The Kashmir Resolutions - Explanations

[bandit]

So why do most Indians regurgitate the same biased history?

Seemingly many Pakistanis carry on with their biased versions about a lot many other things. I however, would refrain from assuming.

What preconditions? I pointed out to you that the resolutions in fact called for 'negotiations' on the issue of withdrawal, and that subsequent resolutions overrode previous ones and removed the point about a unilateral withdrawal by Pakistan.

At the very least you have to refute my point about the condition of 'withdrawal of Pakistani forces' being subject to negotiations between India, Pakistan and the UN appointed commission and rapporteurs. The latter point of whether India 'cherry picked' only one very early resolution out of the many that were passed (becoming more detailed as time progressed) I'll attempt to address next.

The point is Pakistan needed to remove its forces before India could move to the next part of the resolution...Agreed?

Now Pakistan had a lot of time to move its forces back and then squarely blame India for reneging on its commitments. However Pakistan chose to hold on to the land which highlighted its intentions.

Now you say that the countries had to negotiate, but please tell me what could have Pakistan discussed about withdrawing its forces from Kashmir with India. You claim higher moral grounds but Pakistans actions do not justify them based on that India prevented you from withdrawing forces.

I am not mistaken sir, you have no clue about the commitment made by your nation's leadership to the UNSC resolutions, or refuse to see it to push a flawed and distorted narrative.

See Nehru's quotes below and note the dates:

“We had given our pledge to the people of Kashmir, and subsequently to the United Nations; we stood by it and we stand by it today. Let the people of Kashmir decide.” JAWAHARLAL NEHRU, (Statement in the Indian Parliament, 12 February 1951).

“We have taken the issue to the United Nations and given our word of honour for a peaceful solution. As a great nation, we cannot go back on it. We have left the question for final solution to the people of Kashmir and we are determined to abide by their decision.” JAWAHARLAL NEHRU (Amrita Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, 2 January 1952).

“But so far as the Government of India are concerned, every assurance and international commitment in regard to Kashmir stands.” JAWAHARLAL NEHRU (Statement in the Indian Council of States; 18 May 1954).

All statements reiterating India's commitment to the UN, and all in the fifties and one in 1954, when the resolution delineating the UN preferred troop levels for both India and Pakistan had been passed in 1952.

Nehru made the statements based on what the 1948 resolution had called for.

About the underlined part above, how do you expect India to accept a change in the original spirit of the resolution to which India agreed to and which clearly framed Pakistan as the aggressor? You of course hold that dear to yourself as it strengthens your position.

You cannot cherry pick one resolution, that you think supports your POV, out of the many that were passed, since subsequent resolutions override the past ones. The desire to reject the other resolutions is like a thief rejecting a higher courts decision against him.

The same way you chose to ignore the roiginal resolution for 4 years for withdrawing the troops.

Please see above and my point about you needing to refute my argument on troop withdrawal


I fail to see what your point was there, or how I was distorting facts. Please elaborate.
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The contingency for plebiscite was in 1948, and your point about mutual removal of troops is from different resolutions, which as I explained is not acceptable to India as it equates Pakistans position with it on Kashmir.

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There was no alliance with the West at that time, nor can you conclusively argue that all UNSC members were in cahoots to 'rig' the UNSC resolutions - that's an absurd conspiracy theory.

Russia abstained from the voting. Obviously in support of India.
And no you do realize you dont need all members of the UNSC in cahoots for that, just one would have done, USA.


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*The Security Council voted on this resolution on 23-12-1952 with the following result:-

In favor: **Brazil, **Chile, China, France, **Greece, **Netherlands, **Turkey, U.K. and U.S.A.

Against: None.

Abstaining: U.S.S.R.

** Non-Permanent Members of the Security Council, .

.

The Pakistani Army's entrance into Kashmir occured after the IA's entrance. The Tribal invasion occurred after the Mharajah's atocities against his own people when they rose up in rebellion against him - in that sense the Tribal invasion in support of the people of Kashmir against a brutal dictator was the right thing to do.

Now now, lets not be naive shall we, its well documented that Pakistan supported the Tribals. Jinnah even bragged that the Tribals would back out on his single command. Now what does it say about Pakistans intentions at that time. This non-state actor excuse is really getting lamer by the minute.

After all, how do Indians classify their nation's own intervention in East Pakistan by supporting and arming violent rebels?.

Lets not digress shall we, I'll refrain.

.

