The Need of Sino-Japanese Correspondence in the 21st Century: Is there an Empirical Validation ?

[somsak]

Truely beyond Ph.D level works! Cheers @Nihonjin1051

 

[asad71]

A dissertation on Sino-Japan relations must consider volumes of historical,ethnic, economic and strategic realities and factors. Let me place some, and only some, of these:

a. From the last half of the nineteenth century till the WW II, Japan had sought to emerge as a great global power. She had indeed become a major power. But today, as Japan looks on, China, her historical rival and even arch enemy, has become a super power. Obviously there would be some heart burning in Japan.

b. Post WW II Japan has been a global economic power for which remote controlling Western MNCs and International Banks must take the major credit. These players had correctly identified in the Japanese society discipline and obedience to authority which they utilized to the fullest. However, in this century Japan has been loosing ground to Korea and China. Today both have overtaken the Japanese economy. That Korea, a subjugated serf and China also treated mostly as a colony, should move ahead of Japan is also an unpalatable truth to the Japanese.

c. China was an occupied colony of Japan in most parts. All major powers had divided China and major cities in parts for exploitation of resources and manpower. (Panama Canal was built by largely Chinese labor. They called them Collies.) Today China is a truly sovereign nation and a super power. On the other hand Japan has remained an occupied nation since WW II. Japan cannot pursue an independent foreign policy. Her defense and economic affairs are tied to the Americans. It will take centuries for the world, specially S E Asians, to forget Japanese atrocities in WW II and a hundred years prior to that. Japan's imperial/colonial addiction had led to the creation of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. It is difficult to believe this addiction will not re-appear. In contrast China does not have a history of being a colonial power. Any expansions or conquests took place only in the peripheral regions.

 

[Aepsilons]

Japan and China Edging closer

UNMISTAKABLE signs of a thaw in the frozen relations between China and Japan are growing. Indeed, the betting now is that Japan’s prime minister, Shinzo Abe, will meet the Chinese president, Xi Jinping, in November, on the margins of the APEC trade meeting that China will host in Beijing. Until now, China has considered Mr Abe beyond the pale because of his visit last December to Tokyo’s imperialist Yasukuni shrine.

The thaw began in the summer. In July a former Japanese prime minister, Yasuo Fukuda, called on Mr Xi. He bore a soothing letter from Mr Abe and shared a “sense of crisis” over the two countries’ troubled relations. Elsewhere, Chinese and Japanese academics and officials have quietly met to try to work out how to bring their two countries closer. Mr Xi himself has declared that China wants “long-term, steady and healthy” relations with Japan. Several dozen Japanese business leaders were recently welcomed in the Chinese capital. On September 23rd-24th Japanese and Chinese officials met in the Chinese port city of Qingdao to resume talks about matters of concern in the East China Sea. And now Mr Abe himself has, for the first time, mused publicly about how nice it would be to meet Mr Xi.

The Qingdao meeting, the first of its kind in two years, was especially striking. At it, China and Japan agreed to start work between their respective defence ministries on ways to deal with things such as unintended collisions and other emergencies at sea. Since China began aggressively challenging Japan’s control of the Senkaku islands in 2012 (China lays claim to the uninhabited islands, which it calls the Diaoyu), coastguard vessels from both sides encounter each other just about every day. Quite apart from issues of maritime safety, a minor incident could swiftly escalate into military conflict. Both Japan and America, its protector, have long called for China to accept a hotline to Japan.

As for the two countries’ leaders, even a perfunctory handshake in Beijing would be something, while a substantive meeting would be best of all. Japanese go-betweens have quietly been assuring the Chinese that Mr Abe’s visit to Yasukuni, which honours convicted war criminals among the war dead, was his last while in office. The Chinese have long insisted on Mr Abe’s clear undertaking that he will not revisit Yasukuni, but it is very hard to imagine him giving one.

It is equally hard to imagine the Japanese giving ground on the other Chinese condition for a resumption of top-level ties, namely Japan’s acknowledgment that the Senkakus are in dispute. (China has never knowingly controlled them, and only relatively recently rustled up a claim to them.) That is why back-channel efforts are under way to arrive at a vaguely worded formula that would allow both sides to climb down and set the matter of the islands to one side. Don’t hold your breath.

