U.S. Weighs Strikes Into Baluchistan

[Energon]

The PA has ostensibly chosen to not make a big issue out of the drone strikes, and the recent greater success rates speak to the cooperation being extended in that regard, so the issue is not so much 'leaving Pakistan out of high level operations' since it is apparent that it is Pakistani involvement that has ostensibly cut down on the collateral damage and strikes on the wrong (non-combatant) targets that characterized many of the earlier US strikes.

The relationship between the US and Pakistan isn't equitable by any means, and I'm not pointing out this obvious discrepancy because I want to insult you or inflict further humiliation upon Pakistan, but rather because I think that ignoring the underlying realities of a power dynamic when discussing bilateral issues between two parties is a counterproductive and fruitless venture. The PA doesn't have much of an option in this regard; if they try to intervene with the drone operations they'll have to deal with the USAF and USN's other (far more lethal) fighter-bomber assets. They either have to help out so as to minimize the collateral damage, or stand out of the way; luckily the civilian and military leadership realize that the first option is far better for everyone involved. The strike portions of the operations are however unilaterally controlled by the US; it has been made clear that this particular arrangement will not change for the foreseeable future, and the predator technology will neither be shared, nor transfered over to Pakistan despite multiple requests from the GoP. There is however a new plan to reestablish a working relationship with both, Kiyani's PA and Zardari's civilian government based on a constant progress evaluation scheme; and this system seems to have had a good start.

Your own proposals on the way forward tend to take a 'holier than though' attitude with respect to Pakistan, irrespective of whether you are arguing India's case or the US's, and it is not really workable in the current dynamics.

This supposed 'holier than though' issue is entirely your obsession, not mine. You clearly do not know my personal feelings on many things in regards to Pakistan and instead insist upon labeling it as some sort of a personal bias just because we disagree on issues. Please stop doing that, it is not only unfair and inappropriate but also extremely annoying. Also, as I've stated numerous times, my personal attitude or outlook on this matter is categorically irrelevant.

For a litany of reasons Pakistan is (increasingly) neither perceived nor treated as an equal by many states around the world, and this whole drone bombing/ unilateral military action on account of the absolute lack of trust is a clear byproduct of this dissimilitude. The disparity is all the more evident in the newly evolving India-Pakistan-USA/West construct, which of course has always been a sensitive issue. Now I certainly understand why many people here (including you) would find this upsetting, but this preexisting dynamic of Pakistan's relationship is beyond any one of us, and my posts merely reflect this ground reality.

The way forward seems to be a policy where Pakistan's commitment and success in meeting said commitments will constantly be evaluated and tested to determine further involvement (positive or negative). It is undoubtedly an extremely skewed and paternalistic approach, but one borne out of many lessons taken from prior interactions with Pakistan. I think its best to reconcile with the inherent disparity from the outset instead of falling into the trap of expressing 'outrage' later on because something goes wrong. The Pakistani civilian and military leaders certainly seem to be singing the right tune so it looks good so far; but as I said before we'll have to wait and see how it all pans out.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

You clearly do not know my personal feelings on many things in regards to Pakistan and instead insist upon labeling it as some sort of a personal bias just because we disagree on issues. Please stop doing that, it is not only unfair and inappropriate but also extremely annoying.

Stop right there - before I read anything else in your post, lets not play the victim game. In the last thread we interacted in I was not the one spouting pseudo-psychological mumbo jumbo about the 'mental/psychological state of Pakistanis.

Your inherently pejorative generalizations of Pakistanis on that thread, and numerous other times, preclude you from having any grounds to complain about insinuations regarding your personal biases. You have made those biases clear time and again, and this 'holier than thou attitude' has been clearly on display.

If being called out on this is annoying, then drop the petty attitude (which incidentally is on display throughout your last post as well) and you'll receive the same respect in return.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

No drone attacks in Balochistan: Gates​

By Anwar Iqbal
Friday, 20 Mar, 2009 | 12:09 AM PST |


WASHINGTON: US Defence Secretary Robert Gates has said that the United States was concerned about the activities of the Quetta shura in Balochistan but disagreed with the suggestion to use drones against them as well.

At a regular briefing at the Pentagon, Mr Gates also vowed to catch Osama bin Laden no matter how long it takes.

Asked to comment on media reports that a group of Taliban militants known as the Quetta shura were using Balochistan as a base to conduct operations inside Afghanistan, Mr Gates said: ‘We all have a concern about the Quetta shura and the activities of the Taliban in that area.’

But he disagreed with the suggestion that the United States should use CIA-operated unmanned drone aircraft to attack the Quetta shura as well.

‘I think this is principally a problem and a challenge for the Pakistanis to take on. And as we have indicated, we are prepared to do anything we can to help them do that,’ the secretary said.

