Xeric
RETIRED THINK TANK
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A valiant effort, however for the context of the quote, see Xeric's earlier post.
Army not a police force? Interesting idea - Once again, it will be instructive to look at the kind of war the islamist insurgent has imposed on us, low intensity, long term destabilization and delegitimization of the State - Does the army need to retool and reorganize for that?? Apparently like with Xeric, we simply do not agree on the nature of the threat.
I repeat that we need to focus on the economy, you counter with tax reform , etc, -- yes, by all means, these are elements of Economic reform.
And then there is charge, posited as if an objection, that the transition from army to police force is unnecessary --- Yes, certainly, after all, no one is suggesting that the army become the police, though policing is defintely going to be something the army will be involved with (see the nature of the war the islamist insurgent has imposed on us)
Musey, i think the article was published with a bad timing.
Just for a second consider this article being published before or around the time when the Army went in Swat with zeal and zest. Ahaha...perfect timings, but not today. Why?
Well the 'change' and 'shift' that the writer suggest has already been implemented by the Army (well before the suggestions came, atleast the military had understood the requirement for change around that time period). The change that the writer suggest primarily focuses around the change from fighting a conventional conflict to an unconventional conflict. Unconventional conflict bolay tu LIC or COIN. This require (alot of) mechanization, change in SOPs, change in operational procedures, change in tactics, change in battle procedures etc. Now these are just a very few factors that i have mentioned which require a change so that a force can shift itself from a conventional fighting force to an unconventional fighting force. The main factor is the change in focus and this change was made the day it was decided that an operation is now necessary in Swat. Further, in order for a military to undergo this change, apart from emphasis on mobilization, one also needs to make changes in the equipment, not only the major equipment but also the minor equipment which ranges from uniform, helmet, signal equipment, weapons/small arms, web equipment etc.
The way today's soldier dresses is quite different from what it did in the past (atleast before Op RN), we didnt see soldiers wearing bullet proof jackets in the past, they do it now. We have synergized with the airforce, we evacuate casualties on helis now (mobility), we had heli-droped our men (again mobility), though we dont have GPS fitted watches but we make use of GPS tech quite frequently, we dont have Hummvees but we have tried to mock them, we dont have counter-IED (C-IED) vehicles but we have made arrangements to our holdings so that they can counter the effects of IEDs, we may not be employing NetCen Warfare but we have alternatives for this too by the grace of jugards etc etc, all related to 'technology'. Now if we go by suggestion of the writer, perhaps we should have withdrawn the double cabins and issued them with Humvees and other modern equipment related to spec ops and COIN, and believe me the solution that the writer presents (reducing the numbers) is/would never have been enough for cater for the funds for this modernization. Apart from this we still have Sparklingways to audit the military expenditures!!
Now it is easy to sit behind a table and tell us to 'modernize' (i.e. mechanize and air lift ONLY) and extract funds by reducing the numbers, but then actually doing it on ground is totally a different domain. It is also easy to suggest by sitting behind a table that the Fauj should undergo an ABSOLUTE change by renouncing the conventional war fighting techniques and totally shifting to a new system that only focuses around COIN and internal security, but then understanding that an enemy does exist towards our east and we need to keep a potent conventional war fighting capability to ward off this threat and at the same time also remain viable and capable to fight off insurgency is the essence of this change, which indeed we have been successful in doing though we paid a huge price for it.
The phenomenon of 'either you are with us or with them' like in this case which suggest that we should totally shift from an Army to a Policing Force at the same time considering that we are still clinging around with WW2 era tactics is wrong.
There are other changes that have been implemented at Army and strategic levels which i dont feel like discussing, which confirms that the military has changed.
So in short, the Fauj has infact changed, though not exactly as per the dictates of neo-cons.
At the most what we can do is raise a new force as already been discussed elsewhere on this forum by professionals and TTs dedicated for COIN on the line of FBI or any other ATT force. But this, as already been discussed, would require gigantic effort in terms of funds etc if the force is raised from scratch or alot of effort if we decide to raise this force out of the existing holding state.