Despite China’s earlier stipulations, a rapprochement is possible. The Chinese government knows it will be doing itself no favours by being seen to beat up Japan while hosting the summit and taking part in other big gatherings in the region (the East Asia Summit in Myanmar and the G20 in Australia) at around the same time. Some Japanese also think that China is motivated to improve relations because of a sharply slowing economy. Among other things, Japanese direct investment into China has fallen by over two-fifths so far in 2014 compared with a year earlier, as Japanese firms seek to invest elsewhere in South-East Asia—in part, at least, because of rocky bilateral relations. Yet senior Japanese officials remain deeply cynical about the possibility of normal relations with a country they regard as assertive, aggressive, sometimes arrogant, and expansionist, and which respects the rule of law, as they represent it, only when it suits it.


Japan and China: Edging closer | The Economist

 

[Joe Shearer]

I think that it is , indeed, very important that the nations in Asia implement a pragmatic approach to working with each other, and finding ways (sometimes even create mechanisms) to bridge differences. One thing that I have been following recently are the relations between The Republic of India and the People's Republic of China. When China's President Xi Jinping visited India, both Xi Jinping and Narendra Modi talked about energy requirements, increasing bilateral trade, talked about India's plans for a high speed rail, and a consortium of infrastructure projects that China has expressed desire to helping India with. This century points to the direction of India and China because both are the 'Asian Giants'; both having the largest populations in the world, both having large and growing economies. So when the reports came out (here in PDF) about the border situation in Chumar , both leaders tried to continue with business plans while also dealing with security issues responsibly.

Japan should learn from China and India's pragmatic approach in cross-border issues. I mean, i know that there was a conflict between China and India in 1962, but since then, there really have been no major cross-border shellings recently. I am impressed that both border forces hold annual tent meetings and both are restrained. I think that is something the Japanese military leaders of the JSDF should consider -- to see that Chinese side are willing to compromise and hear the other side out. Just as how China and India have direct military contact and communication; I believe that the JSDF (Japan Self Defense Force) and the PLA Military Command should also have direct military communication. This way damage control measures can be implemented quickly in the event of unnecessary exigency arises. It can be controlld on the spot. And prevent media or extremists groups to use this to flame public agitation.

I agree with you completely, @scorpionx. Development must be emphasized. Common differences can be worked out.

It is difficult to see any positive developments arising in the near future in terms of Sino-Indian relations. For one thing, much though a section of the liberal oriented in Indian society may feel discomfort, there is a new political leadership, a leadership empowered, implicitly, to take difficult decisions and to make difficult journeys. This should have been the time for a wise Chinese leadership to take the opportunity and close matters.

That did not happen. Far from it, the visit of the Chinese President left India by and large disappointed, irritated and suspicious of the future.

It was not alone that the expected trade relations were finally realised in a less than full-hearted way. India does not need foreign aid; the thinking had been that substantial Chinese investment would signal a commitment by China to the stability and swift progress of India. On the contrary, the hesitant and less than generous Chinese offer clearly gave the impression that Peking was trying to disparage Indian perceptions about their national role and profile in Asia, and ensuring that there was no scope for egalitarian thinking.

Right through the visit, military confrontations continued. This does not happen by accident; clearly the Chinese top leaders had agreed that confrontations should continue. That is an unbelievable state of mind. It is clear that this is not the last word.

<More>

A dissertation on Sino-Japan relations must consider volumes of historical,ethnic, economic and strategic realities and factors. Let me place some, and only some, of these:

a. From the last half of the nineteenth century till the WW II, Japan had sought to emerge as a great global power. She had indeed become a major power. But today, as Japan looks on, China, her historical rival and even arch enemy, has become a super power. Obviously there would be some heart burning in Japan.

b. Post WW II Japan has been a global economic power for which remote controlling Western MNCs and International Banks must take the major credit. These players had correctly identified in the Japanese society discipline and obedience to authority which they utilized to the fullest. However, in this century Japan has been loosing ground to Korea and China. Today both have overtaken the Japanese economy. That Korea, a subjugated serf and China also treated mostly as a colony, should move ahead of Japan is also an unpalatable truth to the Japanese.

c. China was an occupied colony of Japan in most parts. All major powers had divided China and major cities in parts for exploitation of resources and manpower. (Panama Canal was built by largely Chinese labor. They called them Collies.) Today China is a truly sovereign nation and a super power. On the other hand Japan has remained an occupied nation since WW II. Japan cannot pursue an independent foreign policy. Her defense and economic affairs are tied to the Americans. It will take centuries for the world, specially S E Asians, to forget Japanese atrocities in WW II and a hundred years prior to that. Japan's imperial/colonial addiction had led to the creation of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. It is difficult to believe this addiction will not re-appear. In contrast China does not have a history of being a colonial power. Any expansions or conquests took place only in the peripheral regions.

