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Towards a new & Improved Fauj

What makes you argue that they two generals mentioned above are against peace? Kiyani was after all involved in the back-channel peace talks with India under Musharraf.

He was also present in the room when Musharraf told CJ Chaudhry he was not wanted. Didn't speak a word.

I understand that his essential point of view is to be found in his actions rather than in his words.
 
He was also present in the room when Musharraf told CJ Chaudhry he was not wanted. Didn't speak a word.

I understand that his essential point of view is to be found in his actions rather than in his words.

And what part of his actions do you interpret as indicating he is 'against peace'?

May I remind you that it is not Kiyani who has advocated a 'two front war' or 'limited conventional conflict under a nuclear umbrella', or for that matter exhibited any inclination to adventurism such as India's in Siachen and Pakistan's in Kargil.

I therefore fail to understand why so many in the Indian media and intelligentsia have taken to branding him as 'anti-peace'. If we are basing such analysis on their 'actions', as you indicated you are, then what 'actions' on the part of Kiyani and Pasha are we using to justify this 'anti-peace' mindset being attributed to them?
 
Oh and if you have links with some influentials please give them a phone call and ask them not to throw everyone seeking Khilafat into jail...
If you are referring to the arrests of the HuT members protesting in Lahore today, then I agree with you. So long as it was a peaceful protest it should have been allowed to continue. I do think that the HuT could do itself a big favor by avowing to change the system through gaining the peoples support in elections, and not talk about 'overthrowing XYZ'. A shift in the perceived methods to bring about change by the HuT might assist in changing perceptions about it and ending the ban on it.
Regards... Your previous post was excellent
Thank you - all this military bashing is resulting in analysis that is akin to 'mistaking a tree for the woods'. The issues crippling Pakistan, whether it be in COIN or development, remain the ineptitude and corruption in the civilian administration and the institutions (such as law enforcement, domestic intelligence and Public Enterprises etc.) the civilian administrations run.

Any resource gains from a 'leaner, meaner military' (which as I argued will likely not even happen if we are to make the military 'meaner' through better technology and training) will be miniscule compared to the resources being lost from poor governance by the civilian administration and the loss making Public Sector Enterprises costing Pakistan magnitudes more than the entire defence budget every year.
 
Niaz sahib,

IMO focusing on upgrading the quality of hardware and training (even with a leaner military) will end up being a more expensive proposition than the current manpower heavy 'mid-tech' military we have. High tech and higher quality hardware will cost a pretty penny when imported, and significant investment in domestic R&D and infrastructure if procured locally. Increasing the quality and quantity of training will also entail significantly higher expenses in procuring, setting up and maintaining the necessary equipment and infrastructure to support that increase. As it is our training costs are significantly higher than they used to be since soldiers in the Army are now being trained in FIBUA and COIN as well as their conventional military training. Significant resources have been put into (and continue to be) setting up the infrastructure and procure equipment required to support FIBUA and COIN training.

Returning to the author's point about 're-orienting the military' towards the domestic threat - I believe that has already been undertaken to a significant degree with the additional training being imparted (mentioned above). I also believe that the author is completely wrong in suggesting a permanent or complete re-orientation of the military (anything significantly more than what is already being done) since it ignores one of the more widely understood and critical lessons of COIN, namely, 'the locals taking on security responsibilities'.

Pakistan is an ethnically diverse nation and FATA especially has historically been autonomous. The Army, comprised largely of soldiers from outside of FATA, will always be an outside force given the current cultural and political dynamics of FATA. As such, the Army is only useful as a COIN tool in limited applications, such as those we have already seen - large scale military operations utilizing FIBUA and COIN tactics and strategy to clear out organized extremist networks, and maintaining a presence till local authorities are strong enough to take control. The key here is not the 're-orientation of the military', rather the 're-orientation of the civilian administration and law enforcement'.

We can 're-orient the military' all we want, but at the end of the day the military will still be an outside force and the locals will have to step up and take charge in governance and enforcing law and order through whatever local security setup they put in place. What is needed more than 'reform in the Fauj' is reform in the civilian administration and civilian law enforcement and intelligence apparatus. Without that we have no long term and sustainable solution to extremism, terrorism and lack of law and order.

