Towards a new & Improved Fauj

[Xeric]

Well atlast it is guud to know that Musey was able to word his thoughts (through this article).

Ok.

One, the article is correct in a sense that the nature of conflict has indeed changed. But how the change affect our case is the real point that needs to be discussed. With indian doctrines like Limited War and Cold Start, one needs to take the 'change' with a pinch of salt.

Two, the article talks about modernization. Well not exactly modernization but mobilization of foot elements, this includes massive air lift capabilities and emphasis on wheeled (not tracked) ordnance. Now this needs funds. The writers suggest that these funds should be generated by 'reducing' the military's size significantly. But the writers forgets that (purchasing) and maintaining an APC, Heli, F/A aircraft or a self-propelled artillery piece is more expensive then recruiting, training and 'maintaining' (both during the service and after it culminates) a soldier. You can either buy and maintain a squadron of wings or instead you can enjoy the luxuries of a Division size force for life time.

Three, the article completely takes away the india equation out of the context. Oh, i forgot, Musey and those he quotes dont take india as a threat. Nevertheless, considering india a cow while translating this 'paradigm shift' into actions would not be a guud idea while we see the US leaving Afg in near future, keeping in mind the water disputes and mingling by india in certain of our internal affairs. More importantly, the concept (of change) that the writer had penned down revolves primarily around the availability of an internal enemy ONLY and NO external or to be more precise an existential threat. This, my friend is false. Ok, i understand, as the writer puts it, that "the nature of war has changed; acquisition of space or destruction of force are no more valid as strategic objectives", and that the futuristic form of conflict will not be outside the borders but within the confines of our border, but then there has to be available a potent deterrent basing upon which we can inform the enemy that we have the capability to take the war to THEM, or else, any tommy, dicky or harry would feel the itch to finger us where ever feel like.

On anther note, if this article had been written prior to May 1999, i am sure it must have suggested that there's no need for Pakistan going nuclear!

 

[Joe Shearer]

http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/article548266.ece?homepage=true"]

Late in April, Ashfaq Pervez Kayani stood before a solemn audience that had gathered to mark Martyrs Day.

“There is no greater honour than martyrdom”, Pakistan's army chief said, “nor any aspiration greater than it. When people are determined to achieve great objectives, they develop the faith needed to trust their lives to the care of Allah. We are well aware of the historical reality that nations must be willing to make great sacrifices for their freedom”. “I am proud”, he went on, “that the nation has never forgotten the sacrifices of its martyrs and holy warriors”.

If it hadn't been for General Kayani's impeccably-ironed military uniform, his audience might have been forgiven for believing that the speech was being made by the Islamist clerics who have exhorted insurgents to claim the lives of over 2,700 Pakistani troops in combat.

Pakistan's Prime Minister went on national television in July to give his country's army chief an unprecedented three year extension of service. The decision has won applause in some western capitals, as well as from some liberal and conservative commentators in Pakistan. In the midst of a bitter war against Islamists many believe poses the greatest existential threat Pakistan has ever faced, Kayani's supporters believe its army needs continuity of leadership.

Those propositions might be true — but casts little light on the strategic considerations which have given Kayani three more years in office. Pakistan's army hopes, in essence, that Kayani will be able to craft a way out of the crisis without compromising the power and influence of its generals.

Islamabad elites had long been discussing Kayani's plans to secure an extension; this newspaper carried an extensive discussion of the issue in March. Key politicians, though, were evidently clueless. On May 17, Pakistani Defence Minister Chaudhry Ahmed Mukhtar said the government “was neither granting extension to Chief of Army Staff; nor had the general sought it.” But just a week later, media reported that a conference of corps commanders had called for an extension.

Some accounts hold that President Asif Ali Zardari, who is distrusted by the army, had little choice but to accept this fait accompli. Other commentary suggests both President Zardari and Prime Minister Gilani went along with decision, hoping to stave off any confrontation with the armed forces until 2013 — the year their terms in office end. Either way, as Pakistani lawyer and political commentator Asma Jehangir has noted, the extension suggests “that democracy has not taken root. The decision was taken on the basis of obvious pressure from the military”.

But just what was it that drove this pressure? Pakistan's army isn't, after all, short of competent commanders. “My advice to Kayani”, wrote the commentator Kamran Shafi days before the extension, “would be to issue his last Order of the Day on the appointed date of his retirement, receive his successor in General Head-Quarters, and after a cup of tea get into his private car and fade away.” There are good reasons, though, why that advice wasn't heeded.

The Pakistan army's agenda

Kayani is at the centre of three projects critical to the long-term power of the Pakistan army. The first is this: extricating the Pakistan army from a counter-insurgency campaign that appears unwinnable. During Kayani's visit to troops in Orakzai on June 1, the Pakistan army announced “the successful conclusion of operations in the Agency”. But, as analyst Tushar Ranjan Mohanty recently pointed out, it has admitted to over a dozen engagements there since, involving the use of combat jets and helicopter gunships. Refugees displaced last year are yet to return.

Hoping to manoeuvre an exit, Kayani has escalated support to the jihadist networks of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and Maulana Jalaluddin Haqqani. Last week, Canadian diplomat Chris Alexander — who spent seven years serving his country and the United Nations in Afghanistan — charged Kayani with “sponsoring a large-scale, covert guerrilla war through Afghan proxies.” “Without Pakistani military support,” Alexander asserted “all signs are the Islamic Emirate's combat units would collapse”. Earlier, Harvard University's Matt Waldman quoted Islamic Emirate commanders admitting that the ISI's role was “as clear as the sun in the sky.”

Kayani, the Pakistan army hopes, will be able to secure it allies power in a future regime in Kabul — and then use their influence to scale back its conflict with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan at home. Pakistan has, notably, offered to broker a rapprochement between its jihadist allies and Afghan President Hamid Karzai's regime.

Linked to this objective, Kayani is working to heal President Musharraf's rupture with domestic jihadists — a constituency who were once drawn to state-backed organisations like the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad, but have been increasingly supporting the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan. Pakistan's India policy is being reinvented by Kayani to this end: the second project he needs time to see to fruition.

In a thoughtful 2002 paper for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, George Perkovich cast light on Musharraf's reappraisal of Pakistani military strategy on India. Lieutenant-General Moinuddin Haider, who served as interior minister under President Musharraf, told Perkovich he argued that the long-term costs of continuing to back jihadists would be higher than the potential losses from taking them on. President Musharraf feared that confrontation would provoke a civil war. “I was the sole voice initially”, Haider said, “saying, ‘Mr. President, your economic plan will not work, people will not invest, if you don't get rid of extremists.'”

Haider gathered allies — among them Pakistan's former intelligence chief, Lieutenant-General Javed Ashraf Qazi. “We must not be afraid,” General Qazi said in the wake of the 2001-2002 India-Pakistan military crisis “of admitting that the Jaish was involved in the deaths of thousands of innocent Kashmiris, bombing the Indian Parliament, [the journalist] Daniel Pearl's murder and even attempts on President Musharraf's life.”

But Musharraf did little to develop an institutional consensus around these ideas — and, as his legitimacy eroded, proved unable to make a decisive break with the past. Many in the Pakistan army blamed him for precipitating the internal crisis which developed during his term in office. Like so often in the past, the Pakistan army moved to force out a commander-turned-liability.

Ever since Kayani replaced Musharraf, there has been mounting evidence that the Pakistan army is seeking to renew hostility with India. In 2008, the United States was reported to have confronted Pakistan's army with evidence that the ISI was involved in a murderous attack on the Indian diplomatic mission in Kabul. Later that year, it is now known from the testimony of Pakistani-American jihadist David Headley, the ISI facilitated the carnage in Mumbai. Pakistan has denied its intelligence services were linked to the Mumbai attacks, but has neither questioned the officials Headley named, nor sought to interrogate him on the issue.

In February, Kayani told journalists the Pakistan army was an ‘India-centric institution', adding that this “reality will not change in any significant way until the Kashmir issue and water disputes are resolved”.

Language like this fits well with the intellectual climate of Pakistan's armed forces. Lieutenant-General Javed Hassan — who played a key role commanding Pakistan forces during the Kargil war — was commissioned by the army's Faculty of Research and Doctrinal Studies to produce a guide to India for serving officers. In India: A Study in Profile, published by the military-owned Services Book Club in 1990, Hassan argues that is driven by “the incorrigible militarism of the Hindus.” “For those that are weak,” he goes on, “the Hindu is exploitative and domineering.”

