The Fateful Para-Commando Assault - 1965 War

[Awan68]

The solution is modernisation of the mentality of the armed forces, particularly the curriculum within army schools and colleges. These people need to be trained in a military specific version of project management.

There needs to be a clean break away from the colonialist methods of blind lemming like obedience and a a shift towards encouraging intellectual discourse and not weighting the validity of viewpoints on rank alone.

You are right, perhaps we need to learn from non colonised minds to break the chains.

They also need to have accountability. Soldiers were parachuted out without wire cutters and with 60 year old maps. Who was Court martialed for this? If not why not?


What bit do you disagree with? Do you think sending out troops with 60 year old maps and without wire cutters was the right thing to do?

Or perhaps sending then in without viable extraction plans was a good idea?

The more I read about our armed forces, the more the veneer of professionalism wears thin. If your benchmark is the Pakistani politicians its not much to go by.

I didn't write the article, it's written by former members of the armed forces, quoting other members.

Are u familiar with operation market garden?, it was a similar venture by the allies in ww2 on a much grander scale. Guess what?, it failed due to the some similar reasons. The thing is that paratrooping units behind enemy lines to take out and hold targets was a new concept back then and just like anything new, it takes time to attain perfection. 65 was the first major war the state of Pakistan fought, operations of this kind were new even to superpowers like the US at that time and u expected success from Pakistan Army at that given time?, It was a good unorthodox attempt by our boys. We have come a long, long way since then, the COIN opps done in Swat and Waziristan literally wrote the books for such opps for the entire world. The professionalism and speed with which those opps were completed in one of the toughest terrains on earth against an equally resourceful and fierce enemy are seldom heard of in modern warfare.

 

[Jackdaws]

In one sense what you state has element of truth. Although India did not prevail but Pakistan which began the war lost the war because it failed to fulfil it's goal. But I want you to zoom out and look at the bigger picture.

Please tell me in which universe would you see a small country like Belguim have ambitions to snatch territory from the much larger adversery - the Germans? Not only have ambitions but to continously use military force to advance it's objective against Germany? Is that even concievable? When we know the Germans looked at tiny Belguim as just a door mat to drive over in less than 24 hours?

Well, in South Asian context India is Germany [huge] and Pakistan is Belguim [small]. Think about that. You should ave erased the 'problem' decades ago in one hammer blow. But you failed and instead like a giant elehpant have sat there getting continously provoked.

Wrong analogy.


Well, Germany did invade Russia which is considerably larger. Germany got egg on its face but it still exists, no?

Germans too believed that they were racially superior like Ayub believed. They also had more modern weapons like Pak did. What's more - Pak was part of SEATO and CENTO.

 

[Indus Pakistan]

Well, Germany did invade Russia which is considerably larger. Germany got egg on its face but it still exists, no?

Incorrect.

• In 1946 Germany faced Soviet Union which was just 2.5 times larger.

On the other hand

• In 1940 Belgium faced Germany which was 8 times larger.

Now you tell me please which of these two disparities fits closer to the Pak/India equation?

They also had more modern weapons like Pak did.

Who told you this? Indian Centurion and Amx tanks were actually superior [particularly the Centurion which was best tank of that era] to the Patton tanks. India had more men, more weapons then Pakistan. That is a fact.

Germans too believed that they were racially superior like Ayub believed.

He did not believe it. It is true. In the South Asian context India has far greater % of untermenschen groups like Dalits, Shudras, Aboriginals then Pakistan has. And Hinduism in it's wisdom regards these groups as untermenschen. So we are merely applying desi/Hindoo formulae here.

Pak was part of SEATO and CENTO.

You had billion population, Soviet Union, Warsaw Pact. The fact is that non of thee external forces played any role in the fighting. As often happens the fighting always falls on the parties concerned. So this is irrelevant.

 

[PAKISTANFOREVER]

Denial ia mot going to change anything.
All those authors are reputed sources worldwide.

It is Pakistan who started the war by invading Kashmir.
India ended that by crossing IB thus preventing Pakistan from getting Kashmir.


Wrong. There were 6971 Pakistani fatalities during 1965 war including 5200 from Gibraltar force.

Out 2900 Indian fatalities, 55% (1600) were in month of August while fighting the Gibraltar force and less than 1300 during the official war in September.

Out of 167 officers nearly 100 were Emergency commisioned (EC) officers; 80% pf whome were Subedars & Subedar majors promoted to officer ranks for the temporary war duration.
Pakistan did not have a similar system.