No one will deny that fighting ability to a large extent depends upon economic strength. I am proposing that that we give top priority to economic growth. This growth needs to be funded; such funds should not come from borrowing but generated from within.

Thru defusing tension on the Eastern border, we could live with a disproportionate number of defence forces Vis a Vis India for a few years and allocate savings in the defence expenditure towards the strengthening economy. However, this alone is not enough. A multifaceted approach such as increasing overall revenue thru increased taxation; savings thru making white elephants such as WAPDA, PIA, Railways and Steel Mill profitable is required.

This being a defence forum, it is the right place to discuss defence cuts. For sake of argument let us say that we reduce numerical strength of a division from the current 12 – 15 thousand to about ten thousand but make up the difference thru improvement in fire power and fighting ability. Additionally by converting part of the heavy desert infantry to mobile light infantry to improve COIN capability and assigning all the clerical and non-combat jobs to civilian personnel, we could possibly reduce the land army by about 100,000. IMO this reduction should not impair our ability to fight WOT nor should it affect ethnic diversity of the army. No doubt training and equipment would cost more but there should still be substantial overall reduction in the annual military expenditure.

Only reason India can afford to spend more on defence than our entire annual budget is that her economy has grown large enough to allow it. I repeat that I am not proposing a weak defence, I am proposing less emphasis on defence for about 5 years until we get our economy right.

I am also suggesting that we think out of the box and stop trying to keep pace with India. Our aim should be to give top priority to our economic growth in the short term. After a few years of sustained growth, we would be able to allocate more funds (even though a lower percentage of GDP) to defence and make up the imbalance in a short time.

To this end we need to establish Think Tanks made up of ‘Top notch ‘professionals in their fields (including Military professionals) free from political interference to come with the best options of achieving our objectives.

I would be the first one to agree that it is easier said than done. Before anything can be put into practice it has to be approved from the parliament. There would be strong resistance from religious fanatic lobby such as JI who would be promising to wave Pakistan flag on the red fort. There would definitely be a challenge from the conservative military as well as civilian establishment as any paradigm shift is likely to badly hurt their interests. There would also be a small group who would say that all you need is to establish an Islamic emirate and all the problems will be solved as if with a magic wand. Some would appeal to our national honour. Defence forces are for the defence of the nation, but the nation is not an abstract idea but made up of individuals. What are the defence forces going to defend if most of the nationals are living in abject poverty.

As a Pakistani (no more no less) I would like my countrymen to have access to clean drinking water, adequate health care, good education and jobs when they complete their education. These things won’t come easy and the nation would need concrete effort and sacrifices before we can achieve our goal. Only Allah know whether we will succeed or not, but we would never know if we don’t try.
 
And what part of his actions do you interpret as indicating he is 'against peace'?

May I remind you that it is not Kiyani who has advocated a 'two front war' or 'limited conventional conflict under a nuclear umbrella', or for that matter exhibited any inclination to adventurism such as India's in Siachen and Pakistan's in Kargil.

I therefore fail to understand why so many in the Indian media and intelligentsia have taken to branding him as 'anti-peace'. If we are basing such analysis on their 'actions', as you indicated you are, then what 'actions' on the part of Kiyani and Pasha are we using to justify this 'anti-peace' mindset being attributed to them?

It is difficult to understand your bellicose attitude, even more difficult to keep answering patiently in the teeth of the increasing animosity of your posts.

Precisely what response do you expect to your ingenuous question? A listing of articles and news-items and analysis pieces? The originals? How many will do? Or is it that seeking such information is merely rhetoric, and you have made up your mind, and do not wish to be confused by the facts? Do let me know, and you will get the information that you are seeking.

I didn't post to this thread to look for a fight. However, if you happen to be in a bad temper and want to get into an argument, that's your call. Feel free to ask whatever you want, and you will get it. No issues.
 
Mr K's approach with India.. is his approach everywhere else..
He has been this way from the start..
Kautious Kayani..
He was opposed to the kargil plan yet went along with it.
He was opposed to Lal Masjid.. yet went along with it.
But his cautious approach is not to be taken as indecisiveness.
 
