Date Posted: 29-Jul-2011
Targeting peace
UN operations are more substantial than ever before and the fight for peace has become increasingly armed - raising issues of force provision and training. Jim Dorschner reports
While much of the world's attention has focused since 2001 on US and NATO combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the UN is sustaining the highest operational tempo since the organisation's establishment. The UN's history dates back to its very first peacekeeping operation (PKO), the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO), which was established in the Middle East in 1948 and continues today. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), led by Under-Secretary-General Alain Le Roy, manages 15 PKOs with more than 120,000 personnel deployed around the world, including about 100,000 uniformed personnel and 6,000 international civilians. In addition, a new operation began in South Sudan on 8 July.
The welcome news is that the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) closed in December 2010, having accomplished its mission and having "successfully contributed to enhancing security in eastern Chad", according to a report published by the UN secretary-general at the time. From 2012 several more missions will either end or initiate reductions leading to closure in the near future. These include Timor-Leste and Liberia, both expected to close next year, while Haiti, Côte d'Ivoire, Cyprus and Kosovo may see reductions.
With an approved budget for June 2010 to July 2011 of USD7.83 billion, the DPKO faces daunting challenges in terms of force generation and sustainment, fielding of adequate equipment and service support capability and provision of critical rotary-wing airlift. Operationally, deployed UN peacekeeping forces routinely face harsh environmental and health conditions in some of the most poverty-stricken and remote areas of the world while dealing with dangerous and frequently unpredictable armed factions enjoying significant local advantages.
Deployed UN force commanders also have to deal with friction among different national force components with varying degrees of capability and professionalism. An additional challenge is found in politically driven restrictions and caveats imposed by states that provide forces and by host countries run by weak, corrupt and less-than-competent governments.
Sudan
The Republic of South Sudan is the world's newest country, three times the size of neighbouring Uganda and one of the world's poorest, with a barely functioning economy and national infrastructure. It lacks nearly all government services, from health care to education and rule of law.
The country's society is split among majority and minority ethnic groups and the countryside is plagued by armed groups of militia and bandits that have competing interests and, in some cases, links outside the country. More than 2,300 people have been killed in South Sudan this year alone, despite the government spending USD700 million on security-related activities, exceeding the rest of the entire national budget.
Despite this largesse, the country's security forces are likely to remain a loose collection of poorly disciplined and trained but well-armed former guerrillas with leaders reluctant to embrace coherent direction or control by a weak central government, all of which will further complicate the relationship between the government and the UN's latest mission in the area.
On 27 June 2011 the UN Security Council (UNSC) authorised the deployment to Sudan of a contingent of 4,200 Ethiopian troops, known as the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA). The Ethiopians deployed to begin monitoring the flashpoint border between the north and south on 20 July, with the authority to use force to protect civilians and humanitarian workers around the contested border city of Abyei in the wake of clashes between Sudanese government troops and local militias. This stopgap force is intended to bolster a hastily contrived joint security force of troops from Sudan and South Sudan that is unlikely to reduce tensions in the area on its own.
On 8 July the UNSC approved a mission to help the new nation of South Sudan establish peace and lay the foundation for long-term state-building, conflict prevention and economic development. Resolution 1996 established the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) for an initial period of one year. South Sudan gained independence the next day, after decades of conflict that cost an estimated two million lives.
Headed by newly appointed Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) Hilde Johnson of Norway, UNMISS is authorised to include up to 7,000 military personnel, 900 civilian police and a civilian component by the UNSC mandate. DPKO Press Officer Michel Bonnardeaux told Jane's that UNMISS is "morphing" from the pre-existing UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), which was created following the signing of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement that ended the north-south civil war and paved the way for independence.
"The transition towards this new mission is well under way," said Le Roy, noting that Johnson has been working with an initial team to establish the mission since she took up her post as head of UNMISS on 9 July, with the intent to complete the transition within six months.
Nigerian Major General Moses Bisong Obi has been UNMIS force commander since June 2010 and thereby became UNMISS commander on 8 July, when the Sudan mission officially ceased operations. No decision has been made about a replacement. The nearly 10,000 troops under Gen Obi's command will now reduce in size and reconfigure for the new mission; units are currently deployed far north into Sudan up to Khartoum and shifting southwards.
