1) Did you read through the details? Or are you just going to act like a 12 year old stubborn child? The details were provided. SU-30's scanning range is over 350KM. But it's lock on range is defined at around or below 140KM. Similarly, APG V9 is estimated to have over 300 KM range too. But its lock on range against a fighter sized target 3m2 is around 110-120 KM.
The real question is, is your missile's range enough to reach out to the level of radar's lock on capability? And yes, we ALL understand that a BVR missile and a radar for that fact gives you different performance under different situation depending on altitude, angle, speed and object's location in different flight envelops (terrain, etc).
Our discussion started where you said that no BVR missile can target out to 60-75 KM's. And that is not a kill zone under any BVR engagement, and isn't possible.
Now you are acting like a kid posting wiki stuff. First of all read what I told you to search in this very forum for results. Your these details were thoroughly discussed in this very forum years back with experts posting their views (ex-USAF F-15 pilots) and read the Gambit post above should have given a fair idea.
The moment you start paint a.k.a track an enemy jet, he is aware of that and nobody take a soot @ 75-90km range the probability to hit is, may be 10% and the cost of a AMRAAM is USD 1.7 Mil a unit.
Few evasive maneuvers will easily get rid of the long range treat if you fire @maximum range.
Employment of AAMs involves satisfying the requirements of the particular
missile in the given situation. Missiles are complicated systems com46
FIGHTER WEAPONS
prised of many interdependent subsystems, each having limitations. All
these limitations must be observed for a successful shot.
One method of visualizing the capabilities and limitations of a missile
is to study its firing envelope.
two such envelopes for
a hypothetical Doppler-radar-homing AAM. One envelope is for a nonmaneuvering
target, and the other is for a target in a continuous level turn.
The nonmaneuvering envelope is a scale diagram looking down from
above a target (the arrow) which is flying toward the top of the page. The
various boundaries depicted illustrate the missile capabilities and limitations.
Assume first of all that the shooter has obtained the required radar
track on the target and has aimed the missile in the proper direction for
launch.
The outermost boundary is the maximum aerodynamic, or "kinematic,
'' range at which the missile is capable of guiding to within the lethal
miss-distance of the target. This boundary reflects the capabilities of the
missile propulsion, guidance, and control systems, as well as the speeds of
the launching aircraft and target and the aspect (position relative to the
target) from which the missile is launched. One of the most striking
features of this boundary is the great difference in maximum range between
forward-quarter and rear-quarter shots: here, about five to one. This
obviously reflects the fact that the target is flying toward a missile fired in
its forward quarter and is running away from a rear-quarter shot.
The seeker-limit line shows the tracking limit of the missile's radar
seeker based on the reflectivity of this particular target. Remember that
this reflectivity is a function of target size and other factors. Since missile
radar antennas are necessarily small, their range is limited. In this case the
seeker capability restricts the maximum forward-quarter firing range; but
with a larger target, or at a lower altitude (where maximum aerodynamic
range is reduced), it may not.
The narrow zones marked "look-up required" on both sides of the target
are associated with ground clutter, the Doppler MBC previously discussed.
Missiles required to look down on the target, especially at low altitude,
from a beam aspect are likely to lose track of the target in the clutter.
Looking up at the target reduces MBC and allows continuous track of the
target.
The wider areas on either side of the target reflect the fuzing and
warhead problems associated with beam-quarter target intercepts. The
missile may guide to well within lethal distance, but the geometry of the
intercept and the design of the fuze and the warhead may cause detonation
to occur on the far side of the target, possible resulting in no damage. A
missile launched from this area is not considered to have a high probability
of success. The small area in the stern quarter near maximum-kinematic
range is also the result of a fuze limitation. In this case there is insufficient
missile closing velocity at target intercept for proper fuze functioning.
The inner boundary surrounding the target is the minimum-range limit.
Depending on the aspect this may be the result of fuze-arming time, the
missile's turning capability, guidance reaction time, or the seeker's gimbal
limits or gyro-tracking rate.
The maneuvering envelope illustrates the same conditions, with the
target still flying toward the top of the page, except this time the target
begins a level left-hand turn just as the missile is launched and continues
this turn throughout the missile TOF. The diagram is labelled "hot side"
and "cold side" to define the target's direction of turn. The labels "inside
the turn" or "outside the turn" also could have been used. These terms
reflect initial conditions only (i.e., the instant of missile launch), as the
cold and hot sides rotate with the target aircraft as it turns. An observer on
the hot side of the turn at any point normally would be looking at the top of
the target aircraft, while on the cold side he would have a belly view.