Friends:

Going by the Title of the thread and the two lead pieces, "Restructuring and Retooling.." and "Restructuring The ISI" , the purpose of the thread is to allow us to re-imagine the Strategic imperatives for Pakistan and to explore it's building blocks in progressively more complex and detailed schema - and keeping with that the piece below is will be seen as a most interesting and logical progression, given the wars Pakistan have decided she must fight and prevail in
:


The eternal embrace

Shahzad Chaudhry



From the most preferred allies bound in a proclaimed strategic relationship, the US and Pakistan find themselves estranged and increasingly adrift. This was a relationship founded on weak fundamentals, not one of choice but of convenience. This was a need-based relationship, has always been. For the two to gradually drift apart is but natural and an inevitable end to a cyclical association.

It has not yet ended but is almost there. Somewhere in July and beyond in 2010, there was this increased need for the two military commanders of each side to meet more often and develop a common understanding of the motives, objectives and strategies that needed to bring some success to the Afghan War. There may have been some understanding reached but mostly it was a case of both sides talking through the other; the camaraderie that both enjoyed till then seemed to have taken a clear back seat. First in Geneva, at a NATO and their allies meet, and then in October at the Pakistan-US strategic dialogue, General Kayani, Pakistan’s Army chief, spelt out in clear terms Pakistan’s apprehensions and hopes on how the situation in Afghanistan could be moved towards a respectable resolution. No, it was not about ‘strategic depth’, that most commentators in Pakistan use to lash out at the military, nor a government of Pakistan’s choice in Afghanistan after the US left, but simply a case of Pakistan being given her rightful place at the table as the endgame is played out in Afghanistan. Pakistan already stretched in the east, and likely to be heavily engaged internally in a long war to eliminate extremist strands from Pakistan’s societal midst, cannot afford a third front in the shape of either an inimical Afghanistan or a placid Afghanistan under inimical influence — read India. The reformulation of Pakistan’s threat perception into a less hostile determination is possible but, for that to happen, relations on the India-Pakistan front will need dramatic improvement, something unlikely in the short run.

But I digress. The US and Pakistan are in an unequal relationship. The concept of sovereign equality works well between two evenly matched states but where the tenor is more patron-client, sovereignty is a fabled dream. Pakistan’s politics is American-sponsored; no major party with a reasonable possibility to assume power will ever want to annoy the US with critical statements. The Raymond Davis case is a typical example; when he was finally released, all hell broke loose in phenomenal grandstanding, but while he was still in and the government seemed at a loss on how to appease all quarters, the president sought an All Parties Conference to find a way out of the imbroglio; not a soul moved — so much for Pakistan’s political double-speak. With a government in power, and others like the Sharif brothers indirect beneficiaries on the back of an American-sponsored National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO), it is unlikely that Pakistan can break loose from this eternal embrace.

Similarly, Pakistan will not tax its electorate — the PPP, its agricultural support base and the PML-N and MQM, its trader groups. As such Pakistan stays perpetually indebted to American handouts as the Kerry-Lugar Bill (KLB) arrangement or the IMF-World Bank-Asian Development Bank (IFIs) facilitation. The US carries majority votes in each of these institutions, which are critical to keeping the Pakistani economy afloat during this war against militancy and extremism. The PPP in power has been bereft of any ideas on how to move the economy under a convenient ruse of the economy being a war economy and hence okay to remain impoverished. Not that there are no options. The PPP has never had the economy on their radar, so Pakistan continues to languish.

Militarily too, Pakistan has been traditionally US-provisioned. It is no gainsaying that Pakistan’s difficult neighbourhood imposes its own dynamics, making it imperative to seek a bigger bang for every buck that the military must spend. The military espouses a reasonably well-founded professional tradition built around some real cutting edge capabilities. Most are American in origin, others are either not as good or as cost-efficient. The F-16 remains the easiest bogey in Pakistani discourse but most forget that prior to the recent induction of 18 later-model versions, the other fleet is approaching three decades of service with the PAF. Most other fighters are even older. Yet these were paid for with Pakistani money. What the military now covets however is the three billion dollars in aid over the next five years that will bring some newer technologies to the army, which remains desperately short on much desired improvements. This too keeps Pakistan beholden to the US.