I have already pointed out to you that the entity that India approached for arbitration ruled that the territory was disputed, the means of resolution was plebiscite, and that withdrawal was to be done through negotiations and subsequently ruled that withdrawal would not be bilateral. India's personal opinion does not matter -the neutral entity and arbiter ruled that a unilateral withdrawal was not feasible - India's position was wrong, and she failed to convince the UNSC of it.

Sir please note that appenix VI mentions that

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India agreed to cease fire with effect from 1st Jan: 1949 after some assurances were given to it during the course of discussions and correspondence with the UN Commission for India and Pakistan. One of the assurance given was that “the plebiscite proposal shall not be binding upon India if Pakistan does not implement Part I and Part II of the resolution of August 13, 1948.”.

Subsequently it changed the terms, we really are under no compulsion to follow an arbiters rulings who changes terms after the pact and the neutrality of which is questionable anyways. Please try to read the soviet representatives accusation of US and UK interfering in Kashmir and stating that the constituent assembly shall decide on Kashmir in January 1952. It is obvious sides had been taken on Kashmir by then.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

The point is Pakistan needed to remove its forces before India could move to the next part of the resolution...Agreed?

The parts of the resolution suggest the terms/details of such a withdrawal would have to be negotiated between India, Pakistan and the UN appointed commission - those negotiations were never settled, mainly because of Indian objections.

Now Pakistan had a lot of time to move its forces back and then squarely blame India for reneging on its commitments. However Pakistan chose to hold on to the land which highlighted its intentions.

Now you say that the countries had to negotiate, but please tell me what could have Pakistan discussed about withdrawing its forces from Kashmir with India. You claim higher moral grounds but Pakistans actions do not justify them based on that India prevented you from withdrawing forces.

Pakistan did not have time to withdraw since the negotiations over the withdrawal were never completed.

What had to be discussed was what ended up being represented in subsequent UN resolutions - a bilateral withdrawal with X numbers of forces from either side left behind for law and order purposes, so that neither country could make a military grab for the territory vacated by the other.

Nehru made the statements based on what the 1948 resolution had called for.

He should have been far more specific about that then - he clearly endorsed the UN resolutions which had in fact by then come to reflect a bilateral withdrawal from both sides leaving behind small numbers of troops.

About the underlined part above, how do you expect India to accept a change in the original spirit of the resolution to which India agreed to and which clearly framed Pakistan as the aggressor? You of course hold that dear to yourself as it strengthens your position.

India did accept - see Nehru's statements I posted endorsing the UN resolutions.

The same way you chose to ignore the roiginal resolution for 4 years for withdrawing the troops.

Withdrawal subject to negotiations between India, Pakistan and the UN appointed commission - negotiations that were never concluded.

The contingency for plebiscite was in 1948, and your point about mutual removal of troops is from different resolutions, which as I explained is not acceptable to India as it equates Pakistans position with it on Kashmir.

Nehru's quotes show him endorsing the UN resolutions, not making a distinction between them - so India accepted them. UNSC resolutions automatically override previous ones unless the specify otherwise

Russia abstained from the voting. Obviously in support of India.
And no you do realize you dont need all members of the UNSC in cahoots for that, just one would have done, USA.

The USSR should have voted against, if they had any serious objections.

Now now, lets not be naive shall we, its well documented that Pakistan supported the Tribals. Jinnah even bragged that the Tribals would back out on his single command. Now what does it say about Pakistans intentions at that time. This non-state actor excuse is really getting lamer by the minute.

I am not familiar with that quote of Jinnah's - could you link me to it please?

And Pakistan did have a very low level effort in supporting the Tribals, once the invasion in response to the Maharajah's atrocities was a foregone conclusion, but it is fact that the Pakistani Army did not enter J&K until after the IA entered. Secondly, how was the Tribal invasion (if taken as a Pakistani invasion) different from India's military interventions in other princely states such as Hyderabad and Junagadh? You cannot complain about Pakistan doing so when India herself utilized military force to preempt possible accession by the rulers of those states to Pakistan.

Lets not digress shall we, I'll refrain.

Its not digression - it goes to the heart of the Indian claim that what Pakistan did in kashmir (not Indian territory at the time) was 'immoral', when India did the same not just in East Pakistan, but also in Junagadh and Hyderabad. You have to accept your own wrongs as well if you insist on criticizing Pakistan on that point.
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Sir please note that appenix VI mentions that

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Subsequently it changed the terms, we really are under no compulsion to follow an arbiters rulings who changes terms after the pact and the neutrality of which is questionable anyways. Please try to read the soviet representatives accusation of US and UK interfering in Kashmir and stating that the constituent assembly shall decide on Kashmir in January 1952. It is obvious sides had been taken on Kashmir by then.