The United States uses these drone aircraft, known as the Predators, to attack al Qaeda and Taliban militants in Fata.

Besides eliminating some of the militants, the drone attacks also have killed scores of civilians, causing widespread resentment against the United States.

Another journalist at the briefing observed that while Pakistan was helping the United States against al Qaeda, it was not cooperating in the fighting against the Taliban militants.

Asked to comment on this assessment, which the journalist attributed to US intelligence officials, Mr Gates said: ‘I'm not going to get into that.’

Osama bin Laden
Talking about the possibility of catching Osama bin Laden, Secretary Gates recalled that it took the US Federal Investigation Agency 17 years to catch convicted Unabomber Theodore Kaczynski.

He dismissed the notion that something might be amiss because bin Laden and his top lieutenant, Ayman al-Zawahri, remain free more than seven years after the September 11 attacks.

‘To a certain extent, I think too many people go to too many movies. Finding these guys is really hard, and especially if they have some kind of a support network,’ he said.

The United States blames Bin Laden and Zawahri for the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on US soil. US officials believe they are hiding in the rugged terrain along Afghanistan's mountainous border with Pakistan.

‘We've done some serious damage to al Qaeda over the last number of months,’ Mr Gates, a former CIA director, said without confirming any missile attacks against al Qaeda targets.

‘Everybody continues to look for No. 1 and No. 2. And we will continue that effort and I think everyone's hope is that one of these days, we'll be successful,’ he said.

DAWN.COM | World | No drone attacks in Balochistan: Gates

-------------------------
Well, that puts this most recent controversy to rest, and I'll have to take back my previous derogatory comments about the US defense establishment, since it seems that there are still some rational thinkers around.

"‘We all have a concern about the Quetta shura and the activities of the Taliban in that area.’

But he disagreed with the suggestion that the United States should use CIA-operated unmanned drone aircraft to attack the Quetta shura as well.

‘I think this is principally a problem and a challenge for the Pakistanis to take on. And as we have indicated, we are prepared to do anything we can to help them do that,’ the secretary said."

S-2:

Don't you find Gates's comments about the 'Quetta Shura' nonchalant?

I believe this validates somewhat my argument about the 'Quetta Shura' being on a 'leash' and not a major tangible irritant to the NATO effort, and the US intelligence and defense community being aware of whatever arrangements between the ISI and the Shura exist.

Obviously the US would prefer that even a largely 'symbolic' leadership be eliminated, but the benefits may outweigh the costs if it is a major stumbling block in cooperation against the actual insurgency from Pakistan.

In addition, if these leaders are convinced to share power in the GoA and lay down arms, their influence amongst the Taliban factions would have a tremendous impact in getting the local Taliban to lay down their arms.

Form all the accounts I have read, the old guard leadership (Haqqani, Omar, Hekmetyar) have 'passed the torch' to a younger generation. The Haqqani network is now primarily run by Haqqani's sons, chiefly Sirajuddin Haqqani, so J Haqqani's presence in Quetta has little tangible impact on the insurgent forces operated by his sons.

Mullah Omar too, if in Quetta, is isolated, and the Afghan insurgency is being prrimarily run by local commanders such as Qari Ziaur rehman who attacked Bajaur, Mullah Dadullah (later killed ) etc.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Also, the IG FC (Baluchistan) on the subject of the Taliban:

No Taliban havens in Balochistan: IG Frontier Corps​

Wednesday, 18 Mar, 2009 | 11:37 PM PST |

QUETTA: The Inspector General of Frontier Corps, Major General Saleem Nawaz has denied the presence of Mullah Omar and Taliban in Quetta and other parts of Balochistan, saying that they lacked political and tribal support in the province.

‘Border and other areas of Balochistan territory are not congenial for Taliban activities,’ General Nawaz told reporters in the FC headquarters, here on Wednesday, adding that ‘Quetta is not safe haven of Taliban.’

He said that story published in New York Times about the Taliban presence and free movement in Quetta and other areas needs authentication despite the quoting of US government officials.

Responding to a question about drone attacks planning in Balochistan, the IG Frontier Corps said that drone attacks yielded no positive results and these attacks further aggravated the situation.

He said that as Inspector General FC in Balochistan he was aware of the presence of religious Madrassas (seminaries) but said that they are giving religious education, which was very positive training. However, he conceded that a few Madrassas and people might have contact with them (the Taliban).

General Saleem Nawaz said that explosions and bomb blasts were a nationwide phenomenon. He pointed out that they are taking place all over the country including Islamabad, Lahore, Karachi, administrated and settled areas of Frontier Province. Even in Quetta three suicide attacks were taken place in the different areas and last one was against Maulana Sherani and now such attacks were occurring against religious parties.