Get to the war now. What began as one war has slowly degenerated into a two-war reality. When political aims, strategic objectives and operational strategies remain different, when geo-politics rules end-state culmination, when latent objectives remain latent and do not get shared and when in operational terms the two armies that operate in two distinct geographic regions, even though contiguous, have centres of gravity that are literally poles apart in geographic terms — Kandahar and North Waziristan — there is little if any operational synchronisation in their application. Led by two different commanders, these are two different wars fought by two different armies with significantly different capabilities. It is best to recognise these as two different wars that, in effect, since these are being fought with the common purpose of eliminating extremism and militancy, feed into the supra-strategic level and help the same larger cause but in their own separate ways. Come to think of it, a constant US blame of Pakistan not doing North Waziristan, Pakistan blaming US drone attacks and her many special operatives active in its midst, the CIA and the ISI suspecting each other whole hog but keeping up appearances and Gary Ackermann popping the inevitable on the US’s misplaced regional preferences, and all of the US wondering what in this world these Pakistanis think of themselves when not playing to the tune of the US when she is the one that pays their bills. All this, and then some, lead to this irremediable acrimony.

My solution: treat the war as two separate wars without one being answerable to the other. Let each fight his way using whatever works best for them to appease, conciliate, reintegrate and mainstream people back into the peaceful fold of the past, ensuring that vulnerabilities are not allowed to re-emerge. Even the Taliban, around another time, will be a lot smarter than to play the international crusader. To appease Ackermann and Co, if KLB may not come through let the IFIs alone sustain Pakistan in the short-term; in the meanwhile, Pakistan must find some spine to reform and rekindle her economy. The military should restructure and reorient based on political direction that should be returned its flexibility to work problems with India, the Taliban, and in Balochistan on politico-economic planks.

That way, when we tout sovereignty, it will make an agreeable noise. That way we would obviate the need for any drones to test our sovereignty on a daily basis. We would also stop demeaning ourselves around the baseless banter of being listless. The true sovereign is Allah alone. That should put all else to rest.



Shahzad Chaudhry is a political and defence analyst
 
What makes you argue that they two generals mentioned above are against peace? Kiyani was after all involved in the back-channel peace talks with India under Musharraf.

He was also present in the room when Musharraf told CJ Chaudhry he was not wanted. Didn't speak a word.

I understand that his essential point of view is to be found in his actions rather than in his words.

And what part of his actions do you interpret as indicating he is 'against peace'?

May I remind you that it is not Kiyani who has advocated a 'two front war' or 'limited conventional conflict under a nuclear umbrella', or for that matter exhibited any inclination to adventurism such as India's in Siachen and Pakistan's in Kargil.

I therefore fail to understand why so many in the Indian media and intelligentsia have taken to branding him as 'anti-peace'. If we are basing such analysis on their 'actions', as you indicated you are, then what 'actions' on the part of Kiyani and Pasha are we using to justify this 'anti-peace' mindset being attributed to them?

It is difficult to understand your bellicose attitude, even more difficult to keep answering patiently in the teeth of the increasing animosity of your posts.

Precisely what response do you expect to your ingenuous question? A listing of articles and news-items and analysis pieces? The originals? How many will do? Or is it that seeking such information is merely rhetoric, and you have made up your mind, and do not wish to be confused by the facts? Do let me know, and you will get the information that you are seeking.

I didn't post to this thread to look for a fight. However, if you happen to be in a bad temper and want to get into an argument, that's your call. Feel free to ask whatever you want, and you will get it. No issues.

I have quoted my two posts addressed to you and your response - I fail to see what exactly in my posts you see as 'bellicose and animus'.

You made a claim and I asked you to justify it. Until you actually justify your claim with some facts, you can hardly accuse me of 'not wanting to be confused by the facts'.
 
Clearly now there are two competing ideas in the general public and we must welcome all developments which allow us all to participate - On one hand, the idea that Pakistan's real enemies are Islamist insurgents and that the very nature of that struggle is a long low intensity struggle designed to rob the state of it's legitimacy and ultimately destroy it - and that therefore, in order to deal with this threat, the strategic threat perception has to change as well, from being a India centric one, to one that is focused on destroying the Islamist insurgents. The peace with India, under the direction of elected civilian politicians, with the approval of the armed forces will mark the institutionalization of democratic governance and the normalization of Pakistani politics, and a break from the Arabian paradigm of radical politics and policies designed to project internal pressures outward towards the designated object of hostility. A peace with India led by the civilian elected politicians will give the armed forces both the opportunity and space to retool and reorganize itself, even as it gives the Pakistan economy to be able to support the war effort without US capital and the strings it will come with.