The ones on four legs are Collies; the ones on two legs are coolies.

 

[Lure]

@Chinese-Dragon @Nihonjin1051

Fascinating discussion, gentlemen. One possibility that should be considered is for China to take a more active diplomatic role in binding Asia to its own system. The SCO has always seemed like a tangential distraction to me, especially since its members, as far as China is concerned, do not or cannot help China secure itself, either militarily or economically. Russia's value to China is in the resources it can provide, but otherwise, the non-China SCO members are military and economic dwarves. They can neither help China, nor can they be firmly bound to China since they also need access to the West for their own development.

Therefore, from the perspective of China's long-term goals, I would propose the following program:

1). Lead the creation of an East Asian Free Trade Agreement between China, Korea, and Japan to mirror NAFTA, and thus create an embryonic trading bloc to rival ASEAN, NAFTA, and the EU.

2). Propose to Japan the creation of a "Truth and Reconciliation" committee, modeled on South Africa's, to research and delineate an agreed-upon version of history that would be incorporated into all three countries' school textbooks. This would finally put to rest the "textbook wars" and help these countries finally put their history in the past, and enable a more forward-looking approach.

3). Set up a joint governmental research fund (again, with both Japan and Korea) to promote joint R&D between the universities and corporations of East Asia.

4). Propose a formal status-quo agreement with Japan, whereby disputed territory will be mutually recognized as such, but status-quo administrative facts on the ground will not be challenged for, say, 30 years in the hope that friendlier diplomatic relations in the future would facilitate a diplomatic solution. This would be backed by a joint sovereign wealth fund, administered by a neutral third party (the UN?), and sufficiently large that it would serve as effective collateral if either of the parties broke this agreement--i.e. an M&A-style break-up fee.

And so forth. Soon enough, the "Asia for Asians" or "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" or whatever you would like to call it will naturally take shape. It may lead to more formal arrangements like the EU, or perhaps it will not, but it would likely de-escalate the military tensions, and allow the populations of each country to see the tangible benefits of such a settlement.

China is uniquely positioned to initiate a project like this, and it would simultaneously elevate China's status and secure its neighborhood. Japan would be able to put aside its fear that someday China would seek revenge. It would provide Taiwan an opportunity to more closely integrate with China, while still claiming it was able to maintain its autonomy. And who cares what Korea thinks? (kidding, kidding)

Is this a possible scenario, or is it pure fantasy?

I know I'm a bit late comer but it's a good disucssion and I'd like to join.

Emergence of an EU type partnership in Sinosphere or a more broad partnership like ASEAN + 3 might not be possible as easy as it sounds. And it's not just about the past problems. If Germany and France can solve their problems (They have fought for almost two centuries : First France invaded Germany -Bonaparte era- than Germany invaded France in 2 world wars) surely the regional countries including Japan and China can solve their historical problems and create a somewhat uniform culture and world view.

However such partnership creates a huge power struggle.

Let's analyze the power structure in EU;
Leader Country : Germany
Potential Alternative Leaders / Equal Partners / Balance Factors: France and UK
Senior Developed Partners (Population > 30 million and GDP per capita > 30000$) : Italy, Spain
Senior Developing Partners (Population > 30 million and GDP per capita < 30000$) : Poland
Junior Developed Partners (Population < 30 million and GDP per capita > 30000$) : Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg
Junior Developing Partners (Population < 30 million and GDP per capita < 30000$) : Romania, Greece, Portugal, Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Croatia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Cyprus, Malta

So as you can see we have very nice power structure. Everything is balanced like pyramid. If France and UK doesn't like policies of Germany they can challenge. If Italy or Spain has something to say it will be well respected as a senior partner but will have limited effect when actually implementing it, however if Italy convinces Spain and both demand the same thing they will have broad effect when implementing it (Look at total population and total economic size). If 4-5 junior developed partners make a lobby and unite behind an idea they can also challenge Germany (Again look at economic size and population). So despite being the leader, Germany is definitely not omnipotent.

Now lets have look at ASEAN + 3;
China, Korea (hopefully a unified one), Japan, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Vietnam, Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, Brunei

Now let's have a look at the power structure here;
Leader Country : China
Potential Alternative Leaders / Equal Partners / Balance Factors : Japan????
Developing or Developed Senior Partners (Population > 500 millions) : None
Developed Junior Partners : Brunei, South Korea, Singapore
Developing Junior Partners : The rest

As you can see, even if the rest of the union unites against China in some policy they won't be able to counter balance it. The union will simply turn into Chinese hegemony which will annoy mostly Japan (since it would definitely seek an equal partnership in leadership of such a union) and also the rest of the countries in different tones. The question marks near Japan indicates that, Japan will have no power (in terms of size) to counter balance China in such a union.