The terms were not changed - the resolution of 13 August 1949 clearly establishes the need for negotiations over the details of the withdrawal, details that were clarified in subsequent UNSC resolutions, which override the previous ones, and which Nehru endorsed.

You cannot pick and choose which resolutions you want to implement. If you had concerns over the issue, India should have attempted to influence the language of the resolutions before they were passed and overrode the previous ones.

 

[toxic_pus]

We did respect the UNSC resolutions - they call for tripartite negotiations between India, Pakistan and a UN representative to determine the details and process of demilitarization, details over which the two sides could never come to agreement.

The UNSC resolutions did not call for an unconditional, unilateral withdrawal on the part of Pakistan.

The Truce Agreement does talk of tripartite negotiations, but not to ‘determine the details and process of demilitarization’. Part II/B(1) reads:

“When the Commission shall have notified the Government of India that the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals referred to in Part II A 2 hereof have withdrawn, thereby terminating the situation which was represented by the Government of India to the Security Council as having occasioned the presence of Indian forces in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and further, that the Pakistan forces are being withdrawn from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Government of India agrees to begin to withdraw the bulk of their forces from the State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission”​

Nehru while seeking clarifications on the resolution of 13th Aug, 1948, had sought to identify the parties to the negotiation concerning demilitarization. He wrote to Joseph Korbel, the Chairman of the Commission, on 20th Aug, 1948 (UNCIP’s 1st Report):

“...the paramount need for security is recognized by the Commission, and the time when the withdrawal of Indian forces from the State is to begin, the stages in which it is to be carried out and the strength of Indian forces to be retained in the State, are matters for settlement between the Commission and the Government of India.” (para 4)​

Joseph Korbel, wrote back, on 25th Aug, 1948, confirming Nehru’s interpretation (UNCIP’s 1st Report):

“The Commission requests me to convey to Your Excellency its view that the interpretation of the Resolution as expressed in paragraph 4 of your letter coincides with its own interpretation...”​

Pakistan, too, had sought clarification on this very issue. Joseph Korbel, in his letter to Zafarulla Khan, dated 3rd Sept, 1948, stated (UNCIP’s 1st Report):

“As regards paragraphs B 1 and 2 of Part II, the Commission, while recognizing the paramount need for security of the State of Jammu ad Kashmir, confirms that the minimum strength required for the purpose of assisting the local authorities in the observance of law and order, would be determined by the Commission and the Government of India. The Commission considers that it is free to hear the views of the Government of Pakistan on the subject.”
​

In other words, India was neither obliged to negotiate with Pakistan nor to share information about demilitarization with anyone other than UN Commission. Neither did Pakistan have any right to dictate terms and conditions for its own withdrawal or seek information from India, or perhaps even from UN, about India’s withdrawal. Pakistan’s role was relegated to that of someone who Commission may ‘hear’, and not that of a party to the negotiation. As far as India was concerned, UN was ‘free to hear views’ of Jupiterions, if UN so desired.

UNCIP’s 3rd Report, clarifies the positions of the two countries on this issue of demilitarization and the process of negotiations.

''...the Pakistan delegation held (a) that the objective of the truce agreement is to create a military balance between the forces on each side and (b) that the withdrawal of her regular forces depended upon plans acceptable to the Pakistan Government for the synchronization of this withdrawal that of the bulk of the Indian forces. (para 229)

India, on the other hand, has (a) never accepted the claim of Pakistan to equality of rights in a military or any other sphere, but considers that the presence of Pakistan troops in Kashmir constitutes an act of aggression and a violation of international law; and (b) has refused to discuss with Pakistan any feature of the withdrawal of Indian forces, maintaining that the timing and staging of the Indian withdrawals and the strength of Indian forces to be retained in the State were matters for settlement between the Commission and the Government of India. The Government of India at this time also made it clear that the fulfillment by the Government of Pakistan of the conditions of withdrawal was a condition precedent to the implementation by the Government of India of any arrangement regarding the withdrawal of its own forces. (para 230)​

The Truce Agreement is clear that Pakistan would have to evacuate the territories captured by it and the local authority will be looking after the administration of the evacuated territory under the direct supervision of the UN Commission.