Faced with a flailing war against jihadists at home, Kayani's anti-India platform offers the army the strategic equivalent of an escape button: precipitating a crisis with a historic adversary, secure in the knowledge that Pakistan's nuclear umbrella guarantees is protection from a large-scale war. Pakistan's military, many Indian foreign policy analysts believe, precipitated the bruising showdown between Foreign Ministers SM Krishna and Shah Mehmood Qureshi in Islamabad last month, undermining the fragile dialogue between the two countries.

India and Afghanistan are just parts, though, of the third, and most important project: guaranteeing the political primacy of the Pakistan army. In the wake of President Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq's assassination in 1988, Pakistan developed what the scholar Hussain Haqqani — now his country's ambassador to the United States — described as “military rule by other means.” Hasan-Askari Rizvi noted that the army chief became the “pivot” for political system. The army chief, in turn, derived his authority from the corps commanders who addressed “not only security, professional and organisational matters, but also deliberate on domestic issues”.

In January 2008 General Kayani passed a directive which ordered military officers not to maintain contacts with politicians, and followed up with orders withdrawing serving personnel from civilian institutions. The move was interpreted as evidence of Kayani's commitment to genuine civilian-led democracy. But Kayani repulsed President Zardari's early efforts to bring the ISI under civilian control, and defeated his efforts to seek a grand rapprochement with India. Pakistan's army proved willing to cede influence over the administration of the state, but not over the structure and thrust of national strategy.

“The army is the nation,” General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani said in his Martyrs Day speech, “and the nation is with the army.” Ensuring that this pithy proposition survives the crisis Pakistan is faced with is the purpose of the silent coup that has given Kayani three more years in office.

NB: Emphasis added: Joe Shearer.

 

[muse]

Xeric
1.

With indian doctrines like Limited War and Cold Start, one needs to take the 'change' with a pinch of salt.

Limited War and Cold Start are not about changing the border, they are about coercion ---- but of course, it's important to remember the context, One of Zia's greatest contribution to strategy was the idea of calibration -- in captive Kashmir, this notion was over looked and evoked the kinds of strategies such as limited war and Cold start, basically the same thing -- I do want to point out that the strategy was supposed to bleed by a thousand cuts, and yet note how the Indian responded -- He reformed his economy, instead of bleeding by a thousand cuts, he has been growing by 10 percent for 20 years --- You suggest that we ought not contemplate a change in the strategic threat matrix, this is interesting, which Indian is blowing up Pakistanis in suicide operations?? See, for the less than bright there is always the "foreign hand" argument that has much currency in certain circles.

I think it's fair to say that you do not agree who the main enemy is and what is the kind of war they have imposed on us, is that fair?

2.

You can either buy and maintain a squadron of wings or instead you can enjoy the luxuries of a Division size force for life time.

Yes, this is so and the Fauj may not expect the luxuries it may once have been used to. See, we don't need more explanation than understanding that the nature of war has changed - it's insurgency and maneuver - now if we are agree on this, then you can't really have an argument against your own position can you?

3. Yes., the heart of the matter -- and of course it's a huge paradigm change ( I had recommended to Tom Shearer and will recommend to everybody else interested, to read " The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" in which the notion of a "paradigm" is first articulated - I thought this necessary because we helps us all be on the same page with the language of the piece we hope to evaluate critically. While Kuhn developed the notion of paradigm with relation to great works or schemes in science, it's applicability here is that a paradigm may be thought of as a construct that accounts for anomalies that another construct or theory does not account for, that this new construct attracts persons who find the new construct enables them to for instance solve problems that could not not using the old or previous or competing construct, and of course this new construct is to a degree open ended, such that the problems which are not solved, at first, do not remain , unsolvable -- So a paradigm is a sort of an overarching idea.

For practically the entirety of it's experience as a Nation State, Pakistan has known the Indian as an enemy, or if not an enemy, then an adversary, for sure and for the entirety of it's existence it has been the Patriotic Fauj that has safe guarded Pakistan, to the best of her abilities - We were clear as to who the was, we had 3 wars and the living experience of Bangladesh to prove to ourselves that we were right and correct in our formulation of who and what the enemy was ----

Friends, Xeric, who are the enemy?? Now the universe of "Enemy is large and potentially infinite - lets just be a little more practical, Who are the Enemy?? Who are fight the Paak Fauj?, Who are exploding bombs in our cities?, Who promote radical ideas in our society?? ---- Yes, much like in Afghanistan, it's sometimes a struggle to not point at government failure, but it is also an enemy -- Well, it's clear, the enemy is the islamist insurgency -- now it does ot matter whether our readers delicate sensibilities are upset not by seeing Pakistani soldier beheaded, but by our use of the word islamist to characterize the insurgency and the ideas it claims motivates it and the vision it has for Pakistan.

What Kind of War has the islamist enemy imposed on us?? Is it a different war from the one we have long been preparing for against the Indian?? Of course it is -- and ought we not prepare for fight that war because the very nature of that war is "to whittle away" at the state, in other words a long war?

Wait if we agree to all the above, will it mean that India are not an enemy??

No, it will not mean that at all - See, what we are saying is not that overnight we will create a India that is not capable of threatening us -- What we are pointing out, is that we have to make a "transition" a strategic shift in our thinking - we are in a do or die situation, make no mistake about that -- our focus has to be the economy and to secure that economy we need to create peace, it may be slow, but that is the direction the elected civilian leadership in both countries want to take -- What must the Fauj do to be an enabler and move the country and itself in the direction that is needed?

 

[Joe Shearer]

Paper no. 4369 09-Mar-2011

PAKISTAN-INDIA-UNITED STATES DYSFUNCTIONAL TRIANGLE: THE KAYANI FACTOR

By Dr Subhash Kapila

Introductory Observations

In politico-strategic context the analysis of triangular configurations of nations normally connote a strategic convergence between the three nations and a unity of purpose to jointly achieve political and strategic ends. Strategic triangular configurations by their very existence also denote in terms of international relations that such a grouping needs to be factored in the strategic calculus of major nations.

The Pakistan-India-United States triangle is a dysfunctional triangular configuration with no strategic convergence existing between the three nations and no vision of a united purpose to jointly achieve political and strategic ends.

Ordinarily, Pakistan, India and the United States cannot be said to exist in a strategic triangular relationship. Perforce they still have to be treated as a triangular configuration for analytical purposes because the United States as the global superpower in its political and strategic calculus has taken upon itself to place itself at the apex of South Asian strategic dynamics and treat Pakistan and India as the base of its envisioned strategic triangle. Further it has taken upon itself to preach peace in South Asia not for any strategic benefit for India but as an instrument to keep the Pakistan Army on the American side.

Curiously, the United States in its East Asian strategic calculus ever since 1945 has not forged a strategic triangle with Japan and South Korea both committed military allies of the United States.

Conceding charitably that the United States may have a futuristic vision of a viable and functional Pakistan-India-United States strategic configuration, but analytically such a vision is a self-defeating proposition due to fundamental contradictions that dominate United States-Pakistan relations, United States-India relations and Pakistan-India relations.

However, the persistence with which the United States endows peace between India and Pakistan with hallowed aura prompts this author to project that no amount of United States visionary impulses or intense tactical pressures on Pakistan and India can bring about a strategic convergence between the three nations or peace in South Asia.

Pakistan has always been the regional spoiler in the pursuance of such a strategic vision of the United States even though throughout the Cold War the United States stood strategically tilted in favor of Pakistan. Even in 2000s with a so-called US-India Strategic Partnership in place, the United States continues to remain tilted towards Pakistan.

In 2011, with General Kayani in de-facto political control of Pakistan and adopting both anti-US and strong anti-Indian stances, it is high time for the United States to dispel its South Asian peace crusade.

The Kayani Factor is only highlighted because he is symptomatic of and exemplifies the overall attitudinal impulses and reflexes of the Pakistan military hierarchy all along of a trust-deficit with the United States and confrontational postures towards India. In 2011, General Kayani has carried this trust-deficit with United States and hostility to India to unprecedented levels.

This Paper is also intended to reach out to India’s political establishment where in the past decade at India’s apex level, rosy optimism is entertained that with the United States having de-hyphenated its Pakistan and India relationships, scope exists for the United States to pressurize Pakistan into achieving peace with India. This blinkered vision fostered in India’s policy establishment by Washington must be dispensed with as in 2011 India’s security environment is becoming more threatened. Washington cannot emerge as the sole guarantor of peace in South Asia.

This Paper is also intended to rebut the policy analysts in India who advocate that India should be entering into direct dialogues with the Pakistan Army Chief to bring about peace between India and Pakistan.

