensive experience and expertise in building infrastructure. When announcing the project, Abe emphasized that “in order to make innovations extend to every corner of Asia, we no longer want a ‘cheap, but shoddy’ approach”—a statement widely read as a critique of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.
Underlining the convergence of interests in the India-Japan relationship, a joint statement released in 2015 by the two countries read: “Seeking the synergy between India’s ‘Act East’ policy and Japan’s ‘Partnership for Quality Infrastructure,’ the two Prime Ministers decided to develop and strengthen reliable, sustainable and resilient infrastructures that augment connectivity within India and between India and other countries in the region.”
Keeping its strategic interests in mind, India is seeking investment in its historically underdeveloped northeast region, particularly in key highways connecting India to Bangladesh and Myanmar that are crucial for boosting India’s road links to these countries and beyond. Following Modi’s visit to Japan in September 2014, both leaders affirmed their commitment to infrastructure and connectivity projects with a special emphasis on the development of India’s northeast region and increased connectivity between India and Southeast Asia.
Likewise, many of Japan’s upcoming infrastructure projects in India are focused on developing and connecting northeast India with Southeast Asia. The Japan International Cooperation Agency, the official body that coordinates ODA, is currently conducting feasibility studies on a series of joint projects with its Indian counterparts. India has requested Japanese support to build approximately 1,200 kilometers of roads in the hilly terrains of six northeastern Indian states.5 Among the projects selected, two highways have priority status: the Aizawl-Tuipang road on National Highway 54 in Mizoram and the Tura-Dalu road on National Highway 51 in Meghalaya.6 Japan has pledged an ODA loan of more than 96 billion yen (about $845 million) for both highways at minimal interest rates.
Beyond infrastructure development in northeast India, Japan has also invested in improving energy infrastructure on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The islands provide the Indian Navy with significant access to the Malacca Strait, a key and strategic commercial route. Popularly referred to as India’s unsinkable aircraft carrier, these islands allow New Delhi to expand its maritime influence in the region. This is particularly important as India has watched China’s presence in the Indian Ocean grow with some concern, especially the recent docking of Chinese submarines in Colombo and Karachi.7 Given their distance from the mainland and environmental concerns, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands have remained underdeveloped. As strategic competition in the Indian Ocean increases, however, it is likely that calls for building infrastructure on the islands will only grow louder.
India and Japan are also keen to extend their economic strategic partnership to areas beyond South Asia. Modi’s November 2016 visit to Japan underlined the need for improved connectivity between Asia and Africa for a stable Indo-Pacific region. Apart from collaborations in South Asia, both leaders mentioned Afghanistan and Iran as likely sites of future cooperation, specifically citing infrastructure development for the Chabahar Port in Iran as an example. Joint collaboration in developing this port is a key endeavor given Chinese investments in developing the Gwadar Port in neighboring Pakistan. An increasing Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean is of particular concern to New Delhi. Abe also talked about “the confluence of two seas” (the Pacific and the Indian Oceans) during his speech to the Indian Parliament in 2007.
Looking further abroad, Abe and Modi also “underscored the importance of India-Japan dialogue to promote cooperation and collaboration in Africa . . . [and] promote the development of industrial corridors and industrial network in Asia and Africa.” Both nations are discussing funding mechanisms and development projects for a Pacific-Indian Ocean corridor, with a particular emphasis on investments in African nations. While the specifics of the corridor are still under consideration, this network could also be a strategic counter to China’s maritime B&R route connecting Southeast Asia to Europe through Middle Eastern and East African countries. By expanding their bilateral relationship to include joint infrastructure development across Asia and Africa, Abe and Modi are looking to leverage Japan’s economic and India’s strategic outreach beyond South Asia and in the broader Indo-Pacific Ocean region.
THE ROAD AHEAD
Going forward, India and Japan should develop a long-term strategy to identify specific geographical areas for further engagement. One additional area in which the two countries can work together could be Bangladesh’s Matarbari Island, where Japan is investing in the Bay of Bengal Industrial Growth Belt. Further, New Delhi and Tokyo could also initiate a dialogue with Sri Lanka on facilitating government-to-government assistance for critical maritime infrastructure like the Trincomalee Port. India could also provide investment to complement Japanese funding for a highway running between India, Myanmar, and Thailand that is now extending to Vietnam. Yet another focus could be boosting infrastructure in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, such as better port facilities and enhanced connectivity both on the islands as well as between the islands and the mainland. These improvements could eventually facilitate better military infrastructure on the strategically located islands.
Such planning and cooperation opens opportunities for both India and Japan to advance their national and regional interests. In doing so, Abe is formulating a more proactive role for Japan in maintaining global peace and security.8 Meanwhile, under the Modi administration, India is seeking to realize its great power ambitions and increase its influence in its neighborhood and beyond. Greater coordination and a detailed policy blueprint could help the two countries build a strong foundation for a defining partnership that realizes the full potential of Japan’s economic diplomacy and India’s regional aspirations.
http://carnegieindia.org/2016/12/01...cooperation-between-india-and-japan-pub-66326
This is Japans interests in a variety of projects, not IPEC. Unless your point is that all of these different projects combined are supposed to counter OBOR.