“Pending a final solution the territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission.” [Part II/A(3)]​

By no stretch of imagination can this be construed that ‘the objective of the truce agreement is to create a military balance between the forces on each side’. This deliberately flawed position of (a) led to (b). From Pakistan’s point of view, if it could be established that the withdrawal was about bringing in a ‘military balance’, it would then naturally mean that Pakistan got to decide what, for them, was an acceptable ‘military balance’. This in turn would mean that Pakistan’s withdrawal was contingent upon its agreement with Indian plan of withdrawal. It would then be very easy for Pakistan to weasel out of its own obligation by simply citing its disagreement with Indian plan of demilitarization. (That’s exactly what they did eventually and continue to do)

The Commission had on several occasions, clarified, that Pakistan had to ‘completely’ withdraw from the occupied part. The evacuated land was then to become UN’s concern and Pakistan had absolutely no role to play in it (not even in the subsequent plebiscite). Pakistan’s argument, based on its flawed premise, was in complete contradiction with the Commission’s clarifications. For example, UNCIP’s 3rd Report states:

“...the Resolution […], as has been pointed out, draws a distinction between the withdrawal of Indian and Pakistan forces. Pakistan troops are to begin to withdraw in advance of the Indian troops and their withdrawal is not conditioned on Pakistan's agreement to the plan of the Indian withdrawal.” (para 242)

“That Resolution does not suggest that Pakistan should be entitled to make her withdrawals conditional upon the consultations envisaged between the Commission and the Government of India having led to an agreed schedule of withdrawal of Indian troops. What Pakistan could expect would be that assurance be made that the withdrawals of the two armed forces be arranged and carried out in such a way as to prevent the creation of a situation which might constitute an opportunity for one or the other party to reopen the hostilities.” (para 243) ​

To summarise, (a) negotiations regarding demilitarization was very much a bipartite affair, where Pakistan had limited role to play, if at all it had any role to play, and (b) Pakistan’s withdrawal was ‘unconditional’ and ‘unilateral’, in the sense that it didn’t depend on India’s plan for demilitarization.
___________________________

End Note:

UNCIP’s 1st Report was prepared by Mr Alfredo Lonazo, representative of Columbia and is dated 22, Nov, 1948. Commission’s chairman was Mr Joseph Korbel.

UNCIP’s 3rd Report was prepared by Mr Robert van de Karchove, representative of Belgium and is dated 9 Dec, 1949. Commission’s chairman was Mr Hernando Semper.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

What Pakistan could expect would be that assurance be made that the withdrawals of the two armed forces be arranged and carried out in such a way as to prevent the creation of a situation which might constitute an opportunity for one or the other party to reopen the hostilities.”

In other words not an unconditional withdrawal, and therefore no violation by Pakistan of the UNSC resolutions.

 

[toxic_pus]

What Pakistan could expect would be that assurance be made that the withdrawals of the two armed forces be arranged and carried out in such a way as to prevent the creation of a situation which might constitute an opportunity for one or the other party to reopen the hostilities.”

In other words not an unconditional withdrawal, and therefore no violation by Pakistan of the UNSC resolutions.

'Assurance' was never a problem. The Commission was there precisely to see that the demilitarization wasn't being carried on in a manner that might create an 'opportunity for one or the other party to reopen the hostilities'. For instance, in the words of Mr Robert van de Karchove, the UN rapporteur (UNCIP's 3rd Interim Report):

"It was feasible [...] that the arrangements could be coordinated and supervised by the mediation party, namely, the Commission, so as to cause the two withdrawals to represent a dual operation which would be coordinated in timing and would result in a military situation in the State which was not such as to place either side at a disadvantage." (para 242)​

Further,

"It (the Commission)repeatedly assured the Pakistan Government that this would be evident in the agreement itself, and it must be noted that the terms were to be published in full immediately upon the acceptance of the Governments. The withdrawal plan for the Indian forces [...] was consequently, to be published in advance of implementation by either side." (para 244)​

Besides, India had given plenty of 'assurance' that there would be no unilateral reopening of hostilities on its part, unless provoked.

In spite of all that Pakistan deliberately maintained an absurd stance,

"...(a) that the objective of the truce agreement is to create a military balance between the forces on each side and (b) that the withdrawal of her regular forces depended upon plans acceptable to the Pakistan Government for the synchronization of this withdrawal that of the bulk of the Indian forces" (para 230)​

Regarding 'synchronization' Mr Karchove observed:

"The Commission was not able to share the view of the Government of Pakistan that the only method of assuring this form of synchronization was by the full and free exchange of information between the Indian and Pakistan Governments regarding withdrawal plans." (para 242)​

Hence,

"The Pakistan Government could not in reason expect, nor could the Commission have granted, a "synchronization" which would have been incompatible with the terms of the Resolution of 13 August." (para 243)​

Clearly Pakistan was just looking for ways to shrug off its own responsibilities in a way that would enable it to blame India for all the failures.