Pakistan never managed to advance upto Longewala its gain in southern sector were far less than India which capture the strategic railway town of Radar and went 20 miles deep into Sindh.
Every neutral source accepts India territorial gains were far more than Pakistan.

Even the declassified CIA daily updates reveal that Pakistan was one most eager for a ceasefire and India had an upper hand by end of war.

Any evidence to confirm your claims? If what you are saying is true, please remember to post the links here.

 

[Jackdaws]

Incorrect.

• In 1946 Germany faced Soviet Union which was just 2.5 times larger.

On the other hand

• In 1940 Belgium faced Germany which was 8 times larger.

Now you tell me please which of these two disparities fits closer to the Pak/India equation?

Who told you this? Indian Centurion and Amx tanks were actually superior [particularly the Centurion which was best tank of that era] to the Patton tanks. India had more men, more weapons then Pakistan. That is a fact.

He did not believe it. It is true. In the South Asian context India has far greater % of untermenschen groups like Dalits, Shudras, Aboriginals then Pakistan has. And Hinduism in it's wisdom regards these groups as untermenschen. So we are merely applying desi/Hindoo formulae here.


You had billion population, Soviet Union, Warsaw Pact. The fact is that non of thee external forces played any role in the fighting. As often happens the fighting always falls on the parties concerned. So this is irrelevant.

Lol.
In 1946 there was no invasion. The war was over by then.

Size of Germany - Area: 357,386 km²
Size of Soviet Union - Area: 22.4 million km²

So where did you pull the 2.5 times bigger is anyone's guess.


India was never a Warsaw Pact nation.

You had Sabres, we had ancient Gnats.

Funny you still believe I this racist theories. It has made you lose a few wars. So keep on believing.

And Pattons were 50% faster with almost double the range of Centurions and Pak spec ones had laser finders too.

Look it up.

 

[BERKEKHAN2]

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[http://www] Pakistan Military History

India and Pakistan have fought three declared wars and many undeclared wars of proxy or low intensity wars. This article is a brief analysis of the essence of these wars at the strategic and operational level.



1947-48 Kashmir War



The 1947-48 War was an improvised war fought on an ad hoc basis. It began with some tangible operational strategy and little definite strategy on the Pakistan side and a definite operational strategy on the Indian side. At the onset Mr Jinnah the Governor General of Pakistan ordered the British Acting C in C Pakistan Army to order two brigades into Kashmir, one on the Sialkot-Jammu Axis and the other on Murree-Muzaffarabad-Srinagar-Axis. This was a tangible plan based on a precise strategy of severing Indian landward and aerial lines of communication to Kashmir. The plan was rendered null and void since the Britisher refused to obey Jinnah’s order.

This was followed by a hastily scrambled series of actions with regular Pakistan Army officers leading irregulars, irregulars besieging Indian/Dogra garrisons and conducting mini-wars against Chamb, Naushera, Srinagar, Skardu, Leh etc. In April 1948 the regular Pakistan Army entered the scene. At this stage the Indians were in a strategically disadvantageous position. Leh being cut off, Poonch besieged, Skardu besieged, Naushera threatened etc. At this stage the Pakistani strategy was to contain Indian Army advance towards Muzaffarabad, capture Poonch and safeguard Pakistan’s soft underbelly opposite Gujrat. No one at this stage thought of a ceasefire, which would have been of great strategic advantage to Pakistan. The Indians conceived a fine plan to outflank Muzaffarabad and executed a brilliant brigade level march across against the 3,000 metres plus high Nastachun Pass, thus unexpectedly forcing their way with great ease to Tithwal. The Pakistani official history noted “Brigadier Harbux Singh, commander of the 163 Brigade waited at Tithwal for two days to let the rest of his brigade join him there . He lingered a little longer to prepare for his next move and perhaps also to coordinate his moves with that of the Indian offensive in the Jhelum Valley for a two pronged push towards Muzaffarabad. This delay changed the subsequent course of history in Kishanganga Valley, as it enabled the first two companies of 4/16 Punjab under Major Mohammad Akbar Khan to reach by a forced march in the vicinity of Tithwal and take up positions there”1. The Pakistanis saved their position by reinforcing it with a brigade.