This Paper intends to dwell on the examination of the Kayani Factor under the following heads as to how false it is for both the United States and India to bet on the Pakistan Army Chief that he would effectively contribute to a peace process between India and Pakistan and how truly he would deliver on United States strategic interests in Afghanistan and overall in South Asia:

• United States Poster Boy in Pakistan: The American Image Buildup of General Kayani
• General Kayani Brings Down United States-Pakistan Relations to a Tipping-Point
• General Kayani’s Pronounced Hostile Postures Towards India
• General Kayani Blackmails United States on Pakistan’s Politico-Military Issues with India
• Pakistan-India –United States: Can it Ever become a Functional Strategic Triangle

United States Poster Boy in Pakistan: The American Image Buildup of General Kayani

General Kayani was really built up as Pakistan’s ‘Poster Boy’ in Pakistan at the time of his elevation as Pak Army Chief in 2007. Much was made of him by United States highlighting that he had graduated from the US Army Command and Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. He was projected as far as his image was concerned as being just the opposite of General Musharraf who by 2007 the United States was getting tired of.

The United States went at great length to project the image of General Kayani as being an apolitical General and a thorough professional committed to keep himself and the Pak Army out of politics.

He was painted as an avid golfer, avid reader, prone to listen more than to speak and a chain smoker, as if all such qualities qualified him to be a Westernized Pakistani General and not prone to the Islamist tendencies that dominated the rest of the Pakistani Army Generals around him. Still waters run deep and in case of General Kayani the waters run deeper, keeping his entire army career in mind where he was found to be in privileged appointments which placed him in close proximity to the seat of Pakistan’s political power.

Regrettably such was the American overdrive on building up General Kayani’s image that the then Indian National Security Adviser went on record to state and certify that General Kayani was a thorough professional and that he would not indulge in military adventurism against India.

Such was the powerful feed to the Indian policy establishment from Washington that the Indian policy establishment went around giving certificates of good intentions to a Pakistani Army Chief. Deductively, it can be asserted that such assessments misled India into repeated resumption of Peace Dialogues with Pakistan at the cost of Indian national security.

The United States at that moment of time may have had its tactical reasons for such an image make-over of General Kayani but did India have to second it? Did the Indian policy establishment forget that General Kayani had been Director General of the ISI from 2004-2007 in the time that ISI sponsored terrorist attacks against India were at a peak? Subsequently, Mumbai26/11 attacks could not have been without the knowledge of General Kayani as the ISI is directly accountable to the Pak Army Chief. Also the DG ISI Lt General Shuja Pasha was Kayani’s hand-picked protégé.

Subsequent developments have not borne out the carefully cultivated image that the United States projected of General Kayani at that time.

In this lessons emerge for both the United States and India. The United States has repeatedly gone wrong in its assessments of Pakistan Army Chiefs credentials. The Indian policy establishment must learn henceforth not to accept United States assessments on Pakistan and Pakistani personalities at face value.

Last year again when his normal tenure as Army Chief was coming to an end, the United States had not learnt the requisite lessons and again went into an overdrive to contrive and force the Pakistani civilian government into giving General Kayani another extended tenure of Army Chief for another three years.

General Kayani Brings Down United States-Pakistan Relations to a Tipping Point


The United States had actively rooted for appointment of General Kayani as Pakistan Army Chief in 2007 and again in 2010 prevailed over the Pakistan Government to give the General a three year extension on completion of his tenure. The United States presumably on both occasions was prompted by high expectations of General Kayani to deliver on United States strategic requirements namely on assisting US military operations in Afghanistan, safety of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons arsenal and cessation of Pakistan Army’s patronage and military assistance to the Afghan Taliban, Al Qaeda affiliates like the Haqqanis and ISI directed Jihadi outfits like the Lashkar-e-Toyeba.

The picture obtaining in 2011 after a thorough review of General Kayani’s tenure as Pakistan Army Chief is disappointing and possibly frustrating to the United States in terms of his delivering on United States expectations reposed in him.

General Kayani’s record in broad details has been as under:
• United States Forces in Afghanistan continue to suffer from disruptive attacks from Taliban and Haqqani supported groups based in Pakistani border regions. Pakistan Army has made no efforts to contain or liquidate these
• Pakistan Army has not secured US logistics for Afghanistan transiting Pakistani territory. In fact the Pakistan Army can be said to be complicit in disruption of US logistics and on occasions closed transit points at Khyber Pass to blackmail USA
• General Kayani has constantly refused US pleas to conduct military operations in North Waziristan on one pretext or the other to ensure safe sanctuaries for Al Qaeda and Taliban groups operating in Afghanistan
• General Kayani objected strongly against the provisions of the US Kerry-Lugar Bill which sought to impose accountability on Pakistan Army on US aid and assistance to Pakistan Army
• .General Kayani unwillingly launched military operations in Swat and adjacent regions and that too under duress of US threats of military intervention to stem Taliban advances to Pakistani nuclear weapons bases

This long litany of Pakistan Army’s perfidy against the United States strategic interests under General Kayani has reached a tipping point in 2011 where one witnesses the sordid spectacle of a rupture between the intelligence agencies of United States and Pakistan. The CIA of the United States and the ISI of Pakistan Army had a much vaunted privileged relationship from the 1980s and that today stands ruptured as we all know.

Rhetoric from Washington on Pakistan Army’s valued contributions to its military operations in Afghanistan is sheer hogwash as it flies against the realities outlined above. Rhetoric flowing from Islamabad is equally untruthful that Pakistan Army had suffered thousands of casualties supporting the United States. The reality is that Pakistan Army suffered casualties in its operations against the Pakistan Taliban who have declared the Pakistan Army as their enemy.

General Kayani’s Pronounced Hostile Postures towards India


This aspect stands repeatedly discussed in my earlier Papers on Pakistan. However some salient points need to be emphasized once again to sustain the discussion. General Kayani’s unremitting hostility towards India needs to be stressed to highlight to the Indian policy establishment that India’s peace overtures to Pakistan are not well received by General Kayani despite the contrived propaganda in India currently that the Pakistan Army Generals are genuine in seeking a resumption of the India-Pakistan Peace Dialogue.

General Kayani’s pronounced hostile attitudes against India can be gauged from the following factors:
• General Kayani soon on taking over as Pak Army Chief unilaterally abrogated in 2007 the four year old ceasefire that prevailed on the LOC in Kashmir which was arrived at by General Musharraf. Under General Kayani’s command border clashes, artillery duels and firing incidents once again were resumed from the Pakistani side.
• General Kayani resurrected the Kashmir issue in conflictual overtones publicly to project that he was not in consonance with Musharraf’s parleys with India on Kashmir
• Mumbai 26/11 commando trained attacks orchestrated by the ISI occurred within a year or so of General Kayani taking over as Chief.
• Pakistan Army’s nuclear weapons arsenal seems to have expanded during General Kayani’s watch. The ostensible target is India despite the fact that India has adopted a No First Use principle in its Nuclear Strategy.
General Kayani has been unapologetic in declaring that he is “India-Centric” in his professional approaches and has consistently refused US entreaties to shift forces from the borders against India to the Pak-Afghan border. General Kayani stands rated by US agencies as the most anti-Indian Pakistan Army Chief in Pakistan’s history.
Peace with India is not on General Kayani’s agenda neither now and nor for the next three years. If General Kaayani can adopt adversarial stances against the United States as currently demonstrated what sureties the Indian policy establishment has in believing that peace dialogues with Pakistan can provide optimistic outcomes with General Kayani as the presiding deity of Pakistan’s India policy?

General Kayani Blackmails United States on Pakistan’s Politico-Military Issues with India

General Kayani needs to be credited for having successfully exploited the United States predicaments in Afghanistan and the Pakistan Army Chief’s perceived indispensability therein, to effectively blackmail the United States to pressurize India on yielding on issues of politico-military concern to Pakistan. The three main issues which General Kayani has blackmailed the United States are on Kashmir issue, India’s presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan Army’s balance of power with India.

United States pressures on Kashmir though not overtly applied are yet visibly demonstrated by the Indian Government’s sole focus on Kashmir, at the expense of other burning political issues, and its elusive settlement on Pakistan Army’s terms. The United States too has merrily gone along in this game whereby its noted policy analysts in their books, publications and essays on Pakistan’s impending implosion arrive at circumvented prognostications that Pakistan’s fragmentation can be avoided only and if only the United States prevails on India to give away Kashmir to Pakistan. And if not the whole of Kashmir, at least the Kashmir Valley should be gifted away by India, which is the bottom line for the Pakistan Army.