'Assurance' was never a problem. Pakistan had plenty of it.

 

[niaz]

This is never ending debate. People keep asking about reliable source. Hon Sirs, nearly all the secondary sources that you refer have read the same old news reports that I have only difference is that of interpretation. Like saying a glass is half full or half empty.


The two essential parts of the resolution were:


3. Pending a final solution, the territory evacuated by the Pakistani troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the commission.

PART III
The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan reaffirm their wish that the future status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall be determined in accordance with the will of the people and to that end, upon acceptance of the truce agreement, both Governments agree to enter into consultations with the Commission to determine fair and equitable conditions whereby such free expression will be assured.

Following the UN Resolution, there were many attempts to resolve this issue as noted below:

Talks between Quaid-e-Azam and Mountbatten.

In November 1947, at Lahore talks took place between Quaid-e-Azam and Mountbatten in which Quaid-e-Azam initiated certain proposals in which the Governor Generals and the Prime Ministers of both the countries were scheduled to meet to find out solution to Kashmir. The talks between said dignitaries never took place due to backing out of Sardar Patel. [2]

Liaqat Nehru Report-1950.

In 1950, Mr., Liaquat Ali Khan, the first Prime Minister of Pakistan visited new Delhi where he signed an agreement with his counterpart, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru; which has come to be know as, “Liaquat – Nehru Pact”. This pact was followed in letter and spirit by Pakistan, while India tried to overlook. This pact was the first bilateral agreement between the Pakistan and the India but its results were not long lasting.

1953- Bogra Nehru Talks.

On 25 July 1953, the Pakistani Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra and the Indian Prime Minister Pandit Nehru held negotiations on the question of Kashmir in Karachi which were followed by another round of talks in New Delhi from 16 August. A joint communiqué issue at the end of talks reaffirmed that the Kashmir dispute needed to be resolved in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir through fair and impartial plebiscite. However when it came to implementation, India balked. [3]

1962 Talks.

1962 saw Sino –Indo conflict at the end of which India faced lot of pressure from international community to have solution of Kashmir. As a sequel to it, six rounds of talks were held between the foreign ministers of the two countries from December 27, 1962 to May 16, 1963 at Rawalpindi, New Delhi, Karachi, Calcutta and again Karachi and New Delhi. Various aspects of the Kashmir dispute were discussed, however the meetings concluded without any agreement due to Indian cunning attitude.

Special Edition (Liaqat Ali Khan)

The following is a link to a magazine which is part of the Hindu Newspapers group of India.

Of the India-Pakistan summit, 1955.

The relevant portion is quoted below;

The third reason is that in 1947 Nehru was confident of winning the plebiscite. Earlier volumes in the series record Nehru's retreat from plebiscite and moves for partition. One would suspect that when it concerned Kashmir, Nehru had reservations on a plebiscite even in 1947. Thus, he wrote to Abdullah on November 21, 1947: "Dwarkanath writes to me that there is strong feeling in the leadership of the National Conference against a referendum. I know this and quite understand it. In fact I share the feeling myself. But you will appreciate that it is not easy for us to back out of the stand we have taken before the world. That would create a very bad impression abroad and especially in U.N. circles. I feel, however, that this question of referendum is rather an academic one at present... If we said to the UNO that we no longer stand by a referendum in Kashmir, Pakistan would score a strong point and that would be harmful to our cause. On the other hand, if circumstances continue as they are and the referendum is out of the question during these next few months, then why worry about it now?... It is all a question of the best tactical approach. I would personally suggest to you not to say anything rejecting the idea of a referendum..." (V. 4, pp. 336-7).
Nehru pleaded with the Maharaja of Kashmir (December 1, 1947): "If the average Muslim (in Kashmir) feels that he has no safe or secure place in the Union, then obviously he will look elsewhere... The present position is that in Kashmir proper, the mass of the population Muslim and Hindu is no doubt in favour of the Indian Union. In the Jammu area, all the non-Muslims and some Muslims are likely to be in favour of the Union. But this depends entirely on the policy to be pursued during the next few months" (V. 4; p. 351).
Another consideration weighed with Nehru. He knew that a pro-Pakistan constituency existed in Kashmir. It has to be defeated or marginalised by winning over the people - through the plebiscite offer. Hence his wise counsel to the Sheikh on November 1, 1947: "The people must be made to feel that the question of accession will have to be decided finally according to their own wishes. How this is to be done can be determined later. As far as I can see, it should be done under the auspices of the United Nations" (V. 4; p. 300). Mountbatten's suggestion for reference to the U.N. came later, on December 8.
With Lord Ismay's help V. P. Menon and Chaudhry Mohammed Ali, Secretary-General of Pakistan's Cabinet, arrived at a Draft Kashmir Agreement in November which Ismay discussed with Nehru and Liaquat in detail on December 28, 1947. It had no chance of success given Nehru's attitude despite Liaquat's concessions (V.4; pp. 408-9).
Once the debates in the U.N. Security Council began in January 1948, Nehru became increasingly uneasy and confused. To Krishna Menon he mentioned two alternatives: "One is the possibility of Kashmir being considered more or less independent and guaranteed as such by India, Pakistan and possibly the U.N. The other is the possibility of some kind of partition either by previous agreement or as a result of the vote. I do not fancy either of these; but I do not wish to rule them out altogether" (February 20, 1949; V. 5; p. 222).
On February 26, Mountbatten proposed that "a vote for independence should be included in the plebiscite" (V. 5; p. 232).
Unquote.

