I think some of us will not see any thing they don't wish to -- anyway the larger point - once again - is to position the Fauj for the future, NOW - because the changes, the transition, not just for the army but the state, are only going to gain strength
Muse,
Once again i fail to see the light and once again you try little to clarify what i am missing.
I have looked at a piece or two in this thread and commented on the non viability of reorienting 2-3 divisions of our infantry towards more mobile role, while in parallel reducing the number of troops.
I have emphasized the need for ample boots on ground to hold territory and control the flow of events, if we are to take on every god damn militant group in the Pakistan Afghanistan belt.
We have increased SSG strength from one brigade to one division and have more actively deployed them in recent years than ever before.
Peochar operation was an air assault carried on by a whole battalion of SSG while the regular infantry was miles and miles away.
We also deployed SSG extensively in SWA where we landed our air assault troops on mountain tops and did not let the buggers ambush us.
My issue with the proposed reorientation of military is why should we propose to reduce the numbers when we have ample mobility as it is and need the numbers not just to deal with traditional rival armies but with these terrorists/insurgents as well.
If the reorientation required is with respect to the low intensity conflict, then there are extensive retraining programs active in Army and even in PMA such courses are in place now.
My argument is based on the military non viability of the reorientation as envisioned in the original article pertaining to the doctrine of more mobility with lesser numbers.
I am of the view that we have enough mobility to handle these buggers and also need a lot of troops to choke this insurgency to death.
I am in no way saying that our national security policy does not need a major revamp.
Clearly we should strive more and more in order to improve the counter terrorism network.
We need to work on how we are processing the information received from all avenues into a clear and concise strategy whereby there are very quantifiable objectives given to all the organs of state including the bureaucracy, police, paramilitary, military and agencies.
There should be a national security council which has both civilian and military presence and it should be directly fed in the bits and pieces of information being available to all the agencies.
This shall ensure more visibility, cross questioning, accountability as well as ensuring that everyone is in the same boat.
The PM, COAS, Chief Justice, Foreign minister and interior minister should be on this NSC-National Security Council.
The NSC should have direct access to all the agencies heads and IGs of each province.
I am all for improvement in how we are approaching this war but to me in this post OBL scenario, the area to focus on is our agencies and the police.
The police needs to be taken off their bodyguard duty and be given much more authority, if we are to deny breathing space to these buggers.
We need criminal cases and proper evidence to eradicate the support structure, army action is only effective against the armed terrorists/militants.
Many a bugger has been caught by Army and released due to lack of evidence, only to strike again.
We need the police here as well.
Maybe the trend of drastic changes and interference in police appointments needs to end.
These changes should only be made by the DIGs/IGs and the political pressure on our police should be lifted completely in order to make them professional and fearless of any political fallout of their interrogations and investigations.