However there is a magic formula to overcome this problem : India.

If India joins this union as a similar sized country with China, it will become the necessary factor for counter balance. If the rest of the union has problems with Chinese policies the only thing they should do is convincing India. And I'm sure India will be happily convinced and form a check&balance system against China.

A healthy union (just like human organizations) needs leaders and potential leaders. A single sided union/organization will just evolve into an hegemony which the rest of the group would not accept.

@Nihonjin1051 what do you think about that?

 

[Aepsilons]

This new development is , again, part of the issues that has been discussed here in this thread. I thought it would be relevant in context to how the two nations can utilize this communication channel to prevent military exigencies as well as a way to implement damage control in the event of extenuating circumstance. I applaud both the leaders in Japan's and China's military and government in the implementation of protocols that are illustrative of their accountability and responsibility.

よくできました

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The Japan-China Defense Hotline’s Growing Importance

Japanese and Chinese officials are holding informal talks in Beijing this week, in an attempt to forge a framework for managing territorial disputes at sea, particularly around the Senkaku/Daioyu Islands. The meeting is timely, as Japan has sought better overall relations with China in the last few months and the two circle around the topic of whether their two leaders will meet on the sidelines of next month’s APEC summit, also in Beijing. These talks also occur as tensions between the two countries, which had heightened with frequent naval confrontations around the disputed islands, have now eased noticeably.

A Japanese delegation of the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, led by former officers of the Air and Marine Self-Defense Forces, are meeting with several Chinese defense specialists on Wednesday and Thursday, “to promote private-sector dialogue aimed at averting accidental armed conflicts,” according to sources who spoke with the Yomiuri Shimbun. While current and former defense officials on both sides will be meeting, the talks are deemed a “private-sector effort,” in an attempt to facilitate the creation of a hotline between official defense authorities. The idea of a hotline, which was resurrected in September, would provide a direct link between Japanese and Chinese military officials in order to clear confusion and facilitate dialogue to contain the kinds of incidents that have occurred around the disputed islands for more than two years now.

A Japanese defense ministry official that spoke with the Yomiuri said that both governments hope to resume talks over the hotline by year’s end, while foundation officials have said “There will be two days of talks in the Chinese capital followed by two more meetings that will be held in Japan or China in the coming months, with a report expected early next year.”

These talks between defense officials are likely to be much more fruitful in terms of improving the tense maritime situation in the East China Sea than any quick meeting between Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and President Xi Jinping at the APEC Summit. The envisioned hotline might also help to prevent further near mid-air collisions between surveillance and fighter aircraft. The two countries’ overlapping Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZ) have led to several close calls.

The stated timeline for the hotline will also likely occur roughly alongside the expected update to the Japan-U.S. defense cooperation guidelines, which according to unofficial statements from both sides could now happen as late as next April. If so, then the hotline could prove to be increasingly useful, as Japan is seeking to enhance cooperation, particularly in relation to China’s growing military presence in the East China Sea. If Japan and the U.S. are set to better define and even increase Tokyo’s role in regional defense, then the ability to reach out to China and quickly deescalate unintentional conflict will become paramount.


The Japan-China Defense Hotline’s Growing Importance | The Diplomat

 

[Aepsilons]

Comment: This is exactly what I was hoping for and have been expressed in this thread. Good to see development of greater communication channels. This new development makes my week.


China and Japan smooth over East China Sea island row

China and Japan have agreed to try to reduce tensions over a disputed chain of islands in the East China Sea.

Beijing officials said a crisis management mechanism had been set up to prevent the situation from worsening.

The strategically important islands, known as Diaoyu by China and Senkaku by Japan, are controlled by Japan.

Meanwhile Japanese PM Shinzo Abe said the ground was being laid for a bilateral meeting between him and Chinese President Xi Jinping next week.

"Both Japan and China are coming to the view that it would benefit not just the two countries but regional stability if a summit is held," he said, quoted by Reuters news agency.

The meeting is expected to take place on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (Apec) summit in Beijing on Monday and Tuesday.

If it happens it will be the first proper exchange between the two leaders since they came to power, in 2012 and 2013 respectively.

A territorial row over islands in the East China Sea has put strain on ties between China and Japan
The Chinese foreign ministry said in a statement that senior Chinese and Japanese officials had reached a four-point agreement, which included a recognition of their "different positions" over the islands.