On the operational level the Pakistanis did well by capturing Pandu a position of tactical importance in the Jhelum Valley by a brilliant infiltration plan conceived by Commander 101 Brigade Brigadier Akbar Khan DSO with the indomitable Major Ishaq MC as his Brigade Major. Akbar deputed Lt Col Harvey Kelly, commanding 4/10 Baluch to plan the attack in detail.2 Pandu, however, was an operational episode of great tactical significance but limited strategic value.

From April 1948 to December 1948 the Pakistani GHQ merely reacted tactically moving companies and battalions while the Indians moved strategically. In Phase One, they recaptured Rajauri the gateway to Poonch with a single tank squadron! In Phase Two, they achieved two strategic triumphs! They forced their way through Zojila Pass driving on to relieve Leh and capture Kargil Dras and they relieved Poonch which was a mini-Indian East Pakistan surrounded from all sides by Pakistani troops.

At this stage the Pakistani GHQ had conceived the Operation Venus. Venus was a thrust against the Indian line of communication leading to Poonch Valley with an infantry and a heavy tank brigade in Naushera-Beri Patan area. At this stage the Indians were involved in the relief of Poonch and Leh and strategically off balance. The official account of 1970, however, maintains that the aim of Venus was not to sever the Indian line of communication to Poonch but merely to force the Indians for ceasefire which they did and which came into effect on night 31 Dec 1948/01 January 1949. If ceasefire was the aim then the Pakistani strategy was barren since a ceasefire in July 1948 would have been far more strategically desirable! This was so since in April 1948 Zojila (captured by Gilgit Scouts under Lieut Shah Khan on 7th July 1948) the gateway to Srinagar as well as Ladakh in Pakistani hands, the frontline near Rajauri and Poonch surrounded by Pakistani troops/irregulars. It is not clear what the Pakistani GHQ advised the civilians at this stage but no records have been made public which prove that they gave any advice!

In the 1960s General Fazal-i- Muqeem asserted that the ceasefire of 1948 took place to the army’s horror since the army was close to a great victory. However, this point is refuted by the Pakistan Army’s Official account of 1970. Much later in 1976 General Sher Ali who was commanding a brigade of the Venus Force asserted that had the operation been launched Pakistani tanks would have been in Jammu within no time! This has to be taken with a pinch of salt once we compare it to the performance of armour in an offensive role in 1965 and 1971!

The Kashmir War ended with the Indians as masters of Poonch Valley, Srinagar Valley and Leh Valley but with a communication to all three valleys running precariously close to the Pakistani border! Thus strategically the Indian position despite all their strategic triumphs was not secure since their line of communications offered multiple objectives to any single Pakistani thrust. One tank brigade with a twenty mile thrust could threaten the existence of a whole Indian army corps. The Indians took no care to remedy this state of affairs despite many war games held in their Kashmir Corps to show that the Pakistanis could threaten the Indian line of communication in Poonch Valley.3



1965 War

The 1965 War was a comical affair! Civilians at the foreign ministry assessed that the Indians could be knocked out at the strategic level while soldiers at the highest military level and political level, the president being a soldier were not interested in any military adventure. The civilian hawks led by Bhutto, however, were in league with a group of generals and brigadiers within the army and finally succeeded in persuading the president

(famous for tactical timidity in Burma) into embarking on a military adventure. Musa the army chief had little strategic insight and was against any military adventure in which he may be forced to exercise his qualities of leadership! Musa had rudimentary understanding of strategy and tank warfare since he was a political choice appointed more because he was seen as politically no threat rather than for any military strategic or operational talent!

The Pakistani offensive plan i.e. a thrust against Indian line of communication at Akhnur in case of a limited war in Kashmir or/and against Indian line of communication between Indian Corps holding Ravi-Sutlej Corridor at Jandiala Guru on Amritsar-Jullundhur road in case of an all out war was brilliant in conception. This was so because if successful any of the two plans would have forced the Indians to sue for peace at best and to surrender at worst. No less an authority than the Indian Western Command C in C Harbaksh Singh thus confessed

“A Blitzkrieg deep into our territory towards the Grand Trunk Road or the Beas Bridge would have found us in the helpless position of a commander paralysed into inaction for want of readily available reserves while the enemy was inexorably pushing deep into our vitals. It is a nightmarish feeling even when considered in retrospect at this stage”.

To the Pakistan Army’s misfortune a plan which was brilliant at the strategic and operational level failed simply because those who were leading the military machine at the highest level lacked the strategic insight as well as resolution! The first opportunity was thus missed in Chamb-Jaurian Sector, when even a foreigner i.e. Chinese Foreign Minister visiting Pakistani thought that Akhnur5 was the key!