Alternately, an opposing idea that see much utility in ambiguity, with regard to the relationship with the US, with regard to the commitment against the islamist insurgents, with regard to India - proponents of this idea, first of all are utopians - they seek to secure for themselves the moniker of "islamist", educated and articulate, they are motivated by pan islamism and see Pakistan and her army and the strategic capability of the armed forces as theirs for the taking, in this regard, they and the present day Islamist insurgents are no different.

To ensure that the Pakistan armed forces do not transition and that those with present day vested interests remain represented in to the near future and to ensure that the policies of the Pakistan State remain in a state of ambiguity, the argument is offered that the civilian politicians tolerate (read engage) in gross negligence and corruption in state institutions run by civilians and that Pakistan armed forces are not a drain on the economy and that the elected civilians use the army as a whipping boy and worse still that these elected civilians do not understand the national interest and the role of India as belligerent.

Personally I persuaded by the former rather than the latter. Which way will the Pakistan army decide? I genuinely think that this decision is not anywhere close to being made in the very near future -- and I, judging from past performance, do not think, not without the US intervening with positive policies, that is to say a break from the near past and a rejection of the fanatics who run that policy, that the Fauj will make the right decision, there is just too much for her to lose, both in terms of the financial and armaments she has set herself to acquire.
 
Clearly now there are two competing ideas in the general public and we must welcome all developments which allow us all to participate - On one hand, the idea that Pakistan's real enemies are Islamist insurgents and that the very nature of that struggle is a long low intensity struggle designed to rob the state of it's legitimacy and ultimately destroy it - and that therefore, in order to deal with this threat, the strategic threat perception has to change as well, from being a India centric one, to one that is focused on destroying the Islamist insurgents. The peace with India, under the direction of elected civilian politicians, with the approval of the armed forces will mark the institutionalization of democratic governance and the normalization of Pakistani politics, and a break from the Arabian paradigm of radical politics and policies designed to project internal pressures outward towards the designated object of hostility. A peace with India led by the civilian elected politicians will give the armed forces both the opportunity and space to retool and reorganize itself, even as it gives the Pakistan economy to be able to support the war effort without US capital and the strings it will come with.
With all due respect, your analysis is full of flaws, some of which I have already outlined in my response earlier to Niaz, and elsewhere. 'Peace with India' is not going to bring about any 'surge in development and economic growth', because there is nothing to indicate that the current political leadership (in power and out of power) has any intention of implementing the necessary tax reforms or restructuring the Public Sector Enterprises that are hemorrhaging tens of billions of dollars every year, directly and indirectly.

Nor do the current lot of political leaders appear inclined to implement institutional reforms in law enforcement and other security agencies such as domestic intelligence, customs, border security etc. that would assist in creating an environment in which investors and the average citizen feels comfortable, and all sorts of criminal activity (including extremists and terrorists) are kept in check and the law applied fairly to all.

Without addressing these deep structural problems, peace with India does very little. In terms of 're-orienting the military', that is a flawed and uninformed argument to begin with given the existing COIN and FIBUA training programs already being implemented by the Army, and the fact that at the end of the day the insurgency can only be defeated long term through LOCAL cooperation and institutions. Again, these arguments of 're-orientation' are nothing but attempts to deflect away from the actual malaise affecting Pakistan - which continues to be the weak civilian institutions that are necessary for 'holding' and rebuilding' the space created by military operations against insurgents and extremists. I am not arguing against 'peace with India', but I do have to point out the flaws and failings in the 'overly optimistic' scenarios being concocted here through 'peace with India'.

Alternately, an opposing idea that see much utility in ambiguity, with regard to the relationship with the US, with regard to the commitment against the islamist insurgents, with regard to India - proponents of this idea, first of all are utopians - they seek to secure for themselves the moniker of "islamist", educated and articulate, they are motivated by pan islamism and see Pakistan and her army and the strategic capability of the armed forces as theirs for the taking, in this regard, they and the present day Islamist insurgents are no different.
This is really irrelevant and based on a lack of understanding of what drives support for 'utopian Islamist government' ideas.