General Kayani is a crafty and smooth operator who is working on three factors which he considers favorable to Pakistan Army, namely, (1) Both India and Pakistan have politically weak chief executives prone to US pressures (2) United States needs Pakistan’s cooperation in a smooth military exit from Afghanistan (3) General Kayani as Pakistan Army Chief can deliver on the last named factor with its strong leverages on the Taliban and the Haqqanis.

General Kayani has already succeeded on Afghanistan by limiting India’s involvement and presence. General Kayani prevailed on the United States and Britain to exclude India from the London Conference and the Istanbul parleys on Afghanistan. The United States has not conceded a major role to India in the training of the Afghan National Army despite India’s willingness to do so.

The United States due to its Afghanistan compulsions has caved in to General Kayani’s demands to ensure conventional near-parity with India. The United States has supplied F-16 advanced fighter jets, maritime patrol aircraft and attack helicopters besides other advanced military hardware totally unrelated to Pakistan’s war on terror.

Pakistan-India-United States; Can it ever become a Functional Strategic Triangle?


The only context in which a functional strategic triangle of Pakistan-India and the United States can be put in place is to suit United States strategic requirement of a South Asia-based containment strategy of China. But the moot question is whether the United States has the political sagacity and strategic tenacity to bring about this strategic configuration?

This can only be brought about by the United States by a judicious mix and management of the following factors

1. United States is able to draw away Pakistan from its strategic embrace of China
2. United States is permissive in letting South Asia’s natural balance of power prevail
3. United States uses its significant leverages over the Pakistan Army to restrain it from boxing much above its true weight
4. United States prevails over Pakistan to put contentious issues of the 1947 Two Nation Theory on the backburner and move forward to economic integration in South Asia.
5. United States desists from playing balance-of-power politics between India and Pakistan.

Would the United States opt for the above strategies? Would Pakistan acquiesce in accepting a South Asian role commensurate with its true potential? Would Pakistan stop clinging to the Two Nation Theory?

The answers to all of the above are all negative as there continues to exist a pronounced trust-deficit between all the three nations involved in the Pakistan-India –United States Triangle. There are competing strategic interests and conflicting agendas
The horizon for the next three years promises to remain clouded because of the Kayani Factor which complicates Pakistan-United States relations and Pakistan-India relations.
India has no option in the prevailing circumstances but to maintain heightened security vigilance, enhance its war-preparedness and hone up its intelligence apparatus with a priority in penetration of fundamentalist Pakistani outfits. India’s policy establishment should not allow history to be repeated wherein Pakistan has resorted to military adventurism against India to divert domestic attention from Pakistan’s’ worsening political situation.

'Concluding Observations


The Pakistan-India-United States have been thrown together in the cauldron of South Asia. All three nations have no strategic convergences or unity of purpose to confront strategic challenges. Therefore Pakistan-India-United States as a triangular configuration is not a classic triangular strategic combination which can be counted in global strategic calculus.

This configuration becomes a strategic triangular configuration only in the sense that in 2011 the strategic interests of the United States intersect with those of India and Pakistan in diverse ways forcing both India and Pakistan to factor-in the United States in their respective strategic calculus and also in India-Pakistan bilateral approaches. On present indicators there is nothing more that can suggest anything substantial.

In this triangular context the United States has to recognize the strategic reality that India cannot be treated in its strategic calculus as a strategic co-equal of Pakistan in its strategic formulations. Thereafter everything will fall into place and possibilities would emerge for sustainable peace in South Asia.

(The author is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He is Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. Email: drsubhashkapila.007@gmail.com)

 

[BATMAN]

An example of the latter, rather than the former - and an excellent articulation, if I may add.

talk simple.. so i can understand you.
Don't you think you missed the word 'priority' and rest of the post, perhaps you never read.

To be frank, you are the one who shall be credited for articulation.
All what is boiling inside you is some thing else.
Every minister, ambassador, head of functionary is hand picked by Zardari......are you not happy yet?
Even though all of them are doing nothing but rape with this country!
Every one is a class in its own and record makers.

 

[muse]

talk simple.. so i can understand you

Not to woory, it's enough that I understand you

Tom Shearer

Two articles about kiyani the bad guy -- but is that what this thread is about?

Dr. kapila in his introductory observation notes:

The Kayani Factor is only highlighted because he is symptomatic of and exemplifies the overall attitudinal impulses and reflexes of the Pakistan military hierarchy...

An individual as representing an army the size of Pakistan, an army that does not reason but is impulsive and reflexive - and this is offered as serious scholarship?

Anyway, lets not allow ourselves to be sidelined - we have on this thread alone articles by retired professionals, if they seem impulsive and reflexive top you, you will be better served elsewhere.

 

[Xeric]

Xeric
1.

Limited War and Cold Start are not about changing the border, they are about coercion ---- but of course, it's important to remember the context, One of Zia's greatest contribution to strategy was the idea of calibration -- in captive Kashmir, this notion was over looked and evoked the kinds of strategies such as limited war and Cold start, basically the same thing -- I do want to point out that the strategy was supposed to bleed by a thousand cuts, and yet note how the Indian responded -- He reformed his economy, instead of bleeding by a thousand cuts, he has been growing by 10 percent for 20 years --- You suggest that we ought not contemplate a change in the strategic threat matrix, this is interesting, which Indian is blowing up Pakistanis in suicide operations?? See, for the less than bright there is always the "foreign hand" argument that has much currency in certain circles.

In order to avoid running in circles i will just concentrate on the bold part: Isnt this enough an excuse to not to lower our guard? No one can alter the physical presence of a country today, we all know that, but you have understood CS (which i am sure you have), it primarily revolves around 'destruction of Pakistan Armed Forces' and not around capturing Lahore Gym thereby defeating Pakistan's will to resist and force it into submission, now that's how i see the 'coercion'. Coercion, deterrence, mal-intentions whatever, this doent guarantee that a physical assault will never materialize. Well it may not materialize ever, but then who can ensure this? i know how you linked this indian 'coercion' with Zia and syndrome but then it more than what Zia did. BTW, who occupied Kashmir? It was not us at the first place. Let's not become thieves every time.

I think it's fair to say that you do not agree who the main enemy is and what is the kind of war they have imposed on us, is that fair?

No doubts.

2.

Yes, this is so and the Fauj may not expect the luxuries it may once have been used to.

Believe me being all mobile isnt a luxury either.

See, we don't need more explanation than understanding that the nature of war has changed - it's insurgency and maneuver - now if we are agree on this, then you can't really have an argument against your own position can you?

Insurgency and maneuver? What's that?

Yes the nature has indeed changed, but this doesnt imply we should forget who we are. Ever wondered why they still use standard HF frequencies/radios amidst hi tech, frequency hoping satellite 101 bee ess communication technology?

3. Yes., the heart of the matter -- and of course it's a huge paradigm change ( I had recommended to Tom Shearer and will recommend to everybody else interested, to read " The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" in which the notion of a "paradigm" is first articulated - I thought this necessary because we helps us all be on the same page with the language of the piece we hope to evaluate critically. While Kuhn developed the notion of paradigm with relation to great works or schemes in science, it's applicability here is that a paradigm may be thought of as a construct that accounts for anomalies that another construct or theory does not account for, that this new construct attracts persons who find the new construct enables them to for instance solve problems that could not not using the old or previous or competing construct, and of course this new construct is to a degree open ended, such that the problems which are not solved, at first, do not remain , unsolvable -- So a paradigm is a sort of an overarching idea.

Too much philosophy.

For practically the entirety of it's experience as a Nation State, Pakistan has known the Indian as an enemy, or if not an enemy, then an adversary, for sure and for the entirety of it's existence it has been the Patriotic Fauj that has safe guarded Pakistan, to the best of her abilities - We were clear as to who the was, we had 3 wars and the living experience of Bangladesh to prove to ourselves that we were right and correct in our formulation of who and what the enemy was ----

Friends, Xeric, who are the enemy?? Now the universe of "Enemy is large and potentially infinite - lets just be a little more practical, Who are the Enemy?? Who are fight the Paak Fauj?, Who are exploding bombs in our cities?, Who promote radical ideas in our society?? ---- Yes, much like in Afghanistan, it's sometimes a struggle to not point at government failure, but it is also an enemy -- Well, it's clear, the enemy is the islamist insurgency -- now it does ot matter whether our readers delicate sensibilities are upset not by seeing Pakistani soldier beheaded, but by our use of the word islamist to characterize the insurgency and the ideas it claims motivates it and the vision it has for Pakistan.