‘Political parties in Pashtoon areas were not in the favour of Taliban,’ he said, adding that in view of these facts one can draw conclusion that atmosphere is not very congenial for the Taliban to assemble here and having their headquarter in and around this area and plan to attacks as suspected in these reports.

‘In view of these facts, I see such eventuality may not be materialized in Balochistan,’ General Nawaz claimed’ but added ‘if it does happen the government of Balochistan would handle it in the national interest.’

He said that such things were not happening in Balochistan and as he told that ‘territory is not congenial for various social, political, tribal and economic reasons.’ He said that Taliban cannot operate effectively from this area. However, he said that if somebody is passing from particular territory they look like Baloch, Pashtoon people of Balochistan, NWFP, FATA and Pakistanis and their movement in Pakistan cannot be denied and it is never denied.

‘Balochistan is not safe haven for Taliban.’ Major General Saleem Nawaz said.

On John Solecki’s abduction

Replying to a question about John Solecki, General Saleem said that high officials of Balochistan government Interior Ministry, US agencies and UN officials are direct or indirectly in contact with abductors.

‘I think abductors have realized that they had put their hand in the wrong place and committed mistake, he said adding that they would not like to aggravate which is positive thing. ‘I am of the view that they perhaps need a safe exit for some face saving.’

He said that same people are involved in the kidnapping of John Solecki who claimed the champions of Baloch rights. He said that efforts are under way for safe recovery of UN top official.

He said that he was still confident that Solecki was not shifted to across the border as FC and other security agencies were strictly checking all vehicles in the border areas along with Pak-Afghan border.

‘John Solecki is huge man and cannot be shifted to any where on camel, horse or donkey,’ General Saleem Nawaz said.

He said that some suspects were taken into custody from Magochar area of Kalat district and handed over to the concerned officials for investigation. He said that Solecki could be kept in Dalbandin, Ahmed Wal, Ispelangi and Mangochar areas and security forces were keep strict eye on these areas.

DAWN.COM | - Balochistan | No Taliban havens in Balochistan: FC chief

 

[S-2]

"Don't you find Gates's comments about the 'Quetta Shura' nonchalant?

I believe this validates somewhat my argument about the 'Quetta Shura' being on a 'leash' and not a major tangible irritant to the NATO effort, and the US intelligence and defense community being aware of whatever arrangements between the ISI and the Shura exist."

Thanks but, no, I do not. Gates is, by nature, a calm man. The comment below underscores his thoughts.

"We all have a concern about the Quetta shura and the activities of the Taliban in that area."

Nothing from this comment suggests he views the Quetta Shura with nonchalance. Certainly, he hasn't expressed concern about their freedom of expression as opposed to their potential threat posed to us.
Whether within the city proper or associated Afghani refugee camps, the certainty of collateral damage, possibly significant, would STRONGLY mitigate it's use. I think the original article made clear the difficulties associated with using PREDATOR in Quetta.

I believe that Gates' thoughts below reflect those difficulties-

"I think this is principally a problem and a challenge for the Pakistanis to take on. And as we have indicated, we are prepared to do anything we can to help them do that"

I see a certain eagerness to assist Pakistan with it's specific Quetta-based "challenge".

"...the US intelligence and defense community being aware of whatever arrangements between the ISI and the Shura exist."

Maybe we're aware of the arrangements. Maybe not. Nothing I see from Mr. Gates comments would indicate a comfort level with such arrangements.

"Obviously the US would prefer that even a largely 'symbolic' leadership be eliminated, but the benefits may outweigh the costs if it is a major stumbling block in cooperation against the actual insurgency from Pakistan."

This is correct although my suspicion is that the Quetta Shura offers tangible operational ROI for a successful attack in addition or in lieu thereof to "prestige value". We believe that there are real command and control elements directing various groups operating in Helmand, Kandahar and even up into Oruzgan.

Nonetheless, Quetta poses real issues in theory or, perhaps, as a result of a functional evaluation and rejection of specific and known targets/locations.

"Mullah Omar too, if in Quetta, is isolated, and the Afghan insurgency is being prrimarily run by local commanders such as Qari Ziaur rehman who attacked Bajaur, Mullah Dadullah (later killed ) etc."

I'm unsure of Omar's functional isolation. You seem far more certain but I don't know why. From NATO-

Two Insurgent Targets Killed in Northern Helmand-NATO

What caught my attention was this-

"Maulawi Mohammad Saddiq was a close associate of the well know central Helmand Taliban, Maulawi Sayed Rahman and answered to senior Taliban, Akhtar Mohammed Mansour and Mullah Naim Barich, who direct insurgent activity from outside Afghanistan."