The second and most serious operational failure occurred in Khem Karan.This had more to do with poor execution at the divisional and brigade level and poor initial higher organization and composition of troops at the divisional level. The first being an operational failure and the second being an organizational failure at the higher command level.

At the operational and tactical level three events stand out in the war i.e. the Grand Slam Operation in Chamb-Jaurian, blunting of Indian offensive at Chawinda at Gadgor on 8th September when one lone tank regiment gave a severe mauling to two tank regiments out of a total available Indian force of an armoured division, and a brigade level counter attack in Lahore Sector.

Grand Slam failed because of change of command! Not because Akhtar Malik was better than Yahya but because one man either Akhtar or Yahya should have conducted the whole operation! The Indians admitted that their position was saved because of the pause of 48 hours, which occurred at Tawi after the Pakistani Chief Musa ordered change of horses in the mid stream!

Now the battle of Gadgor. Technically Gadgor was 24 Infantry Brigade Group versus 1st Indian Armoured Division. In reality the contest was 25 Cavalry versus Poona and Hodsons Horse since 24 Brigade Commander told Colonel Nisar to “do something”6 the vaguest order of 1965 War! Nisar had no idea of what was in front but by a miraculous coup d oeil deployed his tank regiment 25 Cavalry in a manner which would produce an instant nervous breakdown in an instructor who taught tank tactics at the armour school! 25 Cavalry was deployed by Nisar like a thin line of steel! Like a thin net to catch a whale! The manoeuvre if it can be called one succeeded because the Indian brigade commander was paralysed by the fog of war! Thus Commander Indian 1st Armoured Brigade saw a finger as a mountain! He saw a threat to his flanks which in reality was a half squadron of Indian 62 Cavalry which had lost its way and fired at Indian Artillery opposite Rangre! What Nisar deployed after the “Do Something” order was seen by the Indian brigade commander as a tank brigade! Thus he lost the will to use two uncommitted tank regiments to outflank the Pakistani position! Gadgor was a psychological defeat inflicted on K.K Singh by Nisar with Nisar not knowing what was in front of him and K.K Singh over estimating three times what was really in front of him. Thus in cognitive terms, at Gadgor was a tank regiment commander who did not know what was in front of him against a tank brigade commander who was overawed by what he assessed was in front of him and was reduced into a state of total inertia and indecision. The important factor in this decisive battle was the fact that tangibly K.K Singh had the third tank regiment as well as three uncommitted squadrons within his two committed tank regiments with which he could have easily outflanked Nisar and got to his rear! Nisar had tangibly no reserves with which he could have countered K.K’s outflanking manoeuvre.

The counter attack of Brigadier Qayyum Sher in Lahore Sector was a successful divisional battle ordered by Major General Sarfaraz MC and executed by Brigadier Qayyum Sher most resolutely! It produced a crisis on the Indian side and threw the Indians off balance! Both retired in the same rank sometimes after the war!



1971 War

The 1971 War was a strange war! The Indians won great glory but failed to strategically solve their military problems! They overran East Pakistan creating a new state of Bangladesh but merely reduced Pakistan’s defence problems and increased their own problems by creating a new state which became more hostile to India and is far more difficult to militarily to deal with than the old East Pakistan!

The Indians, and an authority no less eminent than their 1971 GOC Western Command General Candeth have admitted that had the Pakistanis started a pre-emptive war in October 1971 all their plans to attack East Pakistan would have been thrown to the winds!7 But strategic insight had not been inculcated yet in the Pakistan Army! The Pakistanis waited and allowed the Indians to attack them in December 1971.

Much has been said about a Pakistani counter offensive in December 1971 to save East Pakistan. At this stage the Indian 1 Corps was in position and the Pakistani Higher Command like K.K Singh on 8th September to gamble their last card! There was a reason for this inaction. One that the cost was too heavy and the second that armour higher commanders (the CGS Gul Hassan and GOC 1st Armoured Division) as Yahya Khan asserts had lost the will to launch an attack.

