Xeric
There is no "demand" list because that's not what this is about - this thread is about exploring the need, if any, of the Pakistan army transitioning towards a new and improved Fauj - And so the transition is about making the fauj and leaner, meaner fighting machine, designed to hunt and kill Islamist insurgents that the genius Fauj itself manufactured.
We all agree that the government can do a much better job at managing state enterprises and collecting taxes, Etc., so we have no point of contention there - It seems you are not following that the net effect of the kinds of changes the AVM suggests is to also change the threat matrix to enable Pakistan and India to evolve normal relations.
Do you understand this? This isn't the pind brother man, where demands are to met or countered - this is a much deeper exercise but you may not realize how much you have given away by the reactionary and knee jerk positions you have offered -- all of them by the way about India -- So, really I would suggest we give up on playing the India card to justify the kind of Fauj we have created - In fact I think the notion that we can play a winning card by giving the Indian the enemy he wants (China) is a winning game for Pakistan - to allow us space to put Pakistan's economy on a more sond footing, an economy that can afford a meaner and more mobile, more technological, more lethal fighting force.
One cannot change the threat matrix by unilaterally reducing its capability to meet a known threat based on assumptions of likewise reciprocation, which is becoming more unlikely in my mind due to the power base increase of India while remaining hostile to Pakistan.
The unilateral threat matrix change is certainly the issue i have with this proposal. We now have two threats but that does not imply we focus on one and ignore the other one, it is much more logical to synergize the COIN and conventional war capabilities of Pakistan Army and not to focus on one alone.
It is criminal to ignore a threat which has been constant.
Do i want Pakistan and India to be at each other's throats, certainly not...However, i want Pakistan to be prepared and not make grand assumptions which impair its capability to meet a challenge effectively when the time comes.
So when we talk about changes in threat perception, we need normalization of ties with India first and then i would give it 5-10 years after establishing good terms with India before changing the threat matrix to a level that has direct and more pronounced impact on our Military posture and doctrine.
I have certainly no issues with retooling military in long term but purely on strategic, technical and economical merits, i do not see this as a short to mid term proposal for enhancing COIN capability...certainly not in the manner the opponents of mine, A.M.'s and Xeric's POV are suggesting.
The bottom line here is that you are going to reduce troops and increase mobility, but to what benefit?
It has two impacts as per our discussions on this thread, one on the economy and one on the military capability.
In my mind its net impact on the economy is not beneficial in the short to mid term, which is a critical phase of our ongoing COIN operations.
The military spending shall certainly not go down since extensively retooling and retraining 2-3 divisions would be much more expensive in short to mid term than maintaining current troops at current military capability, again i reiterate that short to mid term is critical stage of our COIN since right now our Army is heavily engaged in the clear and hold phase of COIN and the insurgents are not just of one creed/group, there are many different motives and different supporters (local, foreign) of the insurgents.
In this regards I think that we need to assess a post US scenario and maybe even experience the effect of US exodus from Afghanistan, before retooling our Army.
Maybe the situation becomes such that we need the manpower even more in future than what current situation demands.
Even if i assume that the cost of maintaining current manpower is same as of maintaining a reduced manpower with more mobility,i still have reservations.
The primary reservation is that of a need for trained/motivated manpower in COIN which can effectively deny space to the insurgents.
The lesser the impetus imparted by our Civilian Government and internal security apparatus to regain control and help the military in the hold and rebuild phase of the COIN, the more critical every additional military boot on ground becomes for us.
Had we seen lightning response of our Internal security apparatus with a clear cut and defined authorization given by Government to reestablish civilian control of the freed up areas, we would not be having this discussion right now.
So, not only does the military strategist reduce the capability to meet any challenge by a traditional enemy without any established trend/treaty to support normalization...We are also expecting him to assume that upon retooling his formations towards much more mobility, someone else will fill the boots adequately in denying space to insurgents.
The strategist has to take for granted that the Government will retool and retrain the internal security apparatus so that the loss of military footprint is more than compensated for by virtue of enhanced performance by internal security apparatus?
We have not even seen a reasonable performance by the internal security apparatus so far and i certainly hold the government responsible in this regards, since it is responsible to come up with some strategy in this regards.
So in such a new strategy even more burden shall be put on the internal security apparatus which cannot even adequately manage the current scope of work which falls in its domain, due to many reasons ofcourse.
How can we expect a strategist to take such huge risks and reduce the holding power of a capable military by putting his faith in the not so capable Police, Paramilitary etc?
What clear plan or intent is evident from our Government's internal/external policy to support such massive assumptions on part of the military/security planners?
Believe me Muse...
we (me, A.M., Xeric) all hate to see military rule and interference, and we certainly are not in pursuit of any agenda other than the interest of Pakistan.
However, i see that this strategy cannot be made in isolation of the State level strategy which includes internal security, foreign policy, economic policy etc.
In current scenario, we are doing the best we can and on the basis of our current relations with neighboring countries, it is a folly to assume goodwill and expose yourself, it is akin to painting a Bulls eye on our posterior and asking for trouble.
A perceived weakness of intent or capability has also led to many conflicts throughout history.
We need first to pursue a more coherent and well defined foreign policy, implement many long overdue police/security reforms and carry out economic reforms.
Only these steps shall bridge the gaps that Army has to plug in the current COIN scenario with its current manpower.
Reducing manpower right now without addressing these other critical areas via extensive reforms shall derail us even further from the ultimate objective of creating a stable, secure and prosperous Pakistan.
The situation on our eastern and western border cannot be improved till some major changes occur, we cannot assume such changes and make concrete changes to our military capability.
Reducing manpower at this stage will be counter productive.
To meet current spectrum of threats and keeping in view the deficiencies in other entities, we have more synergy with current military manpower/capability, in my humble opinion.
I really am enjoying this debate, however i think what we are trying to say is not being understood clearly.