The force is built around a core of infantry battalions from Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Kenya, Pakistan and Zambia, with a myriad of support units, including Russian and Pakistani helicopter units and Chinese engineer and motor transport companies. Bonnardeaux told Jane's that during the reconfiguration process an unspecified number of infantry battalions will be replaced by additional engineer units, possibly from Japan and South Korea, and enhanced force police units (FPUs). The engineers are required to improve airfields and roads and to build and expand base camps.
An important aspect of UNMISS will eventually be a quick-reaction force capability supported by military tactical helicopters, which will respond around the clock throughout the operational area to reinforce scattered contingents on the ground and perform special missions. The capability will probably include dedicated infantry, FPUs and special forces, along with medical, explosive ordnance disposal and other specialised assets.
Meanwhile, violence continues in the South Kordofan area of Sudan just north of the new inter-state border, resulting in further deaths and causing thousands to flee southward. This humanitarian crisis has escalated even as severe drought and conflict-induced population displacement affects the entire East Africa region.
Although UNMISS can take advantage of an existing footprint in South Sudan, the geographically isolated country possesses only a few airports and airstrips, a rudimentary road network and limited infrastructure with which to support the force. The infrastructure of key 'rear area support' countries like Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda are already feeling the strain of ongoing activities, from normal commerce to regional humanitarian aid missions.
Sustaining logistical requirements for UNMISS requires delivering supplies - from potable water to fuel, rations, batteries and spare parts - over vast distances to widely separated remote locations throughout South Sudan. Juba, the main airhead in-country, is roughly 900 km from Nairobi and over 1,300 km from the port of Mombasa; the northern border areas are another 700 km beyond Juba.
Many helicopters are required, with the majority provided by contractors, according to Le Roy. "We have no problem [obtaining] contract helicopters; the problem is military helicopters," he said.
With UNMISS still in transition, it is too early to detail how the force will function beyond acknowledging the difficulties that lie ahead in an incredibly complex and harsh operational environment. No doubt the mission will be extended beyond the one-year mandate.
Congo
Among the 14 other missions under way, the United Nations Organisation Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) is the largest in UN history with nearly 17,000 troops; 729 military observers; 1,255 police officers and 5,727 international civilians. The first UN PKO in the Congo operated from 1960 to 1964 and MONUSCO was a 2010 reconfiguration of a previous mission mandated in 1999: the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC).
The new mission is authorised to use all necessary means to protect civilians, humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders under imminent threat of physical violence and to support the government of the DRC in its stabilisation and peace establishment efforts.
Commanded by Indian Lieutenant General Chander Prakash, MONUSCO is a huge operation with four brigades deployed throughout the country maintaining "26 tactical operating bases that help provide security for remote communities", according to a spokesman. MONUSCO includes infantry battalions from Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, India, Morocco, Pakistan, Senegal and Uruguay; special forces from Guatemala and Jordan; aviation units from Bangladesh, India, Belgium and South Africa; and engineers from China, Indonesia and Nepal.
The mission has suffered a string of setbacks and scandals in the recent past. In October 2010 India withdrew five utility and four attack helicopters, representing a "25 per cent reduction in MONUSCO's military utility fleet and half of the mission's attack helicopters", according to a spokesperson for the UN DPKO. Although the move was ostensibly due to urgent requirements in India, reports have circulated that the decision was motivated by friction with the UN.
More troubling are accusations of negligence and lack of discipline in connection with a series of rapes and sexual assaults. In 2003 six Nepalese troops were convicted of sexual abuse while serving with the UN in the DRC and jailed in Nepal. In 2007 non-governmental organisations and UN officials made allegations in North Kivu that Indian peacekeepers had exchanged food and information with locals for gold from rebels and had sexually exploited female minors.
In August 2010 more than 240 women were raped by rebels and government soldiers in villages close to a MONUSCO base in the Eastern Congo without any intervention by UN forces. This prompted UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Atul Khare to admit: "While the primary responsibility for protection of civilians lies with the state - its national army and police force, clearly - we have also failed.... We must do better."