Those lines of authority would most naturally run SOUTH from Helmand although I don't know this for certain. If so, that would suggest that Quetta holds some operational value. Given the activity in the south and the heavy opium cultivation, I'd believe that there are clear lines of communication running back into Pakistan. I don't carry your confidence though I concur that PREDATOR will not be a fixture over Quetta's city limits. Don't preclude it's use in Baluchistan, though. If we get wind of a key target taking a drive, I'm certain we'd use it in a heartbeat if the execution was technically feasible at modest to no cost.

 

[Energon]

Your views were shown wrong in the Indo-Pak environment as well, when Steve Coll highlighted the near resolution of Kashmir through back-channel diplomacy. Diplomacy, dialog and resolutions of a form you had virulently opposed unless Pakistan met your 'conditions'.

I constantly see you attributing certain parochial views to me and declaring that I have somehow been proven wrong on account of Coll's revelation about the autonomy+ secession- mechanism. To be honest I have no idea what you're talking about, what is clear to me however is that you do not understand my position. I have always been a supporter of diplomatic engagement... But diplomatic dialogues are not synonymous with settlements. The "conditions" in question aren't mine by any means, they are those of the GoI, which receive a lot of support from the international community. India and Pakistan can and should always keep the back channels open in regards to peace, particularly through the mechanism Coll talked about; however no permanent settlement can/will come through until there is palpable evidence that terrorism from Pakistan ceases to present an imminent threat to India, her citizens and her interests. This is a non negotiable requirement to the finalization of the very deal Coll is talking about. Since it never got that far, I'm not really sure how I have been proven wrong.

Your fundamental flaw is of approaching the situation through an absolutist perspective - an approach more in sync with Neo-Con ideology - Pakistan IS 'wrong and evil' and 'XYZ' must be done by it or 'no deal and no talks'. That is not how the world works and no better illustration of that failed line of thinking can be had than the eight years under the Bush Administration.

Again, I have no idea wtf you're talking about and I must ask you again to refrain from attributing ideologies to me, or endorsing them on my behalf without my consent. I have never once made blanket statements about Pakistan being congenitally "wrong and evil". They have made horrendous mistakes, and the overall sum of bad decisions have overshadowed the good ones... but that has nothing to do with my personal beliefs since the effects of those ratios are self evident in Pakistan's general condition today and its perception in the eyes of the global community. But what you're accusing me of is bigotry, and I take exception to that. I have never falsely accused you of anything like this, and I certainly expect you to show me the same level of respect.

The practice of demanding that a party meet 'XYZ' conditions prior to any policy changes (not diplomatic engagement) are made by another party is a founding step of conflict resolution management and diplomatic exchange when hostilities are involved. There is absolutely nothing wrong with India's demands, and no nation in their right mind would settle for anything less... furthermore no elected government would survive for even a day if they were to make concessions on such critical national security issues when dealing with a state like Pakistan where the terrorism problem is virtually unparalleled and there are grotesque in vivo reminders every so often. I can understand why this would displease you, what I can't understand is why you are unable to internalize this rather simple point.

On another and even more important level, it remains to be seen whether the US will indeed step up and help in reconstruction in areas like Bajaur, where the Taliban have been routed, but hundreds of thousands of refugees will also be returning to destroyed homes, businesses and crops. The FC/PA can militarily do no more in areas like these - without reconstruction it will be a downhill slide from here on.

Kudos for bringing this up
Here's my extremely brief take on the situation:
The intention is certainly there, and at least in the US circles it is now finally becoming clear that the reconstruction and revitalization of the areas you've mentioned ought to be given far greater importance than conventional military aid (not COIN specific hardware). I am a supporter of this school of thought, granted there is a slight bias given that my girlfriend (of Pakistani descent) and I are involved (albeit in a small capacity) in some of these initiatives. There are however a few problems as of now which I'm sure most organizations are dealing with:
1. Due to the Financial crisis the availability of funds has dropped immensely not only from the government, but also from NGOs/INGOs (who rely upon governments) and private philanthropic organizations who are funded one way or another by dividends from global markets (either from wealthy benefactors or their own portfolios).
2. There have been long standing issues with regulatory mechanisms where it becomes very, very difficult to ascertain where and how funds are being used, and many agencies seem to be highly cynical when it comes to Pakistan and Afghanistan based on past experience. What is clear however is that no funds will be introduced unless there are strict assurances of their constructive implementation.
3. Security issues, and local resistance. There are concerns about making innocent people targets and there are many locals who view the outside world (especially the GoP and its representatives) with a lot of suspicion. There are also concerns about clashes with pseudo intellectual hacks who have become extremely popular (and wealthy) by disseminating conspiracy theories who can very easily derail this entire process.