They had agreed "to prevent the situation from aggravating through dialogue and consultation and establish crisis management mechanisms to avoid contingencies," the statement added.

BBC News - China and Japan smooth over East China Sea island row

 

[Aepsilons]

Comment: I also wanted to repost an article that was already posted by @TaiShang (want to give him credit for letting me known of this and for heralding it here in PDF), because it is within the framework of bilateral developments. The 4 principles that both Japan and China agreed to is diplomatic victory for both sides.

--------------------------------


China, Japan announce four-part agreement to resume talks


TOKYO, Nov. 7 (UPI) -- China and Japan announced Friday they had reached a four-part agreement to move forward with diplomatic and security talks after two years of strained relations.
Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi and Japanese National Security Adviser Shotaro Yachi hashed out the four-part agreement during a meeting at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse. The two countries said they had agreed to overcome "political obstacles" with the hope of "facing history squarely and looking forward to the future."

The Chinese Foreign Ministry laid out the four points agreed to on Friday.

"First, the two sides have affirmed that they will follow the principles and spirit of the four political documents between China and Japan and continue to develop the China-Japan strategic relationship of mutual benefit.
"Second, in the spirit of 'facing history squarely and looking forward to the future,' the two sides have reached some agreement on overcoming political obstacles in the bilateral relations.

"Third, the two sides have acknowledged that different positions exist between them regarding the tensions which have emerged in recent years over the Diaoyu Islands and some waters in the East China Sea, and agreed to prevent the situation from aggravating through dialogue and consultation and establish crisis management mechanisms to avoid contingencies.

"Fourth, the two sides have agreed to gradually resume political, diplomatic and security dialogue through various multilateral and bilateral channels and to make efforts to build political mutual trust."

"The four-point consensus basically sets up a platform for the two leaders to meet next week" at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Beijing, said Zhu Feng, a professor of international relations at Peking University.

"A bilateral meeting would be a useful, positive gesture -- it would remove certain diplomatic barriers and provide a platform for future talks."


China, Japan agree to resume East China Sea talks - UPI.com

 

[Aepsilons]

Comment: Very interesting. As discussed earlier in this thread, I've mentioned that development of a crisis hotline would help manage and prevent any unnecessary conflagration of maritime patrol issues. Its good to see that this prediction has manifested into actual policy development.

===============================

Japan military chief urges early 'crisis management' pact with China


(Reuters) - Japan's highest-ranking military officer on Friday urged an early start to a "crisis management" mechanism with China amid conflicting claims to a group of tiny East China Sea islands.

Relations between China and Japan, the world's second- and third-largest economies, have also been strained by the legacy of Japan's wartime occupation of its larger Asian neighbor.

Patrol ships and fighter jets from both countries have shadowed each other regularly near the uninhabited islands, prompting fears an accidental collision or other incident could escalate into a larger conflict.

Chinese President Xi Jinping and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe agreed this month to start work on maritime crisis management. Such talks have been halted since Japan nationalized three of the disputed islands in September 2012.

"It would allow communication between people at the scene. That's significant," Admiral Katsutoshi Kawano, chief of the Japanese Self-Defence Forces' Joint Staff, told Reuters.

"The communication mechanism covers both the navies and air forces. Enabling such communication would be a great step forward in avoiding an unexpected situation. We have been pushing for an early implementation all along."

Under the scheme, apart from hot lines between the two countries, direct communication would be possible between Japanese and Chinese vessels and aircraft.

Kawano said it was too early to say when the plans would come to fruition.

"Only when political ties are rebuilt, exchanges between the militaries become possible," he said.

China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan also have competing claims in the potentially energy-rich waters of the South China Sea, criss-crossed by shipping lanes crucial for the smooth flow of international trade.


Japan military chief urges early 'crisis management' pact with China| Reuters

 

[Aepsilons]

Comment: Much has happened in the 4 months that I wrote this paper. And you know what, i feel happy to see that the premise of this article has been vindicated. Here's to renewed friendship between Japan and China, one step at a time !

---------------------------------------------------

China and Japan mending frail relationship one step at a time

It took diplomats from China and Japan months of intense negotiations to produce a terse but carefully worded agreement.

To pave the way for a summit between leaders of the two estranged Asian neighbours last November, the document - also known as the "four-point agreement" - was crafted with convenient ambiguity in both Chinese and Japanese.

Although the two texts still contained discrepancies, both sides appeared content. "We managed to agree on what we could agree on," one Japanese diplomat recalled.

But one thing had slipped past unattended - an English version acceptable to both countries.