The enemy is the economic crisis, the political turmoil, the lack of nationalism, lack of education, awareness, deprivation etc. Extremism, Islamism are just the off shoots. And believe me, fighting these above mentioned enemies dont require mobilization and aviation efforts. i would have accepted the writer's concept if he had argued to reduce the defense expenditure and expend it over RADP instead.

Making a modern army require much more than reduction in numbers, atleast i for one is not ready to disband two divisions and raise a smaller force on wheels, especially when it comes to fight insurgency. Modernization in today's 'changed' nature of conflict means having the capability to respond to fluid and conflicting situations. And to do this you not only require mobilization and mechanization but the ability to generate superior combat power in compressed time frame, which in turn is again dependent upon mobilization capability. Whether we are fighting an insurgency or an all out war, this (employment of superior combat power - may google for what it exactly means in military terms) is the underlying principle of victory.

But then the question is, can we do this with our WW2 type concepts? Yes we can, as demonstrated during the various operations but then the price was too high, both in the terms of men and material. To make this process more efficient we need to do what the author has suggested, but not by playing a pigeon and saying all ij well in the East.

To me it seemed as if the author wants the military to go from an Army to a Police force.

 

[Alternative]

It is fascinating to see that a section, even an intelligent section of Pakistani opinion is under the impression that what is going on today is transient, and will go away as soon as those pests, those party-poopers, the Americans, get into their planes and fly away. All will be well then; Al Qaeda will have nothing to get belligerent about, the Taliban will go back to bullying women, the TTP will simmer down as the full pressure of the Pakistani Army bears down on it, and life will be just as it was, idyllic and perfect, before the Americans swung by on their way to Baghdad.

With respect to Al-qaeda, post US of A, situation will be similar as of in, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain or else where; occasional bomb blasts and a lot of propaganda etc. Al-qaeda will loose its main excuse, nevertheless it will try to sell its ideology but takers will be much less in numbers.
And Pakistani Talibans with their 'baap' gone will have similar results, and life in general would take a new turn and it will be different.

Speaking as a citizen of a nation given to its own paroxysms of fantastic delusions, one cannot help but sympathise.

One self recognizing delusional recognizing and sympathizing with other delusional?

How simple life was before the Americans! All that is needed is to send them on their way, and everything will turn back to its simpler version BBE (Before Bush Era) and we can relax. As it happens, it doesn't look quite the same from a few hundred miles to the east. Pakistan looks to have changed. Permanently. The good ol' days aren't coming back, whether or not the Americans are going back.

There is reason to believe that the deliberate militarisation of Pakistani society may have had its inevitable effects, and that society is now increasingly inclined to follow its leaders' directions through adoption of violent methods

Part in Red is an evidence that you observed some thing 'new', that was not in existence in Pakistan before, and here is a point that you missed terribly.
A streak of Ultra Orthodox and violent behavior in a very, very minor population (as in many other faiths) was present since very early times; from the time of first 'Kharjis' and has modern parallel in Al-qaeda and TTP. Now, as germ of any disease after being introduced in healthy body, need favorable condition to grow and damage the body, similarly,
favorable conditions were provided by the skewed policies and practices and then attack of US of A in Afghanistan, drone attacks etc.. and disease started to spread, attacking most favorable spots.
Cure for me is very simple, US of A out of Afghanistan, engage the tribesman and paramilitary under helping hand of Army to do some required treatments; let the emotions dissipate; Germs will remain but the effects will be much less and isolated to few spots.

Militarization of Pakistani society? Wrong and out of place generalization.

If the major threat to a country is from irregular forces and from irregular warfare within its own boundaries, why should the bulk of its forces not be reoriented to COIN? I presume that the change-over in its entirety is a dramatic flourish both on the side of the proposer as well as of his enthusiastic critic.

So you are discrediting the assertion of ''major retooling'' of ''most the army'' don't be shy when recognizing a fact.

Major threat to Pakistan is not from irregular forces.

Perhaps it has not escaped attention that nearly 30 divisions face each other across the various broad lines, dotted lines, dotted and dashed lines and every other kind of line between our two nations. What this points to is that unless there is a dramatic break-through in some sector, a cataclysmic collapse by one of the two contenders, there is likely to be deadlock of the sort seen in two previous engagements. Greater loads of explosives may be used, greater concentrations of tanks may be used, fortifications may or may not be used. However, every division commander will have read sensational accounts of how his opposing numbers have the task of grabbing as much land in quick swoops as possible. Every division commander who has read this, and those who do not read with any enthusiasm, will be savagely determined not to allow a single square mile to be given up to the enemy, that this, and not the bangs and crashes of regular warfare, is what war with India will be about.

Under the circumstances, deadlock is complete. The inevitable outcome is a stalemated battle-front, with neither side able to make substantial progress against the other.

How a SWAT force be helpful in above scenario for Pakistani cause? what are you trying to convey, a stalemate is not sufficient reason for Pakistan against 7 times larger India to maintain a status quo?

Given a semblance of realism in this evaluation, the Pakistan Army is likely to face significantly greater numbers of tanks; will that not help the Indian Army to capture land? But here is where the nuclear deterrent comes in; it is well-known in staff training and other tactical training courses that the Pakistan Army will not allow more than a fixed percentage of degradation of its forces, measured in terms of increasing inability to match the breadth of the IA attacks. In such a situation, a nuclear situation will arise, a nuclear button could get pressed.

This then is the justification for claiming that no deep penetrations will be possible.

All above isn't help in understanding why should a major or significant portion of Pakistani Army be converted to a SWAT team.

It seems that the conversion schemes are considered to be drastic, root and branch. Must they be that way? Is it not possible to visualise a strategic reserve of ground attack helicopters and aircraft, and a portion of the Infantry Divisions as regular Infantry Divisions, backed up by major concentrations of artillery, and a minimal complement of tanks? Even conversion of one-third of the existing army to a light infantry force of the sort described earlier in the reform article will have a sizeable impact.

Yes, according to original Writer, it must be.
I am not clear what impact it will have, in case of confrontation with India.
Mostly, this 'change' will require much more funds than already being utilized.

Anyone who is stupid enough to argue against your point of view is a more lousy military analyst than a more lousy anything else. Any worthwhile military analyst will avoid battle where the prognosis is a long-drawn out battle of attrition. Avoiding battle with your point of view is the equivalent of not attacking Russia; what's good enough for Napoleon and Hitler should be good enough for the likes of us.

Now your own Post # 44 in response to Rafi, a part, reproduced below

It doesn't need a treaty - any Indian government signing such a treaty given the distance between Pakistani cantonments and Delhi should be thrown out of office immediately -

So in your own case, you are not even willing to take equal position and a treaty is to be thrown out. No need to take a stupid chance.
We need to follow this golden principle when deciding our defense strategy.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

]The Hindu : Opinion / Lead : General Kayani's quiet coup

Late in April, Ashfaq Pervez Kayani stood before a solemn audience that had gathered to mark Martyrs Day.

“There is no greater honour than martyrdom”, Pakistan's army chief said, “nor any aspiration greater than it. When people are determined to achieve great objectives, they develop the faith needed to trust their lives to the care of Allah. We are well aware of the historical reality that nations must be willing to make great sacrifices for their freedom”. “I am proud”, he went on, “that the nation has never forgotten the sacrifices of its martyrs and holy warriors”.

If it hadn't been for General Kayani's impeccably-ironed military uniform, his audience might have been forgiven for believing that the speech was being made by the Islamist clerics who have exhorted insurgents to claim the lives of over 2,700 Pakistani troops in combat.

A quick aside on the authors comments here - there is nothing wrong with Kiyani's comments - just because the words 'martyrdom, Allah and sacrifice' are used by an individual does not make that individual an extremist.

Pakistan's Prime Minister went on national television in July to give his country's army chief an unprecedented three year extension of service. The decision has won applause in some western capitals, as well as from some liberal and conservative commentators in Pakistan. In the midst of a bitter war against Islamists many believe poses the greatest existential threat Pakistan has ever faced, Kayani's supporters believe its army needs continuity of leadership.

Those propositions might be true — but casts little light on the strategic considerations which have given Kayani three more years in office. Pakistan's army hopes, in essence, that Kayani will be able to craft a way out of the crisis without compromising the power and influence of its generals.

Islamabad elites had long been discussing Kayani's plans to secure an extension; this newspaper carried an extensive discussion of the issue in March. Key politicians, though, were evidently clueless. On May 17, Pakistani Defence Minister Chaudhry Ahmed Mukhtar said the government “was neither granting extension to Chief of Army Staff; nor had the general sought it.” But just a week later, media reported that a conference of corps commanders had called for an extension.