In June 2011 the Indian Army launched a court of inquiry against 12 officers and 39 soldiers allegedly involved in cases of sexual abuse while serving with MONUSCO in 2008. The allegations emerged after DNA tests commissioned by the UN on children born to local women in Durla in the Congo showed they had "distinctive Indian features". Thereafter the UN formally asked the Indian Army to initiate further investigations. The battalion in question was recalled from the Congo immediately after the allegations surfaced.
In Le Roy's view the DRC armed forces still suffer from poor discipline and lack of professionalism and are incapable of protecting the civilian population. MONUSCO is expected to remain at current force levels at least through this year's elections and into next year.
Haiti
Another major UN PKO, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), is finally making headway after more than 20 years of UN involvement in the country and may even be reduced next year. Under the command of Brazilian Major General Luiz Eduardo Ramos Pereira, MINUSTAH has 8,720 troops; 3,550 police officers and 542 international civilians. Core infantry units are provided by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Jordan, Nepal, Peru, Sri Lanka and Uruguay. Aviation units come from Argentina, Chile and Uruguay and engineers from Chile, Ecuador, Japan and Paraguay.
MINUSTAH and Haiti suffered a tragic setback when a devastating 7.0-magnitude earthquake struck on 12 January 2010, resulting in more than 220,000 deaths, including 102 UN personnel, with many thousands of people injured and 1.5 million left homeless. UN staff losses included the special representative and his principal deputy and constituted the highest number of casualties in a single day in the history of UN peacekeeping.
Despite the losses, MINUSTAH acted decisively in response to post-earthquake priorities: relief, security and restoration of state capacity. The UNSC endorsed Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's recommendation to increase overall MINUSTAH force levels by 2,000 troops and 1,500 police officers to support immediate recovery, reconstruction and stability efforts in the country.
With the conclusion of successful elections in April 2011, Haiti appears to be on a path to increasing stability and security. The UN hopes it can begin scaling back MINUSTAH in 2012 in anticipation of eventual closure later this decade.
Lebanon
Another large and important continuing mission is the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Established in southern Lebanon in 1978 in the wake of the Lebanese civil war, its mission was strengthened after the 2006 conflict between Israel and Hizbullah.
Commanded by Spanish Major General Alberto Asarta Cuevas, UNIFIL consists of more than 12,000 peacekeepers from 35 countries, including 1,300 troops from France and 1,100 from Spain. Other UNIFIL mechanised and infantry units are provided by Ghana, Italy, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nepal and South Korea, with engineers from Belgium, China, Portugal and Turkey. The rotating offshore maritime component has included warships from Bangladesh, Germany, Greece, Indonesia and Turkey.
UNIFIL's difficult mission is to keep peace in one of the most highly militarised corners of the world, where the prospect of renewed hostilities is ever present - the consequences of which could potentially destabilise the entire region. UNSC Resolution 1701 of August 2006 authorises UNIFIL "to take all necessary action within areas of deployment ... to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind; to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council; and to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel, humanitarian workers and ... to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence".
Given this mandate and the complex operational environment, UNIFIL is the most heavily armed UN force to date, fielding main battle tanks and heavy artillery. Since 1978 277 UN troops have been killed in Lebanon, along with two military observers and eight international civilians.
Le Roy told Jane's that UN peacekeeping forces are "like a fire department that has to buy its equipment once the fire has started". The UN does not posses any forces itself, cannot compel member states to contribute troops and is unable to 'certify' forces, as member states are solely responsible for ensuring proper training and equipment for the units they provide.
Consequently, UN forces and command staff seldom, if ever, have the opportunity to train together and establish standardised procedures before going operational, which significantly reduces effectiveness, particularly in the critical early stages of a deployment.
With the demand for troops at record levels, obtaining contributions of properly trained and equipped forces can be problematic, but Le Roy told Jane's that he "wouldn't call it mission fatigue". He understands the dearth of European and North American contributions since 2001 due to other operational requirements and is sympathetic to the effects of ongoing economic stresses on those armed forces.
At the same time he appreciates the tailored assistance these 'high-end' countries have been able to provide. "In Côte d'Ivoire we couldn't have done what we did without the help of French forces, or in Sierra Leone with the UK, or in the DRC with [EU Operation] 'Artemis'," he said. The efforts of US forces in Haiti in the aftermath of the earthquake were "extremely useful", he added.