I restate my position that Nehru always wanted to grab Kashmir. Even strongly pro Indian Chief Minister of Kashmir, Sh. Abdullah revolted and was sentenced to imprisonment in 1953 when Nehru went back on his word. Sheikh Abdullah remained in Prison until after Nehru’s death in 1964, when all of a sudden all charges against him were dropped and he was reinstated.
Pakistanis feel cheated and bitter about the duplicity of Nehru and Sardar Patel. However the fact remains that India is without doubt militarily, economically, in men and materials numerically superior to Pakistan. It is a universal truth that “Might is always Right”.

 

[rastor]

However the fact remains that India is without doubt militarily, economically, in men and materials is numerically superior to Pakistan. It is a universal truth that “Might is always Right”.

Very true.

Sir, from reading your posts I have cultivated much respect for you. This is the sad reality....kashmir wants to be either independent or slide to pakistan but no Indian govt would agree to that. Ultimately pakistan has to reconcile itself to keeping what it has and accept that territorial re-organization is not the only way to solve this problem.....the only probable solution is along the lines of "keep what you have"......

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

"It was feasible [...] that the arrangements could be coordinated and supervised by the mediation party, namely, the Commission, so as to cause the two withdrawals to represent a dual operation which would be coordinated in timing and would result in a military situation in the State which was not such as to place either side at a disadvantage." (para 242)


Further,

"It (the Commission)repeatedly assured the Pakistan Government that this would be evident in the agreement itself, and it must be noted that the terms were to be published in full immediately upon the acceptance of the Governments. The withdrawal plan for the Indian forces [...] was consequently, to be published in advance of implementation by either side." (para 244)

Again, that only supports Pakistan's position that the withdrawal was in essence neither unilateral nor unconditional.

I fail to see how you can argue otherwise when you just posted material endorsing the point I was arguing?

Besides, India had given plenty of 'assurance' that there would be no unilateral reopening of hostilities on its part, unless provoked.

Did India not reject the demilitarization proposals presented by both McNaughton and Owen Dixon - so how exactly was not intransigent here and how exactly was the Indian rejection of the proposed demilitarization plans in consonance with the two paragraphs quoted above and not tantamount to Indian intransigence?

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

.....the only probable solution is along the lines of "keep what you have"......

That however is not a compromise - that is in essence the Indian position since the fifties when India decided to violate its commitment to the UNSC resolutions and move to annex and integrate the territory under is control into India - Indian officials and Nehru said as much on the record, that they would look to converting the status of the then ceasefire line into the international border.

The status quo of LoC == IB is not acceptable to Pakistan, much as a plebiscite determining the status of the entire territory of J&K is not acceptable to India - a compromise solution different from these two positions needs to therefore be worked on, and was in a way under the backchannel dialog between Pakistan under Musharraf and the GoI.

 

[toxic_pus]

Again, that only supports Pakistan's position that the withdrawal was in essence neither unilateral nor unconditional.

I fail to see how you can argue otherwise when you just posted material endorsing the point I was arguing?