Some accounts hold that President Asif Ali Zardari, who is distrusted by the army, had little choice but to accept this fait accompli. Other commentary suggests both President Zardari and Prime Minister Gilani went along with decision, hoping to stave off any confrontation with the armed forces until 2013 — the year their terms in office end. Either way, as Pakistani lawyer and political commentator Asma Jehangir has noted, the extension suggests “that democracy has not taken root. The decision was taken on the basis of obvious pressure from the military”.

But just what was it that drove this pressure? Pakistan's army isn't, after all, short of competent commanders. “My advice to Kayani”, wrote the commentator Kamran Shafi days before the extension, “would be to issue his last Order of the Day on the appointed date of his retirement, receive his successor in General Head-Quarters, and after a cup of tea get into his private car and fade away.” There are good reasons, though, why that advice wasn't heeded.

No facts so far suggesting an 'anti-peace' mindset on the part of Kiyani or Pasha.

The Pakistan army's agenda

Kayani is at the centre of three projects critical to the long-term power of the Pakistan army. The first is this: extricating the Pakistan army from a counter-insurgency campaign that appears unwinnable.

Another aside - this observation of the author's has been shown to be patently wrong, since military operations against extremists have expanded significantly in both magnitude and intensity during Kiyani's tenure as COAS.

During Kayani's visit to troops in Orakzai on June 1, the Pakistan army announced “the successful conclusion of operations in the Agency”. But, as analyst Tushar Ranjan Mohanty recently pointed out, it has admitted to over a dozen engagements there since, involving the use of combat jets and helicopter gunships. Refugees displaced last year are yet to return.

Hoping to manoeuvre an exit, Kayani has escalated support to the jihadist networks of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and Maulana Jalaluddin Haqqani. Last week, Canadian diplomat Chris Alexander — who spent seven years serving his country and the United Nations in Afghanistan — charged Kayani with “sponsoring a large-scale, covert guerrilla war through Afghan proxies.” “Without Pakistani military support,” Alexander asserted “all signs are the Islamic Emirate's combat units would collapse”. Earlier, Harvard University's Matt Waldman quoted Islamic Emirate commanders admitting that the ISI's role was “as clear as the sun in the sky.”

Again, no credible evidence to support any of those claims - many of the kinds of reports being referenced here were also reported in wikileaks, and some independent observers did point out that they were almost all unverified and hearsay. See this article, for example, illustrating the authors first hand experience in seeing 'intelligence concocted' by Afghan authorities to malign Pakistan, and the tendency of Western officials to see the 'ISI under every rock' so to speak:

Pakistan and Afghanistan: interdependent, distrustful neighbours | Michael Semple | Comment is free | guardian.co.uk

Kayani, the Pakistan army hopes, will be able to secure it allies power in a future regime in Kabul — and then use their influence to scale back its conflict with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan at home. Pakistan has, notably, offered to broker a rapprochement between its jihadist allies and Afghan President Hamid Karzai's regime.

Linked to this objective, Kayani is working to heal President Musharraf's rupture with domestic jihadists — a constituency who were once drawn to state-backed organisations like the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad, but have been increasingly supporting the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan. Pakistan's India policy is being reinvented by Kayani to this end: the second project he needs time to see to fruition.

In a thoughtful 2002 paper for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, George Perkovich cast light on Musharraf's reappraisal of Pakistani military strategy on India. Lieutenant-General Moinuddin Haider, who served as interior minister under President Musharraf, told Perkovich he argued that the long-term costs of continuing to back jihadists would be higher than the potential losses from taking them on. President Musharraf feared that confrontation would provoke a civil war. “I was the sole voice initially”, Haider said, “saying, ‘Mr. President, your economic plan will not work, people will not invest, if you don't get rid of extremists.'”

Haider gathered allies — among them Pakistan's former intelligence chief, Lieutenant-General Javed Ashraf Qazi. “We must not be afraid,” General Qazi said in the wake of the 2001-2002 India-Pakistan military crisis “of admitting that the Jaish was involved in the deaths of thousands of innocent Kashmiris, bombing the Indian Parliament, [the journalist] Daniel Pearl's murder and even attempts on President Musharraf's life.”

But Musharraf did little to develop an institutional consensus around these ideas — and, as his legitimacy eroded, proved unable to make a decisive break with the past. Many in the Pakistan army blamed him for precipitating the internal crisis which developed during his term in office. Like so often in the past, the Pakistan army moved to force out a commander-turned-liability.

The above relates primarily to Musharraf, but the argument itself, of the potential of a civil war and extremely high costs from taking on all the various Kashmir focused groups at once, is one that is a valid one, that illustrates the need for the formulation of a comprehensive civil-military strategy to address the fallout from such a step.

Ever since Kayani replaced Musharraf, there has been mounting evidence that the Pakistan army is seeking to renew hostility with India. In 2008, the United States was reported to have confronted Pakistan's army with evidence that the ISI was involved in a murderous attack on the Indian diplomatic mission in Kabul. Later that year, it is now known from the testimony of Pakistani-American jihadist David Headley, the ISI facilitated the carnage in Mumbai. Pakistan has denied its intelligence services were linked to the Mumbai attacks, but has neither questioned the officials Headley named, nor sought to interrogate him on the issue.

No credible evidence supporting the accusations of an official ISI link with the Mumbai attacks on the attack on the Kabul mission has ever been provided.

In February, Kayani told journalists the Pakistan army was an ‘India-centric institution', adding that this “reality will not change in any significant way until the Kashmir issue and water disputes are resolved”.

And what is wrong with that position? That is the truth, and nothing in it suggests an 'anti-peace' mindset. As an Army, it would in fact be unusual if the COAS had denied that the PA was an 'India centric' institution.

Language like this fits well with the intellectual climate of Pakistan's armed forces. Lieutenant-General Javed Hassan — who played a key role commanding Pakistan forces during the Kargil war — was commissioned by the army's Faculty of Research and Doctrinal Studies to produce a guide to India for serving officers. In India: A Study in Profile, published by the military-owned Services Book Club in 1990, Hassan argues that is driven by “the incorrigible militarism of the Hindus.” “For those that are weak,” he goes on, “the Hindu is exploitative and domineering.”

Very poor analysis of the enemy by LG Javed Hassan, but again, what does that have to do with Kiyani or Pasha's mindset?

Faced with a flailing war against jihadists at home, Kayani's anti-India platform offers the army the strategic equivalent of an escape button: precipitating a crisis with a historic adversary, secure in the knowledge that Pakistan's nuclear umbrella guarantees is protection from a large-scale war. Pakistan's military, many Indian foreign policy analysts believe, precipitated the bruising showdown between Foreign Ministers SM Krishna and Shah Mehmood Qureshi in Islamabad last month, undermining the fragile dialogue between the two countries.

Completely unsubstantiated speculation on the part of the author and those he referenced.

India and Afghanistan are just parts, though, of the third, and most important project: guaranteeing the political primacy of the Pakistan army. In the wake of President Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq's assassination in 1988, Pakistan developed what the scholar Hussain Haqqani — now his country's ambassador to the United States — described as “military rule by other means.” Hasan-Askari Rizvi noted that the army chief became the “pivot” for political system. The army chief, in turn, derived his authority from the corps commanders who addressed “not only security, professional and organisational matters, but also deliberate on domestic issues”.

In January 2008 General Kayani passed a directive which ordered military officers not to maintain contacts with politicians, and followed up with orders withdrawing serving personnel from civilian institutions. The move was interpreted as evidence of Kayani's commitment to genuine civilian-led democracy. But Kayani repulsed President Zardari's early efforts to bring the ISI under civilian control, and defeated his efforts to seek a grand rapprochement with India. Pakistan's army proved willing to cede influence over the administration of the state, but not over the structure and thrust of national strategy.

The Army's influence on domestic politics is a subject for another discussion, but in the context of your comments, how exactly does the author justify his claim that Kiyani 'defeated Zardari's efforts to seek a grand rapprochement with India'? I see no evidence provided so far that Kiyani or Pasha did anything of the sort. The back-channel dialog was broken off by India on the pretext of 'political turmoil in Pakistan', and then terrorists carried out the Mumbai attacks which put all efforts at normalization of bilateral relations on hold. What is Kiyani's role here?

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Yes, this is so and the Fauj may not expect the luxuries it may once have been used to.

Much to respond to here, but 'luxuries'?

You do realize that many of the benefits provided to retired soldiers and officers and their dependents are funded by the Military run Foundations and Trusts don't you? Note for example the savings to the Pakistani taxpayer from just one organization, Fauji Foundation:

Contributed approx. Rs. 34 billion (USD 572 million) to the national exchequer in the form of taxes, duties, and levies in FY2008.