So when Beijing released its own English version shortly after publishing the agreement in Chinese on November 7, Japanese diplomats said they were "surprised by the Chinese side's readiness" and irritated by what they considered to be points of "mistranslation".

A complaint was lodged to Beijing while Tokyo raced against time to produce a "more accurate" English version.

Both countries have now moved on to focus on rebuilding relations, but the wilful or otherwise lost-in-translation episode underscores the frailty of bilateral ties.
Even after the highly symbolic November 10 meeting between President Xi Jinping and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on the sidelines of a regional economic forum in Beijing, officials and scholars remain wary of how much headway can be made this year.

Obstacles are plentiful, diplomats and scholars say. Any improvements to their relationship could easily be overshadowed by the 70th anniversary of the end of second world war in August, an event that will refresh memories of Japanese wartime atrocities and further inflame nationalism in both countries.

Widening mistrust between the two peoples could stymie their governments' options. Experts agree there are strong signs the two leaders - both considered highly nationalistic - will be more pragmatic when managing bilateral ties, but any slight change of heart may deal a severe blow to hard-won progress.

Even though the Xi-Abe meeting was better remembered for their widely publicised icy handshake, the summit revived long-halted dialogue. The latest was an environment and energy conversation forum attended by government officials and business representatives from both countries in Beijing on December 28.

Negotiations on the establishment of a crisis-management mechanism could resume as early as next week, according to Kyodo. Such a system is designed to avoid accidental conflicts in the East China Sea, where increasingly frequent confrontations between government-owned vessels and aircraft have raised concerns.

With a basic framework already set up, Japanese officials said the mechanism could be ready to roll after one or two more rounds of dialogue.

An agreement on the mechanism was first struck in 2007. However, negotiations were put on hold after the 2012 nationalisation of the disputed island chain, known as Diaoyu in Chinese and Senkaku in Japanese, renewed tensions in the area.

The islands were nationalised by the government under Abe's predecessor Naoto Kan. Bilateral ties have spiralled downwards since as each side took steps to up the ante.

After repeated refusals to hold bilateral talks with Abe, Beijing's hosting of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (Apec) forum in November provided a face-saving opportunity, with the two leaders meeting for about 25 minutes on the sidelines.

Yet despite the promising signs, bilateral ties remained fragile, a senior Japanese official with the foreign ministry said in December.

"[It will be] a difficult year for Japan-China relations because of the 70th anniversary [of the end of the second world war]," the official said.

"Things will be a bit nasty, and we hope both sides try to focus on the present or the future."

But for many Chinese people, this part of history was ingrained early in their school education. Chinese authorities and the general public criticise Japan for refusing to reflect on its wartime atrocities, a claim that frustrates many Japanese who believe apologies have been made and all should move on.

"History does not stop at 1945, China should also look squarely at history after 1945," the Japanese official added.

The issue of history has become even more acrimonious under Abe, who has been criticised by both China and South Korea for historical revisionism. The conservative leader has been condemned for attempting to undermine two statements - including the Murayama Statement - by previous Japanese governments in 1990s acknowledging and apologising for the country's wartime aggressions.

Tensions spiked further after Abe unexpectedly visited the Yasukuni Shrine on December 26, 2013. Both Beijing and Seoul see the shrine, which honours Class-A war criminals from the second world war, as a symbol of Japan's militarism.

Earlier this week, Abe sought to dispel concerns over his nationalistic posturing by announcing he would express "remorse" for the war in a forthcoming statement.

Abe added that his cabinet would uphold the general stance on history of successive prime ministers, including the Murayama Statement. The apology, issued by former prime minister Tomiichi Murayama in 1995, has often been considered as Tokyo's official stance on the country's wartime activities.

With nationalistic leaders at the helm, both countries now see nationalism brewing among their respective peoples, who support their governments to take a tougher stance on the other country, analysts say.

Xi's stern handshake with Abe, for example, has been seen as a gesture to pacify the domestic audience.

The widening mistrust between the countries, according to another Japanese official, has remained a fundamental issue despite dialogue resuming. "Our No 1 priority to improve the situation is to solve the mistrust," the official said, acknowledging that would be a tall order.

A joint annual survey by China Daily and Japanese non-profit think tank Genron NPO between July and August last year showed 93 per cent of the Japanese polled had a "bad" impression of Chinese people - a record high - while the figure stood at 86.8 per cent the other way round, a decline of six percentage points on the previous year.

According to the same survey, 70.6 per cent of Japanese and 65 per cent of Chinese interviewees said a bilateral relationship was important. Both figures were at their lowest since the survey started gauging public opinions in the two countries in 2005.