Japans interest in Chabahar is not a sign that they would use the port. They also expressed interest in CPEC, and if they follow through with that then they are most likely going to be using Gwadar Port and therefore OBOR infrastructure.
The US wouldn't force or "convince" private entities to avoid Chinese ports, its just out of the question especially with a right-wing government and Trump at the helm. Also, seeing as how the US is probably not going to invest in this IPEC project, theres no point even speculating that they would anyway.
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Japan pitches for Chabahar port
NEW DELHI, MAY 08, 2017 00:00 IST
UPDATED: MAY 08, 2017 04:37 IST
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Kenji Hiramatsu
Indo-Japan civil nuclear cooperation agreement is still on track: Kenji Hiramatsu
Japan is keen on collaborating with India on projects in Asia and Africa as a counter to China’s Belt and Road initiative (B&RI), Tokyo’s Ambassador to New Delhi said here, indicating Japan’s nod for Australia’s bid to join a quadrilateral for military exercises with India and the U.S..
In an exclusive interview to The Hindu , Ambassador Kenji Hiramatsu revealed that the Japanese government was in talks with Tehran and New Delhi for a role in the Chabahar port project along with India.
“We are interested in connectivity projects and to make sure that this region is free and open and an important port like Chabahar is good for regional connectivity ... I can’t tell when it will materialise, but we have expressed our interest,” Mr. Hiramatsu said. India, Iran and Afghanistan signed a trilateral agreement in May 2016 to build trade and transit routes from the strategically located Iranian port into Afghanistan and Central Asia, a $20-billion investment for India, and will be seen as a rival to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor’s Gwadar port.
Aked if Japan’s plans for connectivity in the region were being challenged by China’s 60-nation BRI, the Ambassador contended that Japan and India could offer similar projects to countries here, based on their common “principles.”
Prosperity, stability
“We are also providing rather generous financing to these countries as well, to enhance prosperity and stability. We hope many of these countries will also choose our projects, some of which we can do in collaboration with India,” he said, adding that Japan shared values of “democracy, freedom of navigation” with India.
The Ambassador’s statement points to the growing discussions on strategic convergence between India and other “Indo-Pacific” powers for whom China’s recent economic moves like the BRI as well as an aggressive maritime stance in the South China Sea have been a matter of concern.
Backing Australia’s request to join the trilateral “Malabar” naval exercises between India, Japan and Australia, Ambassador Hiramatsu said,
“We cherish the cooperation with Australia, and we have just had a Japan-Australia-India strategic dialogue and a political dialogue between these three countries, and we will have to see how it develops.”
Speaking about other areas of bilateral strategic cooperation, the Japanese Ambassador said the Indo-Japan civil nuclear cooperation agreement is still on track, and has been presented for ratification in the Japanese Parliament .
http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/japan-pitches-for-chabahar-port/article18405900.ece
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Indian counterpart Narendra Modi raise their glasses during a luncheon Abe hosted for Modi in Kobe in November 2016. Japan and India agreed to promote cooperation in Africa during the visit. | KYODO
NATIONAL
JETRO to push Japan-India business collaboration in Africa
BY ATUL RANJAN
NNA / KYODO
ARTICLE HISTORY
NEW DELHI – The Japan External Trade Organization plans to promote partnerships between Japanese and Indian companies looking to expand their presence in Africa by leveraging their mutual expertise, JETRO officials said.
The move is aimed at reducing market risks by combining the experience and knowledge of Indian firms in the African market with the technical and funding capabilities of Japanese companies to tap growth opportunities on the continent, the officials said.
Reiko Furuya, director of JETRO’s New Delhi office, said it is organizing a conference in March to discuss collaboration in Africa, among other topics.
Kenji Hiramatsu, Japan’s ambassador to India, said at the Vibrant Gujarat Global Summit held recently that both countries are looking to jointly explore opportunities in Africa.
“Indians have been doing business in Africa for a long time and have the knowledge and experience of operating in the market. We would like to combine this knowledge with the Japanese technologies and financing capabilities . . . this will be a win-win scenario,” the envoy said.
According to experts, the move is in line with a joint statement issued by Japan and India in November last year that “underscored the importance of India-Japan dialogue to promote cooperation and collaboration in Africa, with the objective to synergize their efforts and explore specific joint projects.”
Izuru Kobayashi, chief operating officer of the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia based in Jakarta, said the Japanese and Indian governments are planning to start consulting on selecting specific projects in Africa as per the November statement.
“Japanese firms are good at production and quality management while Indian firms have strong local presence and connections, which are complementary,” he said.
“Japan has been increasing official development assistance loans under the Quality Infrastructure Initiative, and India also extends a substantial amount of lines of credit to African countries,” he said.
“The partnership may create opportunities for both Indian and Japanese firms to develop bankable projects in Africa.”
According to the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, collective gross domestic product in the African continent is expected to reach $3.6 trillion by 2020, up from $2.1 trillion in 2011.