Two cases of operational brilliance and one case of a Gadgor type tactical heroic stand out in 1971. These are the cases of the Pakistani 23 Division offensive in Chamb, the Indian defence of Poonch and the Barapind-Jarpal Battle. In Chamb Pakistan’s General Eftikhar successfully fought a divisional battle in which he deliberately manoeuvred a force of two plus tank regiments inflicting a severe mauling on the Indians forcing them to abandon Chamb. Eftikhar was firmly in control at all stages. When his initial tank thrust was checked at Maandiala he did not sink into inertia or indecision like K.K Singh at Gadgor or Pakistan’s Naseer at Khem Karan! Nor did Eftikhar tell his armoured brigade commander to “Do Something”! Eftikhar did not abdicate the conduct of operational strategy to any tank regiment of tank brigade commander! He resolutely regrouped his command and launched another attack from the south emerging victorious! The second case was the Indian stand at Poonch. The Pakistanis conceived a fine plan to capture Poonch but the Indian brigade commander at Poonch was too resolute while the Pakistani divisional and brigade commanders at Poonch lost their nerve!

The third case of a Gadgor type battle occurred at Barapind! Here the Pakistani tank brigade commander gave a simple order to resort to counter penetration to his tank regiment commander who on his own converted it into an attack! Unfortunately he carried out a piece meal attack, first sending in a squadron and then two more! The Indians admit that had 13 Lancers attacked with all three squadrons8 they would have broken through despite nominal artillery support. The hero of this battle was not the Indian brigade or regiment commander but the Indian squadron who blunted the attack and the Indian troop leader Arun Khetarpal who stopped the attack by skin of his teeth losing his life in the process! In words of Indian Armoured Corps historian the Indian success was attributable to a ‘last ditch stand by just one tank troop leader’.



1984 Crisis

The 1984 Crisis was a calculated Indian response against alleged Pakistani involvement in the Sikh Insurgency in Punjab. Tangibly the Indian position was far superior to Pakistan since Pakistan Army was still equipped with the old T-59s. The situation was saved by two Individuals who polished off the Indian ‘Durga Devi’ thus leading to a swift de-escalation of the crisis.

Siachen Crisis


1984-To Date
A case of zero strategic insight on the Indian side and of personal ambition on part of two and three star Indian generals to start private wars to gain promotion. Both sides gained nothing and one Indian Division and one Pakistani brigade is committed to a mad sentry duty role since 1984!



1987 Crisis

The 1987 Crisis was a case of over enthusiasm at the military level with little outward enthusiasm at the highest political level. The Indian Chief Sundarji was living in visions of Glory and visualized that a military manoeuvre would escalate into a war which would lead to a successful Indian military thrust severing the Pakistani line of communication in Rahimyar Khan Sector thus leading to the emergence of a new state in Pakistani Sindh and the creation of a second Indian Field Marshal after Manekshaw i.e Sundarji!

Comically Sundarji’s visions of glory were not matched by strategic insight! Thus he was overawed into inaction and inertia like K.K Singh at Gadgor, once the Pakistani High Command relocated the Pakistani reserves northwards in a purely defensive move!

1987 was a watershed and marked the Indian Army at its lowest position in the eyes of the highest Indian political leadership

vis-a-vis the high position of 1971. Sundarji destroyed all that the Indian Army had gained in 25 years with one night of irresolution and inertia!



1999 Crisis


The 1999 Crisis in Kargil were the result of an audacious Pakistani plan to inflict a sharp but highly subtle psychological defeat on the Indians by threatening the Indian line of communication to Leh and Siachen by placing a small Pakistani force on the heights overlooking the Dras-Kargil-Leh Road. The execution at tactical level was brilliant albeit marked by poor logistic arrangements at divisional level! The Pakistani political leadership lost the resolution to press home the move to its final conclusion. Full facts are not available about what the Pakistan Army’s highest leadership wanted at this point in time.

The Indians payed a heavy price in terms of casualties for an intelligence failure. What Pakistan gained or lost is not clear although a debate continues about who was Kargils winner. Kargil stands out as merely one stage in a long series of actions in Pakistani military history. If Kargil was a political failure then logically the army should have packed off the political leadership in June 1999! Yet it chose to blame Nawaz only later on like it blamed Liaquat for calling off Operation Venus in 1948! Have things changed or we changed!



Conclusion

Indo-Pak Military history is a continuous story of strategic failures and a mix of operational successes and failures. At the tactical level both the armies fought well.

The reasons for the strategic failures are historical. Both states are successor states of the British Colonial Indian Empire. Indians were not groomed or trained for making strategic decisions. Strategic insight is the result of a process spread over many generations. The German General Staff was not created by a sudden flight. Even the British Empire was not created by the strategic genius of one man! Militarily the failure of both armies at the higher level is more easy to understand. Both were the continuation of a colonial army designed for internal security and brigade level actions. The Indian Army in WW Two either fought as part of a larger British Army or in circumstances of immense material superiority with massive US military aid as in Burma! The political failure in Pakistan is equally simple to explain since in words of Mr Jinnah most of the Muslim politicians would not do anything without consulting the DC (Deputy Commissioner)! That may be a reason why Nawaz Sharif went to DC!