The growing consensus at least for now seems to be that an effort will first be made to install a regulatory or some sort of a watchdog mechanism to ensure that any future funds coming in are implemented constructively. This may cause some short term delays (which are already being experienced), but the long term benefits will be completely worth it. Also, once a reliable oversight mechanism is put in place, the reconstruction process will hopefully grow into a multi-tier multi-national scheme. Furthermore, I think India should be pressured into becoming one of the top tier contributors/investors in this program. I realize that this will not sit well with many Indians at the outset, but I actually have a sizable list of arguments as to why India's involvement is necessary for a long term positive outcome and how this will also benefit India financially (in the long term of course).

I can keep going on and on about all of this, but that would derail the thread, besides this topic actually deserves its own section on this message board let alone another thread; unfortunately that hasn't happened, so I don't think too many people are interested. Either way, if there is portal dedicated to this topic I can certainly provide some input.

 

[Energon]

Stop right there - before I read anything else in your post, lets not play the victim game. In the last thread we interacted in I was not the one spouting pseudo-psychological mumbo jumbo about the 'mental/psychological state of Pakistanis.

Please provide a link.

Edit: victimhood has nothing to do with this. Do not falsely attribute ideologies to me because of your insecurities or deficiencies with comprehension. I am (along with most of the world) heavily critical of many things in and about Pakistan no doubt, but that does not equate to pejorative generalizations about Pakistanis, Muslims or any other acts of bigotry. And yes, persistent attempts to falsely implicate me for indulging in bigotry is very, very annoying. I do not do this to you, and don't expect you to do this to me, its as simple as that.

 

[dabong1]

How long before punjab becomes a target fpr drones..?
We can not trust the dirty yank basta2d govt and the best thing to do is cut all ties with the US and make a military pact with iran.

 

[Energon]

How long before punjab becomes a target fpr drones..?
We can not trust the dirty yank basta2d govt and the best thing to do is cut all ties with the US and make a military pact with iran.

Don't be silly.

 

[S-2]

"The growing consensus at least for now seems to be that an effort will first be made to install a regulatory or some sort of a watchdog mechanism to ensure that any future funds coming in are implemented constructively."

I've made comment to the use of civilian technocrats as part of "civil surge" mobilization elsewhere. I've also addressed some of the oversight and aid implementation processes that I hope we've discovered through seven years of attempting implementation in Iraq/Afghanistan under adverse conditions of war, mal-governance, and endemic corruption.

Both sides of the aid equation must become more efficient in optimizing bang for buck. So too with dollars spent to mentor institutions, whether military or civil.

Nice thoughts and far more articulate to the issues than mine. This is thread hijacking but under the circumstance I'm fine with it. A worthy if momentary diversion that does need further exploration at some point.

Thanks.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

I constantly see you attributing certain parochial views to me and declaring that I have somehow been proven wrong on account of Coll's revelation about the autonomy+ secession- mechanism. To be honest I have no idea what you're talking about, what is clear to me however is that you do not understand my position. I have always been a supporter of diplomatic engagement... But diplomatic dialogues are not synonymous with settlements. The "conditions" in question aren't mine by any means, they are those of the GoI, which receive a lot of support from the international community. India and Pakistan can and should always keep the back channels open in regards to peace, particularly through the mechanism Coll talked about; however no permanent settlement can/will come through until there is palpable evidence that terrorism from Pakistan ceases to present an imminent threat to India, her citizens and her interests. This is a non negotiable requirement to the finalization of the very deal Coll is talking about. Since it never got that far, I'm not really sure how I have been proven wrong.

Again, I have no idea wtf you're talking about and I must ask you again to refrain from attributing ideologies to me, or endorsing them on my behalf without my consent. I have never once made blanket statements about Pakistan being congenitally "wrong and evil". They have made horrendous mistakes, and the overall sum of bad decisions have overshadowed the good ones... but that has nothing to do with my personal beliefs since the effects of those ratios are self evident in Pakistan's general condition today and its perception in the eyes of the global community. But what you're accusing me of is bigotry, and I take exception to that. I have never falsely accused you of anything like this, and I certainly expect you to show me the same level of respect.

The practice of demanding that a party meet 'XYZ' conditions prior to any policy changes (not diplomatic engagement) are made by another party is a founding step of conflict resolution management and diplomatic exchange when hostilities are involved. There is absolutely nothing wrong with India's demands, and no nation in their right mind would settle for anything less... furthermore no elected government would survive for even a day if they were to make concessions on such critical national security issues when dealing with a state like Pakistan where the terrorism problem is virtually unparalleled and there are grotesque in vivo reminders every so often. I can understand why this would displease you, what I can't understand is why you are unable to internalize this rather simple point.