I think I have already clarified it in my earlier post. Pakistan’s withdrawal was ‘unconditional’ and ‘unilateral’ in the sense that it didn’t depend on India’s plan for demilitarization. Pakistan had consistently tried to ‘condition’ its own withdrawal to India’s plan for demilitarization in spite of being repeatedly clarified otherwise by the Commission. That’s where Pakistan’s intransigence lies.

The materials that I have posted, illustrate that Pakistan was not entitled to seek any ‘assurance’ in any manner that was beyond what was already contained in the Truce Agreement itself and what the very presence of UN as a mediator ensured.

The argument that Pak withdrawal was ‘conditional’ upon ‘assurance’ is an argument in vacuum and altogether a desperate attempt to clutch at straw.

Did India not reject the demilitarization proposals presented by both McNaughton and Owen Dixon - so how exactly was not intransigent here and how exactly was the Indian rejection of the proposed demilitarization plans in consonance with the two paragraphs quoted above and not tantamount to Indian intransigence?

Firstly, rejection of any proposal which had the potential to place India at a disadvantage doesn’t automatically mean ‘intransigence’. Negotiation, by its very definition meant that India had the right to reject and/or offer terms and conditions.

Secondly, neither McNaughton nor Owen Dixon made any actionable proposals. McNaughton provided a broad framework for demilitarization and nothing more, while Dixon concentrated solely on the process of plebiscite. Why their proposals were rejected is another debate and deserves a separate thread.

 

[toxic_pus]

That however is not a compromise - that is in essence the Indian position since the fifties when India decided to violate its commitment to the UNSC resolutions and move to annex and integrate the territory under is control into India - Indian officials and Nehru said as much on the record, that they would look to converting the status of the then ceasefire line into the international border.

It is difficult of violate one's commitment when the opportunity to execute one's commitment never presented itself. But don't let these legal trivialities spoil your accusation game.

Regarding annexation, well, Pakistan took it to the UN and UN has till date not ruled it to be 'violation' of any commitment. But again, don't let these minor facts ruin your game.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

I think I have already clarified it in my earlier post. Pakistan’s withdrawal was ‘unconditional’ and ‘unilateral’ in the sense that it didn’t depend on India’s plan for demilitarization. Pakistan had consistently tried to ‘condition’ its own withdrawal to India’s plan for demilitarization in spite of being repeatedly clarified otherwise by the Commission. That’s where Pakistan’s intransigence lies.

The materials that I have posted, illustrate that Pakistan was not entitled to seek any ‘assurance’ in any manner that was beyond what was already contained in the Truce Agreement itself and what the very presence of UN as a mediator ensured.

The argument that Pak withdrawal was ‘conditional’ upon ‘assurance’ is an argument in vacuum and altogether a desperate attempt to clutch at straw.

Please re-read the text you yourself posted - the UN commission implicitly tied any Pakistani withdrawal to Indian actions on demilitarization - there is no clutching at straws here except by you to somehow cast Pakistan as being obligated to perform an 'unconditional and unilateral withdrawal' to erroneously establish a violation of the UNSC resolutions.

""It was feasible [...] that the arrangements could be coordinated and supervised by the mediation party, namely, the Commission, so as to cause the two withdrawals to represent a dual operation which would be coordinated in timing and would result in a military situation in the State which was not such as to place either side at a disadvantage." (para 242)

"It (the Commission)repeatedly assured the Pakistan Government that this would be evident in the agreement itself, and it must be noted that the terms were to be published in full immediately upon the acceptance of the Governments. The withdrawal plan for the Indian forces [...] was consequently, to be published in advance of implementation by either side." (para 244)
​

Firstly, rejection of any proposal which had the potential to place India at a disadvantage doesn’t automatically mean ‘intransigence’. Negotiation, by its very definition meant that India had the right to reject and/or offer terms and conditions.

The rejection of several proposals on demilitarization by India, on the pretext of 'disadvantage', when the goal was to in fact stall implementation of the UNSC resolutions and declare LoC == IB, does qualify as intransigence, but obviously not to the party guilty of it.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

It is difficult of violate one's commitment when the opportunity to execute one's commitment never presented itself. But don't let these legal trivialities spoil your accusation game.

The commitment was to implement the principle of plebiscite to resolve the dispute of J&K as outlined in the UNSC resolutions - statements and actions tantamount to withdrawal from the resolutions was a violation of that commitment.

Regarding annexation, well, Pakistan took it to the UN and UN has till date not ruled it to be 'violation' of any commitment. But again, don't let these minor facts ruin your game.

Not aware of that process and what rationale the UN used to make/not make a decision - perhaps you can provide further details or links to them ...