The majority of both peoples regard the territorial dispute surrounding the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands as the main barrier in developing a bilateral relationship.

Despite the November summit, tensions over the troubled waters linger. "The only thing both sides have agreed on is they don't want this to get any worse," said Liang Yunxiang, a professor of Japanese studies at Peking University in Beijing.

Last Tuesday, China launched an official website detailing its authorised version of the islands' history, legal background and geological environment. China's growing naval presence in the East China Sea has also continued making headlines in Japan.

In Tokyo, Abe has instructed some cabinet members to re-examine by the end of March Japan's policy on managing remote islands like the Diaoyu/ Senkaku to strengthen security around those areas. Japan administers the Diaoyu/Senkaku and insists no dispute exists.

Even with a crisis-management mechanism in place, analysts are sceptical of its effectiveness. Yasuhiro Matsuda, a professor of international politics, said a key challenge for it to function properly was for China to increase its transparency.

"You need to tell the other side why you are sending a certain aircraft, why it is flying on a certain route. And is the person manning the hotline authoritative enough to call the shots?" Matsuda said.

"Simply having a direct hotline is not going to help much."

But many are still hopeful domestic political circumstances will dictate the two countries' leaders to steer bilateral ties away from problems.

Japanese officials and scholars said reviving the country's economy would remain the new cabinet's utmost priority. The hawkish leader, they said, would be forced to take a more pragmatic approach when handling relations with China, a key economic partner.

"Everybody knows he is nationalistic and wants to push the nationalistic policies," said Katsuyuki Yakushiji, a professor at Toyo University.

"But now there are many serious problems, he must improve the economic situation and foreign relations, and he should be realistic and pragmatic."

Japan unexpectedly fell into a technical recession in the third quarter last year, prompting doubts over Abe's economic policies. His call for a snap election in December was widely seen as a calculated move to garner a fresh public mandate.

Even as the drive to push for security reform continued, Liang said the efforts would do little to derail bilateral ties, adding: "Even if we are not happy about it, from a legal perspective it's their domestic issue."

Several Japanese officials said Abe had come to accept that revising the constitution would be impossible during his current term. Security bills related to the re-interpretation of "collective self defence" would be deliberated in the coming parliamentary session, but Yakushiji said the content of those bills would likely be watered down.

For Beijing, whether Abe would visit the Yasukuni Shrine again remains a wild card.

"Based on the current trajectory of improving ties, it seems unlikely Abe would visit the shrine again - if he did all the progress would be erased and we will be back to square one," said Liang.

A senior Japanese official who has worked closely with Abe said that while the prime minister's last visit might have been prompted by the fact bilateral ties were already at their lowest point, any further visit would require a very different calculation.

"Abe is not the kind of person that would slap Xi's face after shaking hands," the official said.

On Xi's part, a desire to improve relations with regional neighbours could keep bilateral relations moving forward, Matsuda said. "If China does not improve relations with its periphery, how does it promote its diplomatic initiatives such as the Asia infrastructure investment bank and 'One Road One Belt?" Matsuda said, referring to Beijing's ambition to project its power through infrastructure investments in the region.

In late November, the Chinese president signalled a conciliatory tone in a major speech on China's foreign policy.

China and Japan mending frail relationship one step at a time | South China Morning Post

 

[Yizhi]

south china morning post?
seems they are really serious about the relationship this time.
i'll wait for more positive narrative like this and then hopefully, they'll have some sort of game-changing agreement together....

 

[Aepsilons]

south china morning post?
seems they are really serious about the relationship this time.
i'll wait for more positive narrative like this and then hopefully, they'll have some sort of game-changing agreement together....

I really was impressed, shocked to see this article from SCMP --- since the outlet used to lambast relations with Japan. Perhaps, just perhaps, they are showing some of the feelings of Chinese people regarding relations with Japan --- currently. If so, then its great. A lot of Japanese news outlets are also saying the same things ---Importance of China, Mending relations with China is national interest of Japan and Northeast Asia. Well, i'm happy. Cooler heads i guess win the day.

 

[Yizhi]

I really was impressed, shocked to see this article from SCMP --- since the outlet used to lambast relations with Japan. Perhaps, just perhaps, they are showing some of the feelings of Chinese people regarding relations with Japan --- currently. If so, then its great. A lot of Japanese news outlets are also saying the same things ---Importance of China, Mending relations with China is national interest of Japan and Northeast Asia. Well, i'm happy. Cooler heads i guess win the day.

i guess it's an east asian thing. we always have months or even years of 'narrative building' before something huge actually happen. hope they can do something big, reconcile historical issue or settle the island dispute....let's just be patient....