The issue is not with me 'internalizing your simple point', but more of you misstating or misunderstanding my position and arguments. Policy does not necessarily change with an agreement or general road map on resolving conflict, nor have I argued that India immediately implement policy changes along the lines of some of the suggestions floated on resolving Kashmir, without concrete moves by Pakistan in the militant issue - we just went over this issue on a separate thread, so for you to attribute that to me is disingenuous.

Where I have criticized you in the past is your refusal to consider even the announcement of a road map to the resolution of Kashmir in the absence of a fulfillment of these 'conditions'. A 'road map' is essentially what the back-channel diplomacy was leading to. We are not here officially representing Pakistani, Indian or US policy, pointing that out is moot - we are however exchanging ideas, and you have voiced support for no movement towards resolution (road-map or engagement towards a road-map) without pre-conditions being fulfilled - a stance I consider fundamentally flawed for reasons we have already explored in another thread in detail. If that is no longer your position, then we have no disagreement here.

That absolutist mind set applied to the Pak-US relationship is what I took exception to - Pakistan and Gen. Kiyani must do this and that and 'satisfy US requirements' before any thing else moves on the US side. The US will never obtain full cooperation from Pakistan, regardless of the official statements, unless it sincerely addresses the trust deficit and Pakistani interests, and Pakistan reciprocates on the same. If merely reiterating your mantra of 'there is no equivocation between the US and Pakistan' was all there was to obtaining cooperation from Pakistan, then we would have seen this cooperation a long time ago.

In fact, I pointed out to you how there was movement from both sides on the intelligence sharing issue and strike coordination, that is forming a strong base for reducing the trust deficit through inter-military cooperation and engagement, that you dismissed in your 'holier than thou' attitude as something the US 'might consider if Pakistan proves itself'.

This isn't about "Pakistan proving itself" - if you really think that then 'petty attitudes and bias' is well deserved a label - this is about two sides with serious trust deficits and legitimate concerns over their respective national security issues removing that trust deficit and assuaging their National security concerns.

Lastly on your attitude, bias whatever - I don't wish for this conversation to go down the road an exchange with S-2 did in the past, and perhaps it isn't so much an issue of your 'attitude' as it is a poor means of expressing your point when engaging in conversation on issues you have fundamental disagreements on.

If you insist, PM me and I'll explain my concerns over the post in question.

Kudos for bringing this up
Here's my extremely brief take on the situation:
The intention is certainly there, and at least in the US circles it is now finally becoming clear that the reconstruction and revitalization of the areas you've mentioned ought to be given far greater importance than conventional military aid (not COIN specific hardware). I am a supporter of this school of thought, granted there is a slight bias given that my girlfriend (of Pakistani descent) and I are involved (albeit in a small capacity) in some of these initiatives. There are however a few problems as of now which I'm sure most organizations are dealing with:
1. Due to the Financial crisis the availability of funds has dropped immensely not only from the government, but also from NGOs/INGOs (who rely upon governments) and private philanthropic organizations who are funded one way or another by dividends from global markets (either from wealthy benefactors or their own portfolios).
2. There have been long standing issues with regulatory mechanisms where it becomes very, very difficult to ascertain where and how funds are being used, and many agencies seem to be highly cynical when it comes to Pakistan and Afghanistan based on past experience. What is clear however is that no funds will be introduced unless there are strict assurances of their constructive implementation.
3. Security issues, and local resistance. There are concerns about making innocent people targets and there are many locals who view the outside world (especially the GoP and its representatives) with a lot of suspicion. There are also concerns about clashes with pseudo intellectual hacks who have become extremely popular (and wealthy) by disseminating conspiracy theories who can very easily derail this entire process.

The growing consensus at least for now seems to be that an effort will first be made to install a regulatory or some sort of a watchdog mechanism to ensure that any future funds coming in are implemented constructively. This may cause some short term delays (which are already being experienced), but the long term benefits will be completely worth it. Also, once a reliable oversight mechanism is put in place, the reconstruction process will hopefully grow into a multi-tier multi-national scheme. Furthermore, I think India should be pressured into becoming one of the top tier contributors/investors in this program. I realize that this will not sit well with many Indians at the outset, but I actually have a sizable list of arguments as to why India's involvement is necessary for a long term positive outcome and how this will also benefit India financially (in the long term of course).

I can keep going on and on about all of this, but that would derail the thread, besides this topic actually deserves its own section on this message board let alone another thread; unfortunately that hasn't happened, so I don't think too many people are interested. Either way, if there is portal dedicated to this topic I can certainly provide some input.

The operation in Bajaur and Mohmand has only recently started winding down, and the refugees were asked to start returning a few days ago, so perhaps thinking about reconstruction may not have been a primary concern for some at the moment.