'Triangular co-operation' is a concept gaining increasing currency in peacekeeping circles, whereby European and North American countries that are unable or unwilling to contribute their own troops offer to train and equip troops contributed by other countries. Examples of this include the US assistance provided to Rwandan forces, Belgium's to Benin and France's to Togo and Senegal.
Major equipment donation programmes are another way to overcome critical deficiencies. An example was Canada's 2005 contribution of 100 prototype Cougar light armoured vehicles to support operations in Darfur. Originally donated to the African Union (AU), they were subsequently handed over to UN forces. While useful to the mission, the programme highlighted training and logistics issues that must be addressed when gifting relatively advanced equipment. For example, according to Amnesty International, soldiers were not in theatre long enough to obtain training and experience on these vehicles.
According to Le Roy, one of the UN's top capability shortfalls is mobility in the form of armoured vehicles and tactical helicopters that can withstand the impact from improvised explosive devices. One source of donation may be the United States, which could offer mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles initially produced for service in Iraq, along with an associated training and support programme.
As for tactical helicopters, there can never be enough. This has forced the UN to pioneer the effective use of contract helicopters, largely from Russia and Ukraine, but these are inadequate to support certain activities that require more capable military aircraft and crews, such as night troop insertions and reconnaissance and 24-hour all-weather medical evacuation.
Also in short supply are engineers and deployable field medical facilities. Europe and North America remain the best sources of modern, deployable field hospital capabilities, but recently Argentina, India, South Africa and other countries have stepped up to support UN operations. In terms of engineer support, China, Japan and South Korea are proving capable and reliable contributors and engineer units are emerging as an important niche capability for smaller countries such as Cambodia and Paraguay.
A feature of UN PKOs over the past decade has been a demonstrated ability to operate in conjunction with other organisations, such as the Economic Community of West African States, the AU and the EU, or directly with such nations as the US, the UK and France. However, while Le Roy foresees "more and more partnerships", the ongoing UN-AU hybrid mission in Darfur has shown some of the limits of co-operative ventures and Le Roy does not expect the experiment to be repeated. "Hybrid is not the most efficient, not the best model. One chain of command is always easier for everyone," he said.
What Le Roy would very much like to see is an 'over-the-horizon capability' that can respond quickly to emerging crises and serve as a limited-duration bridge force while an appropriately trained and equipped UN force assembles and deploys. He cites the EU-led Operation 'Artemis' in the DRC in 2003 as an example.
With France as the lead nation, 'Artemis' forces were deployed in response to a UN request over a three-week period and subsequently grew to about 1,800 troops, mostly French but including forces from Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Croatia, France, Germany, Greece, South Africa, Sweden and the UK. After a three-month period in which the crisis was stabilised, 'Artemis' handed over responsibility to the UN's MONUC.
Le Roy is "pushing the EU to operationalise the concept" of designating existing standby battlegroups as on-call crisis response forces for emerging UN missions and as over-the-horizon reinforcements for UN operations. The same relationship could ultimately extend to other regional groupings in Asia, Africa and South America.
Formalising a rapid-reaction bridge capability would relieve the UN of a significant burden and allow it to concentrate on executing stabilised, long-term missions. Having trained and ready forces available to undertake the demanding initial entry and stabilisation phase of a PKO would also benefit UN forces transitioning into an operation by shaping the operational environment in advance.
In addition to a more co-operative approach with the international community, the last decade has seen UN forces employ more force on operations, including attack helicopters, artillery and special forces; this trend is certain to continue. In Côte d'Ivoire in April joint French-UN military action broke a long-running impasse and set conditions for stability. Such forceful approaches to resolving conflict situations, in relation to the composition and posture of future missions, is likely to include enhanced capabilities to provide what is known as 'robust peacekeeping'. However, Le Roy insists that robust peacekeeping should not be confused with 'peace enforcement', which he believes is not a UN peacekeeping mission.
UNMISS in South Sudan continues a 63-year legacy of UN PKOs without an end in sight as the 21st century progresses. Le Roy told Jane's that the UN is "not asking to increase our market share" in terms of global military operations. The UN DPKO does not have a say on when and how conflicts ignite, but is obliged to respond when called out by the UNSC.
Jim Dorschner is a correspondent based in Washington, DC