Published reports show that Indian foreign direct investment in Africa stood at almost $12.5 billion in 2014 alone, while Japan’s cumulative FDI in the continent was $10.5 billion as of that year.
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/20...a-business-collaboration-africa/#.WSotRWjyuUk
India and Japan launch Asian and Africa growth corridor plan
The Asian Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) vision. ANDUALEM SISAY | NATION MEDIA GROUP
ANDUALEM SISAY in Ahmedabad, India Thursday, May 25 2017 at 13:37 comment
India and Japan on Wednesday launched the Asian Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), a vision document, which aims to link the two continents through multiple sectors.
“The idea is that India and Japan, with other willing partners, would explore joint initiatives in skills, health infrastructure, manufacturing and connectivity,” Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, said at the 52nd African Development Bank (AfDB) meeting his country is hosting.
The document, produced jointly by Indian and Japan’s research institutions, is a result of the discussions between Mr Modi and his Japanese counterpart Shinzō Abe.
Mr Modi visited Tokyo last year, during which the two leaders stressed the need for a partnership for sustainable and innovative development for Asia and Africa.
“In our joint declaration, we mentioned an Asia Africa Growth Corridor and proposed further conversations with our brothers and sisters from Africa,” said Mr Modi.
Development roadmap
The AAGC document is produced by the Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS) of India, the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and the Eastern Asia (ERIA) of Indonesia and the Institute of Developing Economies Japan External Trade organisation (IDE-JETRO).
“AAGC is growth and development roadmap for Africa with back and forth linkages with Asia,” said, Ms Anita Prakash, the Director General of the Policy Development at ERIA, during the launch of the 30-page document.
“It is more than economic connectivity; it is about social connectivity having people at the centre,” she said, indicating that the full study, with projects and impacts on people at local level, may be ready by late 2018.
Commenting on the difference of the envisioned connectivity between Africa and Asia with China’s Belt Road initiative, Prof Sachin Chaturvedi, the Director General of RIS, said AAGC was more of all-inclusive, beyond infrastructure and recalled his prime minister’s objections to the China plan.
Core concerns
China hosted the Belt and Road Forum in mid-May, bringing together the leaders from around 35 countries.
“No country can accept a project that ignores its core concerns on sovereignty and territorial integrity,” the India Foreign ministry said on May 13 on why Delhi refused to be part of China’s plan.
It is not yet clear if AAGC was a response to China’s One Belt one Road plan and which offer Africa would take.
http://www.africareview.com/busines...rridor-plan/979184-3941554-15dklve/index.html
Forget about advising US companies, US is even nudging countries to join hands with India-Japan on IPEC.
US urges Sri Lanka to join Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor (IPEC)
Mar 01, 2016 10:15 AM GMT+0530 | 0 Comment(s)
ECONOMYNEXT - The United States has urged Sri Lanka to get on boards its Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor initiative which aims to weave together an economic block weaving together South Asia, East Asia and Australia with the US.
"The United States encouraged Sri Lankan participation in its Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor initiative to increase economic connectivity among South Asian countries and with Southeast Asia…"
"As fellow democracies, our governments agree that we have a shared interest in working together to foster greater stability, security, prosperity, and a rules-based order for the Indo-Pacific region and around the world,"
Unlike the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) which recognized the value of free trade early and is becoming increasingly prosperous with high levels of economic freedoms available to citizens, South Asians citizens are poor with shackled trade freedoms.
The US is already linking ASEAN nations with the Americas through the Trans Pacific Partnership.
Sri Lanka has expressed interest in joining the TPP. The TPP is virtually a done deal and Sri Lanka will only have to worry about giving more economic freedoms to its own citizens.
An Indo-Pacific Partnership could ideally create a trading block covering the ASEAN and South Asian Association of Regional Co-operation (SAARC).
But the SAARC itself is decades behind ASEAN, and is still mired in regional politics and old-style economic nationalism which is entrenched in the region, with policy ideology generally favouring vested business interests rather than ordinary people and the poor.
Only Sri Lanka has given visa free access to India and Maldives to encourage people to people contact.
There is no active forum to take forward talks between South and South East Asia.
But the joint statement suggested that IPEC was in line with existing efforts to create regional linkages with Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) involving Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Bhutan and Nepal.
President Barrack Obama during a visit to India in 2015, also pushed the IPEC initiative, which is initially not aiming at reducing duties but is more about creating physical linkages that paves the way for more trade and regional economic links.
"Complementing India’s Enhanced Look East Policy, the United States envisions an Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor that can help bridge South and Southeast Asia – where the Indian and Pacific Oceans converge and where trade has thrived for centuries," the US Commerce Department said last September.
"Fostering these types of connections – physical infrastructure, regulatory trade architecture, and human and digital connectivity – will create linkages all the way from Central Asia to Southeast Asia, via South Asia.
"A more integrated South Asia where markets, economies, and people connect is more likely to thrive and prosper.
"The United States is firmly committed to the security and prosperity of the Asian continent, and better connectivity, energy security, and stronger trade and investment links can help realize that objective. "
http://www.economynext.com/US_urges...Pacific_Economic_Corridor_(IPEC)-3-4381-.html
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