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[Cuirassier]

Main reason gibraltar failed is because of very poor Pakistani planning no wonder the failed to relaize such a huge Gibraltar forforce (8000) would be detected soon.
Poor planning and vision has been hallmark of many Pakistani ops be it 1965, 1971 or Siachen or Kargil.

Ten battalion sized forces were involved in Gibraltar. Less than 10% managed to escape as rest were killed or captured. Even Ghaznavi force failed to capture any iimportant town or village and had to hide in dense uninhabited forests of Mendhar in Rajouri.

Pakistani forces have performed poorer compared to Indian forces at both tactical and strategic levels. So Pakistani losses were higher in 65, 71, siachen , kargil despite them starting the wars.
And that is not just for the army, it extends to Navy too. In 1971 there were less than 200 casualties in Indian navy whereas Pakistani casualties were over 1800.

What an idiot you are, now I'll present you with more facts and you'll continue your false bickering.

1971, India lost 3843 men, during the Indian intervention Pakistan lost 2,700 men total. Despite India being all dominant in the East with Mukti support from BEL and East Pakistani defectors.

PAF in 1971 lost 42 a/c, incld 13 self destructed, while the IAF lost 75 in total.

Pakistan Navy losses were not 1800, closer to 700, and this was due to the Navy having no air arm and early warning. Russian MOSS Early Warning system flown by Soviets was used by the IAF to counter Pakistani ground attack efforts which had given a bad blow in 1965.

On the Western Front , total Indian casualties were 6,524 (KiA,MiA,WiA) and 4,958 Pakistani casualties.

Ghaznavi Force has been extensively mentioned in your own official account, and in Indian ceasefire demands.

Gibraltar's plans for infiltration were good but the main factor which they relied on was the support from locals, which they only managed to gain in Rajauri as the populace was more sympathetic to them, while others had a bad impression due to Tribal Lashkars looting their areas back in 1947/48.

Siachen was an Indian initiated plan, and an intel failure, but except for ego gain i don't find anything for India to celebrate after capturing vacant ice.

Kargil was an another example of how even paramilitary can give you a beating.

 

[Qutb-ud-din Aybak]

As per neutral assesment we had lower losses in almost all categories.
Some of the neutral assessments are mentioned below —

According to the Library of Congress Country Studies conducted by the Federal Research Division of the United States[29]–
The war was militarily inconclusive; each side held prisoners and some territory belonging to the other. Losses were relatively heavy—on the Pakistani side, twenty aircraft, 200 tanks, and 3,800 troops. Pakistan's army had been able to withstand Indian pressure, but a continuation of the fighting would only have led to further losses and ultimate defeat for Pakistan. Most Pakistanis, schooled in the belief of their own martial prowess, refused to accept the possibility of their country's military defeat by "Hindu India" and were, instead, quick to blame their failure to attain their military aims on what they considered to be the ineptitude of Ayub Khan and his government.

Former New York Times reporter Arif Jamal wrote in his book Shadow War[13] —
This time, India's victory was nearly total: India accepted cease-fire only after it had occupied 740 square miles, though Pakistan had made marginal gains of 210 square miles of territory. Despite the obvious strength of the Indian wins, both countries claim to have been victorious.

Devin T. Hagerty wrote in his book "South Asia in world politics"[130] –
The invading Indian forces outfought their Pakistani counterparts and halted their attack on the outskirts of Lahore, Pakistan's second-largest city. By the time United Nations intervened on September 22, Pakistan had suffered a clear defeat.

In his book "National identity and geopolitical visions",[131] Gertjan Dijkink writes –
The superior Indian forces, however, won a decisive victory and the army could have even marched on into Pakistani territory had external pressure not forced both combatants to cease their war efforts.

An excerpt from Stanley Wolpert's India,[132] summarizing the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965,
In three weeks the second Indo-Pak War ended in what appeared to be a draw when the embargo placed by Washington on U.S. ammunition and replacements for both armies forced cessation of conflict before either side won a clear victory. India, however, was in a position to inflict grave damage to, if not capture, Pakistan's capital of the Punjab when the cease-fire was called, and controlled Kashmir's strategic Uri-Poonch bulge, much to Ayub's chagrin.