There is a new thread with a short article indicating that the GoP is in the midst of finalizing reconstruction projects in Bajaur in the economy section that I was thinking of moving to the WoT section, given that reconstruction is closely tied to the WoT. You could use that as a launching pad for further discussions ...

On the means of aid - first and foremost I believe a movement on the languishing ROZ bill is important. This involves little direct investment on the part of the US, and has a multiplier effect if it is able to draw investment into the effected areas, and has little political downside in terms of regulatory framework shortcomings and concerns over improper aid utilization corruption etc.

The second most feasible means of support for reconstruction, in the near term, in my opinion remains direct aid to GoP formulated reconstruction projects. The expired Biden Lugar Bill, or something even more specifically targeted at reconstruction and rehabilitation of refugees in affected agencies would be the best means of doing so. While I understand an argument you have made in the past over more accountability on funds disbursed to the GoP (or any AID recipient for that matter) I do not agree with applying those standards in the case of Bajaur where aid is needed now.

There needs to be flexibility in the AID disbursement process and projects in severely impacted agencies like Bajaur should have financial support fast tracked, while stricter accounting practices can remain in place for other sectors - the last thing any Pakistani wants is for more corrupt politicians to line their pockets, part of the reason why you don't really see too much enthusiasm, on the issue of aid, from Pakistanis on this forum either.

NGO's are IMO completely unfeasible in FATA at the moment. Pakistani journalists have to be escorted in for limited durations, and NGO's will only increase the headaches for the SF's, become a flash point for militant criticism (already have) and become attractive targets for attacks. Until the situation stabilizes further, this will have to be a GoP/PA/Tribes led reconstruction initiative.

 

[Kasrkin]

”I expect an army that occupies territory in Kashmir to be masters of this type terrain…”

It is not as simple as that. Our Northern Command (FCNA) mainly consists of NLI infantry recruited from in and around the Gilgit areas. These men, while hardy and acclimatized, are as ethnically and sectarian-ly divergent as is possible to be from the rest of Pakistan. They’re light infantry as their name suggests, and they excel at holding and defending territory in Kashmir. Static defense is almost entirely what they do but with only 4 brigades they’re pretty committed along the LoC; also deploying Ismaili troops to the most religiously volatile and backward areas in the world (where even average Pakistanis are unwelcome, let alone a rival ‘heretic’ army) was not a good option. The formation with the appropriate logistics backup available was the XI Corps which contributed heavily to the forays, and later increasingly the Strike Corps (I, II) who are trained for conventional armored warfare with emphasis on mass maneuver and obstacle crossings but are available. (Some elements of NLI did make it to places like Waziristan, in trivial numbers though). So it’s a complex situation with factors like logistics, strategic commitment and ethnic intricacies coming into play especially since the nature of the conflict soaks up much in terms of troops and resources. But none of this indicates (let alone ‘proves&#8217 complacency on our part or lack of commitment especially when compared to the US/NATO on the other end.

”Neither do I care that you believe that our responsibility to secure your nation's borders in times of crisis somehow exceed yours…”

Don’t play with words, we expect you to secure your borders, not ours. The Durand Line is not just Pakistan’s border, its Afghanistan’s too.

This ‘logic’ can also be effectively used to impale you on your own rhetoric. If you can so casually deny responsibility for failing to check (or even trying to check) the flow of dangerous combatants into our borders; then so can we. Therefore in line with your concepts of ‘responsibility’ and ‘sovereignty’, we’re entirely in our rights not to give a damn about militants infiltrating to Afghanistan through FATA who slaughter, murder and maim US servicemen.

Furthermore since you claim that cross border coordination between your enemies in Afghanistan and some elements in Pakistan warrants unilateral Predator strikes into Pakistan, then we too are in our full rights (at the very at least) to question and criticize the US’s failure in crushing the Taliban when they were out in the open or to at least have contained the spillover through effective/ timely military maneuvering and/ or commitment, or failing all that providing proper governance at least making Taliban resurgence (and therefore all this moaning) impossible regardless of FATA ; all accounts of which the US has had self-professed failure.

I grow tired of saying this but, we’re in this together now. However since you insist on seeing Pakistan as the enemy, you end up looking like a deluded and insecure fool whose attempts at self-assurance include blaming others for a mess that was explicitly of his own making. But if it gives you so much fulfillment then yes I’ll say it; we failed to contain your failure.