The maneuvering aerodynamic max-range envelope is highly asymmetrical,
with the hot-side range being much greater than the range on the cold
side, as the timing of the turn is such that the target essentially is flying out
to meet missiles fired from its left side, and flying away from those initially
coming from the right. By choosing the direction and rate of turn, the target
can exert tremendous influence on this max-range envelope. The minrange
boundary is also affected, expanding somewhat on the hot side, but
not to as great an extent.
The regions of the envelope requiring look-up are greatly expanded in
the maneuvering case. A missile fired from these regions would have to
pass through the target's beam area before intercept could occur, greatly
increasing the chances of losing target track in clutter, especially if it was
looking down. These regions comprise a considerable portion of the entire
kinematic envelope, particularly at longer ranges, and serve to emphasize
the importance of look-up when employing this type of missile against
maneuvering targets.
The fuze-limited regions are also increased somewhat in the maneuvering
case. A missile launched in one of these regions would intercept the
target at close to a beam aspect, either hot side or cold side, with low
probability of warhead damage. Also note that all max-range limits have
been reduced to below the seeker-sensitivity limit, so that restriction does
not affect this case.
These envelopes are already confusing, but a full picture of the capabilities
of this missile would require many such charts to cover a wide range of
possible target maneuvers, shooter/target speeds, and altitudes. In addition,
a single fighter may carry two or three different kinds of missiles, all
with widely differing operating characteristics and envelopes. Envelope
recognition, therefore, becomes one of the major difficulties in AAM
employment. Even if the fighter pilot could draw each envelope from
memory, how would he determine the vital parameters necessary to decide
which envelope was valid (including target speed and turn rate) and
his position within that envelope (including range and target aspect)?
Probably the most workable solution to this problem is to equip the
fighter with a tracking radar system and a fire-control computer. Such
systems can accurately assess and display to the pilot the missile's aerodynamic
capabilities, and as many of the other limits as might be deemed
desirable, almost instantaneously. Most modern fighters have such
systems.
In order to make inputs to the fire-control computer it is necessary that
the radar track, rather than just detect, the target. Automatic radar tracking
is possible using electronic methods that vary with the design of the
particular radar system. The transition from radar detection to automatic
track is called the "acquisition" or "lock-up" process. Depending on the
sophistication of the radar, this too may be an automatic procedure requiring
very little time or aircrew effort, or it may be a manual process of
designating the target LOS and range or closing velocity so that the radar
can determine which return is the desired target. Manual methods are
generally adequate at longer ranges, when LOS rates are low, but once a
fighter is engaged in a close-range swirling "dogfight" some automatic
means of target acquisition is almost a necessity. The ability of Doppler
radars to distinguish between moving airborne targets and ground clutter
makes automatic acquisition systems more practical.
In some cases, however, a radar lock may not be available. If the missile
(a heat seeker, for instance) does not require a host-aircraft radar lock for
guidance information, then some other means of envelope recognition is
necessary. Generally it is achieved by reducing the many envelopes to a
very few, relatively simple "rules of thumb" which describe optimum
firing zones for the missile under expected combat conditions of altitude,
speed, target turn rate, etc. Pilots then must memorize these thumb rules,
along with any special operating restrictions for the missile, such as
requirements for look-up, acceptable load factor at launch, etc. In essence
these rules of thumb provide the pilot with very simplified envelopes that
give him a "ballpark idea" of his missile's capabilities. Of necessity, such
simplifications will underestimate the weapon's true performance under
some circumstances and be overly optimistic in others.
Once the envelope is known, recognition of the critical parameters
becomes the problem. Often range and target aspect must be estimated
visually, based on the apparent size and presented view of the target.
Stadiametric ranging, the method by which gunsight mil dimensions are
compared to the apparent size of a target of known size, was discussed in
relation to air-to-air gun employment. This method may also be used with
missiles, but because of the typically longer ranges of AAMs, where slight
variations in apparent target size may equate to very great differences in
distance, it is generally useful only at short range. A more widely used
method involves the ability to discern various features of the target aircraft
and equate this ability to approximate target range. For instance, at some
range the target will appear to change from a mere black dot to something
recognizable as an aircraft. A little closer, depending on aspect, its type
may be apparent, then the canopy may become visible, followed by its
markings and color scheme. Mastering such methods requires a great
amount of practice, and at best this method results in rough approximations.
In tests of experienced fighter pilots estimating the range of familiar
aircraft, it has been found that errors of 50 to 200 percent can be expected.
The results will be even worse against unfamiliar target aircraft.