In his book titled The greater game: India's race with destiny and China, David Van Praagh wrote[11] –
India won the war. It held on to the Vale of Kashmir, the prize Pakistan vainly sought. It gained 1,840 km2(710 sq mi) of Pakistani territory: 640 km2 (250 sq mi) in Azad Kashmir, Pakistan's portion of the state; 460 km2 (180 sq mi) of the Sailkot sector; 380 km2 (150 sq mi) far to the south of Sindh; and most critical, 360 km2 (140 sq mi) on the Lahore front. Pakistan took 540 km2(210 sq mi) of Indian territory: 490 km2(190 sq mi) in the Chhamb sector and 50 km2 (19 sq mi) around Khem Karan.

Dennis Kux's "India and the United States estranged democracies" also provides a summary of the war,[133]
Although both sides lost heavily in men and material, and neither gained a decisive military advantage, India had the better of the war. New Delhi achieved its basic goal of thwarting Pakistan's attempt to seize Kashmir by force. Pakistan gained nothing from a conflict which it had instigated.

"A region in turmoil: South Asian conflicts since 1947" by Robert Johnson mentions[12] –
India's strategic aims were modest – it aimed to deny Pakistani Army victory, although it ended up in control of 720 square miles (1,900 km2) of Pakistani territory for the loss of just 220 square miles (570 km2) of its own.

An excerpt from William M. Carpenter and David G. Wiencek's "Asian security handbook: terrorism and the new security environment"[134] –
A brief but furious 1965 war with India began with a covert Pakistani thrust across the Kashmiri cease-fire line and ended up with the city of Lahore threatened with encirclement by Indian Army. Another UN-sponsored cease-fire left borders unchanged, but Pakistan's vulnerability had again been exposed.

English historian John Keay's "India: A History" provides a summary of the 1965 war[135] –
The 1965 Indo-Pak war lasted barely a month. Pakistan made gains in the Rajasthan desert but its main push against India's Jammu-Srinagar road link was repulsed and Indian tanks advanced to within a sight of Lahore. Both sides claimed victory but India had most to celebrate.

Uk Heo and Shale Asher Horowitz write in their book "Conflict in Asia: Korea, China-Taiwan, and India-Pakistan"[136] –
Again India appeared, logistically at least, to be in a superior position but neither side was able to mobilize enough strength to gain a decisive victory.

According to the Office of the Historianwithin the U.S Department of State:[137]
Conflict resumed again in early 1965, when Pakistani and Indian forces clashed over disputed territory along the border between the two nations. Hostilities intensified that August when the Pakistani army attempted to take Kashmir by force. The attempt to seize the state was unsuccessful, and the second India-Pakistan War reached a stalemate.


Doninating feature Point 5310 and several other dominating features in yaldor sector on Pakistani side of LoC were taken during or just after Kargil war and remains under Indian control.

bro you only consider pro indian sources as neutral and the rest of the world as anti india and cold war enemies sources and thats why you don't even accept chuck yeagers statements.

 

[War Thunder]

"Secrecy had been stretched to such an extent that instead of surprising the enemy, own troops stood stunned."

Sums it up. We never had a shortage of excellence among the troops. The the planning officers have always been the let down.

 

[Joe Shearer]

I'm not denying there isn't or wasn't social discrimination in our society. However you cannot deny that the British Imperial army had that difference between the officer class and the rest of the forces by design. It was intended to keep the control away from the natives who served for a salary.

The British army which has given birth to our current army in the modern era, deliberately had that setup, our stupids adopted it post independence because it suits our own social discrimination which we've had long before being colonised and will have long after being colonised.

It's almost like you're trying to deny that point altogether.

It might help your own understanding to read the history of the British Army, and to learn about the social stratification in Britain, that was so clearly reflected in the Army, and was faithfully reproduced in the British Indian Army.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Apart from this suicide mission, SSG was pretty good in 1965 unlike what most people assume. They conducted a devastating raid on Drass Cantt, in which Brigadier TM was also involved, blew up the Pashkayum Bridge, and were part of the famous Ghaznavi Force which controlled some 500km2 in Rajauri till ceasefire.

Paratrooping into dense enemy concentrations BEL was a brave thing but I guess the GHQ like many other instances was too unrealistic. Most successful paradrops have occured when friendly forces had air superiority, and linkup forces on ground. You're right in describing this as a sh!tshow.