Also presently Pakistani commitment in terms of troops on the border out number yours and your allies by a great margin, as do the number of casualties therefore endured. So this must mean we’re the ones taking our responsibilities more seriously than you are, eh? Who are you to judge what serious commitment is and what is not, given your own lousy record thus far. If the militants are getting across, that means both sides of the border lack sufficient manning, and you’d have to be retarded to suggest that the follow is a one way trip only…

”I expect that any army running out of Afghanistan faster than a bunch of N.A. tribesmen and SOF guys could chase them to be little problem for a Pakistani army that had between 9/11 and early November to get it's azz up to the border…”

Amazing really, your ignorance is. It’s obvious to all that you know little about this area other than that Pakistani tribesmen are supposed to cheer and be eternally grateful to the US every time a Predator comes destroys one of their homes, for the rest of us the ground realities are different. However primitive your take is and amateurish your analysis might be, even you would understand that guarding the Durand is not like putting a cork in a bottle. Durand is the toughest border (if you can call it a border) in the world when it comes to manning it; not just because of the topography but the demographics.

Sealing the Durand comprehensively in itself is an impossible task; intercepting infiltrators without effective step by step coordination, feedback, directing and collaboration with the initializing force on the other end is an outlandishly laughable concept; BUT expecting, nay complaining, that troops should’ve been deployed in the required numbers and scale across the line without the mildist tactical/ strategic forewarning/ hinting supplied to their commanders by the allied belligerent forces (and I’m not even talking about the time it takes for the intricate tribal political discourse and dealings requisite to the deployment of any troops) on the other side despite prior heavy commitments… should IMO have one’s posting rights confiscated for expressing such sheer stupidity.

The Pakistan Army did step up to its responsibility though, General Tommy Franks wrote ‘Pakistani troops also provided significant help [during the Tora Bora operation]- as many as 100,000 sealed the border and rounded up hundreds of Qaeda and Taliban fighters’. Donald Rumsfeld made similar statements in regards to Pakistan’s helpfulness. So while the Americans and the British, in their infinite commitment and generosity for the most part made do by bribing local rag-tag militias and tribal groups to achieve their narrow, irresponsible objectives…Pakistani commanders were rushing troops (and thoroughly scrwing age old protocol and traditions) into gaps along the ponderous border based on what they saw in the media alone (vague and inappropriate as that insight might be). Pakistan did not lack the commitment or the required prudence, but some people did. This lack of co-ordination between US and Pakistani forces set the tone for years to come, obviously things aren’t exactly helped by folks like Captain America here smugly insisting on Pakistan’s complicity in the Taliban withdrawal and resurgence either.

Unlike you, you’ll never find me saying that we’re responsible for absolutely no mistakes or miscalculations. We don’t enjoy this blame-game that defines you S-2, let by bygones be bygones I say but since you INSIST with this “stand” on every single thread then let’s get it over with.

 

[S-2]

Lot of excuses that don't wash with me. Evidently your general staff has never planned for the defense of your nation from the west or considered the various manners by which that possible assault might occur.

I rather doubt that and it's beside the point. The land behind your border is yours to defend. You didn't. It couldn't be more clear that such an action along your eastern borders would lead to executions for gross negligence. Not so here.

Today the afghani and Pakistani people suffer for the presence of these men in your nation.

On a personal note, Kasrkin, I'm fully aware and capable of admitting mistakes I believe may have been made by my nation. There's little that I'd dispute from FIASCO by Tom Ricks. Sean Naylor's Not A Good Day To Die about Tora Bora is a respected if embarassing accounting of much of our higher command in early 2002 of which I concur. We've had any number of attacks in Afghanistan that have caused grievous casualties, to include upon our own allies and, certainly, civilians.

There. If you've never seen such comments before at least you have now.

Thanks.

 

[Kasrkin]

Lot of excuses that don't wash with me. Evidently your general staff has never planned for the defense of your nation from the west or considered the various manners by which that possible assault might occur.

These are not excuses, just facts. Because like I said before, we don't in the slightest feel the need to excuse ourselves in front of you of all people.

And also, not for the first time and probably not the last, you're wrong. The PA has always had an extensive contingency plan to deal with Tribal belligerents in the west. These plans were inherited from the British and extended and improved by us over time, because these unruly tribes are after all the second greatest threat to Pakistan’s stability after the million-man Indian Army. They were used by us in the 60s at the time of an Afghan backed tribal insurrection in Bajour, they were refined later on with Soviets and their proxies were instigating subversive activities in Pakistan’s borders. But obviously no plan is ever completely fool proof; it is understandable if we over-estimated a superpower’s ability and commitment to deal with a rag-tag zealot militia particularly with what the world was expecting after 9/11, as we did your ability to abstain from blundering interference in our borders and making enough mistakes for the both of us. Sure we made some miscalculations and took some missteps, but that doesn’t validate the context or proportion or nature of the insinuations you’re found of making; particularly given your complete inability to indulge in self-appraisal.

 

[dabong1]

Don't be silly.

What so silly about my idea?