Expenditure on Welfare Services is over Rs. 23.8 billion since inception; in FY2008 Welfare Expenditure was Rs. 2.6 billion (USD 42 million).​

Fauji Foundation​

Over $600 million in costs to the taxpayer offset by the 'luxurious fauj'.

And as Xeric and I have pointed out to both Niaz and yourself, how on earth do you justify the argument that qualitative improvements in hardware and training for the military are going to be offset by a reduction in personnel? The more high tech the equipment, the more expensive it is and the more expensive the maintenance.

I mean this is getting silly - people are throwing around arguments of 'cut the size and become lean and mean and high tech' without any analysis whatsoever of the costs involved in the latter.

See, we don't need more explanation than understanding that the nature of war has changed - it's insurgency and maneuver - now if we are agree on this, then you can't really have an argument against your own position can you?

And you are regurgitating the same argument again and again without addressing the objections raised against the argument - as I have repeatedly argued, the Army has already invested a significant amount of resources in training its regular troops in COIN and FIBUA and setting up the necessary infrastructure to support it. The Army has also significantly expanded its operations in the Tribal belt in both geographic size and kinetic intensity. Now it is the time for the civilian part of COIN to step up. Many agencies and districts have been cleared out, yet the civilian government has not implemented any feasible plan for institution building in the affected areas. How can it? The civilian administration cannot even implement reforms to allow for effective governance and strong institutions in the 'unaffected areas' - some of which I addressed in my previous response to you.

The Army is not a police force. If you want to 're-orient' the Army, then what is the use of local law enforcement and para-militaries? Disband the police forces and everything else! The reorientation and reform, in the context of fighting insurgencies, terrorism and extremism, needs to occur in civilian LEA's, not in the military. Every institution needs to function in the role it was designed for. The role you and some others are arguing the Army needs to 're-orient and re-tool' for is the role the police force was designed for - fix the police and other LEA's and civilian intelligence.

No, it will not mean that at all - See, what we are saying is not that overnight we will create a India that is not capable of threatening us -- What we are pointing out, is that we have to make a "transition" a strategic shift in our thinking - we are in a do or die situation, make no mistake about that -- our focus has to be the economy and to secure that economy we need to create peace, it may be slow, but that is the direction the elected civilian leadership in both countries want to take -- What must the Fauj do to be an enabler and move the country and itself in the direction that is needed?

The 'strategic shift' has to be in the way the politicians think - we need tax reforms, we need PSE reforms, we need economic reforms and we need the resources freed up and generated by the above to be plowed into development, health, education, infrastructure. We need the politicians to reform the LEA's and domestic intelligence, to appoint their chiefs in a bipartisan manner, to free them from political interference and to provide them with greater resources. The Army has helped train several thousand 'elite/special' police units - programs such as those can be stepped up and the existing units can be removed from useless VIP duty and assist regular LEA's in anti-terrorist operations, with Army/AF support where necessary.

That is the shift we need, the shift that will allow for a sustainable solution to terrorism, crime and the paucity of resources, not some half baked 'turn the Army into a police force' suggestions.

 

[muse]

Much to respond to here, but 'luxuries'?

A valiant effort, however for the context of the quote, see Xeric's earlier post.


Army not a police force? Interesting idea - Once again, it will be instructive to look at the kind of war the islamist insurgent has imposed on us, low intensity, long term destabilization and delegitimization of the State - Does the army need to retool and reorganize for that?? Apparently like with Xeric, we simply do not agree on the nature of the threat.

I repeat that we need to focus on the economy, you counter with tax reform , etc, -- yes, by all means, these are elements of Economic reform.

And then there is charge, posited as if an objection, that the transition from army to police force is unnecessary --- Yes, certainly, after all, no one is suggesting that the army become the police, though policing is defintely going to be something the army will be involved with (see the nature of the war the islamist insurgent has imposed on us)

 

[Joe Shearer]

Not to woory, it's enough that I understand you

Tom Shearer

Two articles about kiyani the bad guy -- but is that what this thread is about?

Dr. kapila in his introductory observation notes:


An individual as representing an army the size of Pakistan, an army that does not reason but is impulsive and reflexive - and this is offered as serious scholarship?

Anyway, lets not allow ourselves to be sidelined - we have on this thread alone articles by retired professionals, if they seem impulsive and reflexive top you, you will be better served elsewhere.

Before you over-react in quite so comprehensive a manner, perhaps you should take a look at Agnostic Muslim's previous two posts addressed to me (or at least to a close simulacrum, to Joe Shearer).

 

[Joe Shearer]

It is fascinating to see that a section, even an intelligent section of Pakistani opinion is under the impression that what is going on today is transient, and will go away as soon as those pests, those party-poopers, the Americans, get into their planes and fly away. All will be well then; Al Qaeda will have nothing to get belligerent about, the Taliban will go back to bullying women, the TTP will simmer down as the full pressure of the Pakistani Army bears down on it, and life will be just as it was, idyllic and perfect, before the Americans swung by on their way to Baghdad.

With respect to Al-qaeda, post US of A, situation will be similar as of in, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain or else where; occasional bomb blasts and a lot of propaganda etc. Al-qaeda will loose its main excuse, nevertheless it will try to sell its ideology but takers will be much less in numbers.

And Pakistani Talibans with their 'baap' gone will have similar results, and life in general would take a new turn and it will be different.

So, precisely as predicted, there are those, intelligent to all appearances, who think things will go back to normal, with minor perturbations, an occasional suicide bombing, a couple of girls' schools blown up, but nothing much, because Al Qaeda will lose its raison d'etre and the Pakistani Taliban will scratch around looking for causes.

How delusional can you get? Do you expect the row over blasphemy laws to lessen in magnitude once the Americans go away? Do you expect a greater life expectancy for governors who speak against these laws? Or ministers, for that matter?

In short, why is it that you deny that there has been a degeneration of the degree of tolerance in public life? Why is it that you think that it will be possible to revert to the old days and the old ways? What is it about the present situation, which drivers do you see which make you hopeful for the post-American scenario?

Speaking as a citizen of a nation given to its own paroxysms of fantastic delusions, one cannot help but sympathise.

One self recognizing delusional recognizing and sympathizing with other delusional?

Precisely. It has the merit of candour.

Paraphrasing this admission and acceptance and putting three smileys after it adds neither to a reputation for understanding nor to a reputation for wit. Just to a reputation for leaden-footed heavy-handed humour at spotting an apparent error which can be pilloried.

How simple life was before the Americans! All that is needed is to send them on their way, and everything will turn back to its simpler version BBE (Before Bush Era) and we can relax. As it happens, it doesn't look quite the same from a few hundred miles to the east. Pakistan looks to have changed. Permanently. The good ol' days aren't coming back, whether or not the Americans are going back.

There is reason to believe that the deliberate militarisation of Pakistani society may have had its inevitable effects, and that society is now increasingly inclined to follow its leaders' directions through adoption of violent methods

Part in Red is an evidence that you observed some thing 'new', that was not in existence in Pakistan before, and here is a point that you missed terribly.

A streak of Ultra Orthodox and violent behavior in a very, very minor population (as in many other faiths) was present since very early times; from the time of first 'Kharjis' and has modern parallel in Al-qaeda and TTP. Now, as germ of any disease after being introduced in healthy body, need favorable condition to grow and damage the body, similarly, favorable conditions were provided by the skewed policies and practices and then attack of US of A in Afghanistan, drone attacks etc.. and disease started to spread, attacking most favorable spots.

Cure for me is very simple, US of A out of Afghanistan, engage the tribesman and paramilitary under helping hand of Army to do some required treatments; let the emotions dissipate; Germs will remain but the effects will be much less and isolated to few spots.

Militarization of Pakistani society? Wrong and out of place generalization.

The part in red is not a new observation; it is an old observation applied to present circumstances. It is the observation that a society being radicalised does not cease to move along this path until a point of reaction is reached, at which point there is a reversion. This may be observed in a number of historical and social situations which are amply reported. If examples are required, please ask.

The observation here is that Pakistan is getting radicalised, in the form of increasing Sunni insistence on uniform acceptance of a fixed set of norms and living principles, and that other sects and minorities are gradually coming under increasing pressure. Further, that this will not go away without a vigorous and conscious effort by the liberal segments of society to send it away, and that without such an effort, the impact of this radicalisation on day-to-day life will only increase. It is an observation that this has been the trend, gradual at first, increasing in speed and pervasiveness of late, in society at large.

Look up your own history, and look at it honestly. The first step was the Objectives Resolution; the second step was the declaration of an Islamic Republic; the third step was the parallel institution of Sharia courts.