 

[Aepsilons]

i guess it's an east asian thing. we always have months or even years of 'narrative building' before something huge actually happen. hope they can do something big, reconcile historical issue or settle the island dispute....let's just be patient....

Yes, i agree. It is time to build the future for this generation, our children's generation, and our grandchildren's generation -- and beyond. Patience and calm , you are right. We must be like the rivers that are still -- yet run deep.

 

[Shotgunner51]

I know I'm a bit late comer but it's a good disucssion and I'd like to join.

Emergence of an EU type partnership in Sinosphere or a more broad partnership like ASEAN + 3 might not be possible as easy as it sounds. And it's not just about the past problems. If Germany and France can solve their problems (They have fought for almost two centuries : First France invaded Germany -Bonaparte era- than Germany invaded France in 2 world wars) surely the regional countries including Japan and China can solve their historical problems and create a somewhat uniform culture and world view.

However such partnership creates a huge power struggle.

Let's analyze the power structure in EU;
Leader Country : Germany
Potential Alternative Leaders / Equal Partners / Balance Factors: France and UK
Senior Developed Partners (Population > 30 million and GDP per capita > 30000$) : Italy, Spain
Senior Developing Partners (Population > 30 million and GDP per capita < 30000$) : Poland
Junior Developed Partners (Population < 30 million and GDP per capita > 30000$) : Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg
Junior Developing Partners (Population < 30 million and GDP per capita < 30000$) : Romania, Greece, Portugal, Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Croatia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Cyprus, Malta

So as you can see we have very nice power structure. Everything is balanced like pyramid. If France and UK doesn't like policies of Germany they can challenge. If Italy or Spain has something to say it will be well respected as a senior partner but will have limited effect when actually implementing it, however if Italy convinces Spain and both demand the same thing they will have broad effect when implementing it (Look at total population and total economic size). If 4-5 junior developed partners make a lobby and unite behind an idea they can also challenge Germany (Again look at economic size and population). So despite being the leader, Germany is definitely not omnipotent.

Now lets have look at ASEAN + 3;
China, Korea (hopefully a unified one), Japan, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Vietnam, Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, Brunei

Now let's have a look at the power structure here;
Leader Country : China
Potential Alternative Leaders / Equal Partners / Balance Factors : Japan????
Developing or Developed Senior Partners (Population > 500 millions) : None
Developed Junior Partners : Brunei, South Korea, Singapore
Developing Junior Partners : The rest

As you can see, even if the rest of the union unites against China in some policy they won't be able to counter balance it. The union will simply turn into Chinese hegemony which will annoy mostly Japan (since it would definitely seek an equal partnership in leadership of such a union) and also the rest of the countries in different tones. The question marks near Japan indicates that, Japan will have no power (in terms of size) to counter balance China in such a union.

However there is a magic formula to overcome this problem : India.

If India joins this union as a similar sized country with China, it will become the necessary factor for counter balance. If the rest of the union has problems with Chinese policies the only thing they should do is convincing India. And I'm sure India will be happily convinced and form a check&balance system against China.

A healthy union (just like human organizations) needs leaders and potential leaders. A single sided union/organization will just evolve into an hegemony which the rest of the group would not accept.

@Nihonjin1051 what do you think about that?

Interesting thought, but the situation is more complicated so it might not work that simple.

About EU, there's one very important factor - US provision of security umbrella to all its members including Germany after WWII - and this makes integration easier for all members despite all their differences. Russia is isolated out of the picture, Pax America.

Now take a look at the Asia Pacific, and imagine there is no PRC, then it would be another EU right? Japan the leader country, Korea and TW as equal partners, then so on and so forth. So again, Pax America.

But the reality is China is in it. Biz-wise it's not out of the picture like Russia, rather it engages deep trade ties with all members of this region. Security-wise it's not like Germany, China's has its own geopolitical plans. So China is Russia + Germany? Or what is it? Sinosphere is more complicated than it seems, don't leave out the US factor. So the EU way (even with the magic formula you suggested) can't apply.

Further more on your magic formula, addition of India, doesn't solve the problem. I don't undermine India's weight, I do appreciate them as an important country, but the China to India weight ratio is a lot different from the Germany to UK weight ratio. Also, bringing India alone into the picture is incomplete, you should consider bringing the whole S Asia into this. But then I think the whole big game is so complicated that at least I can't figure out how to play with, worth exploring though.