What drives many of the rank and file and average supporters of this particular idea is, again, the inability of those governing Pakistan to deliver on the basic demands of the citizenry. There is a power shortfall, there are not enough resources to provide educational and health facilities or other necessary infrastructure and services like roads, sanitation, clean water, transport etc. There are not enough resources partly due to corruption and mismanagement in almost every department of the government, but also largely because of the lack of tax reforms and the Public Sector Enterprises mentioned already.

The only reason the 'opposing idea', as you put it, has enough support to be an issue is because the current system is not delivering, and 'peace with India' by itself will do nothing to change that. Again, this is wishy washy simplistic thinking - an attempt to look for simple answers and bogeymen to resolve complex and deep rooted structural problems.

the argument is offered that the civilian politicians tolerate (read engage) in gross negligence and corruption in state institutions run by civilians and that Pakistan armed forces are not a drain on the economy and that the elected civilians use the army as a whipping boy and worse still that these elected civilians do not understand the national interest and the role of India as belligerent.
That is absolutely correct, and I have offered the facts and figures to support my argument that the real drain, by many magnitudes, on the resources of Pakistan (or lack of resources if you will) are the PSE's that drain tens of billions of dollars annually from the economy (directly and indirectly) and the lack of tax reforms that drain potentially tens of billions of dollars more annually. Now compare the losses from those two sectors to a defence budget of $4 to $6 billion, depending on how you figure out the numbers. I fail to see how any rational individual could argue against the argument I have made, especially when you have not offered any sort of refutation to the argument, other than attempting ad hominem attacks and labeling those making the argument as 'Islamists and anti-democracy thugs'.
Personally I persuaded by the former rather than the latter.
You can be persuaded by whatever you want, but let me point out to you that you are 'persuaded' without offering any factual refutation of the argument you reject.
Which way will the Pakistan army decide? I genuinely think that this decision is not anywhere close to being made in the very near future -- and I, judging from past performance, do not think, not without the US intervening with positive policies, that is to say a break from the near past and a rejection of the fanatics who run that policy, that the Fauj will make the right decision, there is just too much for her to lose, both in terms of the financial and armaments she has set herself to acquire.
The Fauj has decided - it has engaged in extensive training programs in COIN and FIBUA for its regular troops, in conjunction with its conventional military training, and it has deployed a significant number of troops to combat insurgents and terrorists. But the Fauj is not a police force, and it should not be expected to the do the job a of a police force when we already have law enforcement agencies in every part of the country. The Fauj has delivered magnificently on COIN and FIBUA, given its constraints. What is needed now is for the civilian governments at the Center and provinces to step up and 'reform, reorient, train and equip' the local law enforcement agencies and other civilian institutions to 'hold and build' the areas freed by the military.

We need to stop deflecting from the real issues that need to be addressed for the sustainable development and progress of Pakistan - in that context what is expected of the Fauj is to avoid usurping power, and let the elected governments function, reform and deliver.
 
I think what Pakistan need on priority bases is improvement in every other ministry but defence.

Army by far is the best organisation and have proven her self as one of the best on every occasion.
No doubt there is always room for improvement but where??? ............and what are we going to achieve next?

All what is needed to improve is that state shall start owning army and politicians shall stop promoting officers out of turn and without recommendation of senior officer.
Unfortunately, all such articles are sanctioned and paid by govt. it self... exactly like the govt. pleaded Kerry logger bill.
Why now this spark.......in the middle of war and course of events and meetings!!!! ? :confused:

IMO.. by pursuing further improvement in army........... we'll be waisting our limited resources and energies for little or no fruit.
if any improvement needed in armed services than it is navy, its growing weaker day by day and no ground work is being set by current naval chief for the deputy.

Our army is already, fighting war against traitors, black water and now openly accepted by US the infamous CIA is also workign agaisnt Pak army.
Not to mention, Iranians, Indian and NA nexus. :undecided:

Senseless approach.... IMO. :hitwall:

Instead, we shall put all available resources and energies in improvement of other ministries and organisations, where criminals and 10 grade are heading ministires.
The dismal performance of interior, foreign, finance and justice ministries is open book and just by changing any thing would be an improvement.

Go to market its full of smuggled goods... who is sleeping on this one?
 
I think what Pakistan need on priority bases is improvement in every other ministry but defence.

An example of the latter, rather than the former - and an excellent articulation, if I may add.
 