There is not even any need to look at Maududi's persecution of Ahmediyyas, for which he was sentenced to death by a Pakistani court. Nor of the clause demanding that these Ahmediyyas declare that they are not Muslim, if they seek passports.

None of these were part of the original vision; all of these are increasingly heavy-handed acts of control and domination of the other sects and minorities.

Nothing new, only a reminder of what is going on, unchecked and untreated. Social conditions will NOT change if the Americans go away. What we see is the Cargo Cult in reverse, and this reverse cult is as ludicrous as the original. The Americans will go away; society will not instantly whip back to what it used to be.

If the major threat to a country is from irregular forces and from irregular warfare within its own boundaries, why should the bulk of its forces not be reoriented to COIN? I presume that the change-over in its entirety is a dramatic flourish both on the side of the proposer as well as of his enthusiastic critic.

So you are discrediting the assertion of ''major retooling'' of ''most the army'' don't be shy when recognizing a fact.

Major threat to Pakistan is not from irregular forces.

Major retooling of most of the army is in no way contradictory of the phrase bulk of its forces. Nor is the major retooling of most of the army equivalent to the entirety.

This is playing with the concept of part merely for the sake of scoring points. Both concepts are in fact identical; nobody expects that the entire Army as it is now should be dismantled, and that trucks will take the place of every tank. What has been suggested is a re-orientation, affecting a significant number of armoured units, for instance, although it is far from clear that the armoured corps will vanish in its entirety.

Finally, let me make a blunt statement: the only threat faced by the Pakistani military today is from irregular forces, that given half an excuse, the Indian army will turn away and focus on the far more alarming northern situation.

The Pakistani military has a vested professional interest in keeping high-budget, high-technology forces in operation; cadet officers would much rather grow up during their careers to command a tank squadron than to ccommand a company of light infantry.

Perhaps it has not escaped attention that nearly 30 divisions face each other across the various broad lines, dotted lines, dotted and dashed lines and every other kind of line between our two nations. What this points to is that unless there is a dramatic break-through in some sector, a cataclysmic collapse by one of the two contenders, there is likely to be deadlock of the sort seen in two previous engagements. Greater loads of explosives may be used, greater concentrations of tanks may be used, fortifications may or may not be used. However, every division commander will have read sensational accounts of how his opposing numbers have the task of grabbing as much land in quick swoops as possible. Every division commander who has read this, and those who do not read with any enthusiasm, will be savagely determined not to allow a single square mile to be given up to the enemy, that this, and not the bangs and crashes of regular warfare, is what war with India will be about.

Under the circumstances, deadlock is complete. The inevitable outcome is a stalemated battle-front, with neither side able to make substantial progress against the other.

How a SWAT force be helpful in above scenario for Pakistani cause? what are you trying to convey, a stalemate is not sufficient reason for Pakistan against 7 times larger India to maintain a status quo?

A SWAT force was a mocking appellation given to the original idea of a counter-insurgency oriented light infantry force. Some members, some proposers of this idea thought it would absorb higher levels of technology, and that thought was twisted and distorted by opponents of the new paradigm and called a SWAT force in order to ridicule it and in order to defend the full-fat, high budget dinosaur that they currently see.

The fact is that the existing capability of the Pakistan Army both in armour and in artillery is several times greater than needed to achieve stalemate. Remember that the requirements for successful attack are 3:1 in regular plains battle-fields, perhaps three times that in the mountains. A simple calculation will reveal that Pakistan is not merely covered, it is covered to excess by its present inventory of armour and artillery. There is a similar situation with regard to nuclear device inventory, as might well be observed.

Shedding a significant proportion of this and moving over to a light infantry model for a significant part of the human resources will in no way reduce the defensive capability of the Pakistan Army against the Indian Army. On the contrary, it will enable it to tackle its major opposition, an irregular, guerrilla opposition, with greater focus. The Indian Army also has sufficient troops to ensure that any 'misadventure', the sub-continental term for undeclared attack by the enemy, is a failure. Therefore the only response from it to a conversion of part of the Pakistan Army is likely to be a corresponding re-orientation towards mountain warfare. No response other than a troop reduction response on the Pakistani frontier is likely.

Once again, a SWAT force is the mocking appellation used for tactical reasons by the opponents of any kind of innovation. It is sad that these opponents do not understand that the economic disparity, therefore the likelihood of increasing asymmetry between the two neighbours, is increasing and will go on to increase every year, every quarter. Running a conventional army, and running it on the basis that some miracle of economics or of diplomacy will find funding for increases to it to match Indian increases, amounts to a mere whistling by the graveyard: plucky but unrealistic.

Given a semblance of realism in this evaluation, the Pakistan Army is likely to face significantly greater numbers of tanks; will that not help the Indian Army to capture land? But here is where the nuclear deterrent comes in; it is well-known in staff training and other tactical training courses that the Pakistan Army will not allow more than a fixed percentage of degradation of its forces, measured in terms of increasing inability to match the breadth of the IA attacks. In such a situation, a nuclear situation will arise, a nuclear button could get pressed.

This then is the justification for claiming that no deep penetrations will be possible.

All above isn't help in understanding why should a major or significant portion of Pakistani Army be converted to a SWAT team.

Your response is diversionary, and as usual, shifts the goalposts. My post was intended to address the perceived lack of analysis behind a statement that no deep penetrations would be possible by either side.

Perhaps it would help to acknowledge that points raised had been addressed satisfactorily, before sliding away at a tangent.

Regarding the comment that the basis of understanding why a major or significant portion of the Pakistan Army should be converted to a SWAT team, there is obviously no need to respond to this obvious straw man tactic: bringing it into the conversation was intended to distract attention in the first place, since the point addressed was completely different and was initiated by you in the first place.

It seems that the conversion schemes are considered to be drastic, root and branch. Must they be that way? Is it not possible to visualise a strategic reserve of ground attack helicopters and aircraft, and a portion of the Infantry Divisions as regular Infantry Divisions, backed up by major concentrations of artillery, and a minimal complement of tanks? Even conversion of one-third of the existing army to a light infantry force of the sort described earlier in the reform article will have a sizeable impact.

Yes, according to original Writer, it must be.
I am not clear what impact it will have, in case of confrontation with India.
Mostly, this 'change' will require much more funds than already being utilized.

As has already been pointed out, no impact. The numbers for a robust defence will continue to be there after reforms.

Secondly, it is misleading to conflate a one-time conversion charge on account of re-training with the kind of annual costs incurred by full-fat units of the sort that will lose out; clearly, logically, what will happen is a one-time conversion charge the first year, following which there will be vastly reduced maintenance charges for all future years.

Anyone who is stupid enough to argue against your point of view is a more lousy military analyst than a more lousy anything else. Any worthwhile military analyst will avoid battle where the prognosis is a long-drawn out battle of attrition. Avoiding battle with your point of view is the equivalent of not attacking Russia; what's good enough for Napoleon and Hitler should be good enough for the likes of us.

Now your own Post # 44 in response to Rafi, a part, reproduced below

It doesn't need a treaty - any Indian government signing such a treaty given the distance between Pakistani cantonments and Delhi should be thrown out of office immediately -

So in your own case, you are not even willing to take equal position and a treaty is to be thrown out. No need to take a stupid chance.

We need to follow this golden principle when deciding our defense strategy.

No, you need not.

The entire discussion, the entire logic behind seeking new ways to address old problems whose dimensions have suffered changes over time is centred on the increasing differentiation between the two nations, a differentiation which is only going to increase, not decrease. In these circumstances, it is no longer valid to play tit-for-tat, no longer useful to be guided by testosterone.

It is time to address the realities of your strategic environment, to accept that the ghosts conjured up from beyond the grave have come to stay, and that the Pakistan Army is likelier to face irregular, guerrilla forces, suicide bombers and masses of IEDs than an Indian Armoured Corps marching to Lahore.

 

[Joe Shearer]

@Agnostic Muslim:

I have only two points to make:

1. Get the blessed man's name correct, at least; it's your COAS;
2. I responded to your challenge to produce any evidence that there was an element of hostility, an exceptional element of hostility, in the leadership of the Pakistan Army. If you disagree, good luck to you. The evidence is there, in front of us, and whether we wish to defend it by making judicious and carefully tailored extracts, or tear it apart using the same tactics is of sublime indifference to me. Just re-read your original post addressing this issue.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Hey bro.. how about the independant decision power . Courage and planning to save the ppls of Pakistan from the intruders especially the US/NATO......
in our top Generalz...

An EXCELLENT idea!

Injection or transplant?