Heliborne Air Assaults are more realistic in today's environment considering the tight surveillance systems and air defences, and the Black Storks are pretty darn good at it.

This kind of meaningless hyperbole becomes very tiresome after a point. From a partisan point of view, however, it is reassuring to see that the old tradition of one side estimating its individual soldier to be as seven times as capable as the individual soldier on the other side continues.

Unfortunately things have not changed at all. Senior leaders [GHQ staff] are still prone to be making monumental blunders on the whims of their egos. You only have to look at the Kargil fiasco to see that. And just like in the past we still never hold them to account. Musharaf instead recieving a dishonurable sacking ended up as president for 10 years.

And just like then everything is hushed up. Anybody asking questions will be accused of being unpatriotic.

While agreeing with you completely, it has to be pointed out that while honest enquiries on your side might have led to punishing a general and a couple of lieutenant generals, not much can be laid at the door of even divisional commanders. In contrast, on the Indian side, not only should the golf-obsessed COAS at the time been punished, but also his subordinate commanding Northern Command, and certainly, and emphatically the Corps commander. At least two of that hero's divisional commanders should have been cashiered, and possibly another half a dozen brigadiers. The Indian Army paid in blood for the incompetence and casual attitudes of its general officers, and all of the guilty are leading happy retired lives; those whom their stupidity and failures of command killed have left behind families surviving on the pensions of the lower ranks and of junior officers.

 

[Joe Shearer]

In one sense what you state has element of truth. Although India did not prevail but Pakistan which began the war lost the war because it failed to fulfil it's goal. But I want you to zoom out and look at the bigger picture.

Please tell me in which universe would you see a small country like Belguim have ambitions to snatch territory from the much larger adversery - the Germans? Not only have ambitions but to continously use military force to advance it's objective against Germany? Is that even concievable? When we know the Germans looked at tiny Belguim as just a door mat to drive over in less than 24 hours?

Well, in South Asian context India is Germany [huge] and Pakistan is Belguim [small]. Think about that. You should ave erased the 'problem' decades ago in one hammer blow. But you failed and instead like a giant elehpant have sat there getting continously provoked.

True, at the level of zoom that you have invoked. However, that correction of vision and magnification is needed because of the dogged insistence of the previous posts at #7 and #9. It is a standard feature of such discussions that somebody insists that the use of commandos, the use of armour and artillery, the use, in short, of every military organisation does not count as war, but a rifle fired across the border further south counts as war. In these narratives, it is then, by this sleight of hand, India that starts the war in 1965.

Such doggedness is, at one level, to be admired.

 

[Signalian]

Such BEL ops are a lot harder now due to use of technology by the enemy on the eastern side and computerization of identity documents. However, they still do happen.

SSG is not just involved in COIN nowadays.They still focus on the previous roles.

An acquaintance of mine who is now in SSG has been to KSA twice for FID/ exercises.

In one of his assignments he was also responsible for checking out the security of strategic sites somewhat similar to US red cell.

Old unconventional warfare roles and assignments are still there.

Such BEL Ops are rare now because SSG has been thrown onto the western front for COIN war, while it was already deployed at LOC, the desert, Siachen, Baluchistan, in training, overseas and UN missions. There is a limit to which a certain formation can be stretched. SSG(N) was mainly tasked for Naval Operations while SSW was born in 2000's. Zarrar ATU being the prime AT formation is headquartered in Tarbela, considering that Police, FC and Army's LCB can tackle AT threats in all cities, Zarrar Coy doesn't need to be distributed in major cities of Pakistan.

Back to BEL Ops. SSG Ops in 80's were mainly inside Indian Occupied kashmir as well as the rest of India, while some formations made contact with Russians in Afghanistan. In 1990's the focus shifted more towards Indian occupied Kashmir. ISI and SSG worked together sometimes in foreign countries, sharing intel for Ops, but mostly Commandos were tasked individually. After 2001, the BEL Ops dried down and COIN Ops started since the regular Infantry was unable to conduct COIN Ops and FC was in miserable condition. Even though the situation for COIN is now handled by other formations, the BEL Ops have not started in full swing like they had been on-going before.

 

[Indus Pakistan]

In 1946 there was no invasion.

Typo

Size of Germany - Area: 357,386 km²
Size of Soviet Union - Area: 22.4 million km²

So where did you pull the 2.5 times bigger is anyone's gues

Population you idiot.

 

[Jackdaws]

Typo

Population you idiot.

Lol. Child, not every civilian is armed.