No one will deny that fighting ability to a large extent depends upon economic strength. I am proposing that that we give top priority to economic growth. This growth needs to be funded; such funds should not come from borrowing but generated from within.
I have no argument with that, and I have argued in favor of the same through restructuring/privatizing the PSE's that cost Pakistan billions of dollars ever year, as well as through tax reforms and expansion, several times.

Thru defusing tension on the Eastern border, we could live with a disproportionate number of defence forces Vis a Vis India for a few years and allocate savings in the defence expenditure towards the strengthening economy. However, this alone is not enough. A multifaceted approach such as increasing overall revenue thru increased taxation; savings thru making white elephants such as WAPDA, PIA, Railways and Steel Mill profitable is required.
Again, I have nothing against peace with India, but it would be naive to argue that a situation can be created where the Indians remove their military from the borders and Pakistan can cut back on its military forces, in any short term time span. Negotiations towards 'peace', building up the trust levels on both sides, and then the eventual Indian military pull back and subsequent Pakistani military reduction is a process that will likely take over a decade, given where we stand today in bilateral relations. As such, arguing for 'military expense reductions' in the context of 'peace with India' to 'focus on development for a few years' is simply unfeasible in the near to medium term. We simply cannot create the conditions on the ground to implement a significant reduction in military expenses in any reasonable time frame. If you see ways where significant reductions in military expenditure can be achieved in the short term, that I have neglected, please expand upon them, because I certainly do not.

Therefore, the only solution, for additional resource generation that can be plowed into development, is on the civilian side through the restructuring/privatization of the PSE's and tax base expansion. The revenues generated from just privatizing the PSE's alone (even if for free) would be almost equivalent to the entire amount spent on the defence budget. These are solutions that can actually be implemented in a reasonable time frame, and provide far more resources than 'trimming the defence budget' ever could.

This being a defence forum, it is the right place to discuss defence cuts. For sake of argument let us say that we reduce numerical strength of a division from the current 12 – 15 thousand to about ten thousand but make up the difference thru improvement in fire power and fighting ability. Additionally by converting part of the heavy desert infantry to mobile light infantry to improve COIN capability and assigning all the clerical and non-combat jobs to civilian personnel, we could possibly reduce the land army by about 100,000. IMO this reduction should not impair our ability to fight WOT nor should it affect ethnic diversity of the army. No doubt training and equipment would cost more but there should still be substantial overall reduction in the annual military expenditure.
It is a defence forum, but the topics discussed here cover a lot of diverse ground. I have nothing inherently against defence cuts, but the context in which we are discussing these cuts is 'more funds into development' and 'peace with India' -and I have pointed out why this proposal is unfeasible at this point, and why far more resources can be generated through reforms on the civilian side.
Only reason India can afford to spend more on defence than our entire annual budget is that her economy has grown large enough to allow it. I repeat that I am not proposing a weak defence, I am proposing less emphasis on defence for about 5 years until we get our economy right.
Again, please see my arguments at the beginning of this post about why the defence expenditure reduction proposal is unfeasible.
 
An example of the latter, rather than the former - and an excellent articulation, if I may add.
Pakistan stands to gain substantially more resources through reforms in the civilian sector (as outlined) than it stands to gain through cuts in the military budget.

I am still waiting for you to illustrate why that argument is wrong.
 
I am still waiting for you to illustrate why that argument is wrong.


Now, why would I want to do that - The positions I am supporting are:

1. Pakistan's main threat is internal - Yes, the Islamist insurgency, the true scale of which remains hidden from most Pakistanis.

Do you agree with this - or Are you in the "it's more comfortable to hate India" club??

2. The Pakistan Army has for more than 60 years been focused on India as the threat - this, certainly justified, has given the army much control over politics, policies and government expenditures, however, seen from the light of point number 1, the threat matrix is now substantially different, particularly since the international community will not support changing the border by force of arms, especially when it involves two and possibly three nuclear powers.

3. Given 1 and 2, Pakistan in order to prevail in the long war (see 1) ought to strengthen her economy and build regional alliances or structures of trust - read peace with India -- now, some will use this to suggest that we forget the captives of Kashmir - certainly not, we just do not pursue our aims on the backs of religious bigots cut from the same cloth as those who explode bombs, do suicide operations and fight the Paak Fauj .

Your point that we can create efficiencies broadly in the economy - sure, I'm all for it.
 

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