 

[rastor]

That however is not a compromise - that is in essence the Indian position since the fifties when India decided to violate its commitment to the UNSC resolutions and move to annex and integrate the territory under is control into India - Indian officials and Nehru said as much on the record, that they would look to converting the status of the then ceasefire line into the international border.

The status quo of LoC == IB is not acceptable to Pakistan, much as a plebiscite determining the status of the entire territory of J&K is not acceptable to India - a compromise solution different from these two positions needs to therefore be worked on, and was in a way under the backchannel dialog between Pakistan under Musharraf and the GoI.

AM,

Those UNSC resolutions are nothing more than junk paper if either India or Pak decide it is so. If you mean something along the lines of "give us the valley - keep the rest" - it ain't gonna happen under threat of proxies and judging from Niaz's posting not by offer of peace too.....that which has taken blood/sweat to achieve is unlikely to be given away....

The basis of all this is not justice or the 'righteous' but power. The more powerful entity will prevail.....take the fact pakistan hasn't gotten anywhere with it's proxies or wars.....I for one would definitely be OK with India ceding kashmir for independence or change in territorial status quo but reality is different. Time for Pakistan to re-calibrate and define what is in it's best interest.

 

[toxic_pus]

Please re-read the text you yourself posted - the UN commission implicitly tied any Pakistani withdrawal to Indian actions on demilitarization - there is no clutching at straws here except by you to somehow cast Pakistan as being obligated to perform an 'unconditional and unilateral withdrawal' to erroneously establish a violation of the UNSC resolutions.

""It was feasible [...] that the arrangements could be coordinated and supervised by the mediation party, namely, the Commission, so as to cause the two withdrawals to represent a dual operation which would be coordinated in timing and would result in a military situation in the State which was not such as to place either side at a disadvantage." (para 242)

"It (the Commission)repeatedly assured the Pakistan Government that this would be evident in the agreement itself, and it must be noted that the terms were to be published in full immediately upon the acceptance of the Governments. The withdrawal plan for the Indian forces [...] was consequently, to be published in advance of implementation by either side." (para 244)
​

‘Indian actions on demilitarization’ was to be preceded by Pakistan’s ‘actions on demilitarization’ making it logically impossible to tie Pakistan’s withdrawal to Indian ‘actions’. That is in fact an absurd proposition. What it could have been contingent upon was the Indian _plan_ of demilitarization. But then, the Commission had explicitly detached Pakistan’s withdrawal from the Indian plan of demilitarization, it being a matter to be settled entirely between GoI and the Commission.

What makes Pakistan’s withdrawal unconditional and unilateral, is that it is irrelevant if Pakistan agreed (or disagreed) to the timing, manner and quantum of Indian withdrawal, so long as UN played the role of mediator. Pakistan had absolutely no say in any of this. It was all UN’s headache. Pakistan had to withdraw _in advance_, consequent on which India had to begin withdrawing in accordance to a plan, agreed upon by GoI and UN and published in public. UN was to _supervise_ the withdrawal to ensure that no country was at a disadvantage. Period.

Nothing, that I have posted, says anything otherwise – explicitly or implicitly.

The rejection of several proposals on demilitarization by India, on the pretext of 'disadvantage', when the goal was to in fact stall implementation of the UNSC resolutions and declare LoC == IB, does qualify as intransigence, but obviously not to the party guilty of it.

If you peel all the layers, you would find that India had rejected only ONE proposal regarding demilitarization. It was about the quantum of troops to be left on either side, immediately after demilitarization. The reason was Pakistan's deliberately twisted interpretation of 'local authority' in evacuated territory (in spite of repeated clarification by the Commission) and the perfidy in connection with disbanding and disarming the 'Azad forces'. The idea of converting LoC into IB was the most practical solution given Pakistan's insistence on not meeting its obligation on one pretext or the other and thereby holding up demilitarization and everything that was to follow from it.


It is easy to point fingers when ignorance is wisdom.

The commitment was to implement the principle of plebiscite to resolve the dispute of J&K as outlined in the UNSC resolutions - statements and actions tantamount to withdrawal from the resolutions was a violation of that commitment.

Wrong. The commitment was to implement the principle of plebiscite once certain very specific conditions were fulfilled. Non fulfillment of those conditions gave India every right to withdraw from the resolutions.

That statements do not tantamount to violation of any commitment, is another matter

Not aware of that process and what rationale the UN used to make/not make a decision - perhaps you can provide further details or links to them ...

Don't have any links. I